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ABSTRACT 
MAKING SPACES SACRED: THE SAYYEDA ZAYNAB AND BIBI PAK DAMAN 
SHRINES AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF MODERN SHI’A IDENTITY  
Noor Zehra Zaidi 
Firoozeh Kashani-Sabet 
 
This dissertation is a study of the Bibi Pak Daman shrine in Lahore, Pakistan and 
the Sayyeda Zaynab shrine in Damascus, Syria and of how these shrines were made 
sacred in the 20th century. Said to house the graves of Ruqayyah and Zaynab, two 
daughters of ‘Ali ibn Abu Talib, the first Shi’a Imam, the two shrines would grow from 
local sites of devotion to critical pilgrimage sites in the 20th century. The dissertation will 
first trace hagiographies related to Zaynab and Ruqayyah and how these narratives 
capitalized on transnational collective memories of Karbala to reinterpret their 
significance to local contexts. These saints and their shrines were also increasingly 
interwoven into Syrian and Pakistani narratives of national exceptionalism. Secondly, 
these shrines emerged as important national spaces and sites onto which competing 
claims of authentic authority and ideology were played out. For shrine authorities, 
religious scholars and students, pilgrims, merchants, and activists, the Sayyeda Zaynab 
and Bibi Pak Daman shrines provide a window into the distinct ways that sectarianism 
was produced and the range of practices that constituted ‘being Shi’a.’  
By the end of the 1970s, the Sayyeda Zaynab and Bibi Pak Daman shrines had 
become increasingly prominent as sites of meaning-making, especially within a changing 
geopolitical landscape and as narratives of Karbala were being reinterpreted around the 
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world in the service of newly assertive Shiite identity and visual culture. The third part of 
this dissertation will address how these shrines were lived spaces, creating both specific 
shrine cultures and visually linking pilgrims to a transnational Shi’a sacred geography.  
Thus, this dissertation explores how these shrines were sacralized in the 20th 
century through narratives, politics, and finances. It will address the unique role that 
pilgrimage to the shrines of female saints has played in both postcolonial transnational 
and national politics and in the construction of a Shi’a identity in the modern world. 
Through this dual focus, the project will reveal the way that politics, ritual, gender, and 
faith function in tumultuous, multi-denominational societies where the balance between 
religious legitimacy and national ideologies necessitates a constantly-evolving policy 
towards pilgrimage and shrines. 
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Introduction 
The Daughters of ‘Ali 
 
 
The genesis of this dissertation began with a few lines of a 1994 hagiography 
found in the bazar of the Bibi Pak Daman shrine in Pakistan, a site devoted to Ruqayyah 
bint ‘Ali. In this book, the author describes the long and arduous path which Ruqayyah, a 
daughter of the first Shi’a Imam, would have traveled from Medina to Lahore to end up 
at the site in the 7th century. At a time when few women would have made such a difficult 
journey, much less the veiled daughter of ‘Ali ibn Abu Talib, the Prophet Muhammad’s 
son-in-law and the founder of Shi’a Islam, Ruqayyah had nevertheless endured great 
personal hardship in her mission to bring Islam to the subcontinent. Yet, as the author 
notes, Ruqayyah came to Lahore because it was her divinely ordained destiny. As her 
father ‘Ali had lay dying years earlier, he had called forth all his children to deliver to 
them his wasiyat, or last will and instructions. While ‘Ali bequeathed to his sons the 
spiritual leadership of the Islamic ummah (community), he had given each of his 
daughters instructions on where they would travel to spread the Prophet’s true message. 
Like Ruqayyah, ‘Ali famously charged another of his daughters with a similar mission. 
Shi’a Muslims have long credited Zaynab bint ‘Ali for her role in carrying on the true 
message of Islam after the tragedies of Karbala, the seminal moment of the Shi’a faith. 
She would fulfill her vow to her father through great sorrows and die in Damascus; there, 
the Sayyeda Zaynab shrine would be built in her honor. Yet the trials of Ruqayyah and 
Zaynab were not in vain. “Today, where Islam is present and prevails, it was because 
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there was the presence of the daughters of ‘Ali; however, where the women of ‘Ali did 
not reach, Islam has not remained,” the hagiography declared.1 
This striking interpretation of the role of ‘Ali’s daughters in the spread of Islam 
raised the questions that form the basis of this dissertation on the evolution of pilgrimage 
(ziyārat) to the Sayyeda Zaynab and Bibi Pak Daman shrines in the 20th century. Only 
decades earlier, these had been relatively minor sites, overshadowed by the scale of Shi’a 
devotion to the male Imams. Now, a hagiography found at one of the shrines positioned 
these female saints as the embodiment of Islam’s success. Yet if Zaynab and Ruqayyah 
carried the weight of Islam to what would become Syria and Pakistan, what did that mean 
for the shrines that marked their sacred graves? What legends were constructed for these 
women and what work was done to highlight their centrality in Islam? How then did 
these shrines function both in the construction of a transnational imagined sacred 
geography and within emerging national frameworks in the post-World War II era? As 
the shrines became increasingly visible sites of religious devotionalism in two countries 
where Shi’as constituted a minority, how did pilgrimage to the shrines change as what it 
meant to be Shi’a evolved during the 1970s?  
 
Meaning Making at the Sayyeda Zaynab and Bibi Pak Daman Shrines 
In his discussion of Shi’a shrines in Syria, anthropologist Yasser Tabbaa posed 
the question of how shrines become sacred, of “what physical remains, historical 
evidence, or pious tales were required to infuse sanctity into these particular spots to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Masood Hashmi, Makhdooma Bibi Ruqayyah Bint Ali: Bibi Pak Damana Lahore Mein (Lahore: 
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prompt their future rebuilding.”2 The complexities of why and how the Bibi Pak Daman 
and Sayyeda Zaynab shrines were sacralized illuminate the ideological tensions of 
nation-building projects and the new ways Shi’as were engaging with public religiosity. 
Unlike the older shrine towns in Iraq and Iran that had emerged centuries earlier under 
the interplay of empires, powerful networks of Shi’a religious scholars (known as ulama), 
and patronage regimes, the Sayyeda Zaynab and Bibi Pak Daman shrines rose to 
prominence in the context of the emerging nation-states of Syria and Pakistan. Beginning 
in the mid-20th century, the shrines benefitted from concerted efforts to verify their 
authenticity, expand the shrines, and justify pilgrimage and ritual practice.  
As the Bibi Pak Daman and Sayyeda Zaynab shrines grew from small local sites 
of devotion to shrines of transnational and national consequence in the independence era, 
the importance of the two shrines was inevitably intertwined and bolstered by new 
hagiographical focus on Zaynab and Ruqayyah’s lives. The first section of the 
dissertation will trace the evolution of these hagiographies through the 20th century and 
explore how narratives were used in the service of promoting ideological agendas in the 
expansion of the shrines. Zaynab and Ruqayyah’s stories were expanded and 
individualized, tied both to an evocative transnational narrative of Shi’a martyrology and 
to the countries to which they came. As geopolitical realities influenced perceptions of 
Shi’a history, so too did interpretations of Zaynab and Ruqayyah’s lives. The interplay 
between narrative and place was cemented as the implications of pilgrimage to the two 
shrines grew in Shi’a conceptions of sainthood and sacred space.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Yasser Tabbaa, “Invented Pieties: The Rediscovery and Rebuilding of the Shrine of Sayyida 
Ruqayya in Damascus, 1975-2006,” Artibus Asiae, Vol. 67, No. 1, Part II (2007), 97.  
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Yet the construction of ziyārat in Shi’a history itself remains unsettled, and this 
dissertation seeks to denaturalize the concept of Muslim pilgrimage. Shrines drew their 
potency in part by claiming a long history of visitation and miraculous interventions. Yet 
the Sayyeda Zaynab and Bibi Pak Daman shrines were newer shrines with contested 
histories and politics, placed within a sacred geography that drew resonance from claims 
of an unbroken chain of transmission and practice. The concept of ‘sacred geography’ in 
this dissertation is borrowed from Diana Eck, a scholar of South Asian religions who has 
explored the interconnected pilgrimage sites scattered throughout India and examined the 
interplay between texts, places, and faith. For Eck, the intersection between mythology 
and geography, between the sacred and the profane, is how Hindus have “mapped” their 
world. Here I employ this concept to the construction of Shi’a understandings of a map of 
faith, grounded both in the particular and in the abstract.3 Sacred geography also flattens 
the sense of time, tying shrines in their present state directly back to the origins of the 
faith and presenting an unchanged reality. Thus, the question of history and tradition was 
complicated on the space of these shrines; as female saints, discourses about Shi’ism and 
ziyārat had to expand in turn. The anthropologist Talal Asad has noted that Islam itself is 
a discursive tradition, a religion defined by discourses “that seek to instruct practitioners 
regarding the correct form and purpose of a given practice, precisely because it is 
established, has a history.”4 These shrines thus gained authenticity through 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 See Diana Eck, India: A Sacred Geography (New York: Harmony Books, 2012) 
4 Talal Asad, “The Idea of an Anthropology of Islam,” Qui Parle, Vol. 17, No. 2 (Spring/Summer 
2009), 14. Originally published in 1986 as part of the Occasional Paper Series sponsored by the 
Center for Contemporary Arab Studies at Georgetown University. Asad notes that traditionally 
anthropologists have dealt with the diversity of “Islams” by distinguishing between text-based 
practice of the towns and the “saint-worshipping, ritualistic religion of the countryside,” arguing 
that both types formed in different ways under different conditions.  
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reinterpretation of Zaynab and Ruqayyah’s lives, by harnessing the long-established 
tradition of ziyārat to sacred spaces, and projecting coherence with that history. They 
resist simple anthropological dichotomies of text-based practices versus ritual invention. 
They are not settled spaces, but rather “lieux de memoire” as Pierre Nora describes, 
operating between history, tradition, and collective memory.5  
These narratives, of course, would not exist in a vacuum; they interacted with the 
realities on the ground and forces that were invested in the promotion and expansion of 
Bibi Pak Daman and the Sayyeda Zaynab. The second section of the dissertation will 
analyze the shrines’ interaction with the developing sovereign states of Syria and 
Pakistan and the ways these sites became enmeshed in local and regional politics as the 
new states attempt to assert federal authority. Indeed, as dominant ideologies shifted from 
the end of foreign occupation through the tumultuous 1970s, the presence of shrines for 
Ruqayyah and Zaynab provided a powerful tool for asserting identity. Successive 
governments sought to maintain a balance between calculated distance and active 
engagement in shrine affairs. Yet these were lived spaces, and pilgrims, shrine officials, 
and religious leaders exerted their own pressures. They would become microcosms of 
accommodation and conflict, sites where the practices of being sectarian emerged. In 
both Syria and Pakistan, traditional elites, new regime officials, shrine authorities, and 
individual pilgrims were brought together at the shrines, making these spaces onto which 
debates about the nature of the state and the performance of ‘being Shi’a’ were mapped. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 See Pierre Nora, “Between Memory and History; Les Lieux de Mémoire,” in Representations, 
No. 26, Special Issue: Memory and Counter-Memory (Spring, 1989), 7-24. 
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The pilgrims who visited the Sayyeda Zaynab and Bibi Pak Daman also created 
their own frameworks for understanding ritual and meaning, especially at shrines devoted 
to two female saints. The third part of the dissertation will compare and analyze the 
distinct shrine cultures that emerged at the Sayyeda Zaynab and Bibi Pak Daman and 
their interconnectedness within a global pilgrimage market. The rise of assertive 
interpretations of Shi’ism and a new visual culture in the 1970s and 1980s changed how 
pilgrims, particularly women, engaged with the physical space of the shrines, the rituals 
they undertook, and the souvenirs they collected. Who was visiting these shrines and how 
they created meaning emphasizes anthropologist Pnina Werbner’s assertion that 
pilgrimage centers are not just political or religious sites but sites of sacred exchange.6  
Thus, the Sayyeda Zaynab and Bibi Pak Daman shrines function on three levels – 
the transnational, the national, and the transactional. The two sites provide an insight into 
how faith and politics function in two distinct, tumultuous, and multidimensional nations, 
where Shi’as form a significant religious minority. In debates over narratives, patronage, 
politics, and ritual, they reflect the deep fissures and anxieties over religious 
devotionalism and the compatibility with modern nation-building projects, of what ‘being 
Shi’a’ meant in a changing geopolitical landscape, and over gender and public practice. 
This dissertation will draw on a syncretic methodological approach and multiple strands 
of historiography, drawing from various disciplines to unpack the process of making, 
activating, contesting, and imagining these shrines. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 See Pnina Werbner and Helene Basu, eds. Embodying Charisma: Modernity, Locality and the 
Performance of Emotion in Sufi Cults (London: Routledge, 1998). 
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Karbala, Ziyārat, and Sacred Geography 
The importance of the Sayyeda Zaynab and Bibi Pak Daman shrines at its core is 
tied to the continued resonance of the events that unfolded at Karbala in the 7th century. 
Karbala is the foundational myth of the Shi’a faith, the lens through which all events 
before and after it is viewed, constructing a language of martyrology that has been 
reinterpreted through the centuries. It was not the first historical event that would create a 
divide in the Muslim ummah, as Shi’a partisans first emerged as a response to political 
debates over succession after Muhammad’s death. According to Heinz Halm, however, it 
is only after Karbala that one can speak of true Shi’a aspirations.7 It is the event that has 
been crystallized into a powerful collective memory, one malleable enough to 
accommodate competing ideologies and interests. For Hamid Dabashi, Karbala is the 
“central trauma of Shi’ism,” continuously reinvented within a “nexus of emotive 
responses and political instincts” that assumes a renewed significance at a vastly popular 
level, which extends its narrative domain from medieval to modern as it does from sacred 
to worldly and cosmopolitan dispositions.8 Its commemoration has constructed an 
expanding sacred geography, one that in the post-WWII era was recast to reflects the 
intersection of new national interests, sectarianism, gender and ritual practice. It is within 
this context that the Sayyeda Zaynab and Bibi Pak Daman shrines grew in prominence.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Heinz Halm, Shi’ism (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004); see also Marshall G. 
Hodgson, “How Did the Early Shi’a Become Sectarian?” Journal of the American Oriental 
Society, Vol. 75, No. 1 (Jan.-March, 1995), 1-13; Kamran Scot Aghaie, “The Origins of the 
Sunnite-Shi’ite Divide and the Emergence of the Ta’ziyeh Tradition,” TDR, Vol. 49, No. 4, 
Special Issue on Ta’ziyeh (Winter, 2005), 42-47; Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Ideals and Realities of 
Islam (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd, 1966).  
8 Hamid Dabashi, Shi’ism: A Religion of Protest (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011), 
85-86, 95. 
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The centrality of ziyārat stems from the question of religious and political 
succession after the Prophet Muhammad, a debate that lay at the heart of the Shi’a-Sunni 
split. Muhammad’s death in 632 AD sent cataclysmic shock waves through the Muslim 
ummah, suddenly faced with the death of its singular political and religious leader. While 
the majority of the ummah settled upon Abu Bakr, a senior companion and father of one 
of the Prophet’s wives, as the first Caliph and political successor to Muhammad, a small 
but vocal faction continued to advocate for leadership to pass to ‘Ali. Despite being 
passed over for the caliphate, he was nevertheless accepted by the Shi‘atu ‘Ali (followers 
of ‘Ali) as the first Imam, God’s spiritual representative on earth. ‘Ali was finally 
declared the fourth Caliph in 656 AD, though Shi’as continued to believe that the 
previous three had usurped the leadership that Muhammad had divinely bestowed on 
him. Indeed, the immediate household of Muhammad (the Ahl al-Bayt) was especially 
venerated by Shi’as, who would come to believe that legitimate political and spiritual 
authority was passed on from Muhammad to ‘Ali and through the generations, from 
father to son, to form the unbroken chain of the Twelve Shi’a Imams.9 Shunned from 
political power, the Imams would instead be seen as the true living spiritual embodiment 
of Muhammad’s Islam, figures that symbolized the oppression of political authority.10  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Shi’a Muslims believe that the family of Muhammad was specifically invoked in the Qurān in 
numerous verses, including 33:33 (Al-Ahzāb, “Allah has decreed to remove from you the 
impurity [of sin], O people of the household”). The Ahl al-Bayt are traditionally referred to as 
Muhammad, ‘Ali, Fatima, Hassan, and Husayn, although later hadith traditions would extend the 
purification to the offspring (descendants) of ‘Ali, the descendants of Aqīl and Muslim bin Aqīl, 
the offspring of Ja’far (whose son Abdullah married Zaynab bint ‘Ali), and the offspring of 
‘Abbas ibn ‘Ali. See Muslim ibn al-Hajjaj, Sahīh Muslim, Vol. 31 – one of six canonical 
collections of hadith in Islam – and “Ahl al-Bayt”, The Oxford Dictionary of Islam, ed. John 
Esposito (Oxford Islamic studies online), accessed Aug. 20, 2014. 
10 A prominent literature exists documenting the religious and political history of the Shi’a- Sunni 
split; for a concise version of the development of Twelver Shi’a Islam, see Moojan Momen, An 
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‘Ali was poisoned just five years after his appointment as Caliph; at that time, 
‘Ali assigned the guardianship of the ummah to his sons and reminded Husayn of the test 
that would come for him at Karbala. It was an event that had been foretold to Muhammad 
by the angel Jibreel and shared with ‘Ali and his family from the time Husayn was a 
young boy: on the banks of the Euphrates, the men of the Prophet’s household would 
endure days of hunger and thirst before death, but Husayn and his family would be 
martyred preserving the Islam of the Prophet. This predetermination is a central 
component to the story of Karbala and, consequently, the traditions and narratives that 
emerge from it.11 The men would knowingly and willingly sacrifice themselves in the 
service of the true message of Islam. The women would be left, made to endure whatever 
hardships were in store and create and preserve a collective memory of these events.  
For the Shi’a faithful, ‘Ali’s prophecy was fulfilled during the Islamic month of 
Muharram in 680 AD, when Husayn and 72 male companions were martyred at the hands 
of the Umayyad host numbering in the tens of thousands. Husayn had been ordered to 
pledge allegiance to the new Umayyad Caliph, Yazīd ibn Muawiyah but had refused, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Introduction to Shi’i Islam: The History and Doctrines of Twelver Shi’ism (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1987). It was only centuries later, with the crisis posed by the disappearance of 
the young Twelfth Imam, that Shi’a theologians and juridical authorities codified doctrine to 
address the unbroken chain of authority and the legitimacy of governance in the physical absence 
of the Imam. See Said Amir Arjomand The Shadow of God and the Hidden Imam: Religion, 
Political Order, and Societal Change in Shi’ite Islam from the Beginning to 1890 (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1984). 
11 The concept of the predetermination of Karbala is found as early as the 9th century in the works 
of Ahmad ibn Hanbal, considered the founder of one of the major schools of Sunni jurisprudence. 
Ibn Hanbal is also one of the most accepted transmitters of authentic sunnah (proscribed sayings 
and teachings of Muhammad). According to a tradition accepted by ibn Hanbal, Umm Salamah, 
one of the Prophet’s wives, narrates, “the Prophet said: An angel that has never visited me before 
came to this house today, and he said to me: This son of yours Hussain will surely be killed. And 
if you wish, I can give you some soil of that land (Karbala) which he will die in. He (the Angel) 
then brought me soil that was red.” See Ahmad ibn Hanbal, Kitāb Fadhā’il al-Sahaba, Vol. 2, 
Hadith #1357 (Qom: n.d.)  965. 
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viewing Yazīd’s rule as illegitimate. On the first of the Islamic month of Muharram, the 
Umayyad army intercepted Husayn’s family and companions in the deserts of Karbala for 
a last confrontation. Along with his half-brother and standard-bearer Abbas were 
Husayn’s wives, young children, sisters, and closest followers. Seven days into the 
standoff, water and food were cut off from the small band. On the tenth of Muharram, the 
day commonly referred to as Ashura by Shi’a Muslims, Husayn and his 72 male 
companions one by one rode out to battle and were killed by the large Umayyad force. 
Husayn’s 6-month old son ‘Ali Asghar was slain by an arrow. Among the men, only 
Husayn’s sick son and the fourth Shi’a Imam, ‘Ali Zayn al-‘Abidīn, was spared. The 
women of the camp, led by Husayn’s sister Zaynab, sacrificed their husbands and 
children without complaint; through much grief they remained steadfast in their belief in 
the righteousness of the cause. Abdullah ibn Ja’far, Zaynab’s husband and nephew of 
‘Ali ibn Abu Talib, did not travel with the caravan to Karbala but was said to have felt 
great satisfaction at the news of the sacrifice of his two sons in Husayn’s name.12 After 
Ashura, the women and young children were taken into captivity and paraded unveiled 
through Iraq and Syria to Damascus, the seat of Umayyad rule, their humiliation serving 
as a warning to those who would support the Ahl al-Bayt. In Damascus, Zaynab was the 
first to conduct a majlis, a mourning gathering to recount the trials of Karbala. She also 
publically delivered a khutba (speech) against Yazīd’s injustice in the Umayyad court, 
condemning his actions against Muhammad’s family.13 When they were finally released 
from Damascus on the fortieth day after Ashura, the caravan traveled to Karbala, where 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Muhammad ibn Jarir al-Tabari, Tārikh al-Rasul wa al-Muluk, 4:357.  
13 For a compilation of Zaynab’s various khutba on the journey from Karbala to Damascus, see 
Badr Shahin, Lady Zaynab, 2nd ed. (Qum: Ansariyan Publications, 2006). 
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the women sat at the graves of their loved ones, remembered the events of Ashura and 
wept. The wives, daughters, and sisters of the martyrs of Karbala were thus the earliest 
mourners – they were the first to undertake ziyārat to Husayn’s grave and their suffering 
formed the basis of rituals of lamentations.14  
According to historian Yitzhak Nakash, for Shi’a Muslims, the tragedy of Karbala 
and the commemoration of the events would become “vital for reinforcing their distinct 
Shi’i identity and collective memory... to evoke every year the sorrow and memory of 
Karbala, and to transmit it to generations to come.”15 In the immediate aftermath of the 
events of Karbala, the Umayyad caliphs sought to curtail access to the tomb, reacting to 
the perceived political danger of a galvanized minority by instituting patrols on the roads 
to Karbala, arrests, and even executions for pilgrimages attempted on a mass scale.16 
Still, Shi’a Imams emphasized two important tenets amongst their devotees – that the 
tragedies of Karbala were pre-ordained by Allah and that the visitation to the graves of 
important Shi’a martyrs was a way to gain favor, as the Prophet and ‘Ali had promised 
that while the righteous would be few at Karbala, a whole faith would emerge to honor 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 For more on the general narrative of Karbala, see E. Honigmann, “Karbala’,” The 
Encyclopaedia of Islam, 2nd ed. [4:637-639]; ‘Abbas al-Qummi, Mafātih al-jinān (Beirut: Dar al-
Mujtaba, 1st printing, 1995); Mahmoud Ayoub, Redemptive Suffering in Islam: A Study of the 
Devotional Aspects of 'Ashura' in Twelver Shi’ism (The Hague: Walter de Gruyter, 1978); Ali J. 
Hussein, “The Mourning of History and the History of Mourning: The Evolution of Ritual 
Commemoration of the Battle of Karbala,” in Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the 
Middle East, 25 no. 2 (2005), 78-88;  
15 Yitzhak Nakash, “An Attempt to Trace the Origins of the Rituals of Ashura.” Die Welt des 
Islams, New Series, Vol. 33, Issue 2 (Nov., 1993), 165.  
16 al-Tabari, Tārīkh al-Rasul wal-Mulūk, 7:365.  
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the martyrs of Karbala.17 Rather than an unexpected tragedy, Karbala became the 
fulfillment of a prophecy and the embodiment of ultimate obedience.18  
Through severe restrictions, Shi’a pilgrims were told to emulate the devotion and 
intense grief of the first visitors to the grave – Zaynab, the young children and wives of 
the dead, and Jabir ibn Abdullah, one of Muhammad’s closest companions. Despite the 
constant threats to his life, the fourth Imam Zayn al-‘Abidīn encouraged those Shi’as who 
were able to safely perform ziyārat to do so and to undertake the pilgrimage in somber 
conditions similar to that of the Hajj.19 By the ninth century the imams began to 
institutionalize the ziyārat practices. The fifth and sixth Imams, Muhammad al-Baqir and 
Ja’far al-Sādiq were especially prolific in religious scholarship, writing extensive 
treatises for the Shi’as to follow. As a consequence of the difficult conditions under 
which these pilgrimages emerged, an ethos developed around ziyārat that emphasized a 
sense of fear and awe, a humble physical state, a single-minded devotion to the journey, 
and a great reward. According to the sixth Imam, Ja’far al-Sādiq, (d.765 AD), any Shi’a 
undertaking ziyārat of Husayn’s shrine would be rewarded as if he has performed “one 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Indeed, Shi’a narrations and theology would link the importance and vitality of ziyārat to the 
comfort it gave these infallible believers at Karbala during their trials. The promise of devotees 
and believers visiting the shrine gave heart to Husayn’s son Zayn al-Abidīn. In his grief, Zaynab 
reminded him that Allah had made a covenant with some people to gather the remains of their 
loved ones and raise a flag to the tomb of the martyrs. Through the centuries, Zaynab promised, 
this mark would endure. See Ibn Qulawayh al-Qummi, Kamil al-Ziyārāt, (New York: Al Khoei 
Foundation Books, 2004), 447. Ibn Qulawayh Al-Qummi’s (d. 990) work is one of the most 
complete sources for Shi’a Muslims on the spiritual benefits of ziyārat, drawing on quotations 
and sayings from the imams and their companions. Many of these traditions would be expanded 
on in Shaykh Abbas al-Qummi’s (d. 1981) Mafatih al-Jinān.  
18 The pre-determination of Karbala would become a critical component of Shi’a theology, most 
clearly articulated by the famed seventeenth-century theologian Muhammad Baqir al-Majlisi (d. 
1698). His Bihār al-Anwār is the locus clasicus for much Shi’a jurisprudence and eschatological 
beliefs that developed since and is the most comprehensive hadith collection in the Shi’a fiqh.  
19 al Baqir Sharif al-Qarashi, Hayat al Imam Zayn Al-Abidīn (Qom, Iran: Ansariyan Publications, 
2000), 35-42.  
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thousand purified Hajj and one thousand purified Umrah [a visit to Mecca outside of the 
official Hajj period]” with a prophet or with the successor of the prophet.20 Ja’far al-
Sādiq was said to have lamented, “If I told you about the merits of [Husayn’s] ziyārat and 
his grave, you would completely abandon going to Hajj.”21 The Imams and their 
companions also detailed the appropriate behavior and emotion of the zā’ireen (pilgrims), 
with emphasis placed on humble manners and ascetic behavior at the shrine. Their diet 
was not to consist of rich foods, with bread and milk being the preferable option; al-Sādiq 
lamented that those who visit the graves of their parents went in great sadness, yet those 
who visit the grave of Husayn “take large supplies of food and travel accessories.”22 
 Even as visits to the shrines were encouraged through great spiritual reward, 
patronage and financial support of the shrines was seen as an additional means to derive 
blessings. As Khalid Sindawi notes, despite the early prohibitions, there were periods of 
greater permissiveness, including during the reign of the sixth Imam, Ja’far al-Sādiq, 
when traditions and elegiac poetry exalting ziyārat to the shrines flourished.23 Beginning 
with the Abbasid regime, Shi’a dynasties bestowed shrines with extensive gifts in order 
to gain spiritual and political legitimacy.24 By the 9th and 10th centuries, with the rise of 
the Buwayhids and Hamdānites in the later Abbasid dynasty, the doctrinal, popular, and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Ibn Qulawayh, Kamil al-Ziyārāt, 335 
21 Ibn Qulawayh, Kamil al-Ziyārāt, 244  
22 Ibn Qulawayh, Kamil al-Ziyārāt, 268 
23 Khalid Sindawi, “Visit to the Tomb of Al-Husayn b. ‘Ali in Shiite Poetry: First to Fifth 
Centuries AH (8th-11th Centuries CE),” Journal of Arabic Literature, Vol. 37, No. 2 (2006), 230-
258. According to Sindawi, the work of the Syrian poet Al-Sanawbarī (d. 943 CE), who lived his 
entire life in Aleppo and Damascus, melded the evocative nature of ziyārat with older patterns of 
Arabic poetry, hinting that pilgrimage had become frequent in his time and that pilgrimage poetry 
had become common.   
24 See Mrs. Meer Hassan Ali, Observations on the Mussulmans of India. (Compiled by Oxford 
University Press, 1917) for details of patronage of shrines by Iranian and Awadh Shi’a dynasties  
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religious support of ziyārat was reflected in a growing travel literature – including 
references to a widening sacred geography, no longer just concentrated in Medina, 
Mecca, and Karbala. In the 12th century, Ibn Jubayr discussed the Shi’a population of 
Damascus, where there “are shrines of many of the family of the Prophet, men and 
women – may God hold them in His favour – whose edifices have been adorned by the 
Shi’ites and which have large pious endowments.”25 The famed Muslim traveler Ibn 
Battuta asserted, “The variety and expenditure of the religious endowments at Damascus 
are beyond computation.”26 By the turn of the nineteenth century, Persian traveler Mirza 
Abu Taleb Khan was describing the evolution of ziyārat and the commerce and industry 
that had emerged around the shrines. He acknowledged, “the number of pilgrims who 
visit these sacred places bring a great quantity of money into the country, and yield a 
considerable revenue to the State…so that it is to Turkish avarice we are indebted for the 
freedom enjoyed here.”27 The shrines to Shi’a Imams had expanded dramatically, 
growing in influence amongst religious and political authorities.   
Indeed, many of the major Shi’a shrines under Ottoman control had achieved a 
level of political and economic autonomy as a result of their ability to attract pilgrims and 
pious donations from Shi’as. The Iraqi shrine cities lay on the frontier of the Safavid-
Ottoman tension, caught between – and often shaping – political rivalries and dynastic 
ambitions. Juan Cole has explored the currents that played out on the Iraqi frontier shrine 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Ibn Jubayr, The Travels of Ibn Jubayr, trans. R.J.C. Broadhurt. (London: The Camelot Press 
Ltd., 1952).  
26 Ibn Battuta, Rihlat – Travels in Asia and Africa, 1325-1354, trans. Hamilton A.R. Gibb (Delhi: 
Pilgrims Book Pvt. Ltd, 1929).  
27 Abu Talib Khan, The Travels of Mirza Abu Taleb Khan, trans., Charles Stewart (New Delhi: 
Sona Publications, 1972); see also Major P.M. Sykes, The Glory of the Shia World: The Tale of a 
Pilgrimage (London: Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 1910) for further description of shrine visitations 
in the early 20th century. 
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cities, highlighting the critical geopolitical and theological movements, especially in the 
1843 Ottoman invasion of Karbala.28 The Safavid and especially Qajar relationship with 
the shrines and their ulama communities was especially complex, with regimes both 
drawing authority from and disputing the scope of shrine influence in political life.29 In 
his study of political and economic patronage networks amongst the ulama of the Iraqi 
shrine cities in Shi’i Scholars of Nineteenth Century Iraq, Meir Litvak underscores the 
importance of the financial activities of these shrines and the ability the ulama had to 
encourage economic activities amongst a network of pilgrims and pious believers.30 By 
the early 20th century, shrine finances had begun to include the promotion of souvenirs 
and tokens, as pilgrimage had become a focal point of the local economy. According to 
Litvak, the production and sale of basic religious relics was a major component of the 
local industry in Karbala, especially clay tablets used by believers to rest their head 
during prostration in prayer. While a select few ulama protested that the “selling the clay 
taken from the area made sacred by the blood of Husayn was tantamount to selling 
Husayn’s very flesh,” their objections could not curtail this popular practice.31 Ziyārat 
had emerged as a negotiated response from a faith repeatedly confronted with the 
traumatic murders of its male authority figures and stripped of political power. It had now 
grown into a transnational force.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Juan Cole, Sacred Space, Holy War: The Politics, Culture, and History of Shi’ite Islam (New 
York: I.B. Taurus, 2002).  
29 See Hamid Algar, Religion and State in Iran, 1785-1906: The Role of Ulama in the Qajar 
Period (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980); Halm, Shi’ism; Arjomand, The Shadow 
of God and the Hidden Imam.  
30 Meir Litvak. Shi’i Scholars of Nineteenth Century Iraq: The ‘Ulama of Najaf and Karbala 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).  
31 Meir Litvak, “The Finances of the ‘Ulama’ Communities of Najaf and Karbala, 1796-1904.” 
Die Welt des Islams, New Series, Vol. 40, Issue 1 (March 2000), 60. 
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 By the time of the British occupation of Iraq after World War I, the scope of 
pilgrimage had increased exponentially. Administrative reports discuss the “hundreds and 
thousands of Shi’a pilgrims that annually visit the Holy Places of ‘Iraq from Persia and 
India” and that the well-being of these shrine cities “to a large extent is dependent on 
those pilgrims.”32 In Samarra, site of the shrines of the 10th and 11th Imams, “the pilgrim 
traffic to the shrines creates a trade of its own, to meet with there is a bazaar in good 
repair termed the Hindi or Persian bazaar.”33 Though pilgrimage was curtailed during the 
war, according to British authorities “permission to renew it was given in 1919, and 
exceptionally large numbers availed themselves of it. An average of 7,000 pilgrims a 
month passed through the frontier town of Khaniqin,” the main border town from Persia, 
with more arriving from the Indian subcontinent.34 British authorities noted that while 
pre-war border crossings at this one town alone were estimated at close to 34,000, by 
1920 the number had jumped to over 44,000, a number that was still limited by internal 
problems that beset the pilgrimage routes.35 Yitzhak Nakash estimated that by this period 
the average number of Shi’a pilgrims arriving from India and Iran numbered 100,000 
annually.36 These accounts, spanning centuries, construct an emerging map of sacred 
geography, one that was claimed to be immutable and pre-ordained by God and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Iraq Administrative Reports, Vol. 2. Administrative Report of the Kadhimain District from 11th 
March 1918 to 31st December 1918.  
33 S. Murray, Captain, Political Officer, Samarra. Administration Report of the Baghdad Wilayat, 
1917. 
34 Review of the Civil Administration of Mesopotamia – Occupation of the Basrah Wilayat . 3rd 
December, 1920.  
35 T. Barrett Heggs. Annual Report of the Health Department for the Year 1920. Administrative 
Report. Baghdad: Printed at the Government Press, 1921.  
36 Yitzhak Nakash, “The Visitation of the Shrines of the Imams and the Shi’i Mujtahids in the 
Early Twentieth Century,” Studia Islamica, No. 81 (1995), 157.   
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Muhammad’s will. The righteous authority of the Prophet’s male descendants would be 
reaffirmed with every visitation. 
 Yet despite the growing numbers of pilgrims who performed ziyārat, pilgrimage 
to these shrines remained a difficult endeavor, one that was undertaken only by devout 
Shi’a who were willing to endure the hardships of the journey and the conditions of 
ziyārat. A description of a pilgrim’s ordeal in British records gives more detail: 
After a prodigious journey in inclement weather, subsisting upon a 
minimum of food in the shape of chupatties [an unleavened cake of 
bread], slaking his thirst with impure water and, as a result of his diet, 
weakened by enteritis and a form of scurvy, the pilgrim arrives at the 
holy town at last, with the wish to die there as his sole sustaining force. 
He proceeds to die in the street or in the mosque and it is to make the end 
of these pilgrims more comfortable, or even to give them a chance of 
recovery…. As regards to statistics, the just way to look at the figures is 
to say that about 50 per cent recovered.37  
 
Though written centuries after Muhammad al-Baqir and Ja’far Al-Sādiq, the Civil 
Surgeon’s description of the pilgrims was remarkably close to the state of deprivation 
that early religious authorities outlined. Nor was process limited to personal risks. In 
1925, the Wahhabiyya movement, with the backing of the Ibn Saud tribe, destroyed Ahl 
al-Bayt graves of the Prophet’s family in Medina’s holy al-Baqī’ cemetary. Indeed, the 
graves of the Imams in the Iraqi provinces and the Hijaz had been attacked multiple 
times, especially through the late 19th and early 20th century. 
Notably, for centuries, it was largely men who were undertaking ziyārat -– male 
pilgrims who were traveling in increasing numbers to pay respects to Husayn, the leader, 
‘Abbas, the warrior, and the other men who had laid down their lives beside them. 
Poetry, hagiographies, and religious tracts abounded to explore the life of the male 
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martyrs. While it was the female survivors of Karbala who had first returned to mourn on 
at the site, it was the male Imams who delineated the boundaries of a faith. Male religious 
and political authorities sought to institute the rituals of lamentation and ziyārat 
performed by Zaynab and the sisters and wives of Husayn’s companions around the 
suffering of their bodies and the sacrifices of their children. The shrines to the Imams and 
their companions became the main points on this constructed and gendered sacred 
geography, imagined and guarded by religious authorities and the predominantly male 
pilgrims themselves. Zaynab is a narrator of traditions, quoted in pilgrimage texts such as 
Kāmil al-Ziyārat, but it is to encourage the pilgrimage to her brother’s grave.  
Nor did these visitations and rituals emerge unchallenged. Indeed, as pilgrimage 
grew and the commemorative practices became more widespread and publically enacted, 
concerns were raised inside and outside of the community. Historian Max Weiss has 
analyzed a bevy of tracts written in the early 20th century by prominent Shi’a leaders and 
marja’, (senior members of the religious hierarchy and sources of emulation) debating 
and defending the practices of ziyārat and Muharram rituals. The leading Shi’a mujtahid 
(an accepted senior Shi’a theologian) in Damascus, Syed Muhsin al-Amīn (d. 1952) was 
a central part of what Weiss has termed the “Ashura Debates.” According to Weiss, al-
Amīn displayed a deep concern with how the Shi’a community in Jabal ‘Amil was 
perceived in relation to pressing concerns with modernity, both by the majority Sunni 
population and Mandate authorities. In a series of controversial writings, he advocated for 
streamlining practices and limiting objectionable public demonstrations such as weeping, 
self-flagellation, and large processions, which he viewed as recent innovations to Karbala 
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rituals.38 Al-Amīn similarly addressed the central concern of ziyārat; according to 
Nakash, he “prohibited the worship of the tomb itself and disapproved of many of the 
popular practices associated with the cult of saints in Islam in general…Yet, contrary to 
the Sunni position, al-Amīn allowed the glorification of the tombs of the imams as part of 
the general worship and glorification of God.”39 Al- Amīn defended the expansion and 
decoration of the shrines as sites to commemorate pious models for living – support that 
would later provide an impetus to the growth of the Sayyeda Zaynab shrine.  
 By the outbreak of WWII, the construction of a distinctly Shi’a sacred geography 
through narrative, religious exhortations, patronage, and practice had resulted in 
sprawling shrine cities in Iraq and Medina. The authenticity and sacralizing of these 
shrines drew from a long chain of traditions and rihla (travel) literature to bolster the 
claims that ziyārat was an essential and original aspect of Shi’a doctrine. Even as the 
older shrines endured, however, new sites would emerge, expanding the map that 
Muhammad and ‘Ali envisioned. The Sayyeda Zaynab and Bibi Pak Daman shrines 
would emerge in sprawling urban settings, not in cities that grew as byproducts of 
pilgrimage to its shrines. As urban shrines that operated within a particular social life, 
they were textual spaces that had new interpretations written onto them. The work to 
place these shrines firmly on the map was done in the 20th century, when these women’s 
stories become individualized and linked to particular sites of commemoration and new 
nation-states.  
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Transnational Spaces  
The emergence of the Sayyeda Zaynab and Bibi Pak Daman was intricately linked 
to evolving narratives that sacralized the shrines by placing Zaynab, Ruqayyah, and their 
sacrifices at the center of Karbala’s many tragedies. It would become the lesson of 
Karbala that the death for men was final and their suffering temporary. It was left to the 
women to carry on the message, to endure more lengthy struggles in the name of Islam. 
The legacy of Karbala was secured on the female body – through the voluntary sacrifice 
of their children and their forbearance through much hardship. Where they went after 
Karbala thus could be expanded and intrinsically linked in to the central sacrifice at the 
heart of Shi’a Islam. As such, the role of the female companions such as Zaynab and 
Ruqayyah provided the broadest realm of possibilities for reinterpretation and it was onto 
their lives and shrines that meaning was made and challenged. Indeed, rather than remain 
peripheral sites of worship, it would be through visitation to their shrines that the full 
scope of sacrifice at Karbala could be understood. Who these women were, where they 
were buried, and why they were buried in those locations became prominent questions in 
20th century transnational Shi’a narratives.  
Scholars of Shi’a Islam have long emphasized the appeal of shrines in the lived 
imagination of devotees and the transnational links of sacred space. Yitzhak Nakash, 
Meir Litvak, and Juan Cole have worked extensively on the transnational flow of 
pilgrims, patronage, and ideologies that shaped the development of Iraqi shrine cities. 
The critical roles of memory, symbols, and narratives have figured more recently in the 
works of scholars such as Kamran Scot Aghaie and Syed Akbar Hyder. Aghaie in 
particular has focused on symbolic discourses surrounding gender and the women of 
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Karbala.40 These works have emphasized the duality of Shi’a devotionalism – while the 
power of narratives and symbols draw on transnational emotional frameworks, they are 
also decidedly influenced by the particularities of their local contexts. As Roschanack 
Shaery Eisenlohr has noted, “transnationalism is always reconfigured in articulation with 
local sociopolitical and economic realities and interests.”41 Understanding transnational 
narratives as a category of practice thus reveals the political nature of social memory. 
According to Shaery Eisenlohr, these memories are critical “in the formation of group 
identities among members of transnational Shi’i networks, negotiating cross-border 
solidarities and national difference.” Why Zaynab and Ruqayyah ended up in what would 
become Syria and Pakistan are social memories, which Shaery Eisenlohr argues are “not 
static but are in dialogue with the political contexts. They often shift in the dynamic 
world of Shi'a transnational politics.”42 Thus, hagiographies about Ruqayyah and Zaynab 
were constructed within particular ideological currents, revealing the political and 
religious interests at stake in framing the histories of these shrines. 
In her work Recovered Roots, Yael Zerubavel explores the relationship between 
place, history, and memory, illustrating how a diverse society of immigrants constructed 
a national identity based on reinterpreting and commemorating key religious tales. 
Zerubavel engages with what Maurice Halbswachs’ “collective memory”: a narrative that 
exists between history and memory, though the two do not operate in complete 
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opposition. She argues, “The power of collective memory does not lie in its accurate, 
systematic, or sophisticated mapping of the past, but in establishing the basic images that 
articulate and reinforce a particular ideological stance.”43 Similarly, the hagiographies 
constructed about Zaynab and Ruqayyah were not uncontested or without ambiguities, 
but they increasingly created tales of extraordinary lives that could be mapped and 
commemorated onto expanding pilgrimage sites. As Zerubavel notes, certain events “can 
continue to occupy a central place in the group’s memory in spite of the tensions 
underlying their commemoration.”44 In this way, historical specifics become subsumed 
for sacred narrative that were linked to particular sites of commemoration.  
Shi’a narratives over the developing Sayyeda Zaynab and Bibi Pak Daman 
shrines shortened the distance of time and space, enabling devotees far removed from the 
lands of Karbala to access the communal memory of suffering – with memory and legend 
often framed as history. These hagiographies shortened historical distance, allowing a 
linear argument to be made between commemoration of Karbala at these shrines and the 
events of Karbala itself. Hamid Dabashi’s recent work on Shi’ism is particularly 
instructive here. Dabashi employs the Weberian framework of charisma and prophetic 
leadership to explain the complex and continuing appeals of the Imams, as well as their 
constant reimaginings as symbols of protest. Shi’ism, according to Dabashi, “is an 
attempt to sustain Muhammad’s charismatic authority, prolonging his personal presence 
from generation to generation by extending it from an Islamic prophetology [Nubuwwah] 
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to an Shi’i imamology [Imamah].”45 I argue that hagiographies expand this framework 
further, extending Muhammad’s charisma through ‘Ali to his daughters and their shrines. 
Indeed, a common current through these narratives is how these women became divine.   
Chapter One explores the evolution of hagiographies about Zaynab bint ‘Ali from 
a passive victim of Karbala’s tragedies to a defiant revolutionary, central to the endurance 
of Husayn’s message. Early Arabic sources recounting the events of Karbala spared little 
detail on Zaynab’s life and character beyond Karbala, instead portraying her solely as the 
weak, grief-stricken embodiment of female suffering. While Zaynab’s khutbāt were 
quoted, they were not the focal point of these early texts. The influence of the Safavid 
dynasty and the institutionalization of Shi’ism, however, led to more detailed, evocative 
Persian-influenced portrayals of Zaynab by the beginning of the 20th century. It was in the 
1930s, however, and the work of the marja’ Syed Muhsin al-Amīn that link between 
person, place, and narrative became pronounced. For al-Amīn’s ideological reformism, 
Zaynab represented the ideal mourner in character and behavior, and his hagiography of 
her life emphasized her lofty status amongst the Ahl al-Bayt. In turn, the presence of her 
grave in Damascus opened tremendous possibilities. A shrine for Zaynab could be a place 
that would raise the status of Shi’as under the French Mandate, a site where his modernist 
vision of Karbala rituals could be enacted.   
The split between Sunni and Shi’a interpretations of Zaynab’s life would also 
become more pronounced in the context of new nation-states. In 1966, the Egyptian 
Aisha ‘Abd al-Rahman published a hagiography of Zaynab entitled Batalat Karbala: 
Zaynab bint al-Zahrā. ‘Abd al-Rahman was from a generation of prominent Egyptian 
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women writers involved in the nationalist movement. Her Zaynab was the embodiment of 
the Islamic ideal for a woman – pious, educated, a wife and mother who was able to step 
into the political arena when circumstances demanded – but she was also a national 
figure. Egyptians had long held the view that Zaynab bint ‘Ali was buried in Cairo, and 
her shrine there had been a recipient of political patronage for centuries. Shi’as, in turn, 
would reject this interpretation, as they were making pilgrimage in growing numbers to 
the shrine in Damascus. By the 1970s, a new assertive Shi’a rhetoric would recast 
Zaynab’s life and death into an essential part of the events of Karbala, creating greater 
impetus for ziyārat to the growing Sayyeda Zaynab shrine. In 1979, a popular 
hagiography written by a Pakistani scholar in Damascus would be the culmination of 
centuries of hagiographies on Zaynab. Marqad al-‘Aqīlah Zaynab tied the blessings of 
her sacred shrine in Damascus to her central role in the salvation of Shi’ism; ziyārat to 
the Sayyeda Zaynab shrine thus allowed pilgrims to capture the same collective memory 
and identity as a visit to the Iraqi shrine cities.  
The ambiguities of hagiographical constructions of women’s lives and the 
opportunities that provided new nation-states form the basis of Chapter Two. If Zaynab 
was a ‘historical’ figure, one whose existed was documented in early accounts of 
Karbala, how Ruqayyah bint ‘Ali arrived in Lahore was the subject of intense investment 
after Pakistan’s independence. Under British colonial rule, few written individual 
hagiographies existed about Bibi Pak Daman. As Christopher Taylor has noted on 
Muslim shrines, “In many instances, the record of the lives and works of the saints relied 
exclusively on oral transmission, since there was no transcendent institutional framework 
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to promote the cult.”46 Though Bibi Pak Daman was a visited site, Ruqayyah bint ‘Ali 
and her shrine warranted brief mentions in compilations on the lives of important Sufi 
saints. Her mere presence, however, was a powerful symbol of Muslim opposition to 
Hindu rule. For anti-colonial and anti-Hindu activists, Ruqayyah’s arrival in Lahore 
represented the indigenous nature of Muslim life in the subcontinent.  
The lack of specificity in Ruqayyah’s life would nevertheless lead to competing 
interpretations and hagiographic impulses. While the new Pakistani state would affirm 
the narrative of Ruqayyah’s presence in Lahore, many Sunni Muslims continued to 
believe that the grave belonged to another woman. For the Shi’as of Pakistan, this 
interpretation represented a deliberate attempt to erase them from the nation’s history. In 
1979, the publication of an extensive hagiography on Ruqayyah and Bibi Pak Daman 
would capture the way narrative had a dramatic impact on the realities on the ground and 
the tensions between national and transnational imaginings. The belief in Ruqayyah was 
thus linked to clear assertion of identity and understandings of history.  
Methodologically, using hagiographical texts as primary sources provides a way 
of understanding transnational historical perspective that is grounded in the specific and 
local. As Karen Ruffle has stated in her work on ritual performance in South Asia, “the 
composition of hagiographies, their performed narration, and the construction of spaces 
memorializing saints thus comprise parts of a profoundly social process.”47 These 
narratives shaped pilgrims’ understandings of the shrine and their place on a map of Shi’a 
sacred space, but they also reveal why particular frameworks were constructed and how 
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the symbiotic link between space, meaning-making, and the conditions that make 
meaning were forged.  
 
National Spaces  
The Sayyeda Zaynab and Bibi Pak Daman shrines drew on centuries of 
transnational narrative construction, but they would also become deeply embedded in 
their national milieus as group and state investment in the shrines grew more pronounced. 
New regimes in Syria and Pakistan developed strategies for engaging with these sites, 
negotiating the difficult balance between using the shrines to bolster their religious 
legitimacy and managing sectarian pressures. The Sayyeda Zaynab and Bibi Pak Daman 
shrines were placed within the bureaucratic frameworks that emerged after national 
independence, as the new states sought to institutionalize the management of sacred 
spaces. Yet they also had complicated relationships to concepts of the past and tradition, 
with new shrines positioned as cultural heritage and with the endurance of older forms of 
familial or relational authority. As shrines to Shi’a female saints, pilgrims and entrenched 
interests at the sites had their own interpretations on the meanings and functions of these 
spaces.  
Consequently they represented internal frontier shrine, sites in dense urban spaces 
that functioned as internal boundaries and borders, physical spaces onto which competing 
ideologies were mapped and contested. The concept of the frontier shrine comes from the 
work of Juan Cole, who focuses on the shrine cities of Karbala and Najaf through the 19th 
century. In Sacred Spaces and Holy War, Cole argues that the conditions of the Shi’a 
shrine cities of Karbala and Najaf captured the actual boundaries between the Safavid and 
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Ottoman empires through the 19th century. These contested shrines would become 
microcosms of the conflicts over power, territory, authority, and finance, and barometers 
of the state of geopolitical tensions and identity formation. While Cole focuses on 
external borders, delineating rival political power, this chapter adapts the terminology to 
argue that the Sayyeda Zaynab and Bibi Pak Daman became internal frontier shrines. 
They mirrored the debates about ritual, authentic authority, ideology, and identity that 
were playing out on a national level. Yet these spaces also brought transnational forces 
together at the shrine to interact, forming extraneous and extra-territorial frontiers. 
 If these shrines were important as microcosms for debate, however, they also 
reveal a window into the myriad of ways of ‘being Shi’a’ in new nation states where 
Shi’as constituted a minority. Recent trends in historiography have rejected the idea of 
the immutability of religious identity, instead emphasizing the manner in which 
sectarianism is produced and lived by the interplay of particular conditions. According to 
Max Weiss, sectarianism “is a way of being in the world that depends upon a set of 
cultural markers and social practices, a framework capable of holding familial, local, 
regional, and even international loyalties together.”48 These behaviors were 
institutionalized in Lebanon with the creation of Shi’a Ja’fari courts, which created a state 
apparatus that endorsed sectarian identity. In his study of Mount Lebanon, Ussama 
Makdisi similarly argues that sectarianism was produced, arising out of a moment of 
crisis for the Ottoman regime, between the pressures of European colonialism and 
tanzimat imperialism. According to Makdisi, “This encounter profoundly altered the 
meaning of religion in the multi-confessional society of Mount Lebanon because it 
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emphasized sectarian identity as the only viable marker of political reform and the only 
authentic basis for political claims.”49 This dissertation seeks to add another dimension to 
work on the construction of identity and sectarian behavior by understanding why shrines 
develop and analyzing how attempts to regulate ritual and space often facilitated and 
activated sectarian behavior at the Sayyeda Zaynab and Bibi Pak Daman.  
For centuries Zaynab’s gravesite had been little more than a small room housed in 
a modest brick and mortar structure and run as a waqf property by the Murtadha family, 
caretakers who claim to be direct descendants of the Imams.50 Chapter Three follows how 
narratives of Zaynab’s importance interacted with forces on the ground committed to the 
shrine’s expansion, as Muhsin al-Amīn, the Murtadha family, individual donors, and 
foreign marja’ combined to create a shrine that would rival the pilgrimage sites of Iran 
and Iraq.  Historiography on the Syrian nationalist movement has long privileged the role 
of a Sunni urban elite, yet in the Mandate era, the shrine provided a space for local Shi’a 
elites to engage in the nationalist enterprise. The politics of Shi’a personal leadership and 
charismatic authority was critical at the Sayyeda Zaynab, yet these authorities also 
responded to pressures from those using the shrines. In the immediate aftermath of Syrian 
independence, a shrine committee was formed in 1952 to administer and promote ziyārat 
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to the shrine. As noted by Italian scholar Marco Salati, despite their critical role in the 
construction of a shrine that would capture the faith of millions, “There is no specific 
study on the Murtadha family to date.”51 This chapter explains the influence of the 
Murtadha family and how they would propel the growth of the Sayyeda Zaynab shrine in 
the 1950s and 1960s, as they called on the support of ‘marja and individual pilgrims to 
donate to the shrine as a modern expression of devotion. While the shrine cities of Iran 
and Iraq were established sites of influence and authority, the Sayyeda Zaynab 
represented a permissive new space onto which religious scholars, businessmen, and the 
Shi’a faithful could articulate their Shi’ism. The donations and bequests made by Shi’as 
for the support of the shrine represented expressions of individual sectarian piety. 
Nevertheless, the Syrian Ministry of Awqaf remained wary of the overabundance of 
foreign donations to a national site; it was the connections of the Murtadha family that 
allowed the shrine committee significant leeway in the promotion of the site. 
The Ba’athist coup in Syria and the rise of Hafez al-Assad in 1971 would have a 
significant impact on the Sayyeda Zaynab, changing perceptions of the government’s 
relationship with the Islam. The rise of the nominally Shi’a Alawi would combine with 
the growing popularity of the charismatic Shi’a scholar Musa al-Sadr and intensifying 
unrest of Shi’a ulama in Iran and Iraq through the 1970s; these ideological and political 
shifts would transform what being Shi’a meant. The shrine would become a national 
issue, promoted by political authorities that sought to solidify the position of the 
Zaynabiyya as a rival Shiite site of pilgrimage to Iran and Iraq. Who was visiting and 
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living at the Sayyeda Zaynab was altered, with the common thread of Shi’ism uniting 
these disparate groups. While Muhsin al-Amīn had first emphasized the Arab heritage of 
the shrine, by the end of the 1970s rhetoric about Zaynab had framed her as a Shi’a 
revolutionary and her shrine became a distinctly sectarian space.   
The tension between national appeals, local particularism, and the creation of 
sectarianism at Bibi Pak Daman is the focus of Chapter Four. Like at the Sayyeda Zaynab 
shrine, through the 1950s local residents and traditional authorities had managed the 
administration of Bibi Pak Daman, forming familial and religious ties around the shrine. 
In the 1960s, under Field Marshall Ayub Khan, the government federalized control of all 
waqf property in the country, the result of a long history of ideological mistrust of the 
perceived mystical hold that shrines and saints had on the masses.52 As a result of the 
nature of the shrine, however, the consequences of this takeover at Bibi Pak Daman were 
more pronounced than at any other sacred site. As with the case of the Sayyeda Zaynab 
and the Syrian government, the government of Pakistan displayed an ongoing interest in 
promoting the shrine as a site of pilgrimage, even as it sought to mediate conflict with 
Sunni populations over the character of the shrine and its place in nationalist rhetoric. At 
Bibi Pak Daman, the shrine was declared a Sunni shrine to pacify the majority of 
pilgrims, though Auqaf officials acknowledged it was the grave of Ruqayyah bint ‘Ali. 
Yet the entrance of the state into the shrine created the conditions for sectarianism to 
emerge. In the 1970s, multiple conflicts between Sunnis and Shi’as flared up at the 
shrine, forcing the state and courts to repeatedly intervene in the management of the 
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shrine.  Once again the importance of these women would color the motivations of shrine 
authorities and devotees alike. A shrine for the daughter of ‘Ali and the sister of Husayn 
was a powerful ideological tool, bringing the core of Shi’a history into national milieus.  
 The political upheavals of the 1970s would have a direct impact on life at the 
shrine. In 1971, the secession of East Pakistan and establishment of Bangladesh would 
challenge the concept of Islamic political unity and undermine the central premise of 
Pakistan’s raison d’être. In turn, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, a secular Shi’a politician, would 
bend to pressure from conservative Islamist groups demanding greater involvement of 
religion in the state. The coup of General Zia ul-Haq in 1977 would dramatically 
accelerate these pressures, creating a state-sponsored normative version of Islam that 
challenged Shi’a narratives and theological underpinnings. The ways that shrine officials 
and pilgrims negotiated the changing national environment illustrate how Shi’as 
perceived themselves and Ruqayyah’s shrine. For Shi’a pilgrims, their rights as citizens 
were tied into the ability to mark Karbala mourning rituals at Bibi Pak Daman.  
 The Auqaf documents at Bibi Pak Daman and the shrine committee’s records at 
the Sayyeda Zaynab shrine provide a rich insight into the ways Shi’a shrines were 
managed, promoted, and contested in a period of great instability. They reveal how 
shrines are constructed and lived through politics, influence, and finances. The fatwas 
from leading marja’ to the Murtadha family illustrate the responsiveness of Shi’a 
religious authorities to matters at sacred shrines. Letters between shrine authorities and 
political appointees reveal the minute, day-to-day concerns that plagued administrators at 
the shrine. Memos and expansion plans detail the efforts to promote and expand ziyārat 
to the shrines. Yet the presence of residents and pilgrims can also be found in these 
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documents. Some wrote petitions and letters directly, demanding recognition of their 
grievances, many choosing to engage with the shrines in a sectarian framework. Other 
voices can be read through the correspondences between shrine officials detailing 
particular concerns or crafting appropriate responses and plans. Supplemented by 
personal archival collections and newspaper articles, these documents demonstrate the 
very real, lived ways in which ‘being Shi’a’ was actualized at the Bibi Pak Daman and 
Sayyeda Zaynab shrines.  
 
Transactional Spaces  
 Though the 1970s, the pressures of geopolitical events had created outward pulls 
on the Sayyeda Zaynab and Bibi Pak Daman shrines. Shi’a communities had become 
increasingly galvanized, rallying around revolutionary interpretations of Karbala and the 
lives of revered Shi’a martyrs. Anthropologist Michael Fischer has coined the phrase the 
‘Karbala Paradigm’ to analyze the politicization of Shi’a discourses and rituals around 
these events and the emphasis on Karbala “as a rhetorical device [and] a mnemonic for 
thinking about how to live.”53 In this paradigm, Muharram rituals and narratives are 
interpreted along a spectrum from ‘quietist’ to ‘revolutionary’, with anthropologists and 
historians arguing that the shift in emphasis of the Karbala Paradigm in latter half of the 
20th century has moved away from accommodation to conflict.54 In particular, the radical 
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ideological agendas of the Iranian sociologist Ali Shari’ati and Ayatollah Ruhollah 
Khomeini and the Iranian Revolution of 1979 would transform understandings of Shi’a 
public ritual and sacred spaces. A new assertive Shi’a material culture would flourish in 
shrine bazaars, creating transnational visual markers of identity. In the context of the 
Iranian Revolution and Shi’a mobilization, ziyārat to shrines would take on an added 
political and sectarian dimension.  
How shrine officials, Shi’a pilgrims, and bazaar merchants in Bibi Pak Daman 
and at the Sayyeda Zaynab understood these changes is explored in Chapter Five. In 
1979, the Sayyeda Zaynab shrine committee and the Ministry of Awqaf approved plans 
for a significant expansion, financed by the new Iranian government. This moment 
represented a significant new context for the shrine. The Syrian shrine authorities had 
long been the guiding force behind the Sayyeda Zaynab, retaining a measure of local 
control and using their social status to bring others to engage with the shrine; now, a 
foreign, avowedly Shi’a regime was directly involved in the management of the site. 
Strong relations between Iran and the Syrian Ba’athist party added another dimension to 
the site, with the alliance actively promoting ziyārat to the Sayyeda Zaynab as a political 
and ideological tool. These developments marked the shrine as a distinctly Shi’a space in 
narrative, finances, politics, and visuals.  
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Since the 1980s, Shi’a religious material culture has formed a new economic 
transnationalism, visible at the two shrines. Iranian involvement would transform the 
aesthetics and space of the shrine. The style of construction would tie the Sayyeda 
Zaynab to Iranian-backed shrines across Shi’a sacred geography and an expanded bazaar 
would become a place where pilgrims could articulate identity. Similarly, at Bibi Pak 
Daman, the items sold in the bazaar would tie devotees to Shi’a spaces, cementing the 
connections between the shrine and a sectarian worldview. I argue that the bazaar 
cultures act as portals, allowing devotees to access broader religious meanings embedded 
in their practices while still engaging in localized economic activity. I adopt David 
Morgan’s assertion that belief is in part a visual practice, and the acts of seeing the 
shrines and engaging in consumption and ritual created new ways of ‘being Shi’a.55 A 
flourishing field of material culture analysis has addressed the way commodities and 
exchanges have shaped identity and memory, with research increasingly done on Muslim 
visitations.56 Here I argue that commodities, gifts, and souvenirs all played a part in the 
acts of ziyārat and meaning-making at the Sayyeda Zaynab and Bibi Pak Daman shrines. 
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Rather than peripheral activities, pilgrims themselves acknowledge the ways that 
consumption had become a modern articulation of ziyārat rituals.  
The development of the ethos of a religious consumer at the shrines problematizes 
the Durkeimian concepts of the sacred and the profane, a distinction that scholarship is 
increasingly challenging. According to Suzanne Kaufman,  
Historians of religion typically disregard links between faith and the 
marketplace, perhaps from fear of “denigrating” the integrity of their 
subject matter. The persistence of such concerns helps to explain why 
historians have dismissed as superficial or inauthentic what might 
otherwise be recognized as significant characteristics of religious 
expression.57  
 
The acts of marketing ziyārat and the purchase of religiously significant objects are ways 
to understand memory and ‘being Shi’a.’ These purchases, however, were not simply 
limited to religious trinkets. A watch or jewelry was given particular meaning when 
purchased near the shrines, as pilgrims tied their purchase to narratives about Karbala. 
Yet these purchases and rituals did not go unchallenged, both by outsiders and 
Shi’a faithful alike. Iranian influence in culture and politics was similarly countered by 
the rise of radical Sunni responses. While the use of objects and images in religious 
commemoration has been an increasingly observable phenomenon in Shi’a rituals, the 
concept of materiality has a complicated place in Islam, opening up devotees to criticism 
of bid’ah (innovation) and shirk (idolatry). As Ingrid Flaskerud points out, for believers 
these items were “vehicles for communication between worshippers, mediators, and 
God…It should however be noted that the visual imagery was not the object of worship.” 
As a Shi’a religious scholar took pains to describe to her, “Pictures could help 
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worshippers to focus on God. He described visual imagery as a way, a tariqeh, to God.”58 
The representational nature of these images was particularly relevant at the Sayyeda 
Zaynab and Bibi Pak Daman shrines, where specific figural illustrations of Ruqayyah and 
Zaynab did not exist because of traditional injunctions against the depiction of women. 
Instead, like their shrines, depictions of these women become vessels for greater 
meaning.  
Ultimately, understanding these shrines as lived spaces means recognizing how 
people on the ground engaged with them as transactional sites – shrines where belief was 
commoditized and exchanged and where the performance of rituals was rewarded with 
blessings. As Robert Orsi has encouraged, “There are aspects of people’s lives and 
experiences within religious worlds that must be included in our vision and attended to 
beyond what is officially sanctioned. This is a call, then, for attention to religious 
messiness, to multiplicities, to seeing spaces as always, inevitably, and profoundly 
intersected by things brought into them from outside.”59 In addition to land permits and 
letters written between pilgrims and shrine officials, fieldwork, ethnography, and 
conversations with devotees at the Sayyeda Zaynab and Bibi Pak Daman shrines 
illuminate how the shrines were used and interpreted by pilgrims – many of them women 
– in rapidly changing landscapes. The items they bought and sold, the actions they 
performed, and the meanings they subscribed to them are explored in this last section. 
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Studying History in Moments of Change   
 The majority of research and fieldwork for this project was carried out during 
periods of intense sectarian conflicts at the Sayyeda Zaynab and Bibi Pak Daman shrines. 
Understanding the complexity of how these shrines came to have significance was a 
delicate balance in a period when these discourses about meaning and history had 
hardened into violent confrontation. In Syria, uprisings against the Ba’athist regime had 
morphed into an outright sectarian war. Foreign fighters had flooded into the country to 
wage jihad against Bashar al-Assad and his Iranian backers, while Shi’a militias from 
Lebanon, Iraq, and Iran had converged to defend the country against puritanical Salafi 
Islamist parties. The Sayyeda Zaynab shrine would become a symbolic and literal 
battleground between these opposing ideologies.60 In Pakistan, the resurgence of violent 
Islamic extremist groups, systematic target killing, and bombing campaigns against 
religious sites have led to increasing fears of Shi’a genocide.61 Bomb threats against 
shrines became a common occurrence, but as a shrine with implications for Shi’a 
Muslims, Bibi Pak Daman was shut down for prolonged periods on multiple occasions. 
Yet ironically, both devotes and enemies of these sites were increasingly operating off the 
same conclusion – these were shrines to Ruqayyah and Zaynab and they did have 
significant meaning for the nature of Islam. The narrative, political, and ritual 
constructions of the 20th century had achieved success.   
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I was fortunate in these conditions to make connections that allowed me access to 
the shrine records from Bibi Pak Daman and Sayyeda Zaynab. These records contain a 
wealth of information, much of it previously unused by historians. Personal documents 
and collections were also another critical resource for this work, including legal petitions, 
waqf documents, and letters. Yet other archives – including those of the Syrian Ministry 
of Culture and Ministry of Awqaf – were simply off-limits. Visiting the shrines also 
meant daily confronting the possibility of violence. Many of those pilgrims that did visit 
the shrines were willing to talk, providing invaluable insight into the ways that ziyārat 
was practiced and understood, but few were willing to lend their names to this work. 
Nevertheless, research constraints also presented a unique opportunity to approach these 
shrines from a multidisciplinary angle, to engage with texts, spaces, objects, and people 
alike.   
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Chapter One 
The Trials of Umm al-Masā’ib, the Mother of all Hardships 
 
The 19th century Urdu poet, Mir Anis, found some of his most evocative source 
material in the multiple tragedies of Karbala. A prolific and celebrated writer, Mir Anis 
was a favorite of the wealthy Indian courts and influential citizens in the Indian province 
of Awadh, who promoted the printing and oral recitations of his work throughout the 
region. The recitation of his marsiyas, or elegiac poetry written about the sacrifice of 
Husayn and his companions, would become an enduring element of Shi’a devotional 
practice in the subcontinent, read in public gatherings and referenced by generations of 
new orators. While Karbala was replete with emotional sacrifices, it was to Zaynab’s 
suffering that Anis’ marsiyas often returned. Her grief and pitiable state in the journey 
from Karbala allowed for the maximum invocation of pathos. Anis’ Zaynab became the 
embodiment of the helplessness of the women at Karbala, who were not individually 
defined beyond their familial link to the men that were martyred. Zaynab’s fear is 
prominent throughout his most popular works. In “Hazrat Zaynab Yazid ka Darbar Mein 
[Hazrat Zaynab in Yazīd’s Court],” Anis writes of the arrival of the prisoners to the gates 
of the Umayyad courts,   
Bano [Zaynab] began to weep in grief,  
Weak arms wrapped around at the entrance pillar  
She collapsed on the dirt, and the daughter of ‘Ali began to lament,  
“I will not show my face, I will not come before this tyrant and 
apostate.”   
A soldier came forward towards Zaynab with ropes to bind her  
Sajjad [Husayn’s son] ran forward in disbelief, “how can you dare?”  
Weeping he begged of Zaynab, “For Allah’s sake, come before 
Yazid…  
Do you not remember my father’s will?”  
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[Zaynab] began her lament, beating her chest, and rose.62  
 
Zaynab is reluctant and weakened by her hardships – a common emotional portrayal in 
Anis’ time – and defined solely through her loss at Karbala.  
Similarly, through the turn of the 20th century commemoration for Zaynab was 
tied primarily to Husayn, both in narrative and practice. It was through hagiographies of 
Husayn and the Shi’a infallibles that glimpses of Zaynab’s life emerged and through 
ziyārat to Husayn’s shrine that Zaynab was primarily remembered. Her shrine remained a 
small clay and brick structure marking her purported grave outside of Damascus. 
However, Zaynab’s depictions became more complex and assertive in the later 20th 
century as Shi’ism grew politicized and the interpretive stakes around her life became 
higher – even before she was adopted as a central figure in the rhetoric of the Iranian 
Revolution. New national constructs, geopolitical relations, and ideological debates gave 
impetus to more developed interpretations of Zaynab and her importance to Shi’a 
practice. Beginning in the 1950s, hagiographies began to explore the specifics of 
Zaynab’s life, raising her to the same stature as the Imams whose shrines were mandated 
pilgrimage sites. Many of these hagiographies sought to authenticate her final resting 
place, as sacred competition between graves in Egypt and Syria took on greater political 
resonance. As Husayn’s first pilgrim she became the parable of mourning for Shi’as, 
embodying the behavior that later za’ireen (pilgrims) would emulate. As the daughter of 
Fatima bint Muhammad, the sacrifice from her body in the death of her children, her 
endurance of harsh physical treatment, and the tears she wept sacralized the events of 
Karbala. Her journey after Karbala as she traveled to al-Shām (the region of Damascus), 
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Medina, and beyond became an essential part of mourning narratives. As Shi’a 
communities began to galvanize in political arenas, accounts of her role after Karbala 
transformed her into a defiant symbol of resistance.   
 The development of Zaynab hagiographies over the 20th century, written primarily 
by male Shi’a religious scholars and writers, would reframe Zaynab’s life as a central 
story of Shi’ism; thus, a visit to her shrine would be equal to ziyārat of Husayn, which 
traditions claimed was as spiritually beneficial as the Hajj. Nor did these works appear in 
a political or social vacuum. The creation of new states, establishment of political and 
regional alliances amongst Shi’a movements and institutions of learning, and 
transnational developments would spur a new interest in the shrine of Sayyeda Zaynab. 
Detailed hagiographies and narratives about Zaynab emerged apace with the expansion of 
the shrine, reflecting and encouraging her growing importance in Shi’a jurisprudence and 
popular practice. Yet these narratives were also produced and appropriated by women, 
creating a gendered framework for understanding Zaynab bint ‘Ali and her importance to 
the Shi’a faith. Indeed, by 1985, the respected Lebanese mujtahid Ayatollah Muhammad 
Mehdi Shams al-Din noted that Zaynab was the root of Shi’a mourning traditions – a root 
that was notably female and subject to shifting interpretations and anxieties over 
‘appropriate’ behavior. Yet by extension, Zaynab’s growing role as the embodiment of 
commemoration necessitated and validated a space devoted to her memory.  
 
The “Historical” Zaynab 
Zaynab was raised in the Prophet Muhammad’s household, but little was written 
of her in the early years of Islam beyond her presence at Karbala. The early recorded 
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history of Karbala was itself sparse, with oral accounts the primary source of knowledge 
and transmission. Beginning in the 10th century, however, the events of Karbala were 
documented in multiple historical chronicles, most prominently in the famed Tārikh al-
Rusūl wa al-Mulūk by the Sunni scholar and historian Muhammad ibn Jarir al-Tabari. 
More commonly referred to as Tārikh al-Tabari, the chronicle is one of the main 
religious and historical sources of early Islam; the volume entitled “The Caliphate of 
Yazīd bin Mu’awiyah” detailed the tragic incidents on the battlefield and political 
repercussions of the aftermath of Karbala. Zaynab appears in this history only during 
Karbala, with little focus on her life before or after returning to Medina. While Zaynab’s 
speeches against the Caliph Yazīd on the journey from Karbala are lauded, she is more 
frequently simply referred to as the sister of Husayn. Zaynab remains defined solely in 
her relation to the men of Karbala and the sorrow the sacrifice of her sons and brothers 
caused her. Most critically, though, al-Tabari credits her for the survival of Zayn al-
Abidīn, Husayn’s son and the designated fourth Imam; thus, she is responsible for the 
continuation of the unbroken line of the Shi’a Imamate. Zaynab nursed him through his 
illness during Karbala and in the long march towards Damascus protected him from harm 
and Umayyad soldiers with her body, accusing, “I plead to you by Allah, if you are a 
believer, if you kill him, you must kill me with him.”63 Knowing he could not strike down 
the daughter of ‘Ali so publically without incurring the wrath of an already restless 
population, Yazīd relented. Through the purity of her female body was the male Imamate 
saved. Yet Tabari’s text also notes that Zaynab herself never sought an outsized role in 
the aftermath of Karbala. Tabari narrates that when Ubaydallah ibn Ziyad, the governor 
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of Kufa, was enraged by Zaynab’s speech, he is placated by the words of his follower 
Amr bin Hurayth: “She is only but a woman. Are women to be responsible for anything 
that they speak?” Thus, even the strength of Zaynab’s words are removed from her own 
control. Zaynab herself assents to this view, according to Tabari, when she scoffs at 
praise, “What has a woman to do with bravery.”64 Al-Tabari does include two of 
Zaynab’s famed speeches along the journey to Karbala, but he does not discuss at length 
the most charged of her speeches directed against Yazīd in the Umayyad court in 
Damascus.65 After their return to Medina, however, little is said of Zaynab’s life in al-
Tabari’s history; it is in his own account of his time in Cairo that he notes Zaynab 
traveled there at the end of her life and passed away of natural causes in Egypt. Few early 
sources highlight the circumstances of Zaynab’s death in great detail, though records of 
visitation to both sites existed.66 Most purely Shi’a accounts that developed in later 
centuries would differ from this narrative, instead emphasizing that she returned in 
sorrow to Damascus and likely died there soon after.67  
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66 Other famed writers mentioned the grave in Egypt, including the Egyptian religious scholar 
Jalaludin al-Sayuti (d. 1505). Aliaa El Sandouby has focused on the history of Ahl al-Bayt shrines 
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commemorate the tragedy of Karbala. Historiographies that place her grave in Egypt give the date 
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Al-Tabari’s chronicle was one of the earliest accounts of Karbala, though its focus 
was primarily on the development of politics and religious authority in early Islam. Two 
Shi’a accounts would build and embellish on the history laid out by al-Tabari and become 
the source for emotive mourning narratives and public sermons commemorating Karbala: 
Shaykh al-Mufīd’s (d. 1022) Kitab al-irshād in Arabic and Mullah Husayn Waiz 
Kāshifi’s (d. 1505) Rawdat al-shuhadā, written in Persian. A detailed biography of the 14 
Infallibles – Muhammad, his daughter Fatima, and the 12 Shi’a Imams – Kitab al-ishād 
was written by the renowned traditionalist scholar Shaykh al-Mufīd during the Shiite 
Buwayhid dynasty. The accounts of Zaynab in Kitab al-irshād are brief, and while they 
allude to her exemplary standing through her relation to the infallibles, they are mostly 
interspersed through the retelling of the lives of the other Imams. In al-Mufīd’s telling, 
Zaynab often lost heart on the plains of Karbala and “struck at her face and cried out in 
grief.”68 When the time came for Husayn to prepare for battle, she tore at her garments 
and was so overcome that she “fell down in a faint.”69 Zaynab herself was not infallible, 
nor portrayed at the same level of piety as all her family, for her open expression of grief 
was a reflection of some doubt in Allah’s will. Among al-Mufīd’s prominent students, 
including the preeminent Shi’a theologian Shaykh al-Tusi, this depiction would take hold 
amongst Arabic writings of the traditionalist school.  
But it would be in the Persian Rawdat al-shuhadā that the more lavish Karbala 
narratives would be recorded. Written by Husayn Waiz Kāshifi, a well-known literary 
figure of the fifteenth century, Rawdat al-shuhadā would become one of the most 
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influential Shi’a commemorative texts, transforming an Arab-centric narrative into an 
accessible and emotionally impactful Persian anthology dealing with the sufferings of the 
prophets and the martyrs of Karbala.70 In her analysis of how changing portrayals of 
Fatima bint Muhammad provide an insight into evolving values, both in the Shi’a 
community at large and in male expectations of ideal Shia womanhood, historian 
Firoozeh Kashani Sabet has noted that Kāshifi’s version of the Fatima legend is 
connected to “his desire to validate the uniqueness of Ali and the lawful claim of the 
Shi’ite Imams to the leadership of the Muslim community after the Prophet’s death.”71 
Kashani Sabet notes that while Kāshifi related narratives that did emphasize Fatima’s 
acceptance of her father’s will and her divine influence in affecting conversions, her most 
frequent depiction was still of “a weeping and emotionally fragile woman.”72 Though a 
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(London: I.B. Taurus, 2002).  
71 Firoozeh Kashani Sabet, “Who is Fatima? Gender, Culture, and Representation in Islam,” 
Journal of Middle East Women’s Studies, Vol. 1, No. 2 (Spring 2005), 8. Kashani Sabet has 
traced the portrait of Fatima from Kāshifi’s work, through the Qajar and Pahlavi period to Ali 
Shari’ati’s Fatima is Fatima lectures delivered in 1971 on the anniversary of her birth. She notes 
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72 ibid, “Fatima is Fatima,” 10.   
	   46	  
source of emulation for her piety and submissive behavior as a woman, Fatima’s life was 
ultimately a validation of the Shi’a Imamate. Similarly, Zaynab’s suffering is but another 
element that compounded the injustices that Husayn endured before his martyrdom. The 
vivid descriptions of the tragedies of Karbala that befell Zaynab are ultimately to incite 
grief for Husayn, because “whoever sheds tears for Husayn…he is bound to enter 
Paradise.”73 The women in these narratives, while displaying admirable traits of idealized 
female behavior, existed primarily to support the claims of the male Shi’a Imams and 
martyrs. Kāshifi’s text in particular would be widely transmitted and translated across the 
Shi’a world, and his dramatic and evocative style provided the richest Karbala source 
material for generations. As such, for centuries Kāshifi’s depictions would be deeply 
influential amongst ulama and orators delivering sermons on Karbala, including 
historians commissioned in the Qajar period.74  
Nasir al-Din Shah Qajar’s patronage of historical writings included the lengthy 
Nasikh al-Tawarikh by Muhammad Taqi Sipihr (Lisan al Mulk). First commissioned 
during Muhammad Shah’s reign, Nasikh al-Tawarikh was to cover world history, though 
primarily linked to the story of Shi’ism as Nasir al-Din positioned himself as the defender 
of the faith. Nasikh al-Tawarikh was the most comprehensive source to date on the 
specifics of Zaynab’s life, containing increasing illusions to her divinity and comparisons 
to Hassan and Husayn. In this account, the Prophet used to put his tongue in the mouth of 
Zaynab like he did with Hassan and Husayn to suckle them when they were thirsty. Like 
Hassan and Husayn, Zaynab was divinely named, as the angel Gabriel descended to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 Husayn Wa’iz al-Kāshifi, Rawdat al-shuhada' (Tehran: Kitab forooshi-e-Islamiyah, 1979),12. 
74 Muhammad Taqi Sipihr, Nasikh al-Tawarikh (Tehran: Kitab forooshi-e-Islamiyah, 1982), vol. 
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Fatima and ‘Ali’s home. Thus, by the turn of the 20th century, Kāshifi’s work remained 
the most prevalent basis of the dominant Shi’a narratives about Karbala.  
 
The Modernizer’s Zaynab  
In 1935, Syed Muhsin al-Amīn’s multi-volume manifesto A’yān al-Shi’ah 
signaled a pronounced shift in depictions of Sayyeda Zaynab, heavily influenced by al-
Amīn’s social viewpoints and political environment. Al-Amīn was one of the most 
influential of the Lebanese marja’ from Jabal Amil, a reformist cleric who completed his 
religious instruction in Najaf and returned to Damascus to guide the Shi’a community to 
increasing prominence during the French mandate.75 Despite his roots in Lebanon, it was 
in Damascus where Al-Amīn found his largest base of support as the only unquestioned 
marja’ of a Shi’a community yet to coalesce into an assertive community under Ottoman 
and colonial rule.76 Al-Amīn’s demands for the protection of Shi’a waqf properties and 
his support for the expansion of the Sayyeda Zaynab shrine were deeply tied to his 
attempts to regulate Shi’a mourning and commemoration rituals vis-à-vis the colonial 
state and other religious communities. Al-Amīn’s preoccupation with appropriate 
religious and social behavior and creating a ‘modernist’ Shi’a community extended to his 
depiction of Sayyeda Zaynab. His debates on reforming Muharram rituals, for example, 
included opposition to overwrought and vocal female emotional responses. According to 
historian Max Weiss, al-Amīn believed that women “should not ‘scream’ within earshot 
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of ‘foreign men’; screaming is described as ‘ugly’…Muhsin al-Amīn relocated that honor 
within her subdued and modest behavior in religious ritual.”77 Perhaps ironically, this 
caution against women’s vocal role in mourning can be directly tied to a portrayal of 
Sayyeda Zaynab that emphasized her forbearance and patience in the face of great 
hardship on the plains of Karbala, surrounded by ‘foreign’ and enemy foes. In Muhsin al-
Amīn’s depiction, no longer was Zaynab crying out, striking her face, and collapsing in 
grief, a narrative that had held since al-Mufīd and Kāshifi’s work. Instead, Zaynab 
accepted the divinely ordained events, willingly sacrificing her two sons, and even 
helping to suit Husayn for battle.78 As Husayn rode out to battle, alone against the 
growing forces of Yazīd, Zaynab could not yet bear the separation and emerged from the 
tents to the top of a small hill to watch the fighting below. Alone and surrounded by his 
enemies, Husayn cried out, “Is there no one here to come to my aid?” Heartbroken, 
Zaynab was tempted to fling herself to her brother’s aid, but she restrained herself, for 
her time had not yet come.79 
Al-Amīn’s Zaynab was also quoted for her virtue and memorization and 
understanding of the Qurān, as she was raised in a most holy house, where the Qurān was 
the basis for all knowledge and advice dispensed. Before Karbala, she too was considered 
an authority in religious instruction; along the route to Damascus as a prisoner, Zaynab 
was said to have recited and responded to insults with verses praising the Prophet and his 
family and condemning the unbelievers.80 Notably, Muhsin al-Amīn himself helped 
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found several schools for Shi’a youth in Damascus, where a lack of proper Shi’a 
instruction was seen as a source of the community’s lack of coherence and progress, as 
students would continue their education in the Muslim Sunni schools of Damascus.81 
Among al-Amīn’s new schools was one for girls to focus on Qurānic instruction, a 
reformist step that would later be praised by Iranian ideologues Jalāl Āl-I Ahmad and Ali 
Shari’ati for tackling the lack of modern education that had doomed Shi’a communities to 
backwardness.82 Muhsin al-Amīn’s ideological commitment to a reformed Shi’a 
community in the Levant and his influence as an unquestioned marja’ in Damascus 
created a new Zaynab: fully versed in the Qurān, not fearful of Allah’s will, firm in her 
sacrifice and knowledge. Al-Amīn’s religious and political support for the expansion and 
development of Zaynab’s shrine cannot be separated from his theological perspective. 
Indeed, his biography included his belief that Zaynab had returned to a small town named 
Rawiya, outside of Damascus, at the end of her life and was likely buried at the current 
gravesite, a belief manifested in his fatwas to back the efforts to grow the shrine. Yet for 
al-Amīn the debate over her grave was less critical than the creation of a site that marked 
the Ahl al-Bayt in Damascus, separate from the conflicting dynamics of history of the 
Umayyad mosque site. It would be a shrine whose religious import rivaled older Shi’a 
sites, a space where his particular theological rationale on appropriate Karbala mourning 
rituals could gain traction. His reverence of Zaynab as an exemplary figure who deserved 
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a shrine worthy of her standing would end with his own burial in the courtyard of the 
Sayyeda Zaynab after his death in 1952.83  
 
 
(Figure 1.1: Funeral of Syed Muhsin al-Amīn) 
 
Al-Amīn’s work, though ostensibly revealing a ‘new’ 20th century discourse on 
Zaynab’s education and strength of character, was still a decidedly male perspective. 
Indeed, al-Amīn’s particular characterization of Zaynab stemmed in part from unease 
with female participation in the patriarchy of Shi’a religious space and the colonial 
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sphere. The concern over who Zaynab was and what her shrine meant was emblematic of 
the confines of colonial discourse. In her work Colonial Citizens, historian Elizabeth 
Thompson has argued that women became a site of conflict in the Mandatory period, and 
keeping the question of women’s status subordinate was a way to alleviate tensions 
between various groups. According to Thompson, the destabilization of male authority 
and the transformation of female roles had created a crisis of paternity, and reaffirming 
gender hierarchies helped mitigate otherwise uncontrollable social tensions.84 
Thompson’s emphasis on the intersection of gender, class, and sect provide a unique lens 
into the colonial and mandatory social relations and how these structures translated into 
the independent Syrian state. It also, however, reveals how control over defining a female 
shrine would fit the particular power dynamics in Mandatory Syria. For al-Amīn, the 
importance of Zaynab and her re-imagining was not in the challenge to traditional gender 
roles; indeed, while it provided a new approach to Zaynab’s behavior at Karbala and 
beyond, it paradoxically stemmed from gendered power dynamics and physical control of 
the shrine. Zaynab’s strength came in part from her silence and restraint in the face of 
great trauma.  
Yet his position among Shi’a ulama and his endorsement of a shrine in Damascus 
would create momentum behind the Sayyeda Zaynab, and his conservative modernist 
discourse on Zaynab would sacralize the shrine. Ulama and Shi’a religious leaders would 
implicitly endorse this view in their hagiographies of Zaynab, though would internalize 
the same gender constructions that marked al-Amīn’s writings. The Najafi shaykh and 
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judge, Muhammad Ja’far al-Naqdi, in his 1943 hagiography Zaynab al-Kubra, notes that 
Zaynab’s early life was defined by privacy and silence. Al-Naqdi relates one of the few 
hadith that mention Zaynab at a younger age and records that ‘Ali’s neighbor claimed, “I 
never heard the voice of Zaynab, nor saw her, although I was living but next door.”85 
Zaynab’s whole life was influenced by Fatima and ‘Ali’s will, according to al-Naqdi, to 
such an extent that one of the conditions of Zaynab’s wedding to Abdullah bin Ja’far was 
that she would be permitted a daily visit to Husayn and that she would never be prevented 
from going on a journey with him.86 Al-Naqdi’s focus remains primarily on a renewed 
emphasis on Zaynab’s piety and closeness to God. At a young age, according to al-Naqdi, 
Zaynab even astonished ‘Ali with her single-minded devotion to God. ‘Ali once tested 
Zaynab on her faith in the tawhīd, or oneness of God, al-Naqdi narrates. When Zaynab 
was a young child,  
As Zaynab was sitting on ‘Ali’s lap, he asked her to say ‘wahīd’ and 
Zaynab replied ‘one.’ Then ‘Ali prompted her to say ‘ithnān’ but Zaynab 
would not say ‘two.’ ‘Ali asked her why, and Zaynab responded, ‘My 
father, the tongue that has said ‘wahīd’ shall never say two.’ ‘Ali hugged 
and kissed her, content in her faith in Allah.87  
 
Her faith and standing in the eyes of Allah were so great, according to al-Naqdi, 
that on the night before his death Husayn requested that Zaynab specifically pray for him 
during her nightly Tahajjud prayers, because no other prayers would reach Allah so 
powerfully.88 It was this ability to intercede for devotees that would become a critical 
argument in the expansion of her gravesite, already undertaken by an alliance of local 
notables and Shi’a religious leaders. By the outbreak of WWII, the theological arguments 
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were emerging to establish the importance of a shrine to Zaynab bint ‘Ali that befitted her 
lineage, her relationship to Husayn, ties to the infallibles, piety and knowledge – albeit 
couched in a conservative language espoused by male Shi’a religious authorities. For 
these Shi’a ulama, a position that stressed the spiritual equality and importance of Zaynab 
was not synonymous with one that challenged her role outside the confines of family. In 
her seminal work Women and Gender in Islam, Leila Ahmed has argued that Islam itself 
contains these two divergent messages within its texts and hadith: the ‘ethical’ message 
that emphasized the moral and spiritual equality of all humans that Islam ensured, often 
overshadowed by the ‘sexual hierarchy’, which has privileged men and prevailed. It was 
the latter that had found its way into the formulation of laws and institutions.89 Similarly, 
these dichotomous instincts would be present in hagiographies of Zaynab that posited her 
emotional control and quiet piety as a sign of her equality.  
 
A Women’s Saint  
A generation of female writers, primarily Egyptian, would reconstruct the entirety 
of her life and fashion Zaynab into an quasi-feminist Islamic role model and nationalist 
icon. Their image of Zaynab would create a new legendary figure, a pious, wise, and 
fearless companion who was capable of political maneuvering when called upon, even 
through personal grief; that portrayal, however, was inextricably tied to a commitment to 
Zaynab as a patron saint of Egypt, a nationalist icon who was buried in Cairo after 
traveling to Misr to escape persecution in Medina. In 1966, Aisha ‘Abd al-Rahman 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 Leila Ahmad, Women and Gender in Islam: Historical Roots of a Modern Debate (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1992).  
	   54	  
published a hagiography of Zaynab entitled Batalat Karbala: Zaynab bint al-Zahrā, part 
of a widely read and acclaimed series of biographies on the women of the Prophet’s 
household. ‘Abd al-Raman was among the generation of prominent of Egyptian women 
academics and writers of the 20th century and a respected Islamic scholar. Deeply 
influenced by the national currents of her time, ‘Abd al-Rahman’s particular gender and 
intellectual concerns would figure prominently in her portrayal of Zaynab. Born in 1913 
in the coastal town of Dimyat, her rural experience would remain a prevalent influence 
throughout her writings, especially in her novels and short stories penned under the name 
Bint al’Shāti’.90 Her mother was a descendant of a former shaykh of Al-Azhar, the 
preeminent institution of Islamic learning, and her father, Shaykh Muhammad ‘Ali ‘Abd 
al-Rahman, taught at a local religious school. He trained ‘Abd al-Rahman in classical 
Arabic and the Qurān from a young age, despite his initial objections to her schooling, 
and left an indelible influence on her. Batalat Karbala was dedicated to her father; in the 
introduction she ruminates, “Your memory was in my mind with every word…you were 
speaking and I was writing.”91 It was through her father’s influence that she was inspired 
to write the book, remembering an occasion from her childhood in the Islamic month of 
Rajab when her father was preparing to travel to Cairo for the urs of Zaynab, even as her 
mother had gone into labor. ‘Abd al-Rahman reminisces that she and her sister Fatima 
begged him to cancel the trip, but her father sat her close to discuss the purpose of his 
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travel, explaining that “his presence at the urs of our Lady Zaynab was his duty.”92 
Before departing, he instructed his wife that if the child was a daughter, her name must be 
Zaynab. Her father’s reverence for the Prophet’s family remained with her and would 
inspire her biographies on the women in the Prophet’s life.  
‘Abd al-Rahman moved to Cairo and received her degree in Arabic Language and 
Literature at Cairo University in 1939, was an instructor of Arabic literature at various 
institutions, was appointed an inspector of Arabic Language in the Egyptian Ministry of 
Education in 1942, and obtained her PhD in 1950.93 Most notably, she was the first 
Muslim woman to publish a full treatise on Qurānic exegesis (tafsir) and became famous 
for her hadith and Qurānic interpretation. In her time in Cairo, ‘Abd al-Rahman would 
witness the growth of Egyptian nationalism and the new women’s movements, and cross 
paths with the giants of the Nahda, the Arabic cultural and literary renaissance of the mid 
and late 20th century.94 From Muhammad ‘Abduh’s Islamic reformism to Qāsim Amīn’s 
nationalism and Huda Sha’rawi’s pioneering movement for women’s rights, the dynamic 
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Egyptian milieu would be reflected in her work. Yet she herself would come to espouse a 
kind of Islamic conservative modernism, emphasizing a woman’s right to education and 
work, but not at the expense of her role as a mother or in a marriage; indeed, ‘Abd al-
Rahman’s own polygamous marriage would be one of the most defining relationships in 
her life. Unlike the more fundamentalist Islamists such as Zainab al-Ghazali who faced 
political oppression, however, Aisha ‘Abd al-Rahman would be honored by Gamal Abdel 
Nasser for her particular concern with the conditions of Egyptian peasants, belief in 
equality consistent with Islamic values, and critiques of Al-Azhar policies.95   
‘Abd al-Rahman’s histories of the women in the Prophet’s life, including Batalat 
Karbala, were part of an emerging women’s biographical tradition in Arab literature that 
had previously been the domain of male authors. Her own personal experiences and 
ideological perspective would influence her portrayal of Zaynab as an Islamic paragon 
for the modern woman – especially for the modern Egyptian woman seeking to define 
herself in a time of intellectual and political pressures. ‘Abd al-Rahman would 
deliberately not call herself a feminist and advocated an understanding of the Islamic 
models of ideal women.96 ‘Abd al-Rahman’s source work in Batalat Karbala is rich with 
references to hadith and religious tracts to authenticate the history. Yet she acknowledges 
that it is not “pure history” but also not pure legend; instead, it is her account of the role 
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and status of Zaynab in Islamic history. Zaynab’s primary role was to be raised as a 
virtuous daughter, mother, and sister, but when her involvement in violent political 
conflict was unavoidable, she distinguished herself as an exemplar of knowledge, 
strength, and devotion. Notably, ‘Abd al-Rahman chose to identify Zaynab through her 
maternal lineage in the title as the daughter of Fatima, not the daughter of ‘Ali, as was 
convention. Zaynab was thus directly associated with the unimpeachable character of 
Fatima, the Prophet’s devoted and only surviving child and the universally revered and 
female exemplar of Islam. In ‘Abd al-Rahman’s account, when ‘Ali informed his 
daughter about what was to come at Karbala, she replied that Fatima had already 
prepared her.  It was her mother’s last instructions, or wasiyat, that she was to never leave 
her brother’s side, because Zaynab’s role was now as his mother after Fatima’s death.97 
Like ‘Abd al-Rahman, Zaynab was a Qurānic scholar who taught the women of 
Medina and would give religious instruction; indeed, according to ‘Abd al-Rahman, 
Zaynab was “raised in the cradle of knowledge, surrounded by the Prophet’s 
companions.”98 ‘Ali paid close attention to Zaynab’s upbringing, instructing her in 
religion, Qurānic exegesis, and morals – much like ‘Abd al-Rahman’s own father. ‘Abd 
al-Rahman affirms the pre-destination of Karbala, but also takes pains to describe 
Zaynab’s preparation for the tragedies and the hardiness she had already exhibited 
leading up to Husayn’s death. She explains, “I have started this work from Zaynab’s 
infancy to illustrate the extent of her suffering and tragedies, from the cradle to the last 
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moments of her life.”99 Fatima’s grief and anger after Muhammad’s death for the rights 
that were taken away from her, the ummah’s treatment of ‘Ali, the “painful sight” of the 
Prophet’s companion ‘Umar forcing entry into Fatima’s home to demand ‘Ali pledge his 
allegiance to the new caliph Abu Bakr – while she was a passive observer of these events, 
they would all make Zaynab accustomed to grief at a young age.100 They prepared 
Zaynab for what she would face at Karbala, so when the time came she was able to bear 
the events with full understanding of divine will. According to ‘Abd al-Rahman, at 
Karbala on the night before Ashura, Husayn awoke from a sleep and informed Zaynab 
that he dreamt of their grandfather, the Prophet, who told him that the time had come that 
Husayn would soon be returning to him. Zaynab let out a cry and slapped her face, but 
Husayn reminded her that she was the granddaughter of the Prophet and that they had 
been prepared for this moment. Quoting Zayn al-‘Abidīn, ‘Abd al-Rahman writes that 
Zaynab lamented that she too could not sacrifice herself for her family, who would all be 
gone by the end of the day.101 She similarly emphasizes Zaynab’s role as the central 
family figure, noting that all the martyrs’ bodies were brought to her for her to weep over 
and sacralize their sacrifice, as “she was as the mother to them all. She gave comfort and 
mourned for all those that had no one left to mourn for them.”102 The focus on Zaynab as 
a mother figure during the battle reflected ‘Abd al-Rahman’s own critique of the early 
vanguard of the women’s movement in Egypt. “Our failure to recognize the true value of 
the mother’s great role was a major stumbling block in the early stages of the movement, 
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for which our generation paid a terrible price,” she noted in a speech soon before her 
death in 1997.103  
‘Abd al-Rahman quotes numerous poets and narrators who relate that Zaynab did 
not leave her brother for one breath at Karbala, but it was only after his death that she 
exerted her will over the political situation. ‘Abd al-Rahman builds on al-Amīn’s 
portrayal of Zaynab’s grief after Karbala, as she is depicted as drawing strength and 
composure in her time as a prisoner. Those that heard Zaynab’s khutba in Kufa and 
before Yazīd swore “it was as if ‘Ali had returned and was speaking before them, in the 
same delivery and words.”104 She rendered the people of Kufa to tears in their shame; 
when the caravan returned to Medina she continued to speak out on the events of Karbala 
so that the memory of the injustices would stay alive. The governor of Medina wrote to 
Yazīd to warn him that Zaynab was inciting rebellion, and in fear of reprisal the residents 
of Medina requested that she leave the city. According to ‘Abd al-Rahman, Zaynab 
prayed to Allah that He would send her somewhere where she would finally find peace in 
her old age. ‘Abd al-Rahman writes, “She left the home of grandfather and the graves of 
her family and arrived by the Nile, a strange land where she had neither friend nor 
relative.”105 A group of shaykhs and members of the court met Zaynab and brought her to 
Cairo, where she was given shelter, peace, and was buried with respect near the home 
where she last lived. ‘Abd al-Rahman notes that after a lifetime of political and religious 
tribulations, chased out of her homeland, Zaynab was finally received by a people who 
gave her the honor accorded to the granddaughter of the Prophet and Husayn’s sister. 
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‘Abd al-Rahman quotes notable historical figures as evidence for her presence in Cairo, 
including historian Shams al-Din al-Sakhawi’s Al-Tuhfah al-latīfah fi Tarīkh al-Madinah 
al-Sharīfah and Sufi scholar Abd al-Wahhab al-Sharani’s Al-Tabaqāt al-Kubra. For Bint 
al-Shāti’s, Zaynab was a source of emulation for women – a pious Muslim, a devoted 
wife, mother, and sister, well versed in the Qurān and hadith, but still able to exert great 
influence in the political arena when the situation arose – and a national icon.   
‘Abd al-Rahman’s emphasis that Zaynab fled to Cairo because of the great love 
that the people of Misr held for the Ahl al-Bayt and that Zaynab died a natural and 
peaceful death there was the account supported by popular Egyptian narratives and the 
preeminent Sunni scholars of Al-Azhar. The Sayyeda Zaynab shrine in Cairo had been a 
revered site of worship for centuries, and Zaynab herself had become a popular saint in 
public consciousness and Egyptian literature.106 While the vast majority of Shi’a Muslims 
claimed Damascus as the spot of Zaynab’s grave, the Sayyeda Zaynab shrine in Cairo 
had a long history of public ritual and political patronage. ‘Abd al-Rahman notes that the 
mosque was rebuilt by Muhammad ‘Ali, considered the founder of modern Egypt; ‘Ali 
Pasha Mubarak, the influential Egyptian Minister of Education and of Public Works 
under the Ottoman Empire, also lived near and frequented the Sayyeda Zaynab mosque. 
At the time of the publication of Batalat al-Karbala, Gamal Abdel Nasser had undertaken 
new renovations of the mosque, coinciding with the Syrian expansion at the Sayyeda 
Zaynab shrine in Damascus.107 The Sayyeda Zaynab mosque in Cairo was a site of 
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unparalleled national and Islamic significance, ‘Abd al-Rahman noted, a shrine that had 
been visited by pilgrims for centuries and should only continue to grow; certainly, her 
influential and extensive hagiography of Zaynab would further sacralize the site and tie 
narrative, history, and sacred geography together onto the space of the shrine.  
While Batalat Karbala would deviate from some of the central components of 
Shi’a hagiography, ‘Abd al-Rahman’s extensive text on Zaynab would become the basis 
on which newly assertive hagiographies of her life were written. Many would take pains 
to challenge her allegedly faulty historical conclusions that Zaynab would end up in 
Cairo, even as her legend of Zaynab would permeate new hagiographies in interesting 
ways. Notably, while the de-veiling of Zaynab and the violation of her virtue was perhaps 
the central tragedy in Shi’a hagiography before the publication of Batalat Karbala and 
the most defining lens through which Zaynab was viewed, ‘Abd al-Rahman devotes 
significantly less attention to this trauma in her text. While it was certainly one of the 
indignities Zaynab suffered, as it was done without her consent, the lack of veil did not 
figure prominently in her discussion of Zaynab’s travels from Karbala to Damascus. 
‘Abd al-Rahman herself did not wear a veil or hijab through much of her public life, even 
refusing the insistence of Al-Azhar shaykhs that she cover her head at a large public 
address there in 1959.108 The de-emphasis on Zaynab’s veil by a female writer in this time 
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period, with the growth of secular and women’s movements, is certainly understandable 
given the historical context of this hagiography. But ‘Abd al-Rahman’s de-emphasis on 
Zaynab’s unveiling would also translate in Shi’a hagiographies into more powerful 
articulations of Zaynab’s strength post-Karbala. While in Shi’a hagiographies the forced 
removal of her veil would remain a major sin committed by the Umayyad forces, Zaynab 
would react in a more defiant manner. No longer would she be cowed and grieved by the 
loss of her veil. Instead, Zaynab would emerge stronger for the loss, with the removal of 
her veil signifying her transformation into an ‘Ali-like figure. Indeed, since the mid-20th 
century and ‘Abd al-Rahman’s hagiography, for many Shi’as the importance of Karbala 
has been in the reinterpretation of Zaynab’s behavior. According to anthropologist Lara 
Deeb in her work on the Shi’a community in Beirut, “representations that had depicted 
Zaynab as a plaintive mourner were transformed to renderings that accentuated her 
courage, strength, and resilience…It is Zaynab who carries the history of Ashura forward 
to future generations of Shi’i Muslims.”109 Her role would thus grow in prominence. She 
would be positioned as a close extension of the 14 infallible Shi’a figures, molded to 
embody their same qualities, and visitation to her shrine in Damascus would be 
positioned to equal and rival that of Karbala or Najaf. 
 ‘Abd al-Rahman’s portrayal of Zaynab would mirror similar moves to shift and 
appropriate discourses about Zaynab and a growing Shi’a consciousness and affiliation 
with her life. The remembrance and recitations of lamentations for Zaynab were common 
themes in private female ritual practice, especially in female-only gatherings 
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commemorating the events of Ashura. While the segregation of male and female 
mourning practices in public was the most common experience, women were still present 
at the margins of these rituals, quietly observing, preparing meals, and providing 
logistical support. Yet through the 1960s, women became more visible in public 
mourning rituals and in their engagement with Zaynab. In particular, older texts and 
narratives were given new life in the public sphere in places like India and Pakistan, with 
prominent female performers reciting marsiyas through popular media. While the words 
of these texts were written in the 19th century, they were given a new resonance when 
performed by female voices and widely disseminated through radio and public television 
recordings. Famed classical singers of India and Pakistan, including Noor Jahan, Lata 
Mangeshkar, and Kajjan Begum, performed Ghabraye Gi Zaynab for wide audiences. 
The classic elegiac poem elaborated on the fear that Zaynab felt on the night of the 10th of 
Muharram, after all her male companions had been killed and the camps of the women 
set on fire. While male orators had long performed the marsiya, the increasing adaptation 
of these verses into the female voice changed the emotive power of the words. Women 
publicly identifying and mourning with Zaynab, owning her pain as their own, heads 
covered but voices raised, even as they lamented her fear at the loss of her veil, 
represented a new paradigm. The words were unchanged, describing Zaynab’s 
helplessness, yet these performances represented a new public appropriation and 
widespread affiliation with Zaynab’s life. As anthropologist Saba Mahmood noted in her 
work on the women’s piety movement in the mosques in Cairo, the prospect of women 
speaking in the same ‘language’ as men or for the same purposes had led her to wonder 
why on the surface “such a large number of women across the Muslim world actively 
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support a movement that seems inimical to their own interests and agendas.”110 Yet as 
with the women’s piety movement, these women’s active engagement with this language 
changed the very meaning of the discourse, and these female performers speaking the 
same words on Zaynab did not mean passively accepting older narratives of her 
character. Indeed, according to scholar Diane D’Souza, women often find and create 
meaning within the larger structures of power of which they are part.111 Female 
performance of marisya in the 1960s specifically detailing Zaynab’s ordeal created a 
heightened awareness of the importance of the female voice in Karbala rituals and 
illustrated an increasing transnational interest in Sayyeda Zaynab.112 
 
The Blood or the Message 
Amidst the politicization and radicalization of Shi’a organizations in the 1970s, 
Zaynab’s sacrifice was made equal to Husayn’s as concerted efforts were undertaken to 
expand her shrine by transnational religious and political networks. Zaynab’s actions at 
Karbala and beyond allowed women to internalize her defiance and construct a space in 
which they could articulate their independence as women.113 Male religious and political 
leaders promulgated and seized on this interpretation of Zaynab as a metaphor for 
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engaging women in ‘acceptable’ tropes of religious resistance and revolution.114 The 
1970s saw new rhetoric in the discussion of women in Shi’ism, as part of larger debates 
about the galvanization and appeal of Islam in the political sphere and the apparent 
failure of secular national leadership in the Middle East. In Lebanon, the leading Shi’a 
mujtahid, Musa al-Sadr, was widely seen as responsible for the politicization of a 
previously unorganized Shi’a community in Lebanon. After accepting a position as the 
leading Shi’a religious figure in Tyre, replacing the well-known Abd al-Husayn Sharif al-
Dīn (d. 1957), al-Sadr would become a visible advocate for Shi’a political and economic 
representation and towering figure in Syrian and Lebanese politics.115 Despite his 
energized efforts at reform and political representation for the Shi’a population, al-Sadr 
was a moderate, preferring to work within the construct of the political system and the 
nation-state paradigm to affect change. Similarly, al-Sadr would advocate for a more 
public role for women in the community and in education, although this participation was 
not to be at the expense of their roles as mothers and wives. In a speech on the role of 
women, al-Sadr noted that women such as Fatima and Zaynab had played a crucial and 
often public role in the early Islamic age. Al-Sadr noted that Zaynab was the one who 
spread the word of Karbala “from the heart of the desert to the capitals of the Muslim 
world, from Kufa to Hums to Hama to Aleppo to Baalbak and then Damascus.”116 Zaynab 
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provided al-Sadr a model of strength and action that had transnational resonance, one that 
he could mold to fit his calls for a more assertive Shi’a community, yet his invocation of 
the most prominent cities of Lebanon and Syria grounded her in a national reality. 
Zaynab’s historical presence in Damascus enhanced al-Sadr’s engagement with sacred 
geography, as shrine authorities in Syria were similarly balancing appeals to transnational 
Shi’ism with an assertion of Arab heritage.     
Thus the new focus on Zaynab provided the contours for reformists of the 1970s 
to reimagine her role, although al-Sadr’s assertive portrayal of Zaynab never reached a 
truly radical one. Simultaneous to al-Sadr’s activism in Lebanon, however, Ali Shari’ati, 
the Iranian intellectual and political activist would be painting a new image of Zaynab as 
fearless and true revolutionary. Shari’ati’s radical interpretation of Shi’ism and 
impassioned opposition to the Shah had incited increasing discontent against the regime 
of Muhammad Reza Pahlavi. After his return from France in 1964, his lectures at the 
Hosseiniyeh Ershad, the institution he had hoped to position as the Shi’a rival to Al-
Azhar, attracted growing thousands to his message of revolutionary ‘Red Shi’ism.’117 
Shari’ati’s dramatically new interpretations of gender roles, institutional ulama authority, 
and social reforms would also alienate significant portions of the clerical establishment in 
Iran.118 Shari’ati would reinvigorate the Karbala narrative into a powerful and 
contemporary political motif about resistance against tyranny and fashion Zaynab as the 
twin face of Husayn’s movement for justice. “One must choose: either blood or the 
message,” Shari’ati had argued in a series of lectures on martyrdom at the Ershad and the 
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Masjid-e-Jami’ in 1972. Husayn had accomplished martyrdom and chosen blood, but 
those who lived must live like Zaynab had, carrying on the message in the face of 
oppression and creating a lasting impact on human history.119 According to historian Ali 
Rahnema, Shari’ati believed that “without the preacher of the message and the storyteller, 
history would have forgotten the blood and the sacrifice;” indeed, the role of the 
messenger in bringing to light injustice was one that Shari’ati himself had embraced.120 
But Shari’ati would also universalize Zaynab beyond just a female exemplar and 
elucidated more than just a reformist view of traditional gender dichotomies. Instead, for 
him Zaynab represented a particular paradigm that was accessible and inspirational to all 
involved in political struggle, to stand up against political oppression in the name of 
‘true’ Islam and not be afraid to speak in public arenas against powerful authorities. 
Zaynab as an exemplary figure was no longer limited to her gender. In one of his most 
important lectures on the role of women in a true Islamic society, Shari’ati noted, “When 
Zaynab saw that the revolution had begun, she left her family, her husband and children, 
and joined the revolution. It was not for the sake of her brother Husayn, who was the 
leader of this revolution, that she joined it. She did so because of her own responsibility 
and commitment to her society, her religion and her God.”121 Unlike al-Naqdi, who 
portrayed Zaynab’s journey to Karbala as stemming from duty and devotion to Husayn, 
Shari’ati argued that Zaynab made this choice as an individual, irrespective of her 
traditional or familial ties. In fact, according to Shari’ati, she sacrificed her traditional 
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role as a wife and mother in the face of the coming revolution, understanding that her 
mission for Islamic justice was too important to stay home. While her strength and 
courage were certainly unique in her circumstances, she represented the other side of two 
equal aspects to revolution, as both the physical and ideological struggle were central to 
Karbala. Indeed, Shari’ati himself had chosen the message, and his reverence for Zaynab 
made her an Islamic icon that transcended gendered affiliations. Yet this individualized 
Zaynab – one whose motivations and narrative existed even independent from Husayn’s 
– provided the critical ideological and popular support for the growing interest in 
Zaynab’s shrine, especially amongst Iranian Shi’a. 
 
Confirming Sacred Space 
At a time when transnational Shi’a activism was at its apex, these assertive 
portrayals of Zaynab bint ‘Ali would be linked to a site where these ideas could be 
captured and galvanized, and where reverence for a figure of Zaynab’s stature could be 
properly expressed. In 1979, as with Shi’a communities in Lebanon, Iraq, and Iran 
mobilized by the ongoing Lebanese Civil War and Iranian Revolution, a definitive 
hagiography and history of Zaynab’s travels to Damascus was published. Written by 
Pakistani scholar Muhammad Hasanayn al-Sābiqi, Marqad al-‘Aqīlah Zaynab was a text 
that reflected the new perception of Zaynab, growing transnational Shi’a networks, and 
the critical link between hagiography and shrine. Hailing from the Shi’a majority city of 
Quetta, Al-Sābiqi received his religious training from Najaf in the 1960s and was 
encouraged to write this book after witnessing the efforts of “men of high lineage” who 
had spent a decade traveling to the Iraqi shrine cities in their “blessed work to make a 
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greater shrine for Zaynab, the daughter of ‘Ali, the Commander of the Faithful.”122 Al-
Sābiqi’s time in Najaf gave him a deep appreciation for the sacredness of the Shi’a 
shrines and the rewards that ziyārat bestowed upon the believer; as such, the righteous 
work being done by the Shi’as of Damascus who were actively promoting the Sayyeda 
Zaynab shrine were a significant blessing to the ummah, he commended.123 Al-Sābiqi 
would move to Damascus in 1975 to continue his work at the hawza Zaynabiyya, the first 
seminary established in the Sayyeda Zaynab shrine. The hawza Zaynabiyya was founded 
by the Iraqi Syed Hassan Shirazi, part of the large and influential Shirazi family of 
Karbala that had been exiled by the Ba’ath regime.124 Al-Sābiqi’s movements from 
Pakistan, to Najaf, and then to the hawza Zaynabiyya in Damascus provide a microcosm 
for understanding the complex transnational religious alliances of the 1970s. Al-Sābiqi 
would also become Pakistan’s national representative of Ayatollah Hassan al-Ihqāqi of 
Kuwait, who had welcomed the Shirazi exiles into the Gulf and supported them against 
Shi’a opponents.  
Marqad al-Aqīlah Zaynab would receive official sanction from the Sayyeda 
Zaynab shrine as the ‘authentic’ history of Zaynab’s life and death. Al-Sābiqi would draw 
on Shi’a hagiographies and historical chronicles to craft a narrative largely focused on the 
importance of ‘al-Shām’ and the lengthy torment that Zaynab endured in Damascus. Al-
Sābiqi would build on al-Naqdi’s Zaynab al-Kubra and use ‘Abd al-Rahman’s Batalat 
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Karbala to argue for the centrality of Zaynab in Shi’a history. Al-Sābiqi cites ‘Abd al-
Rahman’s work to demonstrate the hardships that Zaynab endured at a young age to 
prepare her for Karbala, part of a theological commitment to the idea it was the final, 
predetermined test in a lifetime of persecution. But Al-Sābiqi builds on this, equating 
Zaynab’s upbringing and standing among the Ahl al-Bayt as equal to her father and 
brothers. He narrates from multiple sources that it was encouraged early on by the 
Prophet that believers mourn for all of ‘Ali and Fatima’s children, not merely for Hassan 
or Husayn in their martyrdom. Al-Sābiqi notes, “Our believers do not remember that the 
Holy Prophet (SA) once said, ‘To weep for the misfortunes of Zaynab is as to weep for 
her brothers, al-Hassan and al-Husayn.”125  
Interestingly, while ‘Abd al-Rahman portrays a Zaynab that remained a 
supporting and largely family-oriented figure until the deaths at Karbala, al-Sābiqi’s text 
emphasizes that she was given a comparative standing in the eyes of God from a young 
age. Al-Sābiqi invokes numerous hadith to substantiate the equality between Zaynab and 
her brothers. He quotes the 7th century account of Karbala written by the scholar Ibn 
Tawoos, in which the Prophet was to have said, “Oh ‘Ali, verily your grave and the 
graves of your children are as parts of heaven, and verily from Allah’s creatures he has 
turned the hearts of His chosen people towards you. Verily they will persevere through 
great hardships…to build [them] and they will visit your graves to come closer to their 
Lord… those who have constructed and repaired your graves will be like those who aided 
Solomon in building the temple in Jerusalem.”126 Al-Sābiqi argues that while this hadith 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
125 Al-Sābiqi, Marqad al-‘Aqīlah Zaynab, 22. 
126 Al-Sābiqi, Marqad al-‘Aqīlah Zaynab, 77. 
	   71	  
had long been used by scholars to support ziyārat to the shrines of the Imams, the Prophet 
did not merely limit his words to reference ‘Ali’s sons. Zaynab was one of the Prophet’s 
own grandchildren and would play the defining role in continuing the message of 
Karbala. Thus, this hadith could be seen as a clear indication that Zaynab was included in 
Muhammad’s prophecy.127 He further notes that after the events of Karbala, Zayn al-
Abidīn spent much of his life imprisoned or tightly guarded by Umayyad officials. 
Whatever knowledge came from Zayn al-Abidīn while he was imprisoned, al-Sābiqi 
claims, was hidden to protect the Imam’s life by associating it with Sayyeda Zaynab. 
Only someone of knowledge and full piety could be entrusted to transmit the Imam’s 
words and instructions without error.128 While al-Sābiqi could not argue that Zaynab 
herself received divine instruction, as that was the realm of authority reserved solely for 
the Imams, it is through the purity of her body that the message can be transmitted, and a 
sacred body deserved a sacred shrine. While ‘Abd al-Rahman’s Batalat Karbala was an 
expansive portrayal of an exemplary woman grounded in her earthly roles, Marqad al-
Aqīlah Zaynab would transform her into a divinely-inspired personality.   
Ultimately, the hagiographic components of Marqad al-Aqīlah Zaynab and al-
Sābiqi’s equivalence between Zaynab and the Imams were in the service of glorifying a 
shrine in her name. The hagiography’s intent was primarily to verify and trace the history 
of the Sayyeda Zaynab shrine itself, arguing that the sacredness of the space had not been 
properly disseminated or appreciated. While ‘Abd al-Rahman had done well in 
“revealing” Zaynab’s true character, she had simply failed to understand the history 
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correctly. “There is no fiction or speculation to the view that Zaynab is in Damascus,” al-
Sābiqi declares.129 He engages in a systematic refutation of the shrine in Egypt, quoting 
rihla literature, hadith narratives, and public histories through the centuries to give 
evidence that Zaynab was indeed buried at her shrine in Damascus – the shrine that 
housed the hawza he had been inspired to move to. Al-Sābiqi reasons, “How could our 
most esteemed Lady Zaynab enter Egypt, live there for approximately one year, and die 
in those lands in the witness of all, and none from among the great historians of that time 
period noted it?”130 The absence of historical record, while explained away by ‘Abd al-
Rahman, was damning for al-Sābiqi. “Those great travelers who traversed the Middle 
East…and [whose] work documents the famed archeological sites of their ages,” Al-
Sābiqi argues, travelers who “wrote down everything they observed,” all failed to 
mention the grave of Zaynab bint ‘Ali in Egypt.131 The travelers Ibn Jubayr, Ibn Battuta, 
and Abu Bakr al-Harawī, the geographer Yāqūt al-Hamawī – all these men mentioned in 
detail the sacred graves in Egypt and yet none referred to Zaynab bint ‘Ali. Al-Sābiqi 
notes that while there were women from among the descendants of the Imams to travel to 
Egypt – named in honor after their foremother Zaynab – the Egyptians had failed to 
accurately distinguish between them and Zaynab bint ‘Ali and, in their confusion, these 
visitations had perpetuated a myth that Zaynab traveled there after Karbala.132 The 
Fatimid dynasty had been patrons of a shrine to a Zaynab, as recorded in numerous 
historical chronicles; al-Sabīqi challenges these records, which the vagueness around the 
lives of women in early Islam allowed. His hagiography argues instead that caliphs had 
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visited the shrine of Zaynab bint Yahya bint Zayn al Abidīn, who might have 
understandably traveled to Egypt during the Fatimid reign.133`Al-Sābiqi’s construction of 
an alternate history to these famed writers allowed him to put his interpretive weight 
behind the shrine in Damascus.  
Nor was al-Sābiqi’s text the only work that referenced the circumstances of 
Zaynab’s death and her shrine in Damascus. Religious scholars and Shi’a faithful alike 
published a flurry of ziyārat literature and hagiographies on the lives of Shi’a figures 
throughout the 1970s and 1980s, and new works on Zaynab were among them.134 Sets of 
prayers were written specifically for ziyārat to the Sayyeda Zaynab shrine – a new 
iteration of a tradition that had begun with the imams themselves. The later imams had 
shared a particular set of proscribed rituals for ziyārat, including prayers for pilgrims to 
recite as they neared the graves of martyrs to seek permission to enter the sacred space 
and send blessings on those buried there. Now, published alongside prayers for visitation 
to Najaf and Karbala were those written for ziyārat to Zaynab’s grave in Damascus.135 
These prayers framed ziyārat to Zaynab’s shrine as a continuation of a tradition 
established by the imams as a mandated part of the Shi’a faith, yet the impetus behind 
these prayers was a new construct.  
The evidence of Zaynab’s grave in Syria was numerous, according to Al-Sābiqi; 
his argument for the predetermination of Zaynab’s gravesite in the same manner of 
Husayn’s burial site reveals the growing impulse amongst Shi’as to emphasize the 
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divinity of the shrines, a development away from al-Amīn’s opposition to the veneration 
of the physical sites themselves.  In Shi’a hagiography, traditions had developed that 
Husayn knew the exact spot of his death. Because it was foretold that a great following of 
people would come to visit his grave and mourn his death, when his caravan arrived at 
Karbala, Husayn bought the land surrounding the spot. In keeping with the theological 
concept that developed from this act that the Imams prepared for their death by 
purchasing land where they were to be buried, Al-Sābiqi argues that Zaynab traveled 
towards Damascus because her husband owned vast agricultural land there. She did not 
arrive as a landless refugee to seek asylum; instead, it was simply the fulfillment of her 
purpose to return to the site where she endured her great hardships.136 Yet as she 
approached the city, the pain of memories of her time there overcame her. She paused in 
a garden in some of those lands on the outskirts of the city, in a village named Rāwiyah. 
There, “an enemy of the Ahl al-Bayt” discovered her and “the last martyr of Karbala was 
killed” with a blow to her head.137 Zaynab was buried on that spot, at the site of her 
greatest trials, so that visitors to her shrine could both visit the sacred geography that she 
walked through in Damascus and pay their respects to her at her grave. For Shi’as, the 
grave in Damascus most fully invoked the trauma and persecution of Karbala, conveying 
the tie between narrative, space, and place.  
Almost immediately there would be visitors to the grave, and al-Sābiqi argues that 
the continued visitation of the site affirmed its sacrality. Like the Prophet promised, the 
graves of ‘Ali’s children would never be without pilgrims, no matter how difficult the 
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circumstances. That this was the site of Zaynab’s grave “was known, visited for 
centuries, and proven by these venerated pilgrims.”138 This creation of a historical 
tradition of visitation augmented the growing popularity of the shrine as a pilgrimage site. 
Those who were undertaking pilgrimage to the Sayyeda Zaynab by the publication of 
Marqad al Aqīlah Zaynab were thus partaking in a constructed tradition, one positioned 
as an unchanged history. Among the first visitors was Sayyeda Nafīsa bin Ja’far al-Sādiq, 
daughter of the sixth Imam “who visited the tomb for her foremother in the year 193 Hijri 
and recorded [this] in works that describe her life.”139 These pious role models create a 
justification for ziyārat at the Sayyeda Zaynab.  
The continued visitation of the shrine affirmed its importance, as did the lineage 
of those who cared for the shrine. Al-Sābiqi takes pains to describe how the original waqf 
for the Zaynab shrine was created, as that history was essential to understanding how 
esteemed a site this was and the vital current development it was undergoing. Al-Sābiqi 
notes, “This grave was famous all over the region and thousands used to visit the site 
from all over the world. In 768 Hijri, in the last days of Rabi’ al-awwal [1366 AD], a 
distinguished man from among the learned of Damascus, Syed Husayn bin Musa al-
Mūsavi, assigned all the properties he owned surrounding the blessed grave as waqf.”140 
As a descendant from the seventh Shi’a Imam Mūsa al-Kādhim, the revenues from all the 
agricultural lands that he owned would go to the shrine as part of this endowment, 
remaining in perpetuity out of public use and in the name of Zaynab bint ‘Ali. Among the 
witnesses of the waqf were seven great judges from Baalbek, Damascus, and Mansura, 
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representing the five different Islamic legal schools of thought.141 The waqf was 
registered and confirmed by the presiding qadi, or judge, of the Ottoman Mahakma al-
Sharia in Damascus on the 9th of Rabbi’ al-Awwal, 1010 Hijri [1601 AD].142 The waqf 
described in explicit detail the nature of the property and was confirmed by religious 
scholars of all Islamic schools and granted an Ottoman firmān from the local qadi. The 
strength of witnesses in Islam has historically been a powerful verifying mechanism, and 
the weight of these men’s words were proof that Zaynab bint ‘Ali was buried in 
Damascus.143 Thus, the unbroken chain of visitation, the texts that describe Damascus 
life, and the testimony of respected witnesses gave al-Sābiqi proof to her authentic grave 
at the shrine.  
 The portrayal of Zaynab as a central Shi’a figure, the refutation of the grave in 
Cairo, and the endorsement of the transnational Shi’a religious network mark Marqad al-
Aqīlah Zaynab as the culmination of years of hagiographic development. Written with 
the support of the new hawza in Damascus, amidst the Iranian Revolution and the 
heightened tensions between Iran and Iraq that would lead to war and dramatically curtail 
access to Shi’a shrines in Iraq, it reveals a critical turning point for both Shi’a 
representation and political alliances. Marqad al-Aqīlah Zaynab was the embodiment of 
the symbiotic relationship between the reimagined narratives, hagiography, space, 
pilgrimage, and politics that found its earliest articulations in al-Amīn’s ideological 
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positions. At a time where shrines in Iraq and Iran were becoming increasingly 
inaccessible and concerted efforts were promoting the Sayyeda Zaynab shrine, al-Sābiqi 
constructed a new history in the language of tradition, affirming the view that the Prophet 
had always deemed the shrines for all ‘Ali’s children to be sacred places and that “the 
Prophet promised rewards for those who love his Ahl al-Bayt.”144 These new 
interpretations of Zaynab’s life and the benefits attributed to her ziyārat bolstered interest 
in her grave in the post-WWII era and would create a shrine to rival those of the Imams.  
According to historian Syed Akbar Hyder, ziyārat to Zaynab’s shrine took on 
increasing meaning in the aftermath of the Iranian Revolution, explaining that for 
pilgrims to her grave, “Husain’s [sic] jihad was marked partly by swords and arrows; 
Zaynab’s jihad was waged through words of eloquence. Husain [sic] made Karbala 
immortal; Zaynab assured the immortality of Karbala through her sermons in 
Damascus.”145 This evolving interpretation reveals Zaynab’s journey towards infallibility; 
though she could never be represented as attaining that ultimate status, limited by the 
circumstances of her birth and exclusion from the chain of the Imamate, she would 
become the ultimate and ideal role model through which the Imamate itself survived. 
This unparalleled and unique role would be reinforced by the words of the Iranian radical 
and the most famous ideologue of the Islamic Revolution, Ali Shari’ati, who chose the 
shrine of Zaynab as his final burial spot,  
“One has to choose either the blood or the message, to be either Husayn or 
Zaynab, either to die like him or survive like her…those who died 
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committed a Husayn-like act. Those who survive must perform a Zaynab-
like act.”146 
 
Allama Ali Naqi Naqvi, a Shi’a scholar who earlier in his life referred to Zaynab 
as a “piteous” lady, would come to describe Zaynab as dignified, strong-willed and 
determined not to display her grief by the time of his major work on Karbala, Shaheed-e-
Insaniyat. He remarks, “Zaynab took to her brother’s instructions and in the most trying 
of situations, she did not betray signs of such abject trepidation as to give occasion to her 
enemies to rejoice at her sufferings,” as open expressions of grief in this circumstance 
was equivalent to questioning God’s will for sacrifice. Rather than succumb to fear, 
Naqvi argues, “it was she who handed over to Husayn the garments he last put on his 
person on the 10th Moharrum.” As a witness to the terrible events of that day, scenes 
“which would have daunted the bravest of spirits” Naqvi takes pains to point out that at 
no point did Zaynab despair or reveal the depths of her suffering. Rather, he argues, she 
“confronted all these moments of surpassing gloom and woe with great self-control and 
fortitude,” an inner control of her emotions that parallels Husayn’s ability to sacrifice 
himself in battle. Rather than weep endlessly or be overcome with grief, Zaynab is 
instead lauded for her ability to physically prepare her brother for battle.147 According to 
Zia Mohyuddin, a prominent Pakistani writer who composed a widely popular poetic 
narrative tribute to the events of Karbala that would become a staple recitation text of 
commemoration ceremonies in the early 1980s, Zaynab’s behavior in Karbala and its 
aftermath is seen as the culmination of all the best elements of Shi’ism most revered 
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figures. Zaynab, he wrote, is “the dearest child of the Prophet’s family, highest amongst 
creations, and the pride of the pious,” all attributes that are often used to describe Husayn. 
For Mohyuddin, Zaynab is “the demonstration of the qualities of the Imamate” and “to sit 
at [her] feet and weep for her misfortunes in al-Shām would open the gates of Heaven.”148 
From al-Tabari’s brief chronicle, by the end of the 20th century Zaynab would develop 
into an essential figure in a pantheon of Shi’a martyrs, with her shrine representing new 
sacred space for pilgrims to express their regard for her and her role in Shi’a history.  
***** 
For the pilgrims that would be flocking in the hundreds of thousands to the 
growing Sayyeda Zaynab shrine, which just decades before was not more than a small 
structure in a village outside Damascus, ziyārat to her shrine was framed as an assertive 
articulation of sectarian and narrative representations of Zaynab. The process to define 
Zaynab into one of the central figures in Shi’a history would ultimately be tied to 
authenticating and sacralizing her shrine in Damascus. The link between narrative, space, 
and practice would grow through the early decades and meet its apex in 1979, with the 
Iranian Revolution transforming the nature of being Shi’a in the modern world. The 
politics of expansion would open new interpretations, including from the state, as 
hagiography encountered the facts on the ground.  
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Chapter Two  
Ruqayyah bint ‘Ali and Tales of an Extraordinary Life 
 
 While representations of Zaynab underwent a dramatic, even sectarian, evolution 
in the course of the 20th century as rhetoric over the authenticity and importance of her 
shrine grew, that there was a ‘historical Zaynab’ who was present at Karbala remained 
without doubt. The consequences of who she was, what she meant, and where she was 
buried, however, became the realm of interpretation among scholars, theologians, and 
political figures alike. The story of Ruqayyah, Zaynab’s sister, would take a different 
path. How one of ‘Ali’s daughters would have ended up buried in a small sanctuary 
named Bibi Pak Daman in Lahore has been the subject of various competing narratives, 
all of which reveal the complex religious, financial, and jurisprudential interests at stake 
in this shrine after Pakistan’s independence. As the interest and importance of ziyārat to 
Shi’a shrines grew and evolving interpretations emerged over the role of women in 
political and religious engagement, new hagiographies were constructed around the 
shrine and Ruqayyah that would reveal the dual impulse to link Lahore to Medina, Najaf, 
Karbala – all the established holiest sites of Shi’ism – while still grounding Ruqayyah in 
the national context. Her story and the shrine of Bibi Pak Daman provided a way to order 
the past in a nation still coming to terms with the trauma of Partition and its identity as a 
Muslim secular state.  
  Unlike Zaynab, who immediately figured in political and poetic accounts of 
Karbala from the 7th century onward, the historical figure of Ruqayyah has been more 
elusive – and thus more malleable. Ruqayyah’s childhood and personal characteristics 
would be constructed almost as a direct mirror to interpretations of Zaynab; where she 
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would be individualized was solely in the context of what she would endure at and after 
Karbala. And while hagiographies of Zaynab sought to ground themselves in historical 
records and hadith traditions, even while offering new interpretations as her shrine grew, 
Ruqayyah’s life and her hagiographies embodied miraculous revelations and parables. 
While the name Ruqayyah does appear in early Shi’a history to identify numerous 
women, like Zaynab it was a common name in ‘Ali’s family. Hagiographies claim that 
this Ruqayyah was ‘Ali’s daughter from his second wife, Umm al-Banīn. She was also 
the sister of Abbas ibn ‘Ali, Husayn’s closest advisor and standard-bearer at Karbala, and 
was married to Muslim bin Aqīl, Husayn’s cousin and emissary. Muslim and his two sons 
were killed in Kufa raising support for Husayn before the caravan left for Karbala and are 
considered the first martyrs of Karbala. For centuries, despite her links to these revered 
figures, few accounts of Karbala mentioned Ruqayyah’s presence specifically, nor relate 
any particular narratives to her time in the camps or as a prisoner in Damascus.  
Yet by 1994, in a hagiography written by a Sunni researcher and endorsed by the 
Department of Auqaf in Pakistan, the government agency that had taken over 
administration of Bibi Pak Daman in 1967, Ruqayyah’s destiny had become of critical 
importance to the Ahl al-Bayt. Her purpose was revealed at the same time ‘Ali gave his 
dying instructions to Hassan, Husayn, and Zaynab. To his sons he entrusted the Imamate 
and foretold of the disloyalties they would both face. He reminded Zaynab that it would 
be her mission to carry on the true message of Islam after the death of all the men present 
at Karbala. Then, the author Masood Hashmi writes,    
One by one, Ali gave his daughters instructions for the proselytizing of 
Islam and described the cultures and geographic locations of various lands 
to which they must go…  
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To Sayyeda Ruqayyah, he claimed, “Daughter, your husband and sons 
will be martyred in Karbala, but you will have to take your daughters and 
Fatima’s progeny to Sindh and Hind. There, you are responsible for the 
preaching of the religion of Mustafa [the Prophet Muhammad], for in that 
part of the world is the opportunity to spread Islam the greatest. I see that 
in Sindh and Hind the people will become Muslims by your hands, and 
then this will be the land that will be suitable for the people of Banu 
Fatima to live in, for there will be the greatest number of those who love 
the family of the Prophet.”149 
 
The moment of Ali’s will is a critical moment for Shi’ism; according to traditions, Ali’s 
words created the first imagined map of Islam, constructing a sacred geography that 
would then come to fruition as his descendants spread to preach the faith. The divine 
mandates that he gave to Hassan, Husayn, and Zaynab and the belief that the events of 
Karbala were preordained became part of the theology of Karbala. Zaynab was destined 
to survive and travel to Damascus to spread the true Islam. Yet this hagiography extends 
this map and includes this same role for Ruqayyah, mirroring the weighty mission that 
was given to Zaynab. That ‘Ali would impart to one of his daughters the knowledge that 
she would survive the events of Karbala and was destined to preach in the subcontinent 
served to elevate the status of Islam in the region. Like Karbala itself, Ruqayyah’s 
presence and shrine in Pakistan was foretold, irrevocably tied to the predetermination of 
Karbala and the manifestation of God’s divine will. Yet this narrative also reveals a 
remarkable specificity and importance attributed to a woman whose life remained fairly 
ambiguous through centuries after Karbala. How this became the nationally endorsed 
hagiography of Ruqayyah’s life and the challenges that emerged to this interpretation 
reveal the interpretive and political stakes at this shrine. Bibi Pak Daman would be a site 
onto which tensions over meaning-making, sectarian relations, and Islam in Pakistan 
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would be mapped, and the hagiographies that emerged of Ruqayyah’s life and death 
would reflect the shrine’s increasing prominence.   
 
Ruqayyah bint ‘Ali at the End of the British Raj 
In 1864, Ruqayyah’s story would find its way into popular accounts of important 
religious sites of the subcontinent with the publication of Tahqiqāt-e-Chishti, written by 
the Sufi spiritual leader Maulvi Nur Ahmad Chishti. The author was a follower and 
descendant of the famed Sufi saint Khwaja Moinuddin Chishti, who established the 
Chishti order in Lahore in the 12th century.150 Tahqiqāt-e-Chishti was written as an 
account of the religious and archaeological monuments in Lahore and its surrounding 
areas that had notable ties to the Chishti order, with brief narratives and spiritual 
guidance regarding each shrine. Nur Ahmad Chishti notes that the work was aimed to 
shed light on the affairs of holy men who made a noticeable impact on the daily lives of 
Muslims, for the courts of the sultans had long dictated the recorded history of the 
subcontinent.151 The timing of the work was notable, published shortly after the Indian 
Rebellion of 1857 and undoubtedly influenced by the rise in communalism and reactions 
against the installation of direct colonial rule by the British Raj. Tahqiqāt-e-Chishti was 
arguably one of the more popular early examples of a modern ‘history from below’ in the 
subcontinent, a chronicle of the influence that holy men and Sufi leaders had on the 
affairs of the powerful.  
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Chishti claims that Lahore was rich in holy shrines and graves of hundreds of 
learned men, as the city was said to have been the destination of a caravan headed by 
Ruqayyah bint ‘Ali that arrived in the 7th century. Ruqayyah had brought along 704 
Qurānic scholars as she took refuge in Lahore after the events of Karbala; when she was 
threatened by political persecution, she dispersed her followers, Chishti narrates, and 
“these men continued to guide their students in the ways of the Qurān and would become 
the great pīrs (Sufi masters) that would spread the message among their followers. Their 
graves number in the hundreds around the city.”152 Through Ruqayyah, Chishti notes, the 
pīrs who helped spread Islam in the subcontinent were directly linked to ‘Ali, who is a 
central figure in Sufi traditions. Notably, Chishti had little to say of Ruqayyah herself or 
of her journey to Lahore, nor did he cite any extensive historical or religious sources in 
detailing the caravan she traveled with. Instead, he acknowledges that this was the story 
“that was known to those that have studied the history of Islam in the city.”153 Her 
presence can be traced in the scholars she left behind, who created a direct link from local 
pirs to ‘Ali, venerated by many as the father of Sufism. Ruqayyah was merely a vessel, 
someone whose existence transported Islam to the heart of the subcontinent and to the 
male Sufi saints of prominent orders.  
 The notion that Ruqayyah bint ‘Ali’s presence affirmed Islam’s historic influence 
in the subcontinent would find its way into anti-colonial and anti-Hindu narratives in the 
early 20th century. In his pamphlet Kitāb Yaad-e-Raftagāneh Nau, written about the 
Muslim saints and shrines of Lahore and published in 1910, the Kashmiri activist 
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Muhammad al-Dīn Fawq would elaborate on Ruqayyah’s arrival in the subcontinent and 
the conditions she encountered. In this narrative, Ruqayyah validated the centrality of 
Islam to local heritage and the indelible tradition of Muslim practice in the subcontinent. 
Ruqayyah had been present through Husayn’s arrival at Karbala, Fawq narrates, but on 
the night before Ashura she left Husayn’s camp at his command, headed towards the 
subcontinent with a host of scholars accompanying her. The local Hindu Raja in Lahore 
feared her arrival, for his subjects had grown tired of the oppression they had suffered 
and would be susceptible to her words. Immediately upon hearing whom Ruqayyah was 
and the great lineage from which she descended, the raja’s subjects began to convert 
towards Islam and their idol and fire temples fell into ruin.154 The raja’s own son “was 
moved by the strength of Ruqayyah’s faith and would at once recite the kalimah” and 
convert to Islam.155 By her death, she had converted thousands en masse away from the 
unjust Hindu rulers and had firmly established Islam in Lahore as early as the 7th century.  
The importance of Ruqayyah’s shrine in Lahore and the story of conversion away 
from Hinduism provide an insight into the political and ideological concerns of 
Muhammad al-Dīn Fawq’s time. Since 1845, the majority Muslim province of Kashmir 
had been ruled by Hindu Dogra dynasty, installed with the backing of the British colonial 
regime. With severe repression on publications and on public speech rampant, especially 
targeting Muslim activists, a large population of Kashmiris had fled to Lahore at the turn 
of the 20th century. Muhammad al-Dīn Fawq in particular was a vociferous opponent of 
Hindu rule, a prolific writer, and a close associate of Allama Muhammad Iqbal, widely 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
154 Muhammad al-Din Fawq, Kitāb Yaad-e-Raftagāneh Nau (1910), 36.   
155 Fawq, Kitab Yaad-e-Raftagāneh Nau (1910), 36.  In Urdu, the word kalimah refers to the 
shahada, the testimonial in belief in the oneness of God and Muhammad as his messenger, which 
marks the conversion to Islam.  
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regarded as the ideological father of the Pakistan Movement. In Lahore, Muhammad al-
Dīn Fawq established numerous publications, including the Akhbār-e-Kashmiri Lahore, 
in which he wrote extensively on the social and political issues plaguing Kashmir under 
the Dogras. Of particular concern to Muhammad al-Dīn Fawq was the deliberate 
disregard their Hindu overlords had for the indigenous Muslim archeological heritage of 
Kashmir. The Dogras were only concerned with Hindu sites of worship, he accused; “if 
the religious places of 95 per cent of the inhabitants of the State” could not be given 
appropriate attention, he argued, “they should at least be restored to the 
Muhammadans.”156 Thus, the notion of an indigenous Islamic heritage, one traced 
centuries back to the daughter of ‘Ali himself, lent a powerful legend to anti-colonial and 
anti-Hindu rhetoric. In Muhammad al-Dīn Fawq’s eyes, these Muslim sites had not been 
given their proper respect and care, much as the local Hindu raja in Ruqayyah’s time had 
oppressed his subjects and tried to prevent their conversion and practices. As the recently 
established All-India Muslim League grew in strength, Muslim activists had begun to 
demand greater religious and political rights and autonomy under the British Raj. The 
archeological and political significance of Muslim shrines spoke to the indelible cultural 
heritage of Islam in the subcontinent and, consequently, their rights to equal 
representation.157 In this hagiography, written amidst growing discontent with the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
156 Muhammad al-Dīn Fawq, as quoted in Mridu Rai, Hindu Rulers, Muslim Subjects: Islam, 
Rights, and the History of Kashmir (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), 215.  
157 Notably, however, the arguments made in support of Muslim rights, primarily those made by 
the All-India Muslim League (established in 1906), were initially not couched in religious or 
separatist language but rather in appeals to Muslim cultural heritage on the subcontinent. The 
dominance of the Unionist Party in Punjab and their close ties with the British Raj illustrates the 
conflicting views that existed on defining political identities based on religion. Yet the communal 
sentiments and fear of Hindu domination would eventually make the triumph of the Muslim 
League possible – and indeed, evolve the Muslim League into supporting an independent 
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communal situation, Ruqayyah bint ‘Ali’s presence and the message of Islam was 
powerful enough to convert the raja’s own son, which spoke to Ruqayyah’s personal 
piety and, more critically, to the righteousness of Islam in the face of Hindu opposition. 
At the turn of the century, the contours of Ruqayyah’s story were becoming defined, tied 
to an emerging narrative about the significance of Islamic cultural heritage in the pre-
independence Indian subcontinent.  
Still, despite Fawq’s pamphlet, circulated primarily in Lahore, Ruqayyah’s story 
remained largely in the realm of oral traditions and local devotional practice. The written 
references to her shrine were primarily in the context of Sufi history and heritage in 
Lahore, especially in debates over Islam in the subcontinent vis-à-vis Hindu rulers and 
the British Raj, with the focus on Ruqayyah’s male scholarly companions and their 
knowledge of the Qurān. The Bibi Pak Daman shrine would find a brief mention in John 
Subhan’s 1938 work Sufism, its Saints and Shrines, a popular work written by a Sufi 
convert to Christianity. Subhan was raised in a Muslim home, and his family had close 
and loyal ties to the Mughal regime, until the British Raj’s crackdown after 1857 made 
their political situation more precarious. Subhan converted to Christianity at the age of 11 
and received his education primarily in English. Subhan wrote numerous observances on 
religious life in India, and his unique background made his work popular amongst 
colonial elite and readers outside of India. He chronicles Bibi Pak Daman as “a popular 
site for the Mussalman in Lahore” and notes that locals believe Ruqayyah was the wife of 
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Muslim bin Aqīl, fleeing the events of Karbala.158 Subhan recounts a similar tale of 
conversion, though notably places the emphasis on a conversion from idol-worship to 
monotheism, rather than Islam in particular. He specifically names the five daughters 
buried along with Ruqayyah - Bibi Hur, Bibi Nur, Bibi Gawhar, Bibi Taj, and Bibi 
Shahbaz. These names are Persian in origin, and for those who refuse Ruqayyah’s 
existence and the many skeptics of this narrative, Subhan acknowledges, this fact 
undermines the claim that these women could have been members of ‘Ali ibn Abu 
Talib’s family. Subhan rationalizes, however, that this fact “need not surprise us, because 
after the Muslim conquest of Persia most of the ladies belonging to the Persian royal 
family were given in marriage to ‘Ali’s sons and relatives.”159 Thus, the Persianization of 
names in ‘Ali’s family was a reasonable outcome. This account and Subhan’s own 
injections make clear that while devotees to Bibi Pak Daman had a particular narrative in 
mind, one that appeared to be the popular interpretation of the shrine, there did exist 
challenges on the ground to the legend that Ruqayyah might have arrived in Lahore along 
with her daughters. Subhan notes, however, that the proof of Ruqayyah’s presence also 
existed historically, with the Mughal emperor Akbar endowing as waqf the property of 
the shrine. The hagiography remained the most popular account of Bibi Pak Daman, with 
the discipline of history turning its attention to exploring political and religious 
differences between Muslims and Hindus in the context of independence. While Subhan 
dismisses the objections to Ruqayyah’s grave, later hagiographies would tackle these 
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159 Subhan, Sufism, its Saints and Shrines, 120. Subhan’s work is the first written reference to 
name the graves and is subsequently quoted in all later hagiographies.  
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conflicting narratives head-on, displaying a clear commitment to the narrative that Bibi 
Pak Daman was connected to Ruqayyah bint ‘Ali.  
 
The Shi’a Hagiography  
The most robust and detailed hagiography of Ruqayyah bint ‘Ali would be 
published in 1979, though it was the result of two decades of research and efforts 
undertaken by a local scholar who lived near the shrine of Bibi Pak Daman. The author, 
Maulvi Muhammad Bakhsh Shah Qureshi, had been a self-professed Deobandi Sunni 
Muslim, a follower of the rigidly orthodox Islamic ideology introduced to the 
subcontinent in the mid-19th century; in the aftermath of Pakistani independence in 1947, 
Deobandi ideology had formed the basis of radical militant Islamic parties, including 
many explicitly aimed at targeting the spread of Shi’a Islam in Pakistan.160 Qureshi, 
however, was visited by Ruqayyah in a dream and inspired to convert to Shi’a Islam, 
fostering a deep devotion to Ruqayyah bint ‘Ali and her family. He writes in the 
introduction to his Tarikh-e-Bibian Pak Daman (SA) that he began visiting Ruqayyah’s 
shrine in 1960, praying at the holy site up to twice a day. At the time, however, “there 
were no solid written proofs or evidence on who was buried at the shrine. Though the 
majority of believers knew this was the daughter of ‘Ali, some misguided visitors 
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believed she was the daughter of the Sufi saint Syed Ahmad Tokhta.”161 Qureshi’s deep 
convictions and the miraculous revelations he received made him certain that it was 
indeed Ruqayyah bint ‘Ali’s grave at Bibi Pak Daman. During his visits to the shrine, he 
would repeatedly get into arguments with those who challenged this narrative; one day he 
found himself overwhelmed by those who doubted and began to weep, beseeching 
Ruqayyah for a sign, to reveal “the truth of her presence,” as in his faith “he could no 
longer bear the denials.”162 The next day, from unexpected sources, he was sent a 
message to visit a preacher named Aashiq Hussain, a scholar who had collected proofs 
and documents on Bibi Pak Daman and set him on the decades-long path to write this 
hagiography. Along with Ruqayyah’s own narrative, for Qureshi, the story behind the 
book too was “no less than a miracle,” with even his failing eyesight cured along the way 
as further evidence of her miraculous presence.163  
Written from 1960 to 1979, Tarikh-e-Bibian Pak Daman is a vast chronicle on the 
history of the Ahl al-Bayt, the events of Karbala, Islam in South Asia, and Ruqayyah’s 
own narrative; as the most comprehensive work written on Ruqayyah, it would become 
the main source from which later hagiographies would draw. In addition to the years of 
research he had already undertaken on the shrine, Qureshi was appointed as the only 
Shi’a member of Bibi Pak Daman’s Religious Affairs Committee (RPC) in 1968, his 
commitment fully to the narrative that Ruqayyah bint ‘Ali was buried at Bibi Pak 
Daman.164 Through 1967 and 1968, in the aftermath of the government takeover of the 
shrine of Bibi Pak Daman, Qureshi had published a series of columns in two Lahore 
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164 “Maulana Muhammad Bakhsh Qureshi ki nāmzadgi,” Al-Assad, August 5, 1968.  
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newspapers that were aimed at spreading the true story of Ruqayyah and Bibi Pak 
Daman. The content from the articles would form the basis of the book, though Qureshi 
expanded on them significantly to trace the histories of the shrine’s caretakers, different 
narratives about Karbala, and the political considerations involved in the shrine. 
Qureshi’s purpose in writing the book is clear – to bring to Ruqayyah’s life and shrine the 
respect and understanding deserved for the daughter of ‘Ali, to disprove any rival 
narratives that existed and expose why they had been created, and to make sure the new 
administration of the shrine itself matched the narrative and religious importance of the 
site. Qureshi believed that if these goals could be accomplished, “the shrine and bazaar of 
Bibi Pak Daman would become like Pakistan’s Karbala.”165 Like Zaynab, his 
representations of Ruqayyah and her narrative as she traveled to Lahore would reflect the 
particular ideological and political currents at the shrine as pilgrimage to Bibi Pak Daman 
expanded. It would draw on transnational tropes and parables that would resonate in a 
Shi’a context, creating a miraculous and legendary persona for Ruqayyah, one equal to 
the most revered Shi’a figures. Yet the narrative was also an unabashedly national one, 
the first comprehensive hagiography written in post-independence Pakistan and one that 
shows the extent to which national narratives had already become a powerful construct 
for understanding contentious spaces. It would be published at a critical time – the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan would turn Pakistan into an ally of Taliban fighters, General Zia 
ul-Haq’s martial law and Islamization policies had taken effect, igniting sectarian 
reactions across the country, and the Iranian Revolution would have a deep impact in 
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Pakistan. In this context, Tarikh-e-Bibian Pak Daman would bring significant attention to 
Bibi Pak Daman, igniting new contestations over the space and the meaning of ziyārat.   
 For Qureshi, Ruqayyah’s real journey began in Husayn’s camp on the plains of 
Karbala. In the hagiography, her early life is largely portrayed as a reflection of the well-
known aspects of the history of Ahl al-Bayt and their persecution, rather than through the 
exploration of individual characteristics. She was the daughter of ‘Ali’s second wife, a 
woman named Umm al-Banīn, who it was said he married because he knew she would 
bear him sons who would fight bravely with Husayn at Karbala. Ruqayyah was the sister 
of Abbas, Husayn’s standard-bearer, though little was known about their relationship at a 
young age, unlike the close bond that Zaynab had with her brothers in Shi’a hagiography. 
Ruqayyah’s personality was said to have mirrored Zaynab’s, a fact more likely reflecting 
a lack of historical or theological traditions that could be referenced in detail about 
Ruqayyah. Indeed, what was described as important in Ruqayyah’s life before Karbala 
was simply her connection to the Prophet and ‘Ali’s family. It was in Karbala, however, 
that her true purpose and story would emerge, a narrative that would be tied to the 
importance of Pakistan as a country of true faith and Islamic greatness. On the night 
before Ashura, Husayn summoned Ruqayyah and reminded her it was time for her to 
leave their camps and head towards her preordained fate. According to Qureshi, “Husayn 
instructed her, ‘the will of ‘Ali is that you and your female companions must find safe 
haven in a faraway land.’ When Ruqayyah further questioned why she must leave him, 
Husayn replied that she must go to Hindustan. ‘Your presence there will eventually give 
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birth to a great Islamic nation,’ he promised.”166 According to Qureshi, the importance of 
spreading Islam in the subcontinent in the way that ‘Ali had prophesized and their 
obedience to his authority overcame all their personal emotions. He writes, “Ruqayyah 
wept and asked Husayn how she would show her face to Fatima on the Day of Judgment 
after abandoning her beloved son in Karbala….The pain of a sister leaving her beloved 
brother in such wretched conditions will never be matched.”167 Thus, in Qureshi’s legend, 
Ruqayyah did experience and endure suffering at Karbala and was sanctified by these 
hardships, in the same manner as those whose tales had resonated for centuries. After 
sacrificing her husband and two sons, enduring the days without food and water, her final 
trial was to leave behind her brother, knowing what was to come for them. Nevertheless, 
just as each event at Karbala transpired as they were ordained, 704 men were dispatched 
with Ruqayyah, “so that they could bear witness to the events of Karbala throughout the 
lands and the stories of what happened could never be denied.”168 Interestingly, the motif 
of Ruqayyah as the critical witness and messenger mirrors the most prominent emerging 
depiction of Zaynab – mirrored in Shari’ati’s call for the importance of the message in 
Islamic history and revolution. Though she would not be present during the events of 
Ashura and as a prisoner, she bore the same responsibility as Zaynab. Her grief at leaving 
Husayn was the same as Zaynab’s, yet she had to accept her role as a survivor who used 
the power of words, just as Zaynab would. The martyrs of Karbala were promised that 
they would be mourned by a great many, even though they were abandoned on Ashura; 
Ruqayyah was sent into a fearful unknown with the assurance that from her travel would 
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emerge a great Islamic nation – Pakistan – that would honor her. In this hagiography, the 
divine importance of Pakistan and its Muslims was interwoven into the events of Karbala. 
Lahore and Karbala were linked on a transnational map of sacred geography, at a time 
when transnational religious appeals were reaching their peak. 
According to Qureshi, after much wandering and trials, Ruqayyah and her 
companions reached Hindu-ruled Lahore, setting in motion a miraculous chain of events. 
The masses immediately began to convert to Islam when they encountered Ruqayyah’s 
piety and her heart-wrenching tales of what they had endured in Karbala. “The news 
spread of her blessings and miracles…at the same time, the fire that had continuously 
burned in the Raja’s court went out, and its worshippers were astounded.”169 The Hindu 
raja was disturbed by this turn of events and – much like Yazīd had done – summoned 
these visitors to his court. Ruqayyah and her ladies, however, demurred out of fear, grief, 
and their own piety. In order to forcibly bring Ruqayyah in, the Raja dispatched his son, 
Bakr Mai Sahai, to their camp. When he reached the hill, he announced the Raja’s orders 
in a loud voice, knowing that these foreigners would not be able to comprehend his 
words. To his shock, one woman, who appeared to be their leader, stepped forward and 
responded in his local tongue that they were the descendants of the Prophet of Islam, 
come to seek asylum after the trials of Karbala. Though Ruqayyah’s words had a great 
impact upon him, the prince was forced by duty to bring them in, either willing or 
through force. In Ruqayyah’s distress and anger, she raised her head from her veil to 
glance at him, “the force of which he could not bear and fainted.”170  When he awoke, he 
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renounced idol worshipping and converted immediately to Islam, and was given the name 
Abdullah by Ruqayyah. As a result, for some time Ruqayyah and her family were able to 
live in peace and preach the message of Islam to her followers under the protection of the 
prince and the favor he commanded from the reluctant Raja. The Ruqayyah story is 
unique in its exploration of Hindu/Muslim tensions, as her ties to the center of Islam 
made the contrast more distinct.  
 Indeed, continued harassment by the Hindus made their lives unbearable. 
Ruqayyah gathered the 704 Qurānic scholars that had traveled under her command from 
Karbala and ordered 700 of them to disperse to continue her preaching.171 Thus, she 
ensured that her teachings of the true Islam of ‘Ali would continue around the region, in 
accordance with her father’s wishes, as these scholars would become venerated pīrs 
amongst their own followers. Then, she gathered the four close male companions and the 
women of her family and “prayed that the earth might shield them from the sight of these 
unbelievers, and in answer to their prayer, the earth opened her mouth and mercifully 
swallowed them!”172 Upon witnessing this wondrous sight, the convert prince vowed to 
protect this sacred ground, building seven tombs over the spot and becoming the first 
mujawwar (guardian) of the shrine. Before the government’s takeover of the shrine in 
1967, and even in the aftermath of federal administration when Tarikh-e-Bibian Pak 
Daman was published, the caretakers of the shrine claimed to be descendants of this 
prince, gaining authority and influence from appropriating the concept of hereditary 
succession that marks other Sufi shrines in Pakistan. 
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 This moment that Ruqayyah vanished is perhaps the most critical in Ruqayyah’s 
hagiographies, as her disappearance, then, is not death, as Qureshi notes that these 
women are “still alive, just out of our sight.”173 As such, her ability to intercede on behalf 
of her devotees was determined both by her lineage through ‘Ali and her in-between 
state: neither living nor dead, she transcended both realms. She thus carries a tremendous 
power for devotees, further transforming the shrine into a living space. The shrine was 
thus for Shi’as a place of remembrance and commemoration, where a small remnant 
piece of cloth of their tents was said to be visible after the ground swallowed the women, 
rather than housing the physical remains of Ruqayyah and her companions. Because 
Ruqayyah had not died, the Raja’s son built a boundary wall around the area to continue 
to respect her modesty, so that no men could easily access the site where Ruqayyah and 
her companions had disappeared.  
With time, Qureshi notes, it was likely forgotten by the vast majority of devotees 
that these were not graves, though the pleas for intercession continued unabated. This 
attribute of transcending death was in direct contrast to the lives of the Sufi saints that 
have shaped Islam in South Asia; while believers had affirmed the saints’ ability to 
intercede on their behalf, there were no claims about their immortality in other 
hagiographies. In particular, with the government’s nationalization of waqf properties in 
the late 1960s and early 1970s, the Auqaf Department would publish officially sanctioned 
biographies of saints and pīrs that simply characterized them as figures that embodied 
exemplary Muslim behavior, not as divine figures who could perform miracles. The coup 
of Zia ul-Haq on July 5th 1977 and the tremendous upheaval that followed transformed 
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the nature of the state. The new regime acted immediately and aggressively to implement 
a state-sponsored religious program of Islamization, one influenced by conservative 
Islamic parties descended from the Deobandi School. Prominent shrines did not remain 
unaffected, especially as Auqaf Department sought to reframe saints in the context of 
their pious devotion to the main tenets of Islam. A supplement to the Pakistan Times, 
dated April 27, 1979, illustrated this shifting focus. In an article entitled, “Who was 
Hazrat Shahdaula,” the author details not the miracles the saint was responsible for or 
that devotees at his shrine experienced, but rather that this particular saint  
had a boundless urge for helping the poor and the needy. He swept the 
streets of the town he lived in himself, carried the cows and buffalows 
[sic] of the town people, and during winter, carried firewood to the houses 
of the poor and the needy on his own back.174  
 
The emphasis on pious acts versus miraculous divinity should be viewed through 
the lens of Zia’s Islamic Ordinances– a legal and social framework legislating a 
normative ‘state’ Islam that would fan the flames of sectarian cleavages. In line 
with the resistance to an Islam that emphasized a spiritual or other-worldly 
dimension, in Auqaf documents, the graves at Bibi Pak Daman were said to hold 
the physical remains of the six women. References to the belief that they 
disappeared and are living in occultation are excluded, as this doctrine fell outside 
the scope of ‘accepted’ state orthodoxy.175 Instead, it was the good deeds of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
174 Karim Khan Taunsvi, “Who was Hazrat Shahdaula,” The Pakistan Times, April 29, 1979. 
175 The writings and political pressures of the Jamaat-e-Islami, a group founded by Abul Ala 
Maududi in 1941, inspired much of Zia ul-Haq’s Islamization program. Maududi’s Salafi 
conservative philosophies gained him a huge following in Pakistan and would heavily influence 
the state’s interpretation of Shari’at. Shi’a concepts of ghaybat were based in part on the concept 
of the Mehdi, or Messiah, present in the Qurān. According to Maududi, however, this Mehdi 
would not be a figure returned from occultation. He would not proclaim himself as such. “I do not 
find any room in his work for supernatural acts, divine inspirations and ascetic and spiritual 
	   99	  
Ruqayyah’s life and the importance of her presence in what would become 
Pakistan that was emphasized. Shi’a hagiographies, however, would construct 
Ruqayyah’s life as the embodiment of miraculous divine favor, a rebuttal to the 
rising militancy of sectarian Sunni theology.  
 The claim that these women were simply taken away due to the threat on their 
lives mirrors one of the central tenets of the Shi’a faith: the occultation (ghaybat) of the 
last Shi’a Imam, who was hidden by God after the martyrdom of all the Imams before 
him, to ensure that the line of succession from ‘Ali would continue till the Day of 
Judgment. As such, it is not surprising that the concept of the ghaybat, which remains a 
source of great tension between Sunni and Shi’a theology, would be a feature unique to 
Shi’a hagiographies.176 Yet attributing such a sacred phenomenon to Ruqayyah is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
exercises,” he wrote. This interpretation of the Mehdi would be in direct contrast to Shi’a 
theology. See Abul Ala Maududi, “al-Imam ul-Mehdi,” in A Short History of the Revivalist 
Movement in Islam, 1st ed. (Delhi: Markaza Maktaba Islami, 1973), 40-41. 
176 The occultation of the last Shi’a Imam and the belief in his messianic return remains perhaps 
the most critical – and controversial – component of Twelver Shi’a theology and was developed 
as a response to the crisis of the Imamate after the murder of the 11th Imam, Hassan al-Askari. 
According to Shi’a theology, after the death of Muhammad, the last Prophet, there would always 
remain an Imam of the age to guide and advise the faithful until the end of time. Yet none of the 
Imams had died a natural death, all murdered by various political or religious authorities. After 
the death of Hassan al-Askari in 873 AD, his son, Muhammad al-Mahdi, was hidden from 
Abbasid authorities, though he appointed and still communicated through four deputies. This 
period was known as the Ghaybat al-Sughra, or Minor Occultation. In 941 AD, the fourth deputy 
died, ushering the period known as the Ghaybat al-Kubra, or Great Occultation, in which the 
Imam would be removed from all sight and communication, alive and watchful but separate from 
human affairs; the Ghaybat al-Kubra would last until the end of the days and the Mahdi’s return 
to usher in the Day of Judgment. Drawing from rival religious and chiliastic movements that had 
developed before the ghaybat, contemporary Shi’a scholars such as Ibn Babuya al-Qummi, 
Ya’qubal al-Kulayni, and later Shaykh al-Mufíd developed a theology of occultation. For more 
on the development and institutionalization of the doctrine of occultation, and formative influence 
of the Mu’tazalite rational tradition, see Said Amir Arjomand, “The Consolation of Theology: 
Absence of the Imam and Transition from Chiliasm to Law and Shi’ism,” The Journal of 
Religion, Vol. 76, No. 4 (Oct. 1996), 548-571, and “The Crisis of the Imamate and the Institution 
of Occultation in Twelver Shi’ism: A Sociohistorical Perspective,” in International Journal of 
Middle East Studies, vol. 28, No. 4 (Nov. 1996), 491-515. The question of religious and political 
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striking; the 12th Shi’a Imam, or the Mahdi, is the holiest of figures, one whose very 
existence has defined and continued a distinct Shi’a identity. The most revered figures in 
Shi’ism achieved martyrdom, sacrificing their lives willingly in the name of God at the 
Prophet’s family; yet the focus on Ruqayyah’s ghaybat is implicitly equated with the 
Mahdi and sends a different message – when surrounded by non-believers in a foreign 
land, pursued by the enemies of ‘Ali and his family, she was saved to illustrate both 
God’s omnipotence and the exalted status of the Prophet’s family. In Qureshi’s 
hagiography, of all those that suffered before her and in her family, only Ruqayyah was 
shielded by God.   
 The allusions to ghaybat in Tarikh-e-Bibian Pak Daman appear throughout to 
construct a uniquely divine portrayal of Ruqayyah. Qureshi notes another miracle 
accepted by Shi’a hagiographies: the severed and impaled head of Husayn was said to 
have recited Qurānic verses along the way from Karbala to Damascus. Husayn was 
repeating the Qurānic chapter Al-Kahf, which tells the story of a small group of believers 
who faced persecution in their time. With the guidance of God, they fled to a cave and 
went to sleep; when they awoke 309 years later, the regimes of their oppressors had 
passed and the population had become monotheistic. Husayn’s recitation of this verse 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
authority in Shi’ism in the absence of the Twelfth Imam, however, remained an evolving realm of 
interpretation and adaption, and Ayatollah “Imam” Ruhollah Khomeini’s series of lectures on the 
notion of the Vilayat-e-Faqīh, or the guardianship of the jurist in the absence of the Mahdi, would 
prompt scholarly and religious debates on Shi’ism’s historic relationship to authority and power. 
Said Amir Arjomand, for example, argues that since the overthrow of the Abbasid caliphate, 
Shi’a theologians recognized that a temporal ruler could be recognized as a legitimate, 
conditional on his execution of justice and without claims to the religious authority that remained 
solely in the hands of the Twelfth Imam. Hamid Algar, however, argues there existed an inherent 
incompatibility between Shi’a doctrine and political authority. The concept of ghaybat would also 
provide powerful in literary and political rhetoric. In particular, the concept was used to powerful 
effect in the discussion of the disappearance of Musa al-Sadr, the charismatic Shi’a activist who 
mysteriously disappeared in a trip to Libya in 1978. See Fouad Ajami, The Vanished Imam.  
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illustrated that God had infinite power to protect even the smallest group of believers, if 
he so chose, but in some cases sacrifice was in order. Qureshi compares Ruqayyah’s story 
in detailed to the parable of The Cave. He notes that the ghaybat remains an aspect of 
Ruqayyah’s life that raised the most skepticism, but argues, “Because of ignorance on the 
divine will of Allah, the Qurānic has promised that until the end of time, people will raise 
questions on the People of the Cave. These same people will question Ruqayyah.”177 This 
sacred trope does key work in Ruqayyah’s legend, and the assertion here is a striking one 
– those that do not accept Ruqayyah’s ghaybat, a distinctly Shi’a idea, are as those who 
question the veracity of the Qurān.178  
 Ruqayyah’s miraculous legend and the Islamic parables her story invoked did not 
end with her ghaybat. Indeed, the Hindus who visited her camp were so astonished and 
overwhelmed by her disappearance that they converted on the spot – validating ‘Ali’s 
claim that from Ruqayyah’s presence in Lahore would spring a great nation of believers. 
Qureshi shares that after Ruqayyah’s ghaybat, her caretaker Abdullah was told to marry a 
woman from the neighboring Hindu Jhat tribe. The woman was a cripple and going 
blind. But despite her sorry state, according to Qureshi, “Abdullah took every action at 
the command of his Lady. He prayed for guidance at Bibi Pak Daman and then married 
the woman. After their wedding, he brought his new wife to Ruqayyah and beseeched her 
for blessings. To their astonishment, she was cured with the blessing of this Lady. When 
they saw this miracle, 7,000 Jhat Hindus from her tribe converted on site.”179 The mass 
and spontaneous conversion of Hindus and followers of other religious was not a unique 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
177 Qureshi, Tarikh Bibian Pak Daman, 200. 
178 Qureshi, Tarikh Bibian Pak Daman, 201. 
179 Qureshi, Tarikh Bibian Pak Daman, 145. 
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feature of Muslim hagiographic literature in the subject. Indeed, the obsession with 
conversion played a prominent role in narratives of Islamic figures, and similar parables 
existed in saintly devotional literature. Yet Qureshi notes that Ruqayyah’s story in 
particular was similar to one of Fatima bint Muhammad’s known miracles, recited as the 
Bibi Ki Kahani amongst Shi’a Muslims in the subcontinent to beseech Fatima’s 
intercession for a particular wish. In the prayer, Fatima attends a wedding of a Jewish 
woman, who had invited her just to shame the simplicity of Fatima’s appearance. The 
angels, however, descended from heaven and dressed Fatima such that when she arrived, 
she emanated such divine light that the bride was overcome and collapsed. Despite their 
cruel intentions, Fatima was deeply remorseful that her presence caused such tragedy and 
quickly performed an ablution and began to pray. The bride was revived with Fatima’s 
grace, and when she learned what happened she immediately repented for her devious 
actions and converted to Islam. 7,000 Jews of her tribe followed suit. The similarities 
between the two narratives are striking – the disbelieving others, the miraculous act of 
proof, and the spontaneous conversion of exactly 7,000. Like her parallels to Zaynab’s 
role as witness and messenger, in this work Ruqayyah’s life embodies multiple Shi’a 
parables, from Fatima’s miracles to the rarest and most powerful instances of ghaybat. 
By drawing on these parables and constructing a miraculous portrayal of Ruqayyah, 
Qureshi made Bibi Pak Daman an unquestionably powerful site, one that was 
prophesized by ‘Ali and as central to Islam as any other shrine. The tropes and parables 
of Qureshi’s hagiography were decidedly Shi’a, but the appeal to embrace the shrine was 
national. 
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Sayyeda Ruqayyah Becomes ‘Bibi Pak Daman’ 
 What emerges from these narratives of Bibi Ruqayyah’s life are the multitude of 
ways in which discussions about Bibi Pak Daman navigated a dual purpose: they 
validated the importance of Islam in South Asia, linking this shrine to the perceived Arab 
‘center’ of the faith while simultaneously appropriating Ruqayyah into a national 
narrative. While the ambiguities of Ruqayyah’s life allowed Bibi Pak Daman to be linked 
with a broader sacred geography and noted Shi’a figures, her narrative was deeply 
imbued with tropes that would resonate on a local and national level. In the early 
hagiographies from Chishti, Fawq, and Subhan, the fact that Ruqayyah chose Lahore and 
then converted its people en masse affirmed the case for the historic presence of Islam in 
the region. But her presence and the divine plan she represented could also be interpreted 
as the necessity for the creation of Pakistan. Indeed, the very justification for the 
establishment of the state rested on the notion that Islam was not just a foreign influence 
imposed on the local population but was organically rooted in the subcontinent; Islam’s 
inherent incompatibility with Hinduism was exacerbated by the colonial structure and 
necessitated a separate state. Thus, Islam’s historic presence - embodied by Ruqayyah - 
affirmed that a kind of religious distinctiveness had existed since the early age of Islam 
and was not merely created vis-à-vis India in the 20th century as the colonial enterprise 
wound down. She was, then, seen as the true mother of the great Islamic nation that was 
promised by ‘Ali, just as Pakistan was the fulfillment of that promise.  
 The blessing of Ruqayyah’s presence in Pakistan was repeated throughout 
literature and conscious effort was made to prove and affirm that she did arrive – and 
indeed belong – in the region. Unlike the majority of pirs and their descendants buried 
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across Pakistan who drew their influence from a clear line of hereditary descent, the 
ambiguities of Ruqayyah’s story led to differing claims about who was buried at Bibi Pak 
Daman, reflected early on in Subhan’s rebuttal of their skepticism. While the story that it 
was Ruqayyah bint ‘Ali was a widely accepted one, some Sunni Muslims believed that 
this Ruqayyah was one of the daughters of Syed Ahmad Tokhta Tirmizi, a Sufi pīr who 
lived in the Lahore area in the 12th century. According to Qureshi, however, there was a 
great deal of evidence “and proof from history that the story of Syed Ahmad Tokhta was 
created for greed and religious hatred. These false stories have been spread to keep the 
Shi’a faithful from visiting the shrine and for the extremists to seize control of the site.”180 
This assertion is not surprising, given the political tensions that were at play at the shrine 
during Qureshi’s work and publication. Indeed, the debates and conflict that were to play 
out at Bibi Pak Daman in the aftermath of the government’s takeover in 1967 were in part 
related to who was buried at the shrine – and as an extension, what rights that guaranteed 
particular pilgrims and caretakers. Qureshi states, “There is a live presence at Bibi Pak 
Daman. I hereby request the Auqaf Department not to damage the feelings and devotional 
practice of the pilgrims there.”181 Clearly, these interpretive portrayals of Ruqayyah had 
deep implications on the ground at Bibi Pak Daman. The difference between Sunni and 
Shi’a portrayals of Zaynab resulted in entirely different shrines and sacred geography. At 
Bibi Pak Daman, Sunni challenges delinked the shrine from Shi’a sacred geography.   
 While Qureshi’s work was the most comprehensive hagiography on Ruqayyah 
and Bibi Pak Daman, published at a critical turning point in Pakistani and international 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
180 Qureshi, Tarikh Bibian Pak Daman, 257. 
181 Qureshi, Tarikh Bibian Pak Daman, 253. 
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politics, the authenticity of the shrine and who was buried there were debated by 
pilgrims, residents, scholars, and politicians alike. Qureshi’s articles from 1967-68 in 
support of the Bibi Pak Daman shrine were also directed at the government. Shortly after 
the Auqaf takeover, he noted, “The Department of Auqaf has now taken control of Bibi 
Pak Daman. There is hope that now the government will pay appropriate attention to this 
shrine.” He would then pivot to a discussion of a critical verse in the Qurān, in Surah al-
Shūra, in which the Prophet referred to respecting those near to him. Sunni Muslims had 
deliberately misunderstood this verse, he countered, though it was meant to refer to the 
family of the Prophet – and, by extension, Ruqayyah.182 The hope for Auqaf intercession 
in supporting these claims would be met with deep disappointment, however. To his 
astonishment, he noted, 
In this holy and blessed shrine, when Sunnis arranged the yearly urs under 
the auspices of the Auqaf Department, within the boundaries of the shrine 
they not only had a milad and naat khani, drums, and musical evening, the 
chadors were spread by men on the holy grave! We inquired if these 
events had been approved by the Auqaf Department or by the permission 
of the Chairman of the Shi’a-Sunni Joint Committee [of Bibi Pak Daman], 
Hafiz Nazar Muhammad. If a Shi’a devotee is moved by the presence of 
his Bibi and begins to cry or recite a lament, it is not permitted, but the 
Sunnis can play music and engage in revelry – why is there such a 
difference?  
 
For Qureshi, the disparity stemmed from a difference in interpretation; for Shi’as, 
Ruqayyah bint ‘Ali’s shrine should be a space of solemn commemoration of the tragedies 
of Karbala. Thus, an investment in that interpretation had implications for practice on the 
ground at the shrine. While the government had supported the belief that Bibi Pak Daman 
was Ruqayyah bint ‘Ali, their accommodationist stance to the practices of the majority 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
182 Muhammad Bakhsh Shah Qureshi, “Aaj ke halāt,” Shaheed Lahore, 5th December 1967.  
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Sunni population angered Qureshi. He warned in one of his articles against an over-
privileging of the Sunni majority perspective in the affairs of the shrine: “Our nation is 
going through a difficult and delicate time, and it is necessary that we do not allow 
sectarian divisions to continue and block our development.”183 The country, so recently 
torn apart by the loss of East Pakistan into Bangladesh in 1971, could not afford the strife 
that would result from curtailing Shi’a religious expression, especially with the Shi’a 
population of Pakistan galvanizing behind new communal organizations.184 
The events and his advocacy promoted responses in the local press. In an article 
by a resident of the Bibi Pak Daman published by a local gazette in 1972, the author 
argued about the recent conflicts that “while there have been various schools of thought 
regarding this shrine, often conflicting, all is hearsay.”185 In a nod to the controversy that 
still existed at the time of publication, the first part of Qureshi’s text is devoted to dozens 
of ‘authentication’ letters and testimonials from politicians, parliamentarians, academics, 
and religious leaders attesting both to the quality of his research and the unquestionable 
fact that Ruqayyah did travel to Lahore and ended up at the shrine at Bibi Pak Daman. 
One such letter from Member of Parliament Nawab Nawazish ‘Ali Khan, written in 
August 1973, notes that on behalf of this project, he had “gathered extensive information 
from Iran and Iraq and traveled to verify if there was any evidence of Ruqayyah’s grave 
in any of these other areas. I found none. She did not travel through Kufa and Damascus 
as a prisoner, nor did she return to Medina. Those Arabs that I spoke to on my visit, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
183 Muhammad Bakhsh Shah Qureshi, Al-Assad, 26th July, 1972. 
184 In 1972, the Imamia Student Organization would be formed, a turning point for the 
mobilization – and militancy – of Shi’a youth. See Hassan Abbas, “Shi’ism and Sectarian 
Conflict in Pakistan: Identity Politics, Iranian Influence, and Tit-for-Tat Violence,” Occasional 
Paper Series: Combating Terrorism Center, Sept. 22, 2010, West Point. 
185 Iqbal Saeed, “Mazarat Bibian Pak Damanā,” Arafat-e-Lahore, Issue 4, Sept/Oct. 1972. 
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including religious leaders, verified that she left Karbala and traveled to Lahore with a 
large caravan.”186 As in the case with the Sayyeda Zaynab shrine, personal testimonies 
and witness confirmation served as proof of history. In this hagiography, national figures 
lent their personal credibility to the belief that it was Ruqayyah buried at Bibi Pak 
Daman.  
While the debate was certainly more complex than Qureshi’s assertions, given 
how much of Ruqayyah’s story read as legendary reflections of more historically 
‘known’ Shi’a figures rather than historical record, the government’s position was also 
that Ruqayyah was the daughter of ‘Ali. Hagiographies endorsed by the government after 
its takeover and written by various authors consistently worked to disprove any other 
theories, an indication of a broad political and religious commitment to the notion that a 
daughter of ‘Ali had made her way to Pakistan and been the first to bring Islam to the 
subcontinent, as was divinely ordained. Her shrine could be a site of national unity, 
Qureshi notes, as it was his hope that “this site becomes one of great activity and 
harmony, and no Pakistani from any fiqh is unwelcome here.”187 Years later, after years 
of violent political and religious conflicts waged in the name of Islam, in the 1990 
hagiography endorsed by the Auqad Department and written by a Sunni scholar, Masood 
Hashmi, he laments,  
For us, the people of Pakistan, what a fortunate blessing that for our 
spiritual guidance, one of the children of Ali came as a guest to our land, 
but we have not recognized her as she deserved. If we had, today Bibi Pak 
Daman’s blessed shrine would have been built in a manner that suited her 
standing…. Many people do not agree upon how she came to Lahore, but 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
186 Letter from Nawazish Ali Khan to Maulavi Muhammad Bakhsh Shah Qureshi, August 1, 
1973. Republished in Tarikh-e-Bibian Pak Daman, 73.  
187 Qureshi, Tarikh-e-Bibian Pak Daman, 257.  
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the truth is that most people are not knowledgeable about the history of 
Islam. Her presence is found in the history of Hind and Sindh if one 
knows how to look.188  
 
Thus, Hashmi notes, the cause for controversy should not be in the identity of the graves 
in the shrine but in the way that Pakistanis had cared for this blessing that had been 
bestowed upon them – a critique of moral and physical decay and the inability to 
safeguard the nation that one sees mirrored in a variety of different discourses at the end 
of the 20th century. Nevertheless, the preoccupation with proving Ruqayyah’s identity 
pervaded much of the local literature, because the debate had significant implications for 
nationalist interpretations. Her presence was often referred to as a favor bestowed upon 
the nation that had to continuously prove itself worthy of her presence – especially since 
she remained alive and watchful over her devotees. A shrine for a figure of this stature 
was a validation of both Shi’ism in particular and Islam in general on the subcontinent, 
and it bolstered the nationalist mystique of Pakistan.  
 The presence of Ruqayyah and the primacy of Islam also constructed a simple and 
alternate narrative about Pakistan at a time when the very basis of the nation was being 
questioned in political and literary spheres. Zia ul-Haq’s coup in 1977 shook the 
foundations of the state, ushering in a period of military rule combined with an official 
policy of conservative Deobandi Islamization. Far from the secular democracy 
envisioned by Pakistan’s founders, the state would morph into an authoritarian and 
ideological state – but the question of which Islam remained, especially in a nation still 
struggling to form a positive articulation of national identity beyond its opposition to 
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India.189 Indeed, state-sponsored Islamization exacerbated sectarian and religious 
divisions as the regime promulgated hundreds of new laws that affected every aspect of 
public and private life in its new Nizām-e-Mustafa (Order of the Prophet). It would 
prompt a correspondent for the Pakistan Times to question, “When we say that the 
country’s laws will be brought into conformity with the Holy Qurān every Muslim knows 
the book referred to, but when we say sunnah…we cannot point out any book acceptable 
to the ummah as a safe, secure, and current authority.”190 Pakistan’s founders had 
deliberately shied from integrating Islamic ordinances into the workings of the 
government, for fear of popular divisions, their inherent secularism, and the opposition of 
the ulama against coopting Islamic rule. The authoritarian regime under Zia and human 
rights abuses would also give birth to a new genre of short stories that recalled the trauma 
of partition, an internal challenge to the hegemonic notion of Pakistan as an inevitable 
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minded commitment to Pakistan, but this stemmed from his desire to be the “sole spokesman” for 
India’s unified Muslims. It is from Jalal’s work, however, that historiography would begin to 
question Jinnah’s desire to establish a separate state and the inner workings and contestations 
amongst various interests would emerge. See Ayesha Jalal, The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, the 
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Representation in Colonial India, 1860-1947 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989). 
Gyanendra Pandey in particular would focus on micro histories to analyze the formation of 
Muslim identity in pre-partition India and argued that identity creation was an intertwined with 
the local community. Gyanendra Pandey, The Construction of Communalism in Colonial North 
India (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1984).  
190 “Nizām-e-Mustafa,” Pakistan Times, May 3, 1983.  
	   110	  
and preferable historical endpoint.191 The narrative of Ruqayyah bringing the true 
message of Islam to Pakistan after the events of Karbala provided an implicit challenge to 
Zia’s vision of the Islamic state and his Nizām-e-Mustafa. It crafted an alternative vision 
of what that Islam was – transmitted by a woman, miraculous and spiritual rather than 
retributive, and, most critically, coherent with a Shi’a vision of history and theology. The 
narrative-cum-history of Ruqayyah was critical to the ideological opposition to the state-
enforced Islam of Zia. It created a space for Shi’as to assert their essentiality to the nation 
in a regime whose brand of Islam sought to delineate the bounderies of what constituted 
‘authentic’ religious behavior and eliminate all deviations.192 Ruqayyah’s Islam – Shi’a, 
transmitted by a woman and miraculous – provided a lived counterpoint to Zia’s Islam, 
inextricably linked to the power dynamics of the military as the defenders of the Pakistani 
state.  
 Yet Bibi Pak Daman also created an argument for the distinct sacred territoriality 
of Pakistan. The idea of Pakistan was based largely on the idea of a political and religious 
nationalism, with the partition simply delineating areas of Muslim majority. Few 
arguments were made over the sacredness of the land itself, as was common in many new 
nation states post-WWII.193 By the publication of Tarikh-e-Bibian Pak Daman, however, 
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Gilmartin, “Partition, Pakistan, and South Asian History: In Search of a Narrative,” The Journal 
of Asian Studies, Vol. 57, No. 4 (Nov. 1998), 1068-1095.  
192 Amendments to the Penal Code of Pakistan and the Criminal Procedure Code would forbid 
speaking against or causing dishonor to the Sahaba (companions of the Prophet), who Shi’a 
Muslims felt usurped the righteous leadership of ‘Ali. Further amendments would also declare the 
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Mumtaz Ahmad, “The Crescent and the Sword: Islam, the Military, and Political Legitimacy in 
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193 The most direct example of ideological arguments on the sacredness of land existed in the new 
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Pakistan had waged a disastrous war with India over East Pakistan, losing a huge swath 
of Muslim-majority territory from Pakistan and leading to serious questions about the 
basis of what national identity was in the face of Muslim opposition. Yet in the wake of 
national trauma, more answers emerged, including a renewed emphasis on the geographic 
and religious identity of the new Pakistan. “Gone was the need to straddle, 
schizophrenically, both sides of the subcontinent,” wrote a scholar in 1979.194 Gone, too, 
was a significant chunk of Pakistan’s Hindu majority. The state left was more contiguous, 
more Muslim, and more focused on its Islamic roots. Qureshi’s emphasis on the 
sacredness of the ground of Bibi Pak Daman reflected the new commitment to the 
territorial importance of Pakistan, as Lahore itself was the heart of Pakistan’s largest 
province.  
  Thus, the second aspect of the duality between Bibi Pak Daman’s transnational 
connections and nationalized milieus was the way that Ruqayyah’s story became imbued 
with references to known saints and seminal events in the constructed national narrative. 
After the process of molding her as a central figure in Shi’a martyrology, she would be 
transformed into a national legend. Qureshi notes the most commonly known reference, 
that of the connection between Ruqayyah and Ali Hujweri, Data Ganj Bakhsh, the patron 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
archaeology and the creation of the spatial foundations and ideological contours of settler 
nationhood from the 1880s to 1950s in both the colonial and national projects. See Nadia Abu El 
Haj, Facts on the Ground: Archaeological Practice and Territorial Self-Fashioning in Israeli 
Society (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001). Firoozeh Kashani-Sabet has illuminated 
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194 William Richter, “The Political Dynamics of Islamic Resurgence in Pakistan,” Asian Survey, 
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saint of Lahore. He argues that multiple historical sources noted that Hujweri was a 
devoted pilgrim to Bibi Pak Daman and would spend days in contemplation and prayer at 
the shrine. Such was Hujweri’s regard for Ruqayyah’s exalted status that he was said to 
have crawled miles on hands and knees on his approach to Bibi Pak Daman. There, he 
would often spend weeks on end in solitary meditation.195 This narrative serves a dual 
purpose: it verified the contested timeline of Ruqayyah’s arrival in the subcontinent and 
tied her to a nationally revered figure. Hujweri lived in the 11th century, he reasoned, and 
as such Ruqayyah must have arrived in the subcontinent earlier – too early for her to be a 
daughter of the Sufi saint Ahmad Tokhta, who lived in the 12th century. In fact, the 
hagiography notes, because the vast majority of Sufi saints in the subcontinent trace their 
descent to ‘Ali, they all sought to pay their respects to Ali’s daughter. As such, the great 
saints of the subcontinent, from Lal Shahbaz Qalandar and Syed Muinuddin Chishti to 
Khwaja Nazamuddin Auliya, all visited the shrine of Bibi Pak Daman in their travels.196  
 These narratives reveal a clear effort to prove Ruqayyah’s existence in Pakistan 
by tying her to famed individuals, appropriating her into the national context. By 
extension, these associations further sacralized the shrine of Bibi Pak Daman, both as a 
hallowed national and sectarian space. A visit to Bibi Pak Daman was thus implicitly 
positioned as honoring the national legacy. Nowhere is this clearer than in the association 
of Muhammad bin Qasim, the legendary Umayyad conqueror of Sindh and the Punjab, 
and Ruqayyah. In instructional textbooks written for Pakistan Studies courses through the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
195 Qureshi, Tarikh Bibian Pak Daman, 322. While the Data Ganj Bakhsh shrine has grown into a 
massive and populated complex, there remained a dedicated marble slab in Bibi Pak Daman that 
marked the spot where Ali Hujweri spent time in prayer, receiving wisdom and guidance from 
Bibi Ruqayyah. 
196 Qureshi, Tarikh Bibian Pak Daman, 323. 
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1980s, Pakistan’s history began with the 8th century conquest of Muhammad bin Qasim. 
M.D. Zafar’s A Textbook of Pakistan Studies, a text for Secondary levels of education, 
narrates to students that Pakistan as a distinct historical entity “came to be established for 
the first time when the Arabs under Muhammad bin Qasim occupied Sind and Multan.”197 
His tie to Ruqayyah is made explicit in Hashmi’s 1990 hagiography, in which 
Muhammad bin Qasim was allegedly among those sent to wage war against Ruqayyah 
but was captured.198 When he was informed of the woes of the family of the Prophet and 
the cruelty of Umayyads, he cursed his former rulers. He then proceeded to “raise the flag 
of Islam in all of Sindh” in the name of Imam Husayn, and when he returned to 
Damascus, he was condemned to death for his betrayal of the Umayyad regime. Thus, in 
Ruqayyah’s hagiography, the genesis of Pakistan was a Shi’a one. This connection 
reveals much about the distinct investment that local hagiographies displayed in crafting 
an expansive narrative for Ruqayyah’s place in Pakistan’s constructed history.199  
 Linking Ruqayyah to a prominent early nationalist and Islamic hero illuminates a 
fascinating desire to both authenticate her presence in the subcontinent and place her in 
an accessible local context, even as the shrine drew much of its spiritual authenticity and 
salience from the links to the broader Islamic map. According to both Qureshi and then 
Hashmi, the head of Ruqayyah’s army and the man who captured Muhammad bin Qasim 
was Abdullah Abu Hashim bin Muhammad Hanafiyya, a grandson of ‘Ali. Abu Hashim 
was later killed in the service of protecting Ruqayyah’s caravan “and to this day his grave 
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is in the Clifton district of Karachi, known as Abdullah Shah Ghazi.”200 The shrine of 
Abdullah Shah Ghazi was a sprawling complex in Pakistan’s largest city, and the saint 
regarded as the patron saint of Karachi. The link to Karachi is notable; though Bibi Pak 
Daman was located in Lahore, this narrative again placed the shrine within a national 
matrix, associating it with personalities who were deeply rooted in regional and national 
consciousness. These figures had all made an indelible mark on the subcontinent and 
occupied central roles in the imagined cultural heritage of Pakistan. While the vast 
majority of pīrs and shrines in Pakistan resonated on a local level, in a nation where these 
provincial, ethnic, and religious divisions had become deeply exacerbated, Ruqayyah’s 
life connected those sites in an overarching national narrative. No longer was Sayyeda 
Ruqayyah an Arab exile born from Medina, raised with the values and teachings of that 
milieu, fleeing religious persecution. In these writings, one can see her as the mother 
come home to establish her roots, the first to bring the message of Islam to the nation and 
whom all the great male heroes and saints revered.  
The numerous local and Islamic tropes interwoven into Ruqayyah’s arrival in the 
region similarly worked to transform Sayyeda Ruqayyah into Bibi Pak Daman. Multiple 
sources detailed events that invoked the most prominent trope in the subcontinent – that 
of the destruction of idols and the power of Islam to uproot ‘false’ religions. According to 
all the evolving hagiographies of Ruqayyah, the inhabitants of Lahore were devoted idol-
worshippers, ruled by royal courts that patronized temples to false gods and placed their 
faith in duplicitous fortune-tellers. However, it would be problematic for Ruqayyah’s 
message to exist alongside these unbelievers, since the truth of Islam should be powerful 
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enough to uproot shirk.201 For many noted Islamic figures, legends of their ability to 
affect conversions and prove idols to be false are critical components in establishing their 
piety and righteous nature. This trope is echoed in Ruqayyah’s life. As she traveled from 
Karbala, her sermons attracted masses that were disillusioned by the inequality of the 
Hindu caste system and political control of the Brahims, converting in large quantities to 
Islam. The strength of the Hindu regime was no match for the truth of Ruqayyah’s 
message and the stories of grief she had endured. Like the Islamic heroes of lore, the false 
gods could not withstand her power as a proselytizer.  
These hagiographies operate as history, deliberately rejecting the idea of these 
stories approximating mythology. Yet Ruqayyah’s appeal draws emotional resonance 
from these powerful tropes, such as the spontaneous dousing of the fire of the 
fortunetellers in the courts and the destruction of its idols. Qureshi mentions this 
narrative, noting that when Ruqayyah and her companions arrived in Lahore, the Raja 
was alerted to their presence when the fire that burned in the courts suddenly went out 
and could not be relit. A brief pamphlet written in 1983 by Fazal Ahmad Nishān, one of 
the shrine’s caretakers, or sajjada nashins, expanded on this legend. Not surprisingly, as 
someone directly involved with and benefitting from the promotion of the Bibi Pak 
Daman, Nishān’s short booklet is replete with references to Ruqayyah’s miracles and the 
close relationship she had with the caretaker Abdullah – who he alleged was his ancestor. 
While the Auqaf takeover had removed many of the sajjada nashin from their primary 
role in the day-to-day administration of the shrine, their ties within the community and 
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ability to barter access to the inner sacred space of the shrine made them vested parties in 
the narrative of Ruqayyah bint ‘Ali’s miraculous presence. He narrates that when 
Ruqayyah stepped foot in the Hindu raja’s land, their idols were taken “as if by storm and 
fell to the ground in pieces. The raja consulted his court fortune-tellers, who confirmed 
for him that there had been some Arabs that had arrived from the family of the 
Muhammad. It was their appearance that had caused the commotion.”202 This miraculous 
event was certainly emblematic of how Ruqayyah was portrayed, intertwined with divine 
mysticism and legendary acts. This story was proof of the power of Islam as the ‘true’ 
religion, embodied by Ruqayyah, and the fragility of the false faiths that she came to 
expose. This occurrence, however, was not unique to the history of Bibi Pak Daman; one 
finds that the trope of idol destruction was particularly pervasive in the region, perhaps 
reflecting uneasiness at the coexistence of Islam and Hinduism. Indeed, the accounts 
related to the most popular Muslim figures often addressed their particular interactions 
with idol-worshipping, revealing concerted attempts to explain how these practices 
continued, even as Islam gained a larger foothold. Thus, in some way, these messengers 
must all have acted to undermine Hinduism, either by destroying the inanimate objects 
that its followers worship or by converting the local populations to Islam. Ruqayyah’s 
story embodies both of these components and fits into the larger matrix of South Asian 
Islam. The trope also harkens back to perhaps the most memorable and, ironically, iconic 
moments in the history of Islam in South Asia. In 1025, Sultan Mahmud of Ghazni, “the 
Afghan iconoclast of myth and legend” sacked the Shiva temple at Somnath, Gujrat, 
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refusing to allow the ransom of the main temple idol by claiming, allegedly, that he was a 
breaker of idols, not a seller of them.203 Mahmud of Ghazni’s words invoked the actions 
of the prophet Abraham, who destroyed the idols of his father, a maker and seller of 
idols. This preoccupation with undermining idolatry, either through destruction of the 
idols or the conversion of the idolaters, reveals a conscious anxiety in how to describe 
Islam’s continued existence alongside Hinduism without ever fully vanquishing or 
supplanting it. Interestingly, Qureshi notes that it was Mahmud Ghaznavi who first 
commissioned the first concrete structure in Afghan architectural style over the graves of 
Bibi Ruqayyah and her family.204 As Mahmud Ghaznavi was commonly perceived as a 
virulent iconoclast, it is notable that the initial construction of the shrine is attributed to 
him, since the building of shrines and the rituals practiced in these places remains a 
source of heated debate. Similarly, the extension of Bibi Pak Daman and the creation of 
waqf around the site are attributed to the Mughal Emperor Akbar, another fascinating link 
across time and space to the famed names of local history.205  
***** 
Over a century of hagiographies, Ruqayyah bint ‘Ali’s life would provide a blank 
slate onto which emerging ideas of Islam in the subcontinent were projected. Unlike the 
historical Zaynab, the outlines of Ruqayyah’s story were ambiguous. Yet as more 
complex interpretations were constructed of Zaynab’s role in Shi’ism, hagiographies 
about Ruqayyah would come to reflect similar tropes and characteristics and develop a 
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legendary portrayal that resonated with powerful Shi’a references and themes. For 
devotees, the implications of a daughter of ‘Ali buried in Pakistan were always 
monumental: it had allowed them to link Bibi Pak Daman – and therefore Pakistan – to 
seminal events in the formative years of Islamic and Shi’a history. It affirmed that the 
lands that would become Pakistan were vital at Islam’s inception, rather than a much 
later, peripheral recipient of Muhammad’s message. By the publication of the seminal 
hagiography on Bibi Pak Daman, however, Ruqayyah’s life and the history of Bibi Pak 
Daman would be intertwined with ideological conflicts over the nature of the relationship 
between Islam and the state and the anxieties over the nation-building project. The 
narratives that emerged repeatedly emphasized Bibi Pak Daman’s central place both in 
sacred Islamic geography and national mythology. While Ruqayyah would draw her 
divine and miraculous power from her association with the Ahl al-Bayt and the central 
traumas of Shi’ism, a matrix of links and associations between popular saints, national 
heroes, and historical Islamic figures would be constructed to ground Bibi Pak Daman as 
the original national figure – the mother who gave birth to a great Islamic nation.  
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Chapter Three 
“The Center for all Shi’a Faithful”: the Sayyeda Zaynab, the ahl al-Murtadha, and 
‘being Shi’a’ 
 
 
 In 1952, just a few years after Syrian independence, the renowned historian, 
scholar, and Arabic linguist Muhammad Kurd ‘Ali published Ghawtat Dimashq, a text 
describing the important landmarks, constructions, and ancient history of human 
settlement in the rich agricultural region surrounding Damascus.206 In it, Kurd ‘Ali noted 
briefly that there was a shrine in the Ghawta region that was “among the most beautifully 
furnished mosques” in the area. Despite its immediate aesthetic appeal, Kurd ‘Ali did not 
dwell on a description of this site beyond this cursory mention, noting simply that this 
shrine had benefitted greatly from the donations recently given by mostly Iranian 
pilgrims, who together had contributed to make the otherwise anonymous site worth 
noting.207 For Kurd Ali, the shrine did not hold a specific religious or historical value 
worth elaborating beyond its aesthetic characteristics. Instead, he explained that the 
mosque was a local site, named after one of the many pious women of the Ahl al-Bayt 
who had traveled through Damascus but whose lives and lineages were difficult to trace. 
While the shrine merited brief mention in the work of this prominent Arab literary figure, 
in the same year, however, Muhsin al-Amīn, the popular Shi’a marja’ of Damascus, 
would be buried at the same Sayyeda Zaynab shrine – a shrine he had hoped would 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
206 Kurd ‘Ali was a towering figure in the Syrian intellectual scene and the author of Khitāt al-
Shām, a six volume history of Greater Syria. Kurd ‘Ali’s career spanned the end of the Ottoman 
Empire, through Faysali and Mandate Syria into the independent state, at times fleeing Egypt to 
escape persecution by various authorities. A prolific writer, Kurd ‘Ali published newspaper, 
journals, manuscripts, and biographies, served as Minister of Education in Syria, and as the first 
president of the Academy of the Arabic Language, founded by Faysal I of Syria in 1918. For 
more, see Joseph H Escovitz, “Orientalists and Orientalism in the Writings of Muhammad Kurd 
‘Ali,” International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 15, No. 1 (Feb., 1983), 95-109. 
207 Muhammad Kurd ‘Ali, Ghawtat Dimashq (Damascus: Matba'at al-Tarqī, 1952), 178. 
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become a focal galvanizing point for the Shi’a community of Syria. Al-Amīn’s funeral 
would draw a massive congregation of ulama, pilgrims, local residents, and shrine 
dignitaries that overflowed the boundaries of the small site.208 Al-Amīn’s death would 
coincide with a new focus on the Sayyeda Zaynab shrine in the aftermath of Syrian 
independence, efforts he had encouraged in his lifetime. An administrative committee 
had recently been convened at the Sayyeda Zaynab shrine for the purpose of expanding 
and promoting the site, formed at the urging of al-Amīn, who had long endorsed the 
affairs at the shrine. The Lajna’ Ashrāf ‘alā Maqām al-Sayyeda Zaynab would publish a 
new architectural and fundraising plan that year, aimed at “improving and expanding the 
site of Sayyeda Zaynab for the comfort of her devotees” and to give appropriate attention 
to “a historic Islamic site in our country” which had yet to receive its proper efforts and 
due.209  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
208 Tashyi’i al-Marhūm al-Syed al-Amīn fi Sahn al-Sayyeda Zaynab Alayhā as-salām: taliy’ah 
mawkib janāzah al-Marhūm al-Syed Muhsin al-Amīn fi Damishq. Photograph, Majma’ al-
Sayyeda Zaynab li al-Ma’lūmāt wa al-Abhāth, Murtadha Family Private Papers, Sitt Zaynab, 
Syria. 
209 Khatah al-Jadīda lil Maqām al-Sharif al-Sayyeda Zaynab. File 12, Majma’ al-Sayyeda Zaynab 
li al-Ma’lūmāt wa al-Abhāth, Murtadha Family Private Papers, Sitt Zaynab, Syria. See also 
Muhammad Fakhri Zakariyya, "Mintaqat al-sayyida zaynab bi- al-shām," al-Mawsim, 1, No. 4 
(1989), 230.  
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(Figure 3.1: Funeral of Muhsin al-Amīn) 
 
The contrast between these different understandings of the Sayyeda Zaynab shrine 
1952 is not surprising. For intellectuals and political leaders, the newly independent Syria 
had a rich history of architectural, cultural, and religious landmarks that were coopted in 
the service of the powerful ideological currents of the time – pan-Islamism, Arab 
nationalism, and greater Syrian nationalism.210 In contrast, the Sayyeda Zaynab shrine 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
210 The dominant paradigms in the historiography on Syria are a complicated mix of texts, and a 
complete bibliography is too extensive to be dealt with in full here. For more on Arab 
nationalism, see C. Ernest Dawn, From Ottomanism to Arabism: Essays on the Origins of Arab 
Nationalism (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1973); Rashid Khalidi, Lisa Anderson, 
Muhammad Muslih, and Reeva Simon (eds), The Origins of Arab Nationalism (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1991); for more on Greater Syrian nationalism, see Daniel Pipes, 
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appeared to be a more modest space, one that had resonated for years on a spiritual level 
amongst the region’s Shi’as but had yet to achieve widespread importance as a place of 
pilgrimage and Islamic devotion. Yet the efforts by shrine authorities to promote the 
Sayyeda Zaynab shrine as a critical Islamic and national space were not new in 1952, 
however, as focus on the political and religious importance of the shrine had increased 
during the Mandate period.211 While pilgrimage to the shrine cities in Iraq and Iran had 
been firmly entrenched for centuries as part of an institutional network that emerged 
through the promotion of both political authorities and prominent ulama that drew their 
influence from their associations with these shrines, the Sayyeda Zaynab remained a 
modest gravesite in comparison.212 Yet the developments towards Syrian independence 
and the complex project of nation-building, coupled with new transnational alliances 
between Shi’a networks and more assertive narrative portrayals of the life and importance 
of Zaynab would create momentum behind the expansion of the Sayyeda Zaynab shrine. 
From a small, family-dominated shrine to a tragic female Shi’a saint, the shrine would be 
promoted and actively expanded through the 1950s by individual, community, and 
official channels, reflecting the changing dynamics of religious patronage and politics in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Greater Syria: The History of an Ambition (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990); Philip 
Khoury’s substantial work on the Syrian nationalist movement is instructive, but a brief overview 
is found in his article “Continuity and Change in Syrian Political Life: The Nineteenth and 
Twentieth Centuries,” The American Historical Review, Vol. 96, No. 5, (December 1991), 1389. 
211 The French Mandate in Syria was established after the end of Faysal’s short-lived Kingdom of 
Greater Syria and the April 1920 San Remo conference, which gave France and the French 
General Henri Gouraud administrative control. While an independence treaty was ratified in 
1936, Syria was occupied by the Vichy French troops in 1941. Though the Mandate was 
unilaterally terminated earlier by the French, the last troops French troops departed Syria in April 
1946. See Statement of General de Gaulle concerning the Mandate for Syria and Lebanon, 
November 29, 1941, in Digest of International Law, ed. Marjorie M. Whitman, vol. 1 
(Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1963), 680-681. 
212 See “Introduction” for growth of ziyārat  
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the newly independent states of the region. The rapid expansion of the Sayyeda Zaynab 
in the years following World War II coincided with the evolving reinterpretation and 
conceptualization of the role of Zaynab in the Shiite faith in the 20th century and the 
importance that was placed on ziyārat to her shrine, both as state officials encouraged 
pilgrimage and Shiite faithful sought her intercession. As new narratives and religious 
interpretations were constructed in Shi’a hagiography, so too would ziyārat to the 
Sayyeda Zaynab shrine be encouraged, a symbiotic relationship emerging between 
narrative and space. Through the appeals of shrine leaders and religious authorities, the 
contours of a Shi’a community in transition are revealed, grappling with and producing 
new structures of power and identity. By the end of the turbulent 1970s the Sayyeda 
Zaynab shrine would grow into a critical national and transnational space, a site onto 
which geopolitical alliances, transnational Shi’a networks, and competing ideologies 
about the nature of religion in the modern Syrian state would play out.  
The Sayyeda Zaynab shrine was a socially constructed space, one shaped by 
practice, the politics of the shrine’s construction and expansion, and narratives about the 
importance of Zaynab and Shi’a sites in the postwar era. As such it formed an internal 
frontier shrine, a concept borrowed from Juan Cole’s work on Shi’a shrines, a space that 
became a barometer for ways of ‘being Shi’a’ in particular historical moments. It was a 
space onto which meaning and practice were mapped by a range of forces that sought to 
impose a coherent view of transnational Shi’ism or the nation. It reflected the tensions of 
nation-building in the modern Syrian state, between familial authority, the political role 
of the ulama, patronage networks, government interest, and Syria’s changing relationship 
with its neighbors. It was caught in its own complex relationship with Iran and the Iraqi 
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shrine cities, mediating distinctly Shi’a appeals even as it was framed as a site of national 
heritage. Yet these developments also underscore the different ways of ‘being Shi’a’ in 
the independence era. With the Ba’thist coup of 1963 and subsequent split in the party 
based on regional and sectarian divides, the rise of Hafez al-Assad and the Alawī 
coalition in 1970, and Syrian involvement in the Lebanese Civil War, the pull outwards 
on the Sayyeda Zaynab shrine would take on new dimensions. The presence of Zaynab’s 
shrine gave the new secular government a unique tool through which it bolstered its 
religious authority, even as it sought to manage its link to a minority Shi’a population and 
an ever-growing shrine.  
Thus, the Sayyeda Zaynab would come to reflect Syria’s own ambiguous and 
complex relationship with religion in the state. On the ground, the growth of the shrine 
from the Mandate period to the rise of the Ba’athist state would also change both the 
scale and composition of devotees, leading to debates over whose authority to follow and 
which religious imperatives to fulfill. By the outbreak of the Iranian revolution, the 
Sayyeda Zaynab shrine had grown to capture a powerful emotional, political, and 
ideological resonance and would reflect the construction and challenges to meaning-
making for Syria and its neighbors. The shrine’s contrasts also mirrored the changing 
facets of Damascus itself – an urban capital dominated by Sunni Arab nationalists, a 
cosmopolitan center laying claim to the heritage of the imperial Umayyad dynasty, and 
yet a city that would be transformed by new Shi’a alliances, refugees, and the growing 
institutions at the Sayyeda Zaynab.   
 The growth of the shrine and ziyārat to the Sayyeda Zaynab would thus produce a 
study in contrasts, resisting simple narratives about the structure of authority and religion 
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in Syria, with the contradictions often played out on the space of the shrine. The shrine 
that would emerge in the post-war decades was essentially new, with the mass expansion 
in construction, pilgrimage, and significance bearing little resemblance to the Sayyeda 
Zaynab of the 19th century. Unlike the Shi’a shrine cities that had developed over 
centuries, the Sayyeda Zaynab was a modern shrine – one that would emerge out of the 
particularities and vicissitudes of the 20th century. Yet the discourse, rhetoric, and 
constructed language of piety around the shrine position it as a traditional site of authority 
and intercession; it aspired to a long, unbroken history, though in narrative, finances, and 
politics it was the product of modern framework of conditions and interactions. As Talal 
Asad has noted, the concept of tradition was a powerful one in Islam; indeed, it was its 
defining feature, Asad argued: “if one wants to write an anthropology of Islam, one 
should begin, as Muslims do, from the concept of a discursive tradition that includes and 
relates itself to the founding texts of the Qurān and the hadith.”213 Political leaders, 
religious authorities, and pilgrims alike would position the Sayyeda Zaynab shrine as 
embodying a linear tradition from the Qurān and the Prophet’s hadith, collapsing a long 
history of changes and negotiations into the space of the shrine. Much like in the 
construction of national narratives, the forces at play on the shrine argued for an 
unambiguous history while engaging in the production of memory – an opposition 
elaborated on by French historian Pierre Nora in his seminal work Les Lieux de Mémoire. 
“Memory,” Nora argued, “insofar as it is affective and magical, only accommodates 
those facts that suit it; it nourishes recollections that may be out of focus or telescopic, 
global or detached, particular or symbolic…memory installs remembrance within the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
213 Asad, Idea of an Anthropology of Islam, 14.  
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sacred.”214 Yet despite claims to tradition and religious authenticity, the politics of the 
shrine would require new religious adaptions and concerns for the profane. The Sayyeda 
Zaynab shrine would be couched in language that melded arguments about modernity and 
development with tradition, blurring the divide between what ‘old’ and ‘new’ meant and 
redefining authenticity.215 Unlike other shrines in Syria that had been ‘rediscovered’ at 
the prompting of outside interests, the Sayyeda Zaynab shrine committee and supporters 
laid claim to a rhetoric of indigenous support and benefit, an authentic expression of 
national religious and political interest. The arguments also challenged a hegemonic 
notion of what ‘modernization’ meant in the context of Shi’ism and the state.  
The development of the Sayyeda Zaynab shrine from the late Mandate period 
through the 1970s also provides a microcosm to assess historiographic trends that have 
emerged in the discussion of Syrian nationalism and Shi’a transnationalism and 
challenges simple dichotomies in understanding identity construction and religious 
alliances. In 1938, at a time when George Antonius published his celebrated Arab 
Awakening, tracing the rise and evolution of Arab nationalism from Muhammad ‘Ali, 
shrine authorities, religious leaders, and pilgrims were negotiating local, personal, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
214 Pierre Nora, “Between Memory and History”, Les Lieux de Mémoire, trans. Marc Roudebush, 
accessed March 4, 2013. Online, 
http://www.history.ucsb.edu/faculty/marcuse/classes/201/articles/89NoraLieuxIntroRepresentatio
ns.pdf 
215 Christa Salamandra has written extensively on the spatial divisions of Damascus, with the 
‘old’ colonial constructions that housed the early nationalist, primarily Sunni, elite was solely 
taken over by a more rural, ethnically and religious diverse population after the Ba’athist coup of 
1963. While the Ba’ath regime displayed little interest in maintaining these areas, according to 
Salamandra the renewed interest and revitalization of old Damascus by the ‘old elites’ – 
predominantly Sunni families – was part of a cultural rejection of Ba’athis policies and the rapid 
influx into Damascus. Thus, Sunni elites sought to appropriate the old Damascus they had fled 
and turn it into a new, revitalized, and modern space. See Christa Salamandra, A New Old 
Damascus: Authenticity and Distinction in Urban Syria (Bloomington: University of Indiana, 
2004).  
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religious, and transnational politics that challenged the linear narrative.216 In more recent 
years, with the apparent decline of transnational religious and cultural solidarities, 
scholars have focused on established national borders as the default units of inquiry, 
privileging the concept of the nation as the category of analysis.217 While this work 
accepts the nation insofar as the main forces at play on the shrine dealt within that 
construct, the Sayyeda Zaynab also shows the fluidity of these boundaries, even in the 
formative years of the nationalist movements. Indeed, the Sayyeda Zaynab shrine is 
illustrative of Roschanack Shaery-Eisenlohr’s assertion that, especially in the context of 
local Shi’a communities, “translational ties can help the production of nationalism and 
appeals to transnational solidarities are often rooted in nationalist agendas.”218 The shrine 
also provides a unique counterpoint to a discourse that has privileged a simple Sunni 
versus Alawī construction of modern Syrian history, as well as disaggregated Shi’a 
spaces from Alawī power dynamics.219 Instead, the history of the Sayyeda Zaynab shrine 
underscores the complex intersection of interests that have created space and meaning.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
216 For more on the particular conditions of the development of Antonius’ intellectual thought, 
including his engagement with the Palestinian question, his interactions with Sharif Husayn, and 
the influence of his secularly-oriented education, see Susan Silsby, “George Antonius: The 
Formative Years,” Journal of Palestine Studies, Vo. 15, No. 4 (Summer, 1986), 81-98. 
217 The term ‘category of analysis’ is adapted here from Joan Scott and her article “Gender: A 
Useful Category of Historical Analysis,” in which she argues that gender “becomes a way of 
denoting ‘cultural constructions’ – the entirely social creation of ideas about appropriate roles for 
women and men.” See Joan Scott, “Gender: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis,” American 
Historical Review, Vol. 91, No. 5, Dec. 1986, 1053-1075. In the same manner, I argue that, like 
the nation, the shrine space forms a category of analysis, a space that was constructed by cultural 
and social narratives and practice.  
218 Shaery Eisenlohr, Shi’ite Lebanon, 3.  
219 The Alawites have a complicated history in modern Syria, concentrated primarily in the region 
of Latakia, which had been granted autonomous rule by the French Mandate multiple times. The 
Alawites, known pejoratively as Nusayris during Ottoman rule, follow a mystical derivation of 
Shi’ism. Founded in the 9th century by Muhammad bin Nusayr, who claimed to be a favored 
follower of the 11th Shi’a Imam who entrusted to him a new mystical revelation “which was to 
constitute the nucleus of the Nusayrī doctrine.” See “Nusayriyya.” Encyclopedia of Islam, Second 
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Perhaps the most enduring paradigm in modern Syrian historiography has been 
the ‘politics of the notables,’ as articulated by Albert Hourani in the 1960s.220 The 
‘politics of the notables’ Hourani noted, emerged within a society dominated by “great 
families which…reside mainly in the city, draw their main strength from there, and 
because of their position in the city are able to dominate also a rural hinterland.”221 
Hourani’s work focused primarily on a Sunni elite urban class and privileged a top-down 
narrative of change, to the exclusion of other forces, a view that has been complicated by 
historians and anthropologists.222 In the case of Sayyeda Zaynab, however, the confluence 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Edition. Eds. P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C.E Boswort et all. Brill Online, 2014. Accessed July 12, 
2014. <http://referenceworks.brillonline.com/entries/encyclopaedia-of-islam-2/nus-ayriyya-
COM_0876> 
220 First delivered at a conference in 1966, “Ottoman Reform and the Politics of the Notables” 
would become a seminal work in Middle East historiography, one that has been responded to, 
challenged, and adapted since. Hourani’s article was first published in 1966 at the University of 
Chicago, then republished in his The Emergence of the modern Middle East (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1981). Hourani’s work would shape the intellectual currents of the time, 
influencing Philip Koury’s history of the notables in the French Mandate and nationalist 
movements. See Philip Khoury, Urban Notables and Arab Nationalism: the Politics of Damascus 
1860-1920 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983). Hourani’s thesis would find a 
receptive audience among the growing cadre of social historians focused on the politics of 
patronage and economic dependence in explaining social structures of the Middle East. For more 
on the development of the “politics of the notables”, see Albert Hourani, “The Present State of 
Islamic and Middle Eastern Historiography,” in Europe and the Middle East (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1980); Linda Schatkowski Schilcher, Families in Politics: 
Damascene Factions and Estates of the 18th and 19th Centuries (Stuttgart: Steiner, 1985); Karl 
K. Barbir, Ottoman Rule in Damascus, 1708-1758 (Princeton, N.J., 1980); Abraham Marcus, The 
Middle East on the Eve of Modernity: Aleppo in the Eighteenth Century (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1989). 
221 Albert Hourani, “Ottoman Reform and the Politics of Notables,” in The Emergence of the 
Modern Middle East (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981), 41. 
222 More recently, historian James Gelvin wrote a retrospective on the impact and endurance of 
Hourani’s work, complicating a fully top-down narrative while still accepting the important role 
that notables played in the politics of the French Mandate and post-independence years. See 
James Gelvin, “The ‘Politics of Notables’ Forty Years After,” Middle East Studies Association 
Bulletin, Vol. 40, No. 1 (June 2006), 19-29. The other aspect of the notables paradigm was put 
forth by Patrick Seale concurrently with Hourani’s work – that the conservative urban class was 
overthrown by a younger intellectual middle class, those that would power the series of coups and 
revolutions that took hold of Syria in the decades following independence. The main actor of 
change in Seale’s narrative is the Ba’ath party, “a revolutionary party of middle class 
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of private and communal efforts was critical, and the influence of prominent figures was 
key. The shrine operated under the custodianship of the Shi’a al-Murtadha family, a 
Damascene family from the Shi’a quarters of Hayy al-Amīn and Shurafa’ that owned the 
waqf in Ghawta and operated agricultural land around the shrine. The Murtadha family 
drew on their considerable personal influence to propel the expansion of the Sayyeda 
Zaynab, capitalizing on their religious mandate as caretakers, a lineage traced to the 
Imams, and grounding their authenticity in the local, with a long history of landowning 
and family heritage in Syria. The members of the Murtadha family were central players 
in the efforts to promote the Sayyeda Zaynab shrine, as were some of the most respected 
and significant marja’ of the 20th century, all exerting their influence and promoting 
particular political alignments. Yet they were also responding to mass support and 
transnational impulses, a factor often overlooked in Hourani’s understanding of the 
notables. The Murtadha family provides a unique variation on the ‘politics of the 
notables’, with a Shi’a family that was not amongst the most traditionally elite 
Damascene families using its influence to galvanize support in favor of the shrine.223 As 
such, I utilize Josh Landis’ concept of the ‘politics of the za’ama’, loosely translated into 
politics of personal leadership, rather than a straightforward adaption of Hourani’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
intellectuals, bound by ideas rather than petty alliances…” See Patrick Seale, The Struggle for 
Syria: A Study in Post-War Arab Politics, 1945-1958 (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), 
308. Seale’s work would help frame the way Hourani’s ‘politics of the notables’ were framed in 
subsequent literature.  
223 Philip Khoury divided the 20th century leadership of Damascus into two distinct tiers: 12 
families that were at the peak of society, the most elite with the greatest wealth, and a group of 
among fifty families that still retained influence. Yet it was the latter group that was among the 
more active in more popular nationalist movements. See Urban Notables, 44-45.   
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‘politics of the urban notables.’224 The Sayyeda Zaynab emerged out of a negotiated 
process, and this chapter argues for the instrumentality of the shrine,225 looking its 
narrative, financial, and structural development and the national and international events 
that it influenced and was influenced by.  
 
Historical Origins and Memory: Sayyeda Zaynab and ahl al-Murtadha  
 Some 700 years after the events of Karbala and the tragic death of Zaynab, a waqf 
was established for a humble gravesite purportedly holding her remains by a Shi’a 
landowner in a small agricultural village outside Damascus. In 1366, Syed Husayn bin 
Musa al-Mūsavi al-Murtadha, mufti of the city of Baalbek, assigned all the properties he 
owned in Ghawta to a waqf in the name of Husayn ibn ‘Ali and his beloved sister 
Zaynab, designating his family as caretakers in perpetuity. The land purportedly held the 
grave of Sayyeda Zaynab, and while it had been a well-respected grave, al-Mūsavi 
wanted to ensure that it would remain a sacred space. In the presence of prominent Shi’a 
ulama, al-Mūsavi noted the designation to be waqf was forever and described in great 
detail the extent of the boundaries. It included all his “gardens and lands located in the 
village of Rāwiyah” including both in the east and west, with its “orchards of fruits, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
224 Josh Landis, “Nationalism and the Politics of Za’ama’: The Collapse of Republican Syria, 
1945-1949,” (Ph.D dissertation, Princeton University, 1997). While Landis’ work is deeply 
intellectually indebted to Hourani’s, he acknowledges that a straightforward correlation between 
urban leadership and power did not exist in Syria. Rather, religious and political leaders used 
multiple means of persuasion and negotiation to exert influence.  
225 The focus on instrumentality comes from Gershoni’s and Jankowski’s work on nationalism, 
which argued away from a strictly ideological understanding of nationalism and instead focused 
on its instrumental use. See Israel Gershoni, “Rethnking the Formation of Arab Nationalism in 
the Middle East, 1920-1945: Old and New Narratives,” in Rethinking Nationalism in the Arab 
Middle East, ed. Israel Gershoni and James P. Jankowski (New York, Columbia University Press, 
1997), 1-25.  
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berries, and trees,” “all the land that is to the east of the stream of Jadaliyya” and “west of 
the village of Masboura.”226 Provisions had been made to generate revenue for the upkeep 
of the shrine from the agricultural land, al-Mūsavi attested, and therefore “nothing can be 
sold from the rights of this property, no lien can be put on it, nor can it be owned or 
bought.”227 Few early records exist about the origins of the construction of the shrine 
beyond the waqfnāma of the shrine, which was administered as a family trust and drew 
local pilgrims to a site that was not much more than a wood and mud room.228   
Yet the existence of a shrine was mentioned in numerous medieval travelogues 
and certain ziyārat literature, even before the creation of the waqf, a fact that would later 
be employed as proof of the tradition of continued visitation at the site and the wide 
acceptance of the shrine of Zaynab. The 12th century travel writer Abu Bakr al Hawrani 
(d. 1215) mentioned the shrine in his Kitab al-ishāra ila ma’rifat al-ziyarat, as did the 
geographer Ibn Jubayr (d. 1217) and the renowned explorer Ibn Battuta (d. 1369), who 
noted there was a waqf in the area that residents visited.229 The Islamic biographer Yaqūt 
al-Hamawi (d. 1229) noted that the village was named Rāwiya after Sayyeda Zaynab’s 
shrine, also known as ‘Qabr al-Sitt’ by Ibn Tūlūn,230 and on certain days people visited to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
226 Shajara al-‘ā’ilah ahl al-Murtadha wa waqfnama mazār Sitt Zaynab. File 3, Majma’ al-
Sayyeda Zaynab li al-Ma’lūmāt wa al-Abhāth, Murtadha Family Private Papers, Sitt Zaynab, 
Syria. 
227 ibid, Shajara al-‘ā’ilah ahl al-Murtadha.  
228 Muhammad Bashir Zahdi, “Maqām al-Sayyeda Zaynab al-Kubrā fi madinah al-Sayyeda 
Zaynab: Tarīkh ‘inshiya’ al-maqām wa anhār al-saqf al-qadīm.” al-Mawsim, 1, No. 4 (1989), 173.  
229 Abu 'Abdallah Muhammad Ibn Ibrahim Ibn Battuta, Rihlat ibn battuta (Beirut: Dār Sādir lil-
tiba'a wa al-Nashr, 1964), 99. 
230 The prolific Damascene historian Muhammad ibn Tūlūn (d. 1546) made regular ziyārat to 
shrines and tombs of famous saints in Damascus, recording many of the most notable sites of the 
time. His al-Tawajjuhāt al-Sitt ilā Kaff al-Nisā ‘an Qabr al-Siit was his observation on women 
visiting the shrine of the Prophet’s granddaughter Sayyeda Zaynab. No existing copies remain of 
this monograph, although it is a reference for later ziyārat manuals that mention a Sayyeda 
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perform ziyārat. “Zaynab the Elder,” Yaqūt al Hamawi notes, “the daughter of ‘Ali ibn 
Abī Talib….and the sister of our masters Hassan and Husayn….is buried in the village of 
Rāwifya, near Hujjayrā.”231 The range of literary and historical references to the shrine 
would become the basis for which ziyārat to the Sayyeda Zaynab was later justified and 
encouraged in the 20th century, as the fact of the continued visitation to the site enforced 
the sense of tradition and the alleged unchanging historicity of ziyārat tradition.232 While 
the later innovations at the shrine were constructed and often invented as traditions, they 
were grounded in the long trajectory of increasing pilgrimage outlined by medieval and 
early modern travel writers and biographers.  
In 1601, the waqf for the Sayyeda Zaynab shrine was registered in the now 
Ottoman-controlled Damascus shari’ah courts, with the caretakers of the al-Murtadha 
family receiving a firman affirming its terms.233 As mandated by Syed Husayn bin Musa 
al-Mūsavi, the waqf had remained in the custody of the al-Murtadha family through 
generations, with the caretaker role in shrine management enhanced by their religious 
lineage. The family traced its descent to the seventh Shi’a Imam, Musa al-Kādhim, as 
indicated on the original waqf, and thus their religious mandate was enhanced by their 
role as sharifs and their duty to the Prophet’s family.234 With the waqf registered under 
Ottoman authority and approved in perpetuity, the Murtadha family dictated the shrine’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Zaynab shrine in Damascus. See also Josef W. Meri, The Cult of Saints among Muslims and Jews 
in Medieval Syria (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 153.  
231 Yaqūt ibn Hamawi, Kitāb mu’jam al-buldān, ed. F. Wūstenfeld (Tehran: 6 vols, 1965), 2:210.  
232 These textual citations would also play a critical role in narratives and justification for the 
Sayyeda Zaynab shrine in the 20th century, as outlined in Chapter One.  
233 Naksh al-firmān al Uthmānī/naksh tapu defteri no. 393:149. Copy of waqf documentation, 
Majma’ al-Sayyeda Zaynab li al-Ma’lūmāt wa al-Abhāth, Murtadha Family Private Papers, Sitt 
Zaynab, Syria.  
234 Shajara al-‘ā’ilah ahl al-Murtadha, Murtadha Family Private Papers. The sharif title has 
commonly been used as an honorific for those who trace their descent to the prophet Muhammad. 
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affairs, the male heads of family handing down the role of mutawalli, or caretaker, in 
hereditary descent and operating largely autonomously from the political authorities. 
Despite bequeathing substantial portions of land to the waqf, the Murtadha family would 
also grow in wealth, establishing itself as significant landowners in the region. By the 
mid-19th century, they were a well-established Damascene family, gaining stature from its 
agricultural rents and the moral capital of its affiliation with Sayyeda Zaynab’s gravesite. 
They would come to embody the influence and horizontal linkages that defined the 
notable families of the late Ottoman Empire, especially in the Syrian provinces, drawing 
from their social, religious, and economic status – often derived from a base of support in 
rural areas – to pressure the politics of the city. Indeed, according to historian Moshe 
Ma’oz, the influence of local politics and authority increased in the Syrian provinces in 
the 19th century as a consequence of the Ottoman tanzimat reforms, with many issues in 
the social and economic spheres left to local councils formed by influential elites to 
negotiate.235 These local councils conversely increased the influence of the ulama and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
235 The tanzimat era, traditionally seen as lasting from 1839-1878, marks a period of social and 
political reforms undertaken by the Ottoman Porte to reorganize and reform the empire. It was as 
a wide-ranging attempt to modernize and an effort at quelling unrest in a multiethnic and 
religiously diverse empire, driven by an imperial elite educated in new schools and military 
institutions. Yet the period also saw a rise in religious and ethnic conflict and of different 
ideological movements, including the Young Ottoman movement, with forces such as 
industrialization, foreign imperialism, and nationalism making significant impact. For more, see 
Serif Mardin, “Tanzimat” in The Encyclopedia of Islam and Politics ed. Emad El-Din Shahin 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press online), accessed Aug. 1, 2014; Kemal Kerpat, The 
Politicization of Islam: Reconstructing Identity, State, Faith, and Community in the Late Ottoman 
State (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001). Yet recent scholarship has also revealed the 
dynamism and autonomy of the period, moving away from a central, top-down narrative that 
focused only on the dictates of the imperial decrees and into the ways these reforms were 
negotiated on the ground in the provinces. These local councils, for example, galvanized local 
elites to find ways to protect their interests in the face of new reforms and capitalize on new 
opportunities presented by more autonomy; in turn, other local players on the scene, including the 
Ottoman governor, were able to articulate their own interests as well. See Elizabeth Thompson, 
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a’yān (notables) in a time of supposed modernization and reform, as they “almost 
perpetually used their official status to reinforce their political position and to further 
their private interests.”236 The alliance between ulama and the a’yān that would 
characterize the politics of personal leadership and dictated the early efforts to expand the 
shrine were rooted in these developments.  
In 1840, Syed Musa Murtadha began the construction of a small new shrine on 
the surrounding land to the grave. The withdrawal of Egyptian troops from the Syrian 
provinces had made the political conditions more permissible for such construction and, 
more critically, allowed the resumption of pilgrimage caravans that traditionally flowed 
through Damascus on the way to hajj. The room was unimposing – 6 meters high and a 
diameter of 26 meters, with walls that were 10 centimeters thick of brick, a wooden roof 
that just rested on the walls, and a small dome lightly polished with smattering of gold 
leaf.237 Nevertheless, enough pilgrims from surrounding areas and from the hajj caravans 
were stopping at the site to necessitate more consideration. That roof, however, collapsed 
in 1870 due to torrential rains, with the previous construction built on agricultural land 
that was at constant risk for flooding. The building had lacked basic necessities, and it 
had not met the need of pilgrims that had visited the shrine. Thus, the subsequent 
mutawalli, Syed Salim Murtadha, commissioned a new, more stable construction with 
financial support of wealthy traders and a grant from the treasury of the Ottoman sultan, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
“Ottoman Political Reform in the Provinces: The Damascus Advisory Council in 1844-45,” 
International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 25, No. 3 (Aug. 1993), 457-475. 
236 Moshe Maoz, “Syrian Urban Politics in the Tanzimat Period between 1840 and 1861,” Bulletin 
of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, Vol. 29, No. 2, (1966), 283 
237 Zahdi, “Maqām al-Sayyeda Zaynab al-Kubra.” 
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Abdul Aziz.238 Syed Salim himself was educated in the Shi’a fiqh at one of the few Shi’a 
schools in Damascus, established by Syed ‘Ali Mahmūd al-Amīn, the cousin of the great 
Shi’a marja’ Muhsin al-Amīn and part of the prominent Shi’a network of Jabal Amil. 
From the death of Syed Salim in 1903, the Murtadha family would have two caretakers 
guiding the administration of the shrine through the decline of the Ottoman Empire and 
the tumultuous period preceding Syrian independence, with the demands increasing and 
their engagement in a range of political activities.239 As men whose lives straddled the 
Ottoman era, world war and Mandate politics, and the independence movements, they 
embodied the intersecting alliances and transformations that would be reflected on the 
shrine. They were promoting the shrine to a Shi’a female saint that was growing in 
transnational prominence, even as they grappled with its national resonance and its 
international appeals. Syed Abbas Murtadha (d. 1946) would take the mandate in 1903 
and would be the primary caretaker in a time of constant upheaval, serving as an elder 
statesman of sorts as others in the family engaged in political activism and religious 
campaigns to expand the shrine. During his tenure as mutawalli, six chambers were 
constructed to house pilgrims who required overnight stays;240 among other construction, 
it was an indication that more pilgrims were arriving from afar and requiring 
accommodations for longer visits, rather than the shrine remaining a purely local site of 
worship. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
238 Syed Radha Murtadha, “Tarikh al-banā’ fī maqām al-Sayyeda Zaynab ‘alayhi al-salām.” 
Unpublished written manuscript. Majma’ al-Sayyeda Zaynab li al-Ma’lūmāt wa al-Abhāth, 
Murtadha Family Private Papers, Sitt Zaynab, Syria.  
239 See Appendix for a list of mutawalli caretakers at the Sayyeda Zaynab.  
240 Radha Murtadha, “Tarikh al-banā’ fī maqām al-Sayyeda Zaynab.” 
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The End of Empire: Accommodation and Conflict in Mandate Politics  
At the turn of the 20th century, the caretakers of the Murtadha family embodied 
the in-betweenness of the Syrian notable class, who “had grown wealthy in the 19th 
century on tax-farming, land rents, and agriculture,” notes historian Keith Watenpaugh, 
“yet still sent their sons to be educated as Ottomans to serve the expanding imperial 
bureaucracy and their families’ interests therein.”241 In the space of a few years, they 
would find themselves at the forefront of the nationalist movement, fighting French 
occupation after the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. The power of the traditional elite 
families, according to Philip Khoury, stemmed from relations of personal dependence 
that they had developed, cutting both horizontally and vertically through social strata.242 
Yet the Murtadha family also transcended the divide between the politics of the notables 
and of the middle or lower classes because of their day-to-day engagement with the 
shrine, a religious mandate that carried significant weight and was unusual amongst the 
largely secular and Sunni elite involved in the struggle for Syrian independence. The 
shrine also provide a space where the alliance between ‘ulama and the a’yān and the 
process of the institutionalization of Shi’ism in the Mandate era would play out.243 As 
fragmented as the sources on the shrine are, with much documentation focused on the 
top-down efforts to expand the shrine, the intersecting efforts of the Murtadha family and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
241 Keith Watenpaugh, “Middle-Class Modernity and the Persistence of the Politics of Notables in 
Inter-War Syria,” International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol 35, No. 2 (May 2003), 263. 
242 Philip Khoury, Syria and the French Mandate: The Politics of Arab Nationalism, 1920-1945 
(London: I.B Tauris, 1987), 13. 
243 James Gelvin in particular discussed the existence of “overlapping and often interrelated 
networks of merchants, merchant ‘ulama, and ‘ulama,” in Damascus and the associational bonds 
that connected religious and political influence remained. See Divided Loyalties: Nationalism and 
Mass Politics in Syria at the Close of Empire (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 
115.   
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religious leaders such as Muhsin al-Amīn in the Mandate era to advance the shrine reveal 
the contours of the Shi’a community slowly expanding its importance in Syria.   
Through Arrêté No° 3503, issued on January 27, 1926, the Mandate authorities 
had officially recognized the Shi’a Ja`fari madhhab, or Islamic school of jurisprudence, 
in the State of Greater Lebanon, where a significant Shi’a population existed. The Ja’fari 
courts would adjudicate personal status questions – marriage, divorce, waqf properties, 
and family issues.244 The same was not applied to Syria, where the Twelver Shi’a 
community was substantially smaller and officially sanctioned documentation over waqf 
properties was limited. The Sayyeda Zaynab, however, was an established site, one that 
had a constructed narrative and recorded tradition. It became a site of focus where 
autonomous efforts could yield results, spurred by Muhsin al-Amīn, the most important 
Shi’a figure in the region. Al-Amīn’s reformist efforts, in particular his stance against 
blood-letting and self-flagellation, and attempts to organize and advance the Shi’a 
community of Damascus have been extensively detailed by historians, especially Max 
Weiss and Sabrina Mervin.245 As the main spiritual leader and marja’ of the community, 
al-Amīn had a distinct engagement with production of notions of tradition and modernity. 
As with his portrayal of Sayyeda Zaynab, his reformist positions often melded with an 
argument for authenticity and tradition, coupled with an acute understanding of the way 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
244 Elizabeth Thompson in particular has discussed how these courts became part of a gendered 
colonial structure that allowed male political elites to retain patrimonial control of an increasingly 
changing society. See Colonial Citizens.  
245 Weiss details the debates that emerged over Ashura rituals amongst Shi’a religious leaders and 
‘ulama over the acceptable range of practices for mourning rituals and the ways these ideologies 
intersect with concern over the colonial regime. See “The Modernity of Shi’i Tradition” in In the 
Shadow of Sectarianism. For more on the intellectual debates amongst Shi’a scholars on these 
topics, see also Sabrina Mervin, Un réformisme chiite: Ulémas et letters du Gabal ‘Amil, actuel 
Liban-Sud, de la fin de l’Empire ottoman à l’indépendance du Liban (Paris: Karthala, 2000).  
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the Shi’a community engaged with colonial authorities and the Sunni majority.246 Al-
Amīn had argued for greater autonomy for the Shi’a of Damascus in the control of waqf 
properties and sought to use the Ja’fari courts in Lebanon to his advantage;247 his 
encouragement had led Syed Radha ibn Syed Salim Murtadha to attempt to register his 
role as mutawalli in the Lebanese Ja’fari courts after the death of his father (Syed Salim 
Murtadha). Indeed, as in many colonial structures, local elites had attempted to use the 
variances in colonial administration to their advantage, coopting the laws to create 
openings to advance their own interests.248  
On August 16, 1933 Muhsin al-Amīn issued a fatwa, or a legal-theological 
opinion, at the request of the current mutawalli of the Sayyeda Zaynab shrine, Syed 
Abbas Murtadha and his nephew Syed Mahdi ibn Syed Radha Murtadha.249 The shrine of 
the most revered Sayyeda Zaynab, al-Amīn noted, was a unique shrine, “the only holy 
Shi’a shrine in the region of Damascus…an eternal sign in this area of the Ahl al-Bayt. 
For Shi’a pilgrims, there is no purpose in this region for ziyārat but for the resting place 
of Sayyeda Zaynab.” He observed further, “From ancient times the most respectable ahl-
al-Murtadha al-Mūsavi have cared for this holy grave,” but now Syed Abbas Murtadha 
had become quite aged. The shrine was in need of construction to keep it up-to-date and 
accessible for all the pilgrims who desired its blessings, al-Amīn agreed, and as such he 
would accept the responsibility to aid Syed Abbas in these endeavors. Syed Abbas 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
246 Indeed, al-Amīn’s opposition to latam, the letting of blood, and self-flagellation was drawn 
from a concern with ‘purifying’ the body and also purging tradition from inauthentic forms of 
practice. See Mervin, Un réformisme chiite, 160-179. 
247 Weiss, In the Shadow of Sectarianism, 138. 
248 Radha Murtadha, “Tarikh al-banā’ fī maqām al-Sayyeda Zaynab.” 
249 Syed Abbas Murtadha was the elder mutawalli. Syed Mahdi was his nephew, the son of his 
brother, Syed Radha.  
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Murtadha had also delegated his son, Syed Muhsin, to lead the fundraising efforts, as his 
sickness and advanced aged prevented him from the rigorous effort that was needed. “In 
spite of the fact that this is a shrine visited by both the Sunni and Shi’a believers in 
Damascus, it is in need of much work, especially to manage the extreme cold or heat,” he 
noted. As such, the work undertaken by the shrine’s caretakers to build rooms for greater 
comfort and expand the shrine was a great service for all Muslims. So, al-Amīn 
professed, “May god help those who are aiding in these efforts…for Allah does not allow 
these good deeds remain unrewarded.”250 Al-Amīn’s support for the shrine was solicited 
by the Murtadha family, yet it allowed him to make an argument consistent with his 
ideological positions. The shrine was an important part of the region’s Islamic heritage, 
according to al-Amīn, and visited by Sunni and Shi’a alike, an emphasis in line with what 
Tamara Chalabi calls his “pro-Arab nationalist conception” in which Shi’ism “was no 
longer confrontational or incompatible with the Lebanese (Sunni) mainstream.”251 Al-
Amīn’s concern with the acceptance and advancement of the Shi’a community led to a 
deliberate positioning of the shrine as a space that was both a unique and critical site for 
Shi’a exceptionalism and also one that transcended sectarian divides. According to al-
Amīn, the shrine had a long ‘eternal’ history and had been properly managed by the Shi’a 
Murtadha family. Yet in response to the increasing presence of pilgrims and a more 
engaged Shi’a population, attempts to modernize and renovate the shrine had to be made 
to continue the tradition of pilgrimage.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
250 Fatwa min Syed Mushin Amīn al ‘Amili lil Syed Abbas bin Syed Salīm Murtadha, 24 rabi’ al-
thāni, 1352. Letter from Muhsin al-Amīn to Syed Abbas Murtadha, August 16, 1933, File 4, 
Majma’ al-Sayyeda Zaynab li al-Ma’lūmāt wa al-Abhāth, Murtadha Family Private Papers, Sitt 
Zaynab, Syria.    
251 Tamara Chalabi, The Shi’is of Jabal ‘Amil and the New Lebanon: Community and Nation State 
(New York: Palgrave McMillan, 2006), 147. 
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The Murtadha mutawalli, Syed Abbas and his son Syed Muhsin in particular, also 
simultaneously sought support for their mandate and the modernization of the shrine from 
other traditional sources of religious authority – the Shi’a clerics of Jabal Amil and the 
noted families of the Shi’a ulama networks of the region.252 While Muhsin al-Amīn was 
the most respected Shi’a leader in Damascus, the Murtadha family also simultaneously 
appealed to his main rival in the region, Syed ‘Abd al-Husayn Sharaf al-Dīn, the 
preeminent marja’ in the Mandate province of Greater Lebanon. Sharaf al-Dīn opposed 
many of al-Amīn’s attempts at reform, and was often perceived to have a more cordial 
relationship with the French colonial state.253 Yet he retained significant influence 
amongst the larger population of Shi’a in Jabal Amil, and his support for the shrine was 
critical. In a letter of opinion written to Syed Abbas and his son Syed Muhsin, Sharaf al-
Dīn argued first for the centrality of the shrines to the Ahl al-Bayt and the importance of 
visitation to these shrines, a position consistent with his own attempts to preserve 
‘tradition’ from al-Amīn’s reforms and the promotion of a strong sectarian unity. “For 
[those] that respect the signs of Allah…[they] become a source of purification for the 
soul,” Sharaf al-Dīn noted. The Ahl al-Bayt were commonly referred to as the ‘signs’ 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
252 The families of Jabal Amil had a long history of producing influential Shi’a scholars, which 
have historically been seen as forming the critical class of ulama during the Safavid Empire, the 
most notable of whom was Shaykh Karakī (d. 1534). See Rula Jurdi Abisaab, Converting Persia: 
Religion and Power in the Safavid Empire (London: I.B. Tauris, 2004) and “The ‘ulama of Jabal 
‘Amil in Safavid Iran, 1501-1736: Marginality, Migration, and Social Change,” Iranian Studies, 
Vol. 27, No. 1-4 (1994), 103-122. Yet as a fairly marginalized and economically undeveloped 
community, the Shi’a of Jabal Amil would not truly coalesce into a political force until the time 
of Musa al-Sadr. The ties between Najaf, Jabal Amil, and Safavid Iran were complex, resulting in 
the intermarriage amongst many of the most powerful ulama families through the 19th century, 
including the al-Sadr, al- Amīm, and Sharaf al-Din families. 
253 Both men, however, turned down the role of the head of the Ja’fari courts, established by the 
French. Yet Sharaf al-Dīn was driven in part by his desire to build a more cohesive and strong 
Shiite community, and saw good minority relations with the French in the administrative territory 
of Greater Lebanon as a part of that process. See Weiss, 138-141.  
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from Allah, and thus Sharaf al-Dīn’s letter refers to both their persons and their holy 
gravesites. About the work undertaken on the shrine and the attempts to bring it to the 
required standards, he declared, “Our need is great for this noble act. May Blessings be 
sent upon those who raise the minarets of the Ahl-al-Bayt, especially in the capital of 
Banu-Ummayah.”254 The shrine would be new, but the tradition was old, as was the 
history that Sharaf al-Dīn evoked of Zaynab alone in the Umayyad court. The new shrine 
would similarly be an assertive statement of the minority Shi’a community.  
The attention to the Sayyeda Zaynab was not limited to local religious and shrine 
leaders, however. Even before Muhsin al-Amīn’s engagement with the site, the shrine 
had been receiving donations from distant Shi’a communities, illustrating a growing 
transnational network of patronage and devotional practice. In 1930, Shams al-Muluk, the 
wife of Aga Khan II and the niece of Muhammad Ali Shah of the Qajar dynasty, made a 
personal donation “for the beautification [of the shrine] and work of inlaid tiles in the 
floor of the holy grave.”255 The patronage for Shi’a shrines was not uncommon among 
royal courts and those that deemed themselves descendants of Muhammad, as the 
political and religious legitimization these acts drew remained potent. Notably, however, 
the choice of the Sayyeda Zaynab shrine for a personal donation from the Aga Khan’s 
wife spoke to the increasing prominence of the shrine and the growing gendered dynamic 
– while the Iraqi and Irani shrines had been funded by patronage of the male dynastic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
254 Bayān ‘Abd al-Husayn Sharaf al-Dīn al-Mūsavi, 25 rabi’ al-thāni, 1352. Letter from Sharaf al-
Dīn to Syed Abbas and Syed Muhsin Murtadha, August 17, 1933, File 4, Majma’ al-Sayyeda 
Zaynab li al-Ma’lūmāt wa al-Abhāth, Murtadha Family Private Papers, Sitt Zaynab, Syria.    
255 “Aqilah Bani Hashim ki roza: ziyārat, ma’lumāt, aur tafsīr.” Al-Asad, July 13, 1936. The Agha 
Khan was the head of the Ismaili sect, a branch of Shi’ism whose adherents trace a different line 
of descent following the seventh Imam, and that titular title was passed on through hereditary 
descent. Shams al-Muluk was also the granddaughter of the Fat’h Ali Shah Qajar. 
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leaders and religious classes that had set up residence in the shrine cities, the Sayyeda 
Zaynab shrine benefitted equally by individual and community donations by women and 
families who sought to leave their mark on an expanding site.256 In 1935, a group of 
women from Lahore calling themselves Bināt ‘Ali, or daughters of ‘Ali, began collecting 
money to make a “a special donation of water taps in the name of our Lady, the mother of 
all sorrows.” It was hoped that the donation would incur favor with Zaynab on the Day of 
Judgment, and she would intercede on their and their families’ behalf. Through their 
donation to her shrine, “our names will be amongst the most celebrated,” they hoped.257 
While little documentation exists of the final donation, the incident reveals the resonance 
that both Zaynab and her shrine had in Shi’a consciousness, even before the rise in 
political sectarianism and organization in the post-independence era. For these women, 
Zaynab was an intercessory figure, whose shrine appealed to them on a community level 
in their hopes to gain blessings for them and their families. Donation to the shrines of the 
Ahl al-Bayt in exchange for blessings and worldly regard had a long tradition through the 
19th centuries, as highlighted by Juan Cole and Yithak Nakash. The choice of water taps 
was particularly salient for the Sayyeda Zaynab, as water was cut off for three days 
before the 10th of Muharram at Ashura, and her brother Abbas ibn ‘Ali was slain in his 
attempts to retrieve water for the young children of the camp. It was narrated in traditions 
that till the end of their lives, the survivors of Karbala could not look at water without 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
256 In the same period, the old dome of the shrine was repaired, new pledges were made for more 
rooms by the family of Muhammad Ali Nizam and his children, and individuals undertook repairs 
in return for their names dedicated and memorialized at the Sayyeda Zaynab. See Radha 
Murtadha, “Tarikh al-banā’ fī maqām al-Sayyeda Zaynab.” 
257 “Aqilah Bani Hashim ki roza,” Al-Mu’mineen, July 13, 1936. 
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great sorrow.258 Yet it also melded a decidedly profane and modern concern, as the 
Sayyeda Zaynab did not “possess the healthy facilities for her many believers.”259  
While individual and community donations were bolstering the shrine, often 
given through a personal affiliation with Zaynab as a female saint, the efforts of the 
Murtadha family would demonstrate the responsiveness and connectedness of the Shi’a 
transnational network in the mid-20th century, even as rhetoric focused in the importance 
of the shrine in a broader Islamic history. Due to his failing health, Syed Abbas Murtadha 
would authorize his son to act in his stead and travel to the main centers of Shi’a thought 
to raise the matter of the shrine. He counseled Syed Muhsin that it must be known 
“amongst all the wealthy of our region and the devotees to the Ahl al-Bayt that although 
[the shrine] is not within reach of many of her followers, it is the center for all Shi’a 
faithful and pilgrims…and the center for those who love [Zaynab].” Because of his 
failing health, he noted that he had no choice but to appoint his son as a mutawalli of the 
shrine, as “with the help of Allah we undertake this mission with full force, and we 
beseech Allah for our success. We ask of scholars, marāji’ and protectors of the shari’ah 
to turn peoples’ attentions to this worthy project…and issue opinions on the importance 
of this effort.”260 Armed with the authorizations and fatwa, Syed Muhsin Murtadha 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
258 Multiple hadith mention the centrality of water as a trope before and after Karbala, many of 
them compiled in the substantial Bihār al-Anwār, the most comprehensive Shi’a source on 
traditions and narratives, compiled by the renowned 17th century scholar Mulla Muhammad 
Baqir, known more commonly as ‘Allama al-Majlisi. Al-Majilisi has recounted hundreds of 
hadith on the suffering and aftermath of Karbala. In one such example, Imam Zayn al-Abidīn was 
unable to drink any water without weeping. See Muhammad Bāqir al-Majlisi, Bihar al-Anwār, 
vol. 46  (Qom: Ansariyan Publications 1979), 108. 
259 “Aqilah Bani Hashim ki roza,” Al-Mu’mineen, July 13, 1936. 
260 Letter From Syed Abbas Murtadha to Sayyid Mushin, April 12, 1933, File 4, Majma’ al-
Sayyeda Zaynab li al-Ma’lūmāt wa al-Abhāth, Murtadha Family Private Papers, Sitt Zaynab, 
Syria.   
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traveled to Iran in 1933, accompanied briefly by Muhsin al-Amīn, where he remained for 
six months to promote the importance of the shrine for Shi’a Muslims and the need for 
donations from across the Shi’a world, so that the shrine could “receive its due standing 
and become a masterpiece of Islamic art” and “play its role in Islamic history and 
humanity…and revitalize the city of Damascus, which has been the seat of culture and 
civilization,” noted his son in a 1989 biography.261 In Qom, Murtadha would meet the 
Shi’a marja’ Shaykh Muhammad Husayn al-Na’īnī (d. 1936), who had been expelled 
from Najaf and Sāmarrā by British authorities after his association with Mirza 
Muhammad Hassan Shīrāzī, the leading figure in the 1860 tobacco protests against the 
British Empire262 Na’īnī had been one of the seminal Shi’a figures in the debate over the 
Persian Constitutional Revolution of 1906, and his influence had remained, even with the 
tightening of power for the ulama in Pahlavi Iran. Na’īnī would authorize an Iraqi, al-
Hajj Mahdi Bahbahāni, to act as his representative and collect funds from waqf 
endowments, zakāt, and charitable alms from his followers to use in the way of the 
shrine, as part of a donation in the way of Allah.263 The Murtadha family would also 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
261 Hani Murtadha, “Hayāt Syed Mushin Murtadha: Mutawalli al-maqām al-sābiq.” al-Mawsim, 1, 
No. 4 (1989), 49. In this brief biography, Hani Murtadha notes that his father “Syed Muhsin 
Murtadha didn’t simply rely on Iranian aid. Rather, he remained busy collecting hidāyat [gifts] 
and services from all Arab and Islamic countries.” This retroactive distancing from Iran and Qom 
is noticeable, particular at the end of the Iran-Iraq War, in which Syria was one of Iran’s few 
Arab allies. Yet the Ba’athist regime in Syria carefully managed that alliance, mindful of the 
unease amongst some in Syria’s minority Sunni population with the Alawite alliance with Iran’s 
Shi’a Islamic State.  
262 See Shahrough Akhavi, Religion and Politics in Contemporary Iran (Albany: State University 
of New York, 1980), 27. For more on Na’īnī, see Abdul-Hadi Hairi, “Shi’ism and 
Constitutionalism: A Study of the Life and Views of Mirza Muhammad Husayn Nā’īnī,” PhD 
dissertation, McGill University, 1973.  
263 Letter from Muhammad Husayn al-Nā’īnī to Mahdi Bahbahāni, 15 Shawwal, 1352 Hijri, 
January 31, 1934, File 5, Majma’ al-Sayyeda Zaynab li al-Ma’lūmāt wa al-Abhāth, Murtadha 
Family Private Papers, Sitt Zaynab, Syria.   
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collect letters of witness from the most respected Shi’a marāji’, including Husayn Kāshif 
al’Ghitā’ of Iraq and ‘Ali Husayni al-Shīrāzī in Sāmarrā; the letters and fatwas were 
aimed at authenticating the gravesite and their honored role as caretakers, endorsing their 
efforts as legitimately acting in the way of Allah.264 
The responsiveness of the marja’ to the expansion of the Sayyeda Zaynab shrine 
provides a window into the practice of being sectarian, as Max Weiss has coined, as 
pilgrims were engaging with the site and voicing their concerns to figures they 
considered had the religious and moral authority to initiate change. Yet it also shows the 
world of the Shi’a ulama confronting a narrowing power base across the region. In Iran, 
the ulama were confronted with the modernizing social and political reforms of Reza 
Shah Pahlavi, many that would challenge the ulama’s traditional domains of power and 
authority. A new civil code was enacted to provide a uniform basis for the application of 
shari’ah, new laws of land and property registration and the control of administration of 
waqf land, and questions of personal status that had previously been under the purview of 
the ulama were now brought under civil control. To undermine the influence of the 
religious school, or hawza, the government established a system of modern secular 
schools. Most critically, the abolition of the veil and the uniform dress codes were seen as 
a direct assault on the religious classes.265 In Iraq, oppositional agitation to the 
government was brewing, led by Kāshif al-Ghita and ulama in Najaf and Shi’a lawyers in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
264 See “Shahādāt al-ulamā”, File 5, including Letter from Husayn bin Mahmūd al Tabatabā’i al-
Qummī to Syed Abbas Murtadha, 14 Muharram, 1352 Hijri, Majma’ al-Sayyeda Zaynab li al-
Ma’lūmāt wa al-Abhāth, Murtadha Family Private Papers, Sitt Zaynab, Syria.   
265 For more on the reforms of Raza Shah Pahlavi and the affect on ulama relations, see Akhavi, 
Religion and Politics in Contemporary Iran; M.H Faghfoory, “The Ulama-State Relations in 
Iran: 1921-1941,” International Journal of Middle East Studies, 19 (November 1987), 413-32 and 
“The Impact of Modernization on the ‘ulama in Iran, 1925-1941,” Iranian Studies, Vol. 26, No. ¾ 
(Summer-Autumn, 1993), 277-312.  
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Baghdad, coupled with Shi’a tribal unrest in Rumaytha and Diwaniyya. Shi’a protests 
and revolts had exploded in 1927 and 1932, with calls for participation in government, 
parliament, and a civil service that had disproportionately excluded them, as well as the 
inclusion of Shi’a jurisprudence in law school, the control of waqf revenues, and other 
demands.266 The efforts to expand the Sayyeda Zaynab in Syria were supported by a 
transnational network of Shi’a leaders who were themselves faced with a narrowing 
range of political possibilities from new secular national leaders. Despite the 
transnational nature of Shi’a ideology, by and large these ulama were occupied with very 
specific sets of national concerns, many of them tacitly working within and accepting the 
confines of the national construct. Yet their support of the Syrian efforts to promote the 
Sayyeda Zaynab was an affirmation of assertive attempts to articulate new Shi’a spaces 
and practice, an example of an active engagement with the production of Shi’a 
transnationalism. By lending their name and authorizing the use of religious donations 
from Shi’as internationally towards the shrine, the ulama of Iran and Iraq authenticated 
acts of ‘being sectarian’ among devotees. Certainly, individuals and communities had 
been donating to the shrine as a means of linking themselves to Zaynab bint ‘Ali. The 
authentication of ulama sanctioned these donations as in line with Shi’a jurisprudence 
and tradition and transformed them into acts of being sectarian. Indeed, the Murtadha 
family’s efforts to secure religious sanction for the shrine and their custodianship can be 
read as an affirmation of the still-powerful role that the opinions of the marja’ played in 
daily religious activity of Shi’as, even as political power was curtailed by new regimes.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
266 See Yizhak Nakash, “The Search for Representation” in The Shi’is of Iraq, 109-132 and Elie 
Kedourie, “Anti-Shi’ism in Iraq under the Monarchy,” Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 24, No. 2 
(April, 1988), 249-253. 
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In Syria, al-Amīn’s preoccupation with how the Shi’a minority was perceived by 
colonial authorities and the Sunni majority led to an emphasis on the Islamic and regional 
importance of the shrine, mediating a conciliatory relationship with demands for more 
autonomy.267 Yet even among the Murtadha family, a less accommodationist stance 
existed, providing a microcosm of the myriad ways of Shi’as participated in the public 
arena. Syed Mahdi bin Radha Murtadha, one of the shrine’s two mutawallis, was a 
prominent member of the National Bloc (al-Kutlah al-Wataniyah) party, the political 
party leading the push for Syrian independence and led by notables among the Sunni elite 
of Syria. Nakash has noted that many young Shi’as joined socialist and Arab nationalist 
parties in the years between the wars, yet Mahdi Murtadha’s prominence brought many 
of Syria’s great nationalist figures into contact with the shrine. Educated in both Arabic 
and Turkish, as many of the sons of notables families were at the turn of the century, 
Mahdi Murtadha was deeply involved in the politics of colonial resistance as the 
administrator of its central offices and the organizational link between the leaders of al-
Kutlah and the local leaders and landowners around Damascus. In January 1936, after the 
French authorities closed their offices in Damascus and Aleppo, the National Bloc called 
for a general strike that lasted 50 days and grounded Mandate Syria to a halt.268 From his 
capacity in the resistance, Murtadha led demonstrations and a boycott against the Belgian 
company that had been awarded a monopoly on electricity in Damascus and had 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
267 In March 1939, al-Amīn sent a letter to Gennardi, the French Inspector General of the Controle 
de Wakfs, rejecting attempts by the state to curtail religious authority and noting the increase in 
the “revolution of spirit” amongst Shi’a Muslims. See Weiss, In the Shadow of Sectarianism, 111. 
Yet the dual attitude is reflected in the most prominent Shi’a newspaper in Greater Lebanon, al-
‘Irfān, which took pains to note the joint attendance of Sunnis and Shi’a in commemorative 
rituals. See al-'Irfan Vol. 30, No. 1-2 (Feb-Mar 1940), 156.  
268 “Fresh Riots Occur in Syria and Egypt,” The New York Times, Jan. 28, 1936. 
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continually raised prices.269 The crippling pressure of the national strike led the Mandate 
officials to relent in March, negotiating the Franco-Syrian Treaty of Independence, which 
the French ultimately did not ratify. Yet the opposition to the French intensified; Mahdi 
Murtadha’s increasing involvement in al-Kutlah and his associations with the leading 
nationalist figures of the time – Shukri al-Quwatli, Jamil Mardam Bey, Sa’adallah al-
Jabiri, and Sabri al-Asali – made his duties as the second mutawalli of the Sayyeda 
Zaynab difficult. Syed Abbas Murtadha, the elder remaining mutawalli at the shrine, 
remained in deep support of Mahdi Murtadha’s activities, writing to his nephew that he 
understood the importance of “the future of the nation.”270 On March 21st, 1939, Mahdi 
Murtadha was arrested by French colonial forces, transferred from Tadmor Prison to Sijn 
(or prison) Ramal in Beirut, and finally ended up in room number five in Sijn al-Qi’lah in 
Damascus, where he was housed with Mahmud al-Bayruti, the head of the Nationalist 
Youth party, and Sayf al-Dīn al-Ma’mūn, one of the leaders of al-Kutlah.271  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
269 Radha Murtadha, “Syed Mahdi Murtadha: lamha ‘an hayātuhu,” al-Mawsim, 1, No. 4 (1989), 
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270 Letter from Syed Abbas Murtadha to Syed Mahdi Murtadha, 12 April 1938, in Radha 
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(Figure 3.2: Mahdi Murtadha, R, with Mahmud al-Bayrūti and Sayf al-Dīn al Ma’mūn outside 
prison) 
 
 
Historiography of the nationalist elite in Syria has traditionally outlined the 
centrality of the Sunni urban elite. According to Watenpaugh, “by making Sunni Islam a 
key dimension of political legitimacy, "extra-textual" Muslims – members of Sufi 
brotherhoods, in particular, and more important, those of Syria's heterogeneous Muslim 
sects, the Ismailis, Druze, and the current masters of Syria, the Alawites-were 
marginalized and often driven to less liberal alternatives and more radical Pan-Arabist 
ideologies to annul this marginality.”272 Yet Murtadha’s centrality to al-Kutlah provides a 
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different look into the range of ways of being Shi’a in Mandate Syria, occupying a range 
of options between accommodation and conflict, distinct from al-Amīn’s reformism and 
the Alawī debates between exclusionary and integrationist acceptance.273 Through 
multiple incarcerations, his involvement with the most prominent members of the 
opposition deepened.274 While he remained involved with shrine affairs, heading the drive 
to pave the roads leading up to the Sayyeda Zaynab for easier access to pilgrims, the 
Murtadha family emphasized that the nationalist opposition to France was critical, 
beyond their work to expand the shrine for Shi’a faithful that often worked within the 
construct of the colonial system. In a letter to Mahdi Murtadha after another release from 
prison, his cousin Toufiq Murtadha penned him a letter, writing, “I learned recently that 
you have been released from French custody, by the grace of God. We are grateful for 
your high spirits and have no doubt that your selfless efforts for the people will be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
273 The Alawī dominated province of Latakia had been awarded autonomous rule multiple times 
during the French Mandate, including after a revolt led by the Alawī shaykh Saleh al-‘Ali in 
1919-21; yet in 1936 the French annexation of Latakia to the Syrian state was met support in the 
province, with the hopes that this would lead to more political influence from French officials. 
Centuries of fatāwā declaring them non-Muslims had led to poor conditions amongst the Alawīs, 
documented by the Revered Samuel Lyde, who called life for Nusayris as “a perfect hell on 
earth.” See Samuel Lyde, The Asian Mystery Illustrated in the History, Religion and Present 
State of the Ansaireeh or Nusairis of Syria (London: Longman, Green, Longman, and Roberts, 
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To counter anti-Alawī sentiment that was the result of centuries of fatwa issued declaring them 
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274 Sūrah ba’dh al-ma’taqilīn al-watanīn min qabl al-sultah al-fransīyah fi qil’ah Dimashq. Syed 
Mahdi with nationalist activisits in front the French jail in 1940, Photograph, File 1, Majma’ al-
Sayyeda Zaynab li al-Ma’lūmāt wa al-Abhāth, Murtadha Family Private Papers, Sitt Zaynab, 
Syria. Mahdi al-Murtadha is pictured with some of his closest associates, including Sayf al-Din 
al-Ma’mun and Mahmūd al-Bayruti. [Figure 3.2]                                                                       
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rewarded.”275 His funeral in October 1945 at the Sayyeda Zaynab brought together the 
various religious, national, and local forces that had shaped Shi’a public engagement and 
the milieu in which the shrine operated. The ceremonies were attended by Muhsin al-
Amīn, many activists from the National Bloc and National Youth, the Murtadha family, 
and Shi’a associates from Shurafa’; in addition to the range of dignitaries present for the 
funeral, Mahdi Murtadha was eulogized by Fares al-Khoury, Syria’s Christian Prime 
Minister and a staunch secular nationalist.276  The figures assembled in the space of the 
Sayyeda Zaynab captured a moment of dynamic changes, both for the nation and the 
shrine. With the death of Abbas Murtadha in the same year and the final French troops 
withdrawn from Syria in April 1946, the intricacies of managing the shrine in the 
Mandate would come to a close. Yet the break between colonial and national was fluid, 
as many of the prominent personalities would remain the same and the structures of 
authority cultivated during Mandate rule would endure. Nevertheless, the emergence of 
new states frameworks would alter engagement with the Sayyeda Zaynab shrine. The 
turbulence of the independence era would bring both challenges and renewed 
opportunities in the promotion of the Sayyeda Zaynab and the Shi’a community of Syria.   
 
A National Shrine in Transnational Space 
 
 The euphoria and grand celebrations that accompanied the last withdrawal of 
French troops on Evacuation Day, April 17, 1946 would quickly give way to a period of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
275 Letter from Doctor Toufiq al Murtadha to Mahdi Murtadha, January 17, 1940. File 6, Majma’ 
al-Sayyeda Zaynab li al-Ma’lūmāt wa al-Abhāth, Murtadha Family Private Papers, Sitt Zaynab, 
Syria.   
276 Janāzah al-Syed Mahdi Murtadha al-Mūsavi, October 17, 1945. Photograph, File 1. Majma’ 
al-Sayyeda Zaynab li al-Ma’lūmāt wa al-Abhāth, Murtadha Family Private Papers, Sitt Zaynab, 
Syria.   
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great turbulence that exacerbated “the bitter divisions which plagued Syrian society,” 
noted Josh Landis, and “could not be erased through the manipulation of Syria's national 
history and symbols.”277 Despite the symbolic presence of many religious and political 
leaders at the parade along with President Shukri al-Quwatli, including Shi’a notables, 
discontent with the national government would quickly reemerge. Syria would participate 
in the first Arab-Israeli War in 1948, which brought about the creation of the state of 
Israel and a wave of predominantly Sunni Palestinian refugees settling in the outskirts of 
the Sayyeda Zaynab.278 A succession of new parliaments and coups would destabilize the 
political regime, with four new constitutions drafted and discarded. Yet it was also the 
age of an assertive and secular Arab nationalism, most embodied by the union of Syria 
and Egypt into the United Arab Republic from 1958-1961. Reflecting the ideological 
currents of the 1950s, the promotion of the shrine was couched in appeals to Arab 
heritage and the development of Damascus. Yet the transnational engagement with the 
shrine, including from Iran, from artisans, businessmen, women, and political leaders 
provides a unique window into multiple identities in flux. I argue that these gifts embody 
a way to capture ‘being Shi’a’ and the dynamism of identity amongst a range of classes, 
despite the secularizing policies of the regimes of the newly independent states. 
 The death of Syed Abbas and Syed Mahdi Murtadha in 1945 would usher in a 
dynamic new age for the shrine, led by their sons, Syed Muhsin and Syed Radha 
Murtadha, respectively. The latter had been sent to study engineering in France during 
the years of Mahdi Murtadha’s incarcerations, a route that was not unusual for the sons of 
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nationalist leaders opposing the French Mandate. He would return after independence and 
take on the role as mutawalli with Syed Muhsin Murtadha, who had spent over a decade 
in the service of the shrine. Their forefathers had done good work, they noted, “in the 
expansion of the holy grave, even though the political and economic situation was at 
times difficult and material help was not available. However, with a bettering economic 
situation, our hard work will begin to yield rewards.”279 In 1950, together with Syed 
Muhsin al-Amīn, notables from the Shi’a quarters of Hayy al-Amīn, and Mahdi 
Bahbahāni, the Lajna’ Ashrāf ‘alā Maqām al-Sayyeda Zaynab was formed to design, 
finance, and administer the new shrine. Al-Amīn issued a fatwa to sanction the work of 
the shrine and to bear witness of his endorsement to Shi’a leaders and devotes. “It is 
apparent for those who are most honored to visit the grave of Sayyeda Zaynab (AS), the 
revered sister of our Master, Husayn ibn ‘Ali, in the village of Rawiyyah that that 
respected place is in urgent need of repair, including the masjid that is connected to the 
shrine,” he noted. The reconstruction would “make greater facilities for the pilgrims, 
reduce the congestion and discomfort, and bestow honor on al-Shām.”280 Al-Amīn’s 
statement reflects sophistication in balancing Shi’a appeals, a modernist concern for the 
technical aspects of the shrine, and a broad appeal to its importance to the region as a 
whole – a carefully worded appeal consistent with al-Amīn’s concern of Shi’a 
advancement and perception. Indeed, for al-Amīn, the significance of the shrine was that 
it provided a local and authentic site for honoring the Ahl al-Bayt and a place where 
piousness could be expressed.  
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 For this “noble purpose”, al-Amīn authorized the expenditure of sahm al-Imam on 
the Sayyeda Zaynab, a form of taxation incumbent on all Shi’a Muslims to spend in the 
way of God, the Prophet, and the Imam of their time for the propagation of the faith, 
including instances of ulama support of jihād.281 The sahm al-Imam was historically used 
to help the marja’ develop an independent financial base, often funneled through local 
ulama based outside the shrine cities that associated with the marja’, and often to support 
students and low-ranking ulama under their leadership. Al-Amīn’s adaptation of the 
concept of the sahm-e-Imam to allow Shi’as to donate directly to the promotion of the 
shrine of Zaynab bint ‘Ali was a modern and expansive interpretation of tradition, albeit 
one grounded in hadith and jurisprudence. Al-Amīn was well aware of the competition 
over resources and that this ruling was meant to position the Sayyeda Zaynab as an 
attractive alternative to the Iraqi and Iranian shrine cities.282 Notably, then, it received the 
concurrent sanction of some of the major marja’, in a time where the shrine cities were 
suffering from lack of funding and political repression. Yet for many of these marja’ who 
advocated a more quietist stance, including the revered Najafi Ayatollah Muhsin al-
Hakīm, promoting the Sayyeda Zaynab provided an alternative way to engage a 
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transnational Shi’a appeal within the confines of new restrictions on their influence. It 
would also affirm – and indeed spur – the growing importance of Zaynab bint ‘Ali, 
including her and her shrine in a practice that was historically linked to the male Imams 
and male-dominated ulama institutions. Just as narrative traditions on Zaynab’s role in 
Shi’ism would grow after Muhsin al-Amīn’s work, in practice, jurisprudential traditions 
confined to the Imams would be expanded to include Zaynab. 
 The fluidity of Shi’a jurisprudence and al-Amīn’s sanction to apportion funds 
from mandatory giving directly to the Sayyeda Zaynab had a substantial impact on the 
shrine, freeing up the direct influx of donations and gifts from all over the Islamic 
world.283 In the record of the committee’s first meeting, the members noted, “under the 
leadership of the Great Mujtahid Ayatollah Muhsin al-Amīn, may God praise him” the 
committee called on “all those who have compassion and love of the Ahl-al-Bayt (AS) to 
assist in this mission…and send prayers and donations from all over the Islamic world for 
this exalted work.”284 With the approval of the shrine committee, Radha Murtadha 
completed a comprehensive plan for a new, expansive site, surrounded by 70 upscale 
rooms for pilgrims’ accommodations and important occasions, built in “classical Islamic 
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style” made from the “most quality materials.”285 The international appeals would be met 
by substantial donations to allow the committee to move forward, essential for a country 
in which the Twelver Shi’a population in 1953 represented only 0.4% of the total 
population.286 Despite the death of Muhsin al-Amīn the previous year, a towering 
presence for Syria’s Shi’a population, in the same year the shrine was officially registered 
as a Shi’a waqf property when Ja’fari law was finally recognized by the Syrian state and 
the terms of the original waqf and subsequent rulings were authorized.287 The ability to 
register lands and finances under waqf ordinances would have a significant impact as the 
responsiveness of Shi’a pilgrims and believers to appeals and fatwas yielded more 
donations. The Sayyeda Zaynab shrine presented a new shrine, a modern way to 
articulate a Shi’a affiliation in acts of giving and place a mark on a significant site of 
worship, removed from the traditional institutional structures of the old shrine cities. 
Despite the lack of religious organizations and marja’ based at the Sayyeda Zaynab, 
which were the historical recipients of financial donations and dues, the support from 
Shi’a groups and individuals indicates the receptiveness to these appeals and the 
emotional connection to Zaynab herself.  
 The support of the Sayyeda Zaynab would also become more ornate, more 
aesthetically oriented, much of it donated in return for miraculous interventions from 
Zaynab or as personal representation of devotion to the Prophet’s whole family. In 1950, 
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Muhammad Ali Habib, the Pakistani businessman and financier, had visited the shrine of 
Sayyeda Zaynab to pray for her intercession. His only son and the heir to the family’s 
banking network had been suddenly paralyzed and all the doctors at their disposal had 
been unable to diagnose his condition. Yet upon his return home, he found his son cured. 
In return for these miraculous blessings, Habib commissioned a new large dharih, or 
protective cage, to cover Zaynab’s tomb, made of silver, gold, and precious jewels. Habib 
noted that he traveled to Damascus for he felt “sure in his heart of the mercy of the 
mother of all hardships. In the name of the martyrs of Karbala, for Zaynab bint ‘Ali, the 
daughter of Fatima bint Muhammad, all things are possible and no earnest prayer is 
beyond her reach.”288 Habib would return to the shrine in 1954 for a ceremony with the 
shrine’s committee installing the new dharih, along with many of the Karachi 
businessmen who had aided in its creation.289 Such a public and grandiose religious 
gesture was unusual for Muhammad Ali Habib. Habib had been part of a close cadre of 
Shi’a associates and financiers of Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan, and 
the All-India Muslim League. The Habib Bank had played a critical role in gathering 
funds to finance the Pakistan Movement, and had moved its headquarters to Karachi after 
independence at Jinnah’s request, providing the new Government of Pakistan a 
substantial line of credit in its infancy. Yet the Habib family rarely overtly discussed its 
Shi’a background, much like Jinnah, who rarely self-identified as Shi’a, always 
emphasizing instead the need for a secular and non-sectarian Islamic democracy. Indeed, 
when prompted to guarantee special rights for Shi’a minorities in return for political 
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support, Jinnah had instead responded, “We must so organize the Muslim League that 
justice is done to every sect and section inside it,” demurring on the request for 
exceptional treatment for Shi’a Muslims.290 Though Habib would similarly shy away 
from tying himself to a sectarian identity in the early years of the Pakistani state, as many 
of the influential Shi’as among Jinnah’s supporters did, the reluctance was not 
inconsistent with the personal reverence for Zaynab bint ‘Ali. Being Shi’a was a lived 
and fluid identity, one that took on salience in particular moments and acts of practice. 
Yet the deliberate choice of Sayyeda Zaynab was an interesting one, as female shrines 
have long been associated with more familial, domestic concerns. Her connection as the 
‘mother of all hardships,’ her association with the martyrs of Shi’sim, and increasing 
narratives tying her directly to the infallibles made her shrine appealing. Yet it was also a 
more permissive site, welcoming donations and support at time when the shrine cities of 
Iran and Iraq faced increasing suppression.   
 The vigorous support of Iranian Shi’as would also be critical, both through 
official and unofficial channels. In 1954, in a letter from the Iranian embassy in 
Damascus to the Shah’s personal office, the envoy noted that not long previously, the 
shrine had been an insignificant and unmaintained village outside of Damascus. 
However, he reported, through the “joint efforts” of Syrian Shi’a with ties to the 
government and with local Iranian encouragement, the road leading to the village of al-
Sitt had recently been paved. As a result, “the numbers of pilgrims, including Iranians, 
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and construction at the shrine had increased.”291 Indeed, the Shah’s private office 
remained interested in the Sayyeda Zaynab and was kept abreast through the embassy 
and the shrine committee, despite uneasy political relations between the two countries. 
Tensions grew from Syria’s strong Arab nationalist tint, coupled with Iran’s pro-Western 
alliance and membership in the Baghdad Pact treaty of military cooperation. Yet 
Muhammad Reza Shah’s secularization did not preclude interest in the Sayyeda Zaynab. 
Mahdi Bahbahāni noted in letters to the Iranian embassy in Syria and to the Shah’s wife 
that through “support from His Imperial Majesty and the voluntary donation of Queen 
Soraya Pahlavi,” the electricity for the new expansive setup had been established.292 The 
involvement and donations from the Shah and Queen of Iran belied easy binaries between 
sectarian and secular, Arab and Persian. On the heels of a coup deposing the popular 
Iranian Prime Minister, Mohammad Mosaddegh, a donation to Zaynab bint ‘Ali’s shrine 
would appeal to popular sentiment, while keeping support away from the shrine cities of 
Iran, which were centers of opposition to the regime. Yet in the bequest of Queen Soraya 
can be read multiple factors and motivations in the complex web of meanings that are 
captured by human action. While named donations had historically been a public means 
of currying popular favor, Zaynab’s unique standing amongst Shi’a faithful added a 
powerful component. The gendered dynamic, in particular, resonated in Queen Soraya’s 
donation, with Zaynab’s growing stature in Shi’a narratives and lamentation rituals. Yet 
genuine faith and a desire to express that through the donation to a revered Shi’a saint 
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cannot be ignored. While the Shah continued his father’s secularization policies, he 
himself enjoyed mostly cordial relations with the most senior and leading marja’ in 
Shi’ism, Grand Ayatollah Syed Hossein Borujerdi, whose general quietism on political 
affairs was said to have caused some concessions in religious instruction.293 Political 
calculations may have been at play in the Iranian court’s interest in the Sayyeda Zaynab, 
but like many of the contemporary gifts to the Sayyeda Zaynab, donations to the shrine 
allowed the expression of individual piety at a site that was gaining increasing attention 
in the Shi’a world. 
The impact of Iranian artists and donations from devotees around the world would 
slowly transform the aesthetic character of the Sayyeda Zaynab, in a time where appeals 
to Arab history and heritage were strong. In 1953, the Shah was informed that the famed 
Iranian artist Muhammad Sanīy’ Khatem had been commissioned by a group of 
businessmen to work on a decorative tomb for Zaynab.294 Khatem had previously 
provided his work for the shrines in Iraq and Iran and would work for 13 months on 
handcrafting the new tomb, worth 200,000 Syrian pounds and of “the highest personal 
artistry.”295 The box arrived in Syria to great fanfare, accompanied by an Iranian 
delegation of businessmen, artists, and officers from the army. To mark its installation, 
the shrine committee and the two mutawalli organized a teatime celebration at the 
Sayyeda Zaynab on April 20, 1955.  For this “auspicious ceremony, on the occasion of 
the unveiling of the new tomb (dharih al-abnūsi) donated by the government and people 
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of Iran,” Muhsin and Radha Murtadha extended an invitation to Syria’s Prime Minister 
Sabri al-‘Asali, member of the National Bloc and one of the most influential nationalists 
of the independence era.296 The aesthetics of the ceremony captured the conflicting 
dynamics of the Sayyeda Zaynab, the ‘in-betweenness’ and fluid forces at play in the 
shrine. Al-‘Asali would preside over a large ribbon-cutting ceremony in the shrine’s tomb 
and the now-expansive courtyard, his presence meant to “celebrate a pinnacle of Syrian 
culture,” surrounded by the Murtadha family, members of the shrine committee, and 
religious scholars and pilgrims. Yet the Iranian donation drew the shrine outwards, 
creating an ornamental link between the Sayyeda Zaynab and the Shi’a shrine cities of 
Iran and Iraq and marking it as a more distinctly Shi’a site. Al-Asali was part of the old 
guard of Syrian nationalists, a predominantly Sunni cadre of leaders who advocated a 
secular Arab nationalism. Dressed in a Western suit and an Ottoman style fez, al-Asali’s 
physical representation offered a particular and ‘official’ sanctioning of the Sayyeda 
Zaynab, his presence meant to validate the Arab and Syrian importance of the shrine. He 
embodied Damascus – a city of Syrians, urban, predominantly secular. Al-Asali posed 
extensively for photographs with the bureaucrats and pilgrims present for the large 
gathering. In one photograph, numerous religious scholars dressed in traditional robes 
flank him, scores of whom had come to the shrine to celebrate an important occasion at 
the new shrine.  
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(Figure 3.3: Sabri al-Asali and guests at the Sayyeda Zaynab, 1955) 
 
Yet perhaps the most telling pictures remain the photographs of the crowds at the 
ceremony for Zaynab bint ‘Ali. Male bureaucrats and guests of honor in suits and clerical 
robes were seated in dozens of rows in the courtyard behind al-Asali and the Iranian 
ambassador. Yet huddled in small groups in the fringes observing the ceremony are 
veiled women, many in full black robes, or chador, a female security guard peering from 
around the box that carried the new tomb, and a group of lower class men, identified by 
their style of dress, with turbans, coats and shawls topping long cotton shirts and loose 
bottoms. These were the everyday pilgrims to the Sayyeda Zaynab, those that frequented 
the shrine for ziyārat and to offer daily prayers. Their presence speaks to the daily use 
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and milieu of the shrine – not by foreign dignitaries or political leaders, but by religious 
scholars and nearby residents, those who had likely been visiting the shrine for prayers 
when stumbling across the elaborate ceremony in the courtyard.297  
 
(Figure 3.4: Ceremony in the courtyard of the Sayyeda Zaynab shrine) 
 
Indeed, it is their presence at the Sayyeda Zaynab, in ever growing numbers, 
which prompted the concern amongst the shrine committee to expand the shrine and 
make it comfortable for pilgrims. A 1954 letter from the Iranian envoy in Damascus to 
the Shah’s office indicates that many were traveling to Damascus to make a regular 
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ziyārat, especially with the political climate in Iraq closing opportunities for regular Shi’a 
pilgrimage. The presence of these pilgrims and their growing engagement can be read 
through the detailed concerns of shrine officials and religious scholars, who often spoke 
on the behalf of these visitors and addressed their concerns, even though in the official 
records their voices on the day-to-day practice at the shrine remain limited. Yet Shias 
around the world, including women, were expressing an interest in the use and visitation 
of the space. In a letter sent to a resident of Pakistan’s Data Ganj Baksh region, a pilgrim 
that set out to do hajj with his wife recounts to his daughter that they had made the niyat, 
or intention, to visit the shrine of Sayyeda Zaynab along the way. Afzal Mahmood was 
informed that her mother had desired “to visit the grave of her Bibi to give pursa 
[condolences] for her suffering and request her intercession in [your] marriage matter.” 
According to Sajjid Majmood, they had written off a small donation at the shrine, and his 
wife had wanted that amount to be in her own name. His wife did not pen the note, 
leaving the narration to her more literate husband, yet her desire for ownership in the 
named donation highlights the personal connection she felt with Zaynab.298  
Yet beyond proactive expansion and promotion of the Sayyeda Zaynab, pilgrims’ 
concerns were sometimes recorded with the shrine committee and with leading ‘ulama 
who were kept abreast of the shrine’s progress, prompting religious and financial 
responses. In a letter to Ayatollah Tabataba’ī, Mahdi Bahbahāni assured him that the 
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issues that pilgrims had complained to him about – “that there is no place in that facility 
to make visitors feel comfortable” – had been addressed. Many were sleeping outside in 
the elements, catching illness and disease. To ease the struggle, 45 chambers had been 
constructed and it had been decided that he would “meet with several carpet merchants in 
Tehran. We asked from each of them to donate a piece that is 12 meters for this purpose. 
I am confident that the devotion of these merchants will lead them to accept these 
charitable requests that will enhance the experience of ziyārat.”299 The letter was signed 
and returned stamped with Tabataba’ī’s personal ensign and a brief message of support 
for this endeavor. According to Syed Kazem Shariatmadāri, one of the leading marja’ in 
Iran, the efforts to build the shrine “for greatest comfort” was critical for believers 
everywhere, yet the work had still not been accomplished, and problems remained. He 
noted, “In order to complete this project [Bahbahāni] requires more assistance from the 
believers, religious authorities, and merchants, especially those who visit her blessed 
tomb. Each of those people should help according to his capacity. By God’s will, they 
will be among those Blessed on the Day of Judgment.”300 Yet much of the focus was on 
the importance of sanitary conditions, with many pilgrims who made the journey falling 
ill and news of this reaching their religious leaders. These practical considerations of 
plumbing, lack of food storage, electricity, and a functioning slaughterhouse remained a 
critical focus for marja’ – the pilgrims performing ziyārat to the Sayyeda Zaynab were 
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numerous enough that news of day to day conditions and concerns remained relevant. 
Many were clearly in contact with these religious authorities, writing letters or sitting in 
audience upon return from their ziyārat. Syed Abdul Husayn Sharaf al-Dīn, Muhsin al-
Amīn’s former rival and marja’ of Lebanon reported to his followers, “You have learned 
about the efforts of the good servant, al-Hajj Mahdi Bahbahāni, in the construction of the 
shrine of Our Lady, the Best of the Women and the Wise, and Exemplar of the 
Prophethood.” Sharaf al-Dīn continued that the importance of locating a safe and 
constant source of water was of utmost concern, as many had complained of suffering 
“great difficulties.” Yet, he noted, the ability to do so depended on the finances available, 
and thus he designated Bahbahāni his representative to receive sahm al-Imam from 
endowments made in the name of the ahl al-Bayt.301 Through the letters between the 
shrine committee and religious leaders, the day-to-day hardships that pilgrims endured 
and their ability to create change through their persistence and engagement are 
illuminated. Yet while Shi’a tradition and guidance from the Imams had emphasized that 
the physical discomfort of ziyārat was meant to bring pilgrims closer to the suffering of 
Shi’a martyrs, encouraging further visitation in face of hardship and restrictions, these 
correspondences reveal a modern and practical concern for ease.   
In response to the complaints over difficulties and inadequacies at the shrine, 
rapid attempts were made to alleviate these concerns, with ‘ulama often raising these 
issues and encouraging more generous donations. The unofficial bonds of influence and 
religious authority had proven strong, even as these same scholars found themselves on 
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the retreat in political spheres. Yet these marja’ called on Shi’as to affirm their identities 
in acts of giving with significant results, and in turn these pilgrims expected engagement 
from their religious leaders. The growing involvement of Iranian Shi’as, investing and 
contributing to the expansion of the Sayyeda Zaynab in significant efforts, would lead the 
Syrian Ministry of Awqaf to request notification and approval of larger donations.302 The 
secular Syrian state, which had acquiesced in the Lajna’s autonomous role in 
administrating the shrine, nevertheless felt some unease with the unchecked influx of 
donations for a Shi’a shrine. Much of it remained outside official channels, with the state 
apparatus unable to monitor and benefit from these sacred exchanges. For the 
government, as under the Mandate era, a tacit acceptance of the shrine was predicated on 
its centrality to the region and the Arab ‘character’ of the support, a link Muhsin al-Amīn 
and the Murtadha family had been careful to cultivate and one that the emphasis on 
funneling donations through the Syrian Awqaf officials was meant to maintain. Yet the 
effectiveness both of donations and the centralizing control of the committee had 
propelled the site into a substantial draw for many around the world to capture and 
express ‘being Shi’a.’ It provided a space for leading ulama, many in retreat politically in 
their national contexts, to encourage engagement and wield their influence to create a 
new Shi’a space. The shrine allowed for all these interpretations – claiming a long and 
unchanged tradition of ziyārat to Shi’a shrines, even as new concerns and rationale were 
employed. Its newness allowed individuals and communities to galvanize around acts of 
giving and impart meaning, expanding the Sayyeda Zaynab into a critical Shi’a site.  
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A New Regime 
 
On March 8th, 1963, the Military Committee of the Arab Socialist Ba’ath Party 
would enact a coup d’état in Damascus to form a new government, just one month after 
the Ba’athist overthrow in Iraq. The Ba’athist Party, inspired by the ideological works of 
founders Michel ‘Aflaq and Salah al-Bittar, argued that the united Arab nation had been 
divided by imperialist meddling, and that the Arab nation was in need of resurrection 
(ba’ath) and social reforms.303 The party would find its base of support in the country’s 
middle class, peasants, and landowners in rural communities – many of whom would 
form the basis of the military’s membership.304 Ba’athist support included the strong 
backing of Syria’s numerous minorities, in particular the Alawites, who had yet to 
achieve full integration into the ideological and economic developments of the Syrian 
state, despite the aspirations of the Mandate era and the fatwa issued decades earlier by 
Hajj Amin al-Husaynī declaring them ‘orthodox’ Muslims.  
The creation of the United Arab Republic in 1958 had caused many of the formal 
organizational structures of the Ba’ath party to disappear, but the dissolution of the UAR 
in 1961 reconstituted the party around a core group of military officers who would lead 
the coup. Yet the failure of the union between Egypt and Syria and the apparent 
endurance of the post-WWII borders proved an implicit challenge to transnational 
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ideologies, including the Arab Ba’athist doctrine. A split would soon emerge within the 
Ba’athist leadership between those of ‘Aflaq’s loyalists that advocated a more ideological 
transnational policy and those that supported a more regionalist, less doctrinaire 
orientation, led by Defense Minister Lieutenant General Hafez al-Assad. The 1967 war 
with Israel, however, and the resounding defeat of the Arab states would discredit much 
of the current leadership across the Arab world. On March 1st, 1969, Hafez al-Assad 
maneuvered a shift in power, placing President Nurredin al-Attassi and Major General 
Salah Jadid under house arrest. Yet it was not immediately clear that al-Assad was trying 
to take over the Government, as observers “believed his aim was to impose not himself 
but a policy – that of military cooperation with Iraq against Israel.”305 Al-Assad was the 
de facto authority, yet Jadid retained some trappings of political power. However, in early 
1971, after botched Syrian intervention in Jordan’s Black September civil war, al-Assad 
would become the first Alawī president of Syria, after centuries of fatwa declaring them 
non-Muslims and suffering extensive political and religious persecution.306  
The period of tumult was not limited to internal Syrian politics, however. In Iraq, 
the rise of the Iraqi Ba’ath party would lead to severe crackdowns on Shi’a ulama and the 
shrine cities, spurring the underground formation of the Shi’a al-Da’wa party.307 The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
305 Dana Adams Schmidt, “Holiday Shrouds Changes in Syria; Damascus Said to Be Calm,” The 
New York Times, March 2, 1969.  
306 Matti Moosa, Extremist Shiites: The Ghulat Sects (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 
1988). 
307 The coup of Abd al-Karim al-Qasim in 1958 would result in widespread opposition from Shi’a 
‘ulama, who both opposed the secularizing measures he undertook and in particular land reform 
measures, which threatened the political and economic base of power for the clerical 
establishment. In addition, the rise of leftist parties in Iraq in the 1950s and 1960s attracted many 
among the Shi’a. As a response, the Hizb al-Da’wa al-Islāmiyya party was formed, under the 
charismatic leadership of Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, a young religious scholar from a well known 
‘ulama family, and Mahdi al-Hakim, the son of the most senior Shi’a marja’ of the period, 
	   170	  
creation of the Palestinian Liberation Organization and the effects of subsequent decades 
of war with Israel would bleed into Syria, resulting in changing demographics and newly 
radicalized population of Sunni refugees settling around the Sayyeda Zaynab. In Iran, the 
Shah’s White Revolution reforms were designed to break the influence of landowning 
elite and the ulama; the Shi’a clerical classes would organize in staunch opposition, and 
Ruhollah Khomeini would gain widespread popularity, giving the Shah a new outspoken 
critic. Khomeini would be exiled in 1963, but the boom and bust cycles of Iran’s 
economy and the Shah’s ostentatious displays of wealth would lead to growing 
discontent. In neighboring Lebanon, Musa al-Sadr had turned his focus on the country’s 
substantial Shi’a community in attempts to galvanize them into a powerful and united 
force in the sectarian political system. This charismatic religious and political leader had 
taken over the leadership of Lebanon’s Shi’as after the death of Ayatollah Sharaf al-Dīn, 
signaling a change in guard away from the predominantly quietist Shi’a leadership of the 
previous decades.  
While the Sayyeda Zaynab had emerged as a result of individual and community 
donations, the political currents and upheavals in the Middle East would enter the space 
of the shrine. What it meant to be a Syrian, who was a Shi’a, and the political relationship 
with shrine spaces would change. It would become a site of refuge for Shi’as from 
different countries, transforming the nature of the shrine and its visitors. In addition, 
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Shi’ism in Syria would increasingly become synonymous with the Alawīs, and with a 
nominally Shi’a-led government in place, engagement with the Sayyeda Zaynab became 
fraught with new ideological considerations and symbolism. Yet the period nevertheless 
saw the most dramatic expansions and ornamentation of the space thus far, as the 
groundwork that previously had been laid by shrine leaders and religious authorities came 
to fruition. In 1965, a new gold dome was constructed, financed by Iranian businessmen 
and designed by Hajj Qasem Hamdani.308 Along with other Iranian pilgrims, tiles were 
laid in the courtyard, new verandas and rooms were built, and the family of Muhammad 
Ali Habib commissioned new ornate pillars by Iranian artists.309 Aesthetically and 
financially, the Sayyeda Zaynab would be brought closer into the Iranian orbit, with 
internal turmoil in Syria and crackdowns in Iraq limiting Arab donations. In the course of 
a few decades, it had transformed from a site that needed the encouragement and 
authentication of local elites and marja’ into a visual spectacle, one designed to draw 
attention to the assertively Shi’a and new aesthetics of the shrine. The Ministry of Awqaf 
would again reiterate with the Iranian Embassy in Syria the need for donations to be 
registered directly through official channels to protect the integrity of the donations and 
also prevent any wrongdoing, with the new Ba’athist state under al-Assad more 
conscious of its engagement with religion.310  
 The intersection between the Sayyeda Zaynab and the Murtadha family, the 
Ba’athist government, and transnational Shi’a forces would become more complex. The 
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shrine would be officially registered in the new Awqaf Department in 1966, with the 
support of Shi’ism’s Grand Ayatollah Muhsin al-Hakīm authenticating the Murtadha 
family’s hereditary claim as mutawalli of the Sayyeda Zaynab. Al-Hakīm received a copy 
of the original waqf from Syed Muhsin and Radha Murtadha, and he noted, “I 
acknowledge that they [who wrote it] have authorization from the descendants of al-
Wāqif, may God increase his standing. The executors of this waqf, may God praise and 
aid them, were able to carry out this waqf to their abilities, have not changed or replaced 
anything, and retained control of the waqf.”311 The Awqaf Department would continue to 
allow the shrine committee to operate in the administration of the shrine, but the Sayyeda 
Zaynab had become one of the most prominent sites in Syria, and the shrine committee 
would manage a careful relation with the Awqaf Department. Yet it was one of the rare 
religious sites not in complete control of Awqaf officials after the Ba’athist coup, with a 
new regime that balanced a secular agenda and its ethno-religious ties cautiously. The 
history of the Sayyeda Zaynab and the established ties of the Murtadha family would 
allow them greater leeway than other Shi’a sites in Syria, many that would increasingly 
be seen as Iranian-created and dominated.312 The site could still be positioned as an 
authentic ‘Syrian’ site, one that had an Islamic heritage and a tradition of caretakers 
grounded in the local.  
Yet despite the state’s recognition of the Sayyeda Zaynab, the “Shiitization” – and 
sectarianization – of the site would nevertheless begin in earnest after al-Assad’s 
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Ba’athist takeover, though for reasons and an opening of power dynamics extending 
beyond religious impulses. Radha Murtadha himself would be appointed the president of 
the Office of Education and Director General in 1969 and remain in the role for over 20 
years. From that position, he would support the creation of new institutional centers 
around the Sayyeda Zaynab – though oppose the over-proliferation of ‘traditional’ 
schools. Nevertheless, developments would nonetheless mark the shrine as a decidedly 
Shi’a site. In 1973, the first Shi’a religious seminary was established at the Sayyeda 
Zaynab, founded by the Iraqi Syed Hassan Shirazi (d. 1983), part of an extended family 
of Shi’a scholars and activists that had been exiled by the Iraqi Ba’athist regime. Indeed, 
on-going tensions with the Iraqi regime and the crackdown on religious authority in Iran 
would create an influx of clerical and Shi’a refugees into Syria, where they were granted 
asylum. The Shirazi family, including Syed Hassan and his brother Muhammad, had 
advocated an active transnational and revolutionary approach to Shi’ism, with members 
of the family displaced from Iran and Iraq to the Gulf states, Lebanon, and Syria in the 
1970s.313 The presence of growing numbers of exiled Shi’as and the newness of the 
hawza Zaynabiyya would result in a more activist stance on Shi’a theology and 
jurisprudence, one that was generally permitted by the new Syrian state.314  
The same year of 1973 marked critical new developments in transforming the 
Sayyeda Zaynab into a politically sectarian site, one that had expanded well beyond al-
Amīn’s hopes for a shrine that provided comfort for Syria’s pilgrims. The shrine itself 
was already being drawn into a new rhetoric reinterpreting the lives of Shi’a martyrs, 
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with active discussion of the role of Zaynab stemming from larger debates on the role of 
Islam in the modem world. After years of individual and group donations, in 1973 the 
Iranian and Syrian governments would conclude an agreement to cooperate in the 
renovation and expansion of the Sayyeda Zaynab, the first time that either government 
had sanctioned an official agreement on the shrine.315 The cooperation on the state level 
marked a new awareness for al-Assad’s regime in understanding the political salience of 
supporting such an emotively powerful Shi’a shrine, within the context of religious 
protests that had emerged around the country. In March 1973, al-Assad’s regime had 
approved a new non-sectarian constitution, which did not designate Islam as the religion 
of the state. Massive Sunni protests erupted across Syrian cities against the regime, with 
new charges leveled that Alawīs were not Muslims. Multiple assassination plots were 
claimed by secret police in their crackdown against protestors claiming al-Assad was the 
“enemy of Allah.”316 When faced with the prospect of discontent amongst the majority 
Sunni population and a lingering unease about the orthodoxy of the Alawī sect, the 
regime, so avowedly secular in its takeover, searched for authentication. It found it in the 
form of Musa al-Sadr, who had been pressing Alawī shaykhs in Lebanon to come under 
the umbrella of his newly established Supreme Islamic Shi’ite Council. For Musa al-Sadr, 
Shi’a unity in Lebanon would increase their political leverage and bargaining position, 
but the small Alawī population had resisted incorporation and loss of autonomy. Now, 
with the Syrian regime facing opposition based on religious legitimacy, the ties between 
the Alawites and Musa al-Sadr became mutually beneficial. In a speech in 1973, al-Sadr 
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declared, “those Muslims known as Alawīs are brothers of those Shi’as called 
‘mutawallis,’” appropriating the word that had long been used as a derogatory reference 
to Lebanon’s Shi’as. One of Musa al-Sadr’s Alawī appointees remarked, “we belong to 
the Ja’fari school…and our religion is Islam.”317  
Musa al-Sadr’s embrace of the Alawites would ostensibly label the regime as both 
secular and Shia-oriented, dominated by a minority that had long been ostracized by even 
Shi’a religious authorities. It would represent a new paradigm of ‘being Shi’a’ in Syria, 
now linked to the Ba’athist regime and its interests. With the growing influx of Shi’a 
refugees and increasing agitation amongst Shi’a populations in Iran, Iraq, and Lebanon, 
the ever-expanding Sayyeda Zaynab would come to represent those in the margins, 
searching for authenticity and power. From al-Amīn’s new interpretations of tradition to 
al-Sadr’s legitimization, from the worries over fresh water to the laying of expansive 
marble courtyards, the Sayyeda Zaynab shrine was a decidedly modern site, drawing its 
resonance from its purported link to early Islamic and Arab roots while emerging through 
a range of pressures as a critical site. It was the Iranian Revolution, however, that would 
irrevocably transform it into a sectarian site, fraught with new implications and political 
salience.  
 
***** 
 
On June 26th, 1977, the body of Iranian ideologue and sociologist Ali Shari’ati 
was flown from London and laid to rest in an elaborate ceremony in the newly renovated 
cemetery at the Sayyeda Zaynab shrine. After years of surveillance by the Iranian secret 
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service SAVAK and imprisonment by the Shah in solitary confinement, Shari’ati had 
been released in 1975 and later allowed to leave Iran, leaving in his wake a country that 
his ideas had sent hurling towards revolution.318 Shari’ati would die in London at the 
young age of 44 in what his followers would claim were mysterious circumstances, 
another death added to Shi’ism’s pantheon of martyrs. He would be buried in a 
customized marble tomb at the Sayyeda Zaynab, near the woman whose role as the 
messenger of Karbala he had sought to emulate and whose courage and strength he had 
framed as the Muslim Joan of Arc.319 Reports of his funeral would remark on the fitting 
final resting place of the Sayyeda Zaynab shrine. It was “the culmination of the blood and 
the message,” a local paper in Pakistan noted, and Shari’ati’s burial at the Sayyeda 
Zaynab meant that, like for Husayn, even after his death “the message was most 
important.”320  
 Yet the significance of Shari’ati’s funeral at the shrine in 1977 went beyond the 
ideological and emotional connections to Zaynab herself. Certainly, Shari’ati had raised 
Zaynab to the status of an iconic and legendary revolutionary in his compelling 
reinvigoration of the Karbala narrative, though the process of reimagining Zaynab’s role 
in Shi’a history had been ongoing. These narratives about Zaynab had been transformed 
through the 20th century on a supranational level, from her role as passive witness to 
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Karbala, on whom tragedies were visited upon, to a powerful messenger of Muhammad 
and ‘Ali. Yet the dynamics of the scene on the ground also reflected the growing political 
and religious alliances that were reflected on the space of the newly prominent Sayyeda 
Zaynab shrine, which had just decades earlier been an unassuming brick and mortar 
structure in a small village outside of Damascus. Shari’ati’s body had been unable to 
return to Iran, caught in the throes of unrest his writings had helped to provoke, and the 
Iraqi shrine cities had become increasingly inhospitable and inaccessible with the 
government’s crackdown on the Islamic Shi’a Al-Da’wa party. Through political, 
religious, and community support, Sayyeda Zaynab shrine had undergone extensive 
development and emerged as an attractive alternative site, one that had attained the same 
resonance as the shrines to the male Imams.  
Attended by dignitaries, religious scholars, and the growing transnational 
community of Shi’as, Shari’ati’s funeral would also mark the new alliances and 
ideologies that had emerged around the shrine in the preceding decades. The proceedings 
were officiated by Musa al-Sadr, who had fostered the close ties with the Alawī-led 
Ba’thist government and Iranian opposition to the Shah.321 Shari’ati had admired al 
Sadr’s work in galvanizing the Shi’a of southern Lebanon and had visited al Sadr in 
Lebanon a number of times. Those gathered for Shari’ati’s funeral prayers presented a 
mix of Iranian dissidents, shrine authorities, ‘Alawī Ba’athist government officials, and 
Shi’a students and scholars from the new hawza Zaynabiyya – a visual that highlighted 
the unique forces that had transformed the Sayyeda Zaynab shrine into a critical space in 
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the post WWII landscape.322 As it had three decades earlier, the shrine again provided 
both a sacred and profane space in the funeral of an influential figure, with mourners 
gathering as national and international events appeared to be spiraling towards change. 
Like at Mahdi Murtadha’s funeral in 1945, the shrine was itself a powerful actor and 
meaning-maker in Shari’ati’s funeral, embodying both an evocative religious and 
personal connection and the changing ideological and political landscape. Yet the 
differences were instructive – the shrine, too, had changed, with a new guard of 
supporters filling the space. The constancy of the Murtadha family was, on the surface, a 
sign of the unchanged endurance of traditional forms of familial authority in the face of 
great upheaval. Yet it was the flexibility and newer alliances of the Murtadha caretakers, 
in particular their involvement with the new Ba’athist government and a perceived 
loyalty to the state’s apparatus, that allowed them to continue to operate the Sayyeda 
Zaynab with relative autonomy. The presence of Alawī Ba’ath officials at the shrine 
presented a dramatically different portrait. While Mahdi Murtadha’s funeral in many 
ways represented a gathering of nationalist figures and traditional notable families, 
signaled by the choice of Fares al-Khoury to eulogize Murtadha, Shari’ati’s funeral 
demonstrated the pull outwards and increasing sectarian nature of the Sayyeda Zaynab, 
embodied in the complex linkages that Musa al-Sadr himself drew on.  
The Sayyeda Zaynab was increasingly linked to debates over what it meant to be 
Shi’a in an evolving transnational landscape. The development of the Sayyeda Zaynab 
was a microcosm for larger disputes playing out on a national level, as the Syrian state 
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progressed from Mandate rule to the Ba’athist coup. While Muhsin al-Amīn had 
emphasized the Arab nature of the Sayyeda Zaynab and encouraged a committee of local 
Syrian Shi’a notables to take the lead on promoting the shrine, by the 1970s external 
pressures were coming to bear on the ground. Ideological debates over the true nature of 
Islam and the role of Shi’ism in public life would alter what a shrine for Zaynab meant, 
for the state and the pilgrims that frequented it in growing numbers.   
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Chapter Four 
‘A Blessing on Our People’: Bibi Pak Daman and the Nationalized Sacred 
 
 
On June 3rd, 1970, Noor Jahan, the legendary Pakistani singer and actress, 
announced her intention to visit the small shrine of Bibi Pak Daman, nestled amongst the 
bustling narrow streets of Lahore’s Old City. Noor Jahan was one of the most influential 
stars of her time, an icon in Pakistani popular culture that had captured the spirit of a 
nation during her performance tours in the 1965 India-Pakistan war. Her presence at the 
shrine for the urs, or death anniversary celebrations, of Ruqayyah bint ‘Ali was a 
dramatic affair, one with deep cultural significance.323 Noor Jahan’s visit was heralded as 
“the mother of melody honoring the mother of our faithful.”324 Government officials who 
controlled the shrine took care to document the details of her visit, one that had been a 
tremendous boon to the site. The visit had gone off largely without a hitch, the shrine 
manger relayed to his superior, except for the unseemly presence of one of the shrine’s 
mutawalli caretakers. This particular mutawalli, Shah Ali Khan, had become a thorn in 
the government’s side as they attempted to assert control on the site. The manager 
complained that Noor Jahan “had come to receive the unique blessing of her Bibi 
Ruqayyah,” and the mutawalli had taken 500 rupees from her to ensure that majlis to the 
Shi’a Imam Husayn and his family was sponsored on her behalf.325 He continued, “This 
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occurrence is necessary to relate to you because this particular mutawalli regularly sits in 
this alley as a pīr and collects money from these devotees that come and go and has made 
this his sole source of income. It is unseemly that a male attendant should so engage with 
a respected lady pilgrim of Bibian Pak Damana.”326 
Over a quarter of a century later, another towering figure would celebrate the urs 
at Bibi Pak Daman when Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto visited the shrine with 
her “Iranian” mother in 1996, a visit that would draw on the resonance of critical Islamic 
narratives.327 Though these visits stand out for the impact they had on a national level and 
the tensions they raised over gender, religious devotion, and government control, the 
sight of a prominent figure visiting a shrine to a revered saint in Pakistan was certainly 
not an uncommon one. Pakistan’s landscape is dotted with hundreds of shrines, marking 
the sacred landscape of a country where ties to Sufism and its saints run deep. In rural 
villages, sites of communal devotionalism are imbedded into the fabric of social life, 
functioning as centers of education, marriage regulation, family life, and governing the 
critical distribution of funds and resources. Some grew to provincial and national 
prominence, spurred by patronage, population growth, and ethnic rivalries.  Yet the 
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shrine of Bibi Pak Daman has stood apart since Pakistan’s independence in its unique 
cultural and political significance. It was the newly revitalized shrine to a female saint, 
one that in narrative, practice, and rhetoric was animated by its firm ties to a distinct 
supranational Shi’i sacred geography and simultaneously by the rival forces that shape 
the facts on the ground. From Pakistan’s independence through the tumultuous 1970s and 
Islamization of the 1980s, Bibi Pak Daman was activated and reimagined by debates over 
nation building and national identity, the nature of religion and gender in public life, and 
the turbulent effects of geopolitical influences.  
The uncertainty over the identities of the women buried at the shrine remained a 
source of some controversy in the years following Pakistan’s independence. Yet those 
debates over hagiography, narrative, and meaning had a real impact on the physical space 
of the shrine, creating and exacerbating the conflicts that emerged in the administration of 
Bibi Pak Daman. While most Sufi saints on the subcontinent traced their lineage to the 
twelve Shi’a Imams – and indeed derive their spiritual authority from these constructed 
genealogies – Ruqayyah’s status and close link to the family of the Prophet set her apart. 
The presence of the shrine validated the historic presence of Islam in South Asia, 
affirmed the idea of a historical Muslim nation, and provided a powerful narrative 
counterpoint to conservative Islamic ideology.  Yet though believers and shrine officials 
sought at critical moments to establish its place in Islamic, Shi’a, and national sacred 
geography, Bibi Pak Daman continued to occupy an ambiguous and contested space in 
both devotional and official discourse.  
With the new state’s federalization of waqf properties in the 1960s and the 
government’s takeover of Bibi Pak Daman in 1967, the debates over Bibi Pak Daman and 
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religious practice at the shine were exacerbated. The shrine was subsumed under similar 
governing authority as the numerous shrines to Sufi pīrs and saints around Pakistan, 
despite the multiple factors that clearly made Bibi Pak Daman distinct; this framework 
would soon provide its own challenges. Like many of these shrines, it did serve a clear 
social function, linking local religious systems to the wider world of Islam.328 Yet 
hagiographies and narratives also worked to ground the shrine within a national milieu, 
adopting the founding mythologies and tropes as a defense against the ‘othering’ of the 
site.329 Bibi Pak Daman provides the interpretive lens to view the tensions between Shi’a 
hagiographies and what was the ‘accepted’ range of Sunni and Sufi practice, between 
ritual practices that have emerged at the shrine and regulated efforts to extricate Pakistani 
Islam from its Indian roots. At various moments, the shrine emerged as a flashpoint 
where tensions between the majority Sunni and minority Shi’a populations become 
pronounced. Few shrines under the state’s control had been subject to such competing 
interpretations or charged valence, and as a result of the legal environment established 
after independence, devotees found themselves resorting to government authority to 
police the differences between sects and enforce the boundaries – both spatially and 
spiritually – between Sunnis and Shi’as. 
Like the Sayyeda Zaynab shrine, this chapter argues that Bibi Pak Daman also 
constituted an internal frontier shrine: it is a place onto which competing ideologies about 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
328 For more discussion, see Richard Eaton. “The Political and Religious Authority of the Shrine 
of Baba Farid” in Moral Conduct and Authority: The Place of Adab in South Asian Islam. ed. 
Barbara Daly Metcalf (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984).  
329 The narrative of Bibi Pak Daman is epic in scope, linking the great heroes and conquerors of 
Islam in the subcontinent with the family of the Prophet, as famed names as ‘Ali, Hussain, 
Muhammad bin Qasim, Mahmud of Ghazni, and Akbar all figure prominently in literature. See 
Chapter 1 and 2 of this dissertation. 
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religion and the state were mapped and conflicts over meaning were played out on the 
physical space. Like no other shrine, Bibi Pak Daman exemplified the tensions that 
existed with the new Pakistani state’s role as religious arbitrator, the distinction between 
public space and private enterprise, between state sanctioned religious rhetoric and local 
traditions, between nationalism and communal rivalry, and within a Shi’i community 
negotiating these geopolitical events affecting the space of public discourse. Thus, this 
chapter will focus on the bureaucratic history and contestations around Bibi Pak Daman 
immediately before and since the federal takeover of the shrine in 1967. Through the 
1960s, under the influence of Field Marshall Ayub Khan, Bibi Pak Daman was enmeshed 
in the ongoing nation-building project and the preoccupation with creating a rationalized 
and bureaucratized state. For devotees and local leaders, that meant a new reality on the 
ground, as well as unique anxieties about the presence of a male-dominated state 
regulating conduct at the shrine of a revered female saint. With the rise of the Bhutto 
family and the tumultuous 1970s – including the loss of Muslim East Pakistan –the shrine 
became the flashpoint for new ideologies and rivalries. Finally, following trends in 
historiography that emphasize the creation of sectarianism, it examines the emergence of 
sectarian conflict at the shrine in the context of critical national and geopolitical events – 
the Iranian Revolution and Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, and Zia ul-Haq’s 
Islamization policies of the 1980s – that directly impacted life at Bibi Pak Daman.  
 
The Shrine and the “Ideology of Pakistan” 
 The importance of Bibi Pak Daman owed in part to the extensive and interwoven 
histories of Sufism and Shi’ism in the subcontinent, as well as the development of 
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complex and diverse ‘shrine cultures’ in Pakistan. Scholarship on Sufism and shrine 
culture in South Asian history and politics has grown into rich field, bolstered by two 
important factors. First, Sufism played a significant role in spreading Islam in the Indian 
subcontinent, creating what is commonly referred to as a multitude of ‘lived’ Islams.330 
While the traditional dichotomy between doctrinal and ritual Islam has been repeatedly 
problematized, Sufism is often credited as being the “principal historical force in the 
spread of Islam in the subcontinent” playing “the dominant role in the evolution and 
development of popular Islam,” allowing recent converts to slowly adapt to a social order 
grounded in Islamic spirituality.331 Second, in historiography, the emergence of subaltern 
studies through the 1980s spurred a new emphasis on locating local voices and traditions. 
The shrine space, with its traditions and social life, was seen as a more authentic 
expression of Islamic religious practice. To view these sites through Shi’a doctrine and 
ritual would thus by extension ignore the development of a syncretic, locally distinct 
Islam.  
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Nevertheless, it was initially through the establishment of Sufi khanqahs (a prayer 
house specifically designated for gatherings and rituals) that religious shrines would 
evolve into a politically powerful system in Pakistan. By the 12th century, Sufi masters 
(or pīrs) began arriving in the subcontinent and creating networks of devotees, converting 
local tribal leaders, winning their political allegiance, and establishing new forms of trade 
and exchange between the khanqah and its tribal allies.  The maintenance of these 
networks was key to political, economic, and religious affairs in this region. The stability 
of this system led to the adoption of hereditary inheritance to institutionalize the political 
allegiances between the local population and the Sufi masters; the saint’s piety and 
spirituality was now passed on to a designated successor amongst his descendants, 
cementing the political and social order of the community. Thus, as spiritual leadership 
changed from a learned process to a hereditary one, the Sufi pīr and his successors (often 
called murshids or sajjada nashins) became central to social order. The lineage of the 
sajjada nashin is a vital component to his authority, as most early Sufi pīrs identified 
themselves as sayyids, descended from the Prophet Muhammad. Upon the death of the 
pīr, the khanqahs would frequently double as shrines to these revered figures.   
 The shift to hereditary succession after the death of the Sufi saint led to the 
firming of the master-disciple (pīr-sajjada nashin) paradigm and of the political, 
spiritual, and economic links to the Sufi shrines through generations.332 Due to their 
tremendous influence, political authorities sought to coopt the khanqahs and shrines to 
gain traction in the rural countryside, places where state authority located in urban centers 
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was often unable to extend their rule. Land grants (jagirs) were given to maintain shrines 
and the economic status of their sajjada nashins. The shrines, in particular, were used and 
appropriated by the British colonial authorities, whose interest lay in formalizing a 
hereditary, land-based system that would establish a sedentary population of identifiable 
tribes and villages in the countryside. While the British attempted to maintain 
Enlightenment rhetoric of freedom and a hands-off approach in religious affairs, the 
centrality of the shrines and its sajjada nashins necessitated a mutually dependent 
relationship between the colonial structure and the influential hereditary descendants of 
the many pīrs of the subcontinent.333 Under British rule, shrines, pīrs, and sajjada 
nashins received official patronage through land allocations in return for political 
support. Pīrs were designated “landed gentry” in the administration of Punjab Alienation 
of Land Bill of 1900.334 British jurisdiction over these religious and charitable institutions 
led Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the future founder of Pakistan, to push forward the 
Mussalman Wakf Validating Act of 1913, which restored private ownership of the waqf 
(or religious endowment) from the British and “won him the heart of Muslims.”335  
Indeed, for the early ideologues of the Pakistan Movement, the prevalence and 
acceptance of shrine culture presented an important opportunity. The structure of the 
shrines – and the revenue deriving from ritual donations– could be integrated into the 
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infrastructure of the government of a nascent Pakistani state. After Pakistan’s 
independence in 1947, the importance of these centers did not diminish. According to 
Javid Iqbal, the shrine could be harnessed as a center of Islamic order. Iqbal, the son of 
Allama Muhammad Iqbal – the moving ideological force behind the Pakistan Movement 
– was an influential Supreme Court judge and philosopher of Islamic political thought. 
He advocated for regulation of religious shrines that would emphasize saintly acts and 
not miracles, with government oversight to ensure that religious practice was properly 
channeled and would align with political interests – and capture revenue derived from 
religious endowments and donations.336 The oversight of shrines, mosques, and religious 
endowments would be undertaken by the federalized Department of Auqaf, allowing the 
state a way to regulate lands and finances previously out of their purview.337  
 In line with Iqbal’s conclusion, soon after his coup in 1958, Field Marshal Ayub 
Khan initiated a string of orders aimed at state building and social reform, including the 
Muslim Family Laws and decrees that would federalize shrines and religious property in 
Pakistan. The government issued the West Pakistan Waqf Properties Ordinance in 1959, 
and then a further detailed and similarly titled Ordinance on October 23rd, 1961; among 
its extensive clauses, the Ordinance pronounced, “The income from boxes placed at a 
shrine and offerings or subscriptions for charitable purposes shall be deemed to be Waqf 
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property.”338 Further laws were issued to apply to East Pakistan, and provincial 
assemblies began the process of creating regional Auqaf branches. These bills “sought to 
create a sense of unanimity between government policy direction, religious values, and 
the reformist ideals of the pīrs.”339 Coopting shrines into the state’s new bureaucracies 
would give the Ayub government access to land that was previously held privately in 
perpetuity, allow it to regulate devotional practice on site and reframe saints as Islamic 
social reformers, and provide an important tool to combat the growing influence of the 
banned Jamaat-e-Islami and Islamist parties.  
 State officials – many whom had previously frequented shrines to garner political 
loyalty from its followers – were now centrally involved in shrine celebrations, along 
with cultural committees appointed to major shrines. In July 1961, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, 
then Minister of Commerce, Communications, and Industry inaugurated the anniversary 
celebrations at the shrine of famed saint-poet Shah Abdul Latif Bhittai, “under the 
auspices of the Bhit Shah Cultural Centre Committee,” where “eminent scholars and 
poets from all over the country…read papers on various aspects of life, poetry, and 
philosophy of Shah Abdul Latif.”340 The same month, the Auqaf Department disclosed 
that it had set apart Rs. 12,000 for the anniversary (urs) in Lahore of Ali Hujweri Data 
Ganj Bakhsh, perhaps the most revered Sufi saint in Pakistan, with the Data Ganj Bakhsh 
Urs Sub-Committee and Auqaf Department publishing “a brochure containing the life-
history and teachings of the saint and the outlines of the renovation and reconstruction 
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plan for distribution among the visitors.”341 Books and pamphlets full of parables and 
sayings were jointly issued by the Auqaf Department with local shrine committees, 
coinciding with key political cycles. These shrine committees were composed of the 
hereditary descendants of the Sufi saints and local civil leaders, such as the Qalandar 
Cultural Society, set up in 1961 “for the purpose of collecting and completing the 
literature on the life and sayings of the great soofi-saint Hazrat Usman Marwandi, 
popularly known as Qalandar Shahbaz,” another popular Sufi saint.342 
 With the federalization of shrines under the Auqaf department, successive 
governments of Ayub Khan (1958-69), Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (1973-77), and General Zia 
ul-Haq (1977-88) “maintained a policy toward the shrines that was consistent with their 
ideological goals,” with Ayub Khan and Bhutto’s governments emphasizing the welfare 
aspects of shrine centers and not the miraculous or fantastical biographical details.343 
Visit to and rhetorical use of Sufi pīrs and shrines also became a vital and contested tool 
for government officials, given the powerful resonance many of these names held with 
portions of the public. In 1976, Punjab Auqaf Minister Rana Iqbal Ahmad Khan, a 
member of Bhutto’s Pakistan People’s Party, noted that certain ulama “had repeatedly 
leveled frivolous charges against the People’s Government in furtherance of their selfish 
political ends” in mosques and shrines, “undermining the sanctity of houses of prayer.” 
Then, harnessing the ubiquitous appeal of these saints and shrines, he claimed Islam “has 
spread because of its sublime moral and spiritual values and not by force,” citing the 
manner in which saints such as Data Ganj Bakhsh had brought a large number of non-
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Muslims into the fold of Islam by “efficiently preaching Islamic tenets and by the appeal 
of their own piety and noble character.”344 The control of shrines – and, indeed, the ability 
to frame the lives of saints whose shrines they controlled, provided a potent means for 
Ayub Khan and Bhutto to validate the Islamic nature of their political agendas.  
 The Auqaf (Federal Control) Act of 1976 further cemented the government’s 
involvement in religious devotional practice, and as the Auqaf Department expanded by 
establishing provincial branches, so too did the publication of books to bolster the 
educational component of shrines, a goal that was urged by Javid Iqbal. Pamphlets about 
shrines highlighted the move away from the notion of pīrs as possessing divinely inspired 
mystical qualities and towards the daily life and deeds of these saints, who, as a collective 
body, “worked together to convert Pakistan as a nation to Islam,” placing the emphasis on 
the ‘good deeds’ that Iqbal advocated.345 The Presidential Ordinance of August 10th 
divested control of Auqaf properties from one central department to the now established 
provincial departments, amending the 1976 Act to state “the administration, control, 
management, and maintenance of all Waqf property situated in a Province…shall instead 
be transferred to the Government of that Province…”346  
The trajectory, influence, and political relationship with Sufi shrines in 
Pakistan provides an instructive context for the milieu in which Bibi Pak Daman 
functioned. Because Sufi shrines had been more abundant and been an important 
factor in the political dynamics of Pakistan, the legal framework, political 
discourse, and scholarly focus on shrines have emphasized this lens in addressing 
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all religious sites – even those that are not primarily Sufi shrines. This was 
exacerbated by historiographical trends to locate and extract the local indigenous 
voice from hegemonic structures. However, this privileging of a kind of 
‘authentic’ local experience ignores the critical supranational narratives and 
impulses that shape these spaces. In the case of Bibi Pak Daman, while it was 
subsumed under the same land and regulatory authorities concerned with Sufi 
shrines, its importance for the new Pakistani state cannot be understood without 
exploring the Shi’a structures and the emotional valence of such a site.  
 
A Frontier Shrine in Urban Politics 
 It is within these legal and political frameworks that discourse around the 
construction and ritual practice of the Bibi Pak Daman shrine exists. It, too, is this context 
that highlights the unique interventions that the history and politics of Bibi Pak Daman 
has made. The shrine stands out on the national landscape, both in importance to the 
government and in the ideological debates projected onto the space of the shrine.  
 A close reading of the hagiographies and representations of Ruqayyah reveal the 
complex stakes that were at play at Bibi Pak Daman – the supranational appeal, the 
gender implications, the attempts to link her to the constructed Islamic past on the 
subcontinent, and the founding national myths. These narratives, tropes, and signifiers are 
critical because of the work they do, what they project, and how they directly affected the 
physical reality of the shrine. It was not merely control over the discourse surrounding 
Bibi Pak Daman that was contested, and these debates were not confined simply to the 
realm of meaning-making.  Who Ruqayyah was and what Bibi Pak Daman meant had 
	   193	  
direct implications on government regulation, jurisprudential ramifications, and control 
of resources. On the eve of the government’s takeover, it was the second largest shrine in 
the Punjab in annual donations and revenue, and the stakes for all sides were high.347 
Indeed, physical control of the shrine also entailed the ability to define the shrine, 
to determine the narratives and interpretations that emerge from it and normalize ritual 
surrounding it. This was a particularly potent issue, especially in regards to a shrine 
whose history remains ambiguous. Though the government and devotees had a vested 
interest in displaying the international importance and nationalist implications of Bibi 
Pak Daman, the shrine was a deeply contentious space, and debates over the history of 
the shrine revealed the deep divisions that were present in Pakistani society; indeed, its 
very ambiguity allowed it to take on multiple valences, serving as a site on which distrust 
of government authority in religious practice, land disputes, communal tensions, and 
rhetoric about ‘proper’ religious rituals are mapped.  
Though Ruqayyah was said to have arrived in Lahore near the end of the 7th 
century, according to the Auqaf Department’s official publications, the first verifiable 
written reference to a land deed of Bibi Pak Daman was in 1856, when a local census 
record noted a combined ownership of a large tract of land on which the shrine was 
located.348 From the first rudimentary constructions around the site, a network of self-
proclaimed sajjada nashins and surrounding residents had slowly encroached and exerted 
control over the shrine, forming a de facto administration that ruled the shrine as 
communal property. Tracts of land were passed down through generations as waqf 
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property, complicating questions of ownership with Islamic precedence and civil law. In 
1924-25, the British administration allowed a more detailed demarcation of land, and the 
individual plot for Bibi Pak Daman was defined.349 While pilgrims from all over Pakistan 
regularly visited the shrine, the administration and upkeep of the shrine had been a 
localized affair. The shrine’s sajjada nashins intervened in disputes onsite, using their 
influence amongst the community to regulate activities on site and maintain a status quo. 
While little work was done to expand or increase activities at the site, prominent Shi’a 
families in Lahore had endowed Bibi Pak Daman with gifts to aid pilgrims at the shrine. 
Sayyeda Fakhra Begum, the daughter of Syed Maratib Ali Shah, a prominent Shi’a 
businessman and philanthropist, helped repair the rundown veranda at Bibi Pak Daman, 
so that pilgrims could “continue to use the shrine with peace and ease.”350 
On September 9th, 1967, the government took control of the administration of Bibi 
Pak Daman and the surrounding land through the authority of the West Pakistan Waqf 
Properties Ordinance of 1961, ending centuries of ambiguity over the control and 
ownership of the shrine. The shrine was registered as a Sunni shrine, likely because over 
the centuries Sufi sajjada nashins in the surrounding environs had claimed their descent 
from Ruqayyah and thus been the recipients of all shrine donations and allocated funds.351 
Registering the shrine as a Sunni shrine was in effect de facto recognition and acceptance 
of these men as caretakers of the shrine, subsuming their authority and informal structure 
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351 While the term sajjada nashin is more prevalent in the South Asian context, the term 
mutawalli is also used interchangeably. While sajjada nashins claim a spiritual authority, 
traditionally a mutawalli is the caretaker of the shrine, the hereditary descendant of the owner of 
the waqf property.  
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into the new order. While the federalization of the shrine was indeed a dramatic break, 
bringing the state for the first time into such close proximity, the expressed interest of the 
government was not to impede or disrupt existing systems. Hence, registering the shrine 
as a Sunni site was a nod to the claims and facts on the ground, albeit dubious in origin. 
This classification would nevertheless have important ramifications for the governance 
and politics of the shrine.   
The federalization notification was published in the West Pakistan Gazette, 
acknowledging that the Chief Administrator of Auqaf had “taken over and assumed the 
administration control, management, and maintenance of the Shrine”, including the 
attached mosque and graveyard.352 Simultaneous with the publishing of notification 
1(71)-Auqaf/63, Muhammad Asghar, the Assistant Manager of Auqaf, Lahore Central 
District, was dispatched to the shrine to take possession of Bibi Pak Daman. The process 
was a remarkable marshaling of the state’s nascent bureaucratic capacity, with meticulous 
attention given to the site now under the government’s purview. His assessment provided 
minute detail on the layout and state of affairs at the shrine as the government entered the 
space. He first assured the Chief Administrator that all surveying was carried out with 
“full respect to the ladies who reside at the shrine and specially [sic] the veiling of 
women, in reference to your requests.”353 Immediately, then, there is an 
acknowledgement of the particularity of Bibi Pak Daman – the predominance of female 
visitors to the shrine and the pious ancestry of Ruqayyah and her family would have to be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
352 Order Notification from M. Masood, C.S.P, Chief Administrator of Auqaf, West Pakistan. 
No.1(71)-Auqaf/63, Sept. 9, 1967. Issued by Office of the Chief Administrator of Auqaf, West 
Pakistan, Lahore. General Records of Darbar Hazrat Bibi Pak Daman, Lahore. 
353 Letter from S. Muhammad Asghar, Assistant Manager Auqaf, Central Zone Sector II, Lahore 
to Chief Administrator Auqaf, Central Zone, Lahore [trans] Sept. 9, 1967. General Records of 
Darbar Hazrat Bibi Pak Daman, Lahore. 
	   196	  
reconciled with a male-dominated state authority inserting itself into the public space of 
the shrine. This question of the gendered nature of the shrine would repeatedly feature in 
correspondence between government officials, pilgrims, and local residents, as Bibi Pak 
Daman provided challenges unlike any other site in Pakistan.  
Asghar then continued with his assessment for the Chief Administrator of Auqaf, 
providing a full account of the scene at the official handover from the sajjada nashins 
(known locally as gaddi nashins) to government personnel. “At this darbar, there are 4 
collection boxes, on which we put our own locks and sealed them and the list of present 
property was prepared,” he noted.354 The locking of the donation boxes was an 
unmistakable assertion of a new order at the shrine, one that suddenly changed the very 
structure of daily observances, as all pilgrims who visited the shrine would typically offer 
a small monetary offering in return for prayers answered and blessing.  Those voluntary 
charity funds (or sadaqa) were previously funneled through the self-appointed mutawalli 
and then distributed at their discretion for religious ceremonies and expenses at the 
shrine. There were 8 mutawalli families that claimed trusteeship of the shrine, Asghar 
explained, “and take weekly turns taking responsibility for the shrine and in their own 
turns they keep taking their cut from the cash boxes, which cannot continue. The cash 
boxes are in 4 different locations, for which is now needed one caretaker and one guard 
for the evening to safeguard the funds. There is only one power meter, registered in the 
name of Malik Abdul Karim, sajjada nashin, who uses it as suits him.”355 These 
observations suggest the self-policing nature of the sajjada nashin system at Bibi Pak 
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355 ibid, Letter from S. Muhammad Asghar, Sept. 9, 1967.  
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Daman before the state took control. These families shared informal responsibilities at 
their convenience and, most critically, all the funds collected from devotees.  
Though the Auqaf Department was seizing control of the physical resources and 
presenting itself as the new authority at the site, henceforth responsible for implementing 
new policies and arbitrating all disputes, the manager proceeded to make lengthy 
recommendations for how the government must manage the immediate transition so as 
not to interrupt the key ongoing rituals at the shrine. Asghar’s specific observations on 
the urs and the rituals and charitable feasts (langar) that accompanied it reflect the almost 
scientific collection of institutional knowledge and the bureaucratization of the federal 
government – a focus of the Ayub regime.356 The expenses had been previously borne by 
the mutawalli families, though the state would now need a full understanding and 
accounting of those rituals. “The blessed urs is going to be on the 6th/7th of Jamadi-ul-
Sani [sic] and the distribution of the langar must be arranged for the 7th evening and 8th 
morning,” he advised. “On the 6th Jamadi-ul-Sani [sic]…the shrine is cleansed and bathed 
to distribute small pots of sweet rice on the 6th evening. On the 7th after Ishā there is 
Qurān reading and the distribution of langar and then qawwali is recited. On the 8th, from 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
356 Ayub Khan believed in an essentially reformist vision of Islam, focusing on economic 
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Syracuse University Press, 1986),  336.The bureaucratization of religion was, of course, not a 
process isolated to Pakistan. During the 1960s in Iran, key reform movements supported by the 
government highlighted the state penetration of religious institutions under the Pahlavi regime. 
The sponsoring of rational reform movements (including land reform) to gain influence in a 
sector previously removed from government control proved an instructive one for Ayub’s regime. 
For more on Iran see Shahrough Akhavi, Religion and Politics in Contemporary Iran: Clergy-
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11 AM to 12:30: naat khani continues, then reciting and finishing of Qurān, then langar.” 
As the government was resuming the responsibility and financing to continue this ritual, 
he reminded the Chief Administrator of Auqaf that “at the end of the urs, dupattas are 
distributed to the men and women who recite milād.”357 The distribution of gifts was a 
key part of the ritual process. Those who recited the milād, or recitations of praise for the 
Prophet and his family, were gifted a token that symbolically recalled the importance of 
veiling in Ruqayyah’s story, a unique dimension to the rituals at Bibi Pak Daman.  
In a follow-up letter sent a few days later, Asghar described his subsequent trip on 
September 12th to the shrine to order necessary arrangements and account for all property 
now under the authority of the Auqaf Department. In this letter, he acknowledged that 
“because there has been a takeover and there are shops and homes in that area…Auqaf 
will decide what the rentals will be so that the government can start collecting [funds].”358 
Indeed, the assertive state and its new bureaucracies indicated it would not be an 
unobtrusive presence at the shrine. The letters between Auqaf officials reveal an attempt 
to maintain the essence of ritual at the shrine, especially in regards to female 
devotionalism and its unique relationship to Ruqayyah, while they injected themselves 
into the management and formalized structure at the shrine.  
This balancing act was, of course, a tenuous one. Despite the professed desire to 
ensure a smooth transition, Auqaf officials quickly acted to formulate and disseminate 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
357 Memorandum of Authority. S. Muhammad Asghar, Assistant Manager Auqaf, Central Zone 
Sector II, Lahore to Chief Administrator Auqaf and SPO Police, Central Zone. [trans] Sept. 9, 
1967. General Records of Darbar Hazrat Bibi Pak Daman, Lahore. The dupatta is a long scarf 
often used to cover a woman’s head and seen as a symbol of modesty in South Asian culture. 
358 Letter from S. Muhammad Asghar, Assistant Manager Auqaf, Central Zone Sector II, Lahore, 
to Chief Administrator Auqaf, Central Zone. Memo No. 204-HMLW-1/T.O/67. [trans.] Sept. 14, 
1967. General Records of Darbar Hazrat Bibi Pak Daman, Lahore.  
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new rules of conduct in an attempt to exert control and subvert any rival authorities. 
Because of the long history and complex narratives associated with the shrine and the 
lack of clear familial descent, over the course of centuries both informal and formal 
systems of patronage and authority had emerged. From the government’s perspective, 
these mutawalli families had simply encroached on the land of the shrine over centuries 
and usurped funds and authority; unlike other shrines, the absence of an unbroken, 
verifiable chain of descent of sajjada nashins made any claims appear dubious. As such, 
the Auqaf officials rapidly mobilized to observe and respond to the situation on the 
ground in a series of instruction letters and official orders. In a letter from Abdul Majid, 
the Administrator Auqaf, Central Zone, to the same Assistant Manager Muhammad 
Asghar, concerns about arrangements that had continued at the shrine beyond the control 
of the Auqaf department were discussed. “It has been brought to my notice,” he stated, 
“that the caretaker Mastana sits as the Gaddi of H. Bibian Pakdaman and handles money 
from the devotees for putting in the cash-boxes. This practice is very much objectionable 
and should not be allowed to continue any longer.” Information was also collected from 
pilgrims at the site, as he continued, “It was also reported that he collects the burqas 
offered at the shrine by the lady visitors and sells them in the market. All the offerings 
received, of whatever kind it may be, belongs to Auqaf Department and it should be 
disposed of by the Asst. Manager concerned.”359  
The concern over informal business arrangements is clear in this exchange. In the 
absence of officially regulated structures, patronage agreements, mutually beneficial 
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financial exchanges, and links between caretakers and bazaar shopkeepers flourished. 
Because of the centrality of veiling and piety in Ruqayyah’s narrative and her prayer to 
deliver her from the eyes of nonbelievers, devotees at Bibi Pak Daman often donated 
chadors or dupattas in exchange for the granting of prayers. Before the government’s 
intervention at the shrine, these were collected by the attendants, many who subsisted on 
the donations and extra funds procured at the shrine, and resold in the bazaar. The Auqaf 
Department’s demands to eliminate these practices were thus imposed to the attendants 
now in their employ. The attendants who served in the ladies section of Bibi Pak Daman 
were issued strict instructions to list all donated chadors, cash, or expensive items by 
date, which could no longer be passed on to other pilgrims at their discretion. Cash could 
not be accepted by hand and had to go directly into locked cash boxes that were watched 
by Auqaf managers. Most critically, however, was the demand conveyed to the female 
attendant that no male attendants or pilgrims were to be allowed to sit near the shrine. 
Hagiographies and common narratives about Ruqayyah’s life emphasize the purity of her 
veiling – so much so that even after the ground opened and delivered them from prying 
eyes, even the men of the enemy Hindu Raj would not desecrate the sacred space by 
coming near it. In deference to her lineage, most accounts claim that men should avoid 
the inner areas of the shrine.360 As time passed, however, this had become lax, with men 
freely sharing the space of the shrine and the male sajjada nashins given full access. The 
government’s position on this was notable, with the Auqaf Manager’s strict warning that 
“the above instructions must be followed strictly, and if there are any complaints from 
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our pilgrims you will be fired from the job.”361 In fact, this injunction was not just a 
passing reminder – it was reinforced again months later, when additional cash boxes were 
placed on the periphery of the shrine’s interior so that men would not pass near the 
grave.362 This issue of the use and division of space at the shrine was not yet settled. 
 These stricter regulations did not simply apply to streamlining rituals and 
donations at the shrine. The Auqaf takeover removed large swaths of land from private 
ownership into government-controlled waqf property, the boundaries of which 
encompassed historic Bibi Pak Daman, despite decades of urban sprawl and 
encroachment. The government was quick to develop a rent schedule and allocate 
proceeds from rent collected towards the shrine’s expenses, quickly drafting a budget for 
June 1968. The same attention was marshaled to verify land deeds; correspondences 
reflect the assertiveness of the new state’s federal bureaucracies, determined to redefine 
the social order. The state was now at the doorsteps of pilgrims and shopkeepers, as 
Assistant Manager Asghar’s update to the Auqaf Administrator of Lahore reassured, 
“Those who were not paying rent to the mutawalli will be investigated” and noted that 
“some current construction is illegal and must be demolished immediately.”363  
Yet for all the apparent speed in implementation in rent collection and land 
consolidation, this was a negotiated process, carried out incrementally as the government 
faced resistance from local residents and shrine leaders. While the federalization of all 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
361 Letter from Office of Manager of Auqaf to Ghulam Fatima, Ladies Attendant, Darbar Bibi Pak 
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waqf property was a critical state building enterprise for a new nation struggling to define 
a national identity, shows of authority by the state were challenged on the ground. The 
everyday resistance to the nation-building project was evident at Bibi Pak Daman, where 
the unique nature of the shrine exacerbated divided loyalties. In response to the takeover 
notification on September 9th, 1967, surrounding landowners immediately sent land 
claims to the Auqaf Department and petitioned the courts, contesting in particular the 
government’s right to control the surrounding shops, graveyard, and a mosque on site. 
Indeed, the nature and history of Bibi Pak Daman made these land disputes even more 
complex than the takeover of other shrines around Pakistan. The government claimed that 
the shrine itself was ostensibly situated on all waqf property established by Akbar, 
erasing centuries in between and connecting laws from the height of Mughal rule with the 
establishment of the Pakistani state. This waqf was certainly not enforced, and over the 
centuries families had moved into the surrounding environs of Qila Gujjar Singh, passing 
land deeds on through generations and passing on in waqf certain portions of their 
holdings.  
In his article “Endowing Family,” Beshara Doumani highlights the extensive use 
of waqf endowments in Tripoli and Nablus, arguing that the waqf is a more permissible, 
flexible system of inheritance. Waqf endowments “created the largest space of 
maneuvering by individuals who wished to express their personal preferences and desires 
when it comes to the devolution of property,” allowing them to create a long-term social 
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safety net for family and protect against unexpected upheavals or new governments.364 
The tumultuous history of partition, the establishment of a new state based on Islamic 
principles and a civil code, and the subsequent federalization of waqf properties created 
just that uncertainty. On a broader level, those who had held those properties as private 
family holdings were now forced to pay an additional layer of government taxes, and the 
takeover of land was met with resistance. Residents and landowners around Bibi Pak 
Daman mobilized to assemble documentation that would prove inheritance and exclude 
their land from what constituted essential shrine property. Far less confusion surrounded 
larger Sufi shrines, as hereditary inheritance was more established and the land that 
shrines were built on had remained communal property, governed by shrine committees 
recognized by British and then Pakistani officials.  
At Bibi Pak Daman, rather than tacitly accept the Auqaf takeover, residents 
immediately took action to get their lands released from Auqaf control. They gathered 
what documentation they had available – though much had been conducted through 
informal tenders and exchange systems. Many of these sales were conducted pre-
independence, and with new laws dictating land rights the government was forced to 
adopt creative solutions to these disputes. In these interactions between residents and 
government and judicial officials, one discovers the responsive nature of the shrine 
authorities in the early years of the federalization project, a mirror of the Sayyeda 
Zaynab. Just days after the Auqaf Department secured the land around Bibi Pak Daman, a 
letter and supporting documents was sent from a Mahmud Akhtar, on behalf of his 
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widowed sisters, requesting a specific plot be released. For these women, the loss of 
income and stability found in land ownership had an immediate impact. He argued, 
“Since January 1933-34, this lot number 2417…has been in the name of our father 
Muhammad Din son of Maula Bakhsh. This right was confirmed in 1939 in the court of 
lower judge Abdul Wahid.” On September 14th, 1967, however, this lot was taken into 
the control of the Auqaf Department. Akhtar continued with his appeal. “Dear Sir, any 
notice or order issued on this lot should be issued in my name. This graveyard is my 
ancestral property and there is no connection to Bibi Pak Damanan and I still have 
control over this property.”365 This appeal would become a common theme in these land 
requests. Petitioners learned that the most successful tactic was not to contest the Auqaf 
Department’s federalization notification writ large, nor did they debate the right to the 
shrine itself.  Instead, petitions from local residents argued that their specific plots were 
not associated with the religious purposes of Bibi Pak Daman.  
Many of these appeals were then filed in Lahore’s lower courts, as residents 
joined together in collective action to contest the state’s new regulations. The resulting 
judgment was that apart from the main shrine and portions of the attached graveyard – 
land that was directly connected to shrine governance and regulating the proper 
administration of resources – the surrounding land could not be claimed for Auqaf 
control under government ordinances. On December 15th, 1967, the excluded land was 
released back into private ownership – a process that mirrored legal challenges to the 
Auqaf ordinances that took place across Pakistan after the nationalization decrees were 
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issued.366 These debates about the state’s authority and its active stance on social issues 
were played out in these interactions between residents and Auqaf officials, as petitioners 
adopted the most effective defenses of their property. In many cases they challenged the 
government with competing authority structures or ways of understanding inheritance – 
religious edicts, legal judgments from courts, pre-partition land laws still written into the 
civil code. Bibi Pak Daman was the site onto which all these claims were mapped. 
Complicating the matter further at Bibi Pak Daman, however, was that the mix of 
Shi’a and Sunni waqf properties and stipulations created an additional layer to civil 
proceedings over registered land deeds. Because Bibi Pak Daman was taken over and 
registered by the Auqaf Department as a Sunni shrine, despite the widely held belief that 
Ruqayyah bint ‘Ali was buried there, Auqaf control and regulations violated the terms of 
many Shi’a waqf properties. Many Shi’a landowners around the shrine had set up 
businesses and private educational services that were consciously linked to Bibi Pak 
Daman, with land deeds that stipulated their property could only be used by sayyids (or 
descendants from the Prophet’s family). Some Shi’a families argued that their families 
had settled at Bibi Pak Daman for the sole purpose of being close to Ruqayyah. 
Petitioners had argued that particular plots were “their private and personal property, 
which they inherited from their forfathers [sic].”367 To calm these particular tensions, 
Auqaf officials were more easily convinced to de-notify those lands and return to private 
ownership. Those residents, it was argued, were not undertaking any activities that would 
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undermine the administration or spirit of Bibi Pak Daman and were remanded their 
property and refund vouchers for taxes collected.368  
Part of the reasoning for the Auqaf takeover was to reclaim the entirety of 
‘historic’ Bibi Pak Daman, which had fallen out of public – and profitable – use through 
decades of private construction and encroachment. Plots had been passed on as personal 
inheritance, becoming centers of family life and business for years. In this context, the 
task for Auqaf officials to notify and retain the land was an uphill battle. Yet in some 
cases, the government’s takeover was welcomed as a way to protect the territorial 
integrity of the shrine. One particular case embodied the unique circumstances at Bibi 
Pak Daman.  In 1956, before the state takeover of Bibi Pak Daman, a woman named 
Sayyida Muhammad Fatima, a widow and local resident, registered her property as waqf 
lands. The waqf-nama described clearly what she intended for the land: her late husband 
had bequeathed a piece of land in the name of Husayn ibn ‘Ali and Ruqayyah bint ‘Ali – 
a common practice amongst Shi’a Muslims. He had purchased the plot with the intent of 
donating it to be used for pilgrims who visited Bibi Pak Daman. Sayyid Muhammad 
Fatima then forsook all personal legal claims to it.  Her husband had named her the 
executor of this waqf, but she believed that her decision to remain veiled would impede 
her ability to implement his wishes. As such, she had authorized a family representative, 
Jaffer Ali Muhammad Ali wald Ibrahim, “to collect contributions and build a structure 
[on this land] for the purpose of majlis-e-Husayn, Sayyid-e-Shuhada, beloved brother of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
368 Notification to be Published in the West Pakistan Extra Ordinary Gazette: Office of the Chief 
Administrator of Auqaf, West Pakistan. July 27, 1968. General Records of Darbar Hazrat Bibi 
Pak Daman, Lahore. See also Memo from Administrator of Auqaf, Central Zone, to Assistant 
Manager, Waqf Properties Sector V Lahore. Memo No. ACZ-1(1)-104/67/3748. Sept. 30, 1968. 
General Records of Darbar Hazrat Bibi Pak Daman, Lahore.  
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Ruqayyah bint Ali.”369 While the land had been bought specifically for the purpose of 
constructing the center, to her chagrin, however, Jaffer Ali had been unable to do so. She 
could not oversee the work herself because she was veiled, but was mindful that the terms 
of her husband’s will had to be executed. Therefore, she declared, “Of my own accord, 
within my full senses and in sane mind, through this document I donate this land to 
Madrasa Jamiat al-Muntazar, Lahore so that its committee will assume construction of 
the center.” Because she was unable to write the terms of the waqf, her fingerprint was 
recorded in the presence of male witnesses to verify the waqf stipulations. 
The Jamiat al-Muntazar Trust had been established in 1954 with the goal of 
creating the preeminent religious institute for the Shi’as of Pakistan, at a time where there 
was only one other Shi’a madrasa in the country. Thus, the donation of land to create 
another outpost close to Bibi Pak Daman was a significant bequest. However, Sayyida 
Muhammad Fatima’s waqf cautioned, “Jamiat Muntazar will have the full authority to 
construct the center and it will be mandatory to have 10 majālis during the first 10 days 
of Muharram, and throughout the year all Shi’a community will have the right to hold 
majālis at any time other than school hours. If ever this organization is shut down, this 
property that I have given as waqf will remain used in the name of Imam Hussain and our 
Shi’a will have the right to use it as a religious center and imambargah.”370 The terms of 
this waqf were exceptionally clear – she intended for her land near the shrine of Bibi 
Ruqayyah to be devoted completely to learning, remembrance of Husayn and Karbala, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
369 Waqf-nama of Sayyeda Muhammad Fatima Zawj Khan Bahadur Niaz Qutb. Witnessed Jan. 
30, 1956. Document 549 file 3114 pg 58/62. Registered Feb. 13, 1956. Office of the Sub-
Registrar. Records of Bibi Pak Daman Trust via Asma Mamdot, Chairman, MPA National 
Assembly.   
370 Waqf-nama of Sayyeda Muhammad Fatima Zawj Khan Bahadur Niaz Qutb, Feb. 13, 1956 
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and use by Shi’a pilgrims in perpetuity. Even if the lands were removed from the control 
of Jamiat al-Muntazar, they were to remain open to the Shi’a pilgrims at Bibi Pak Daman 
to use in the service of Ruqayyah and Husayn.   
 Over a decade later, however, the trustees of Jamiat al-Muntazar were still 
attempting to fulfill the terms of the bequest at Bibi Pak Daman. There had proven to be 
significant challenges and resistance in the establishment of the school itself, both 
bureaucratic and ideological. It was unable to expand and effectively run another center 
at Bibi Pak Daman on its own. As a result, the principle of Jamiat al-Muntazar, the 
widely respected Shi’a religious leader Maulana Sayyid Safdar Hussain, had delegated 
the collection of funds and rents, expansion of the construction, and conduct of legal 
proceedings to the president of a local Shi’a organization.371 The Trust had hoped that a 
local organization around Bibi Pak Daman could effectively carry out the waqf 
stipulations. Yet the difficulties remained. The residents around Bibi Pak Daman were 
largely Sunni, and Shi’a organizations were often at a disadvantage in collecting 
donations and mounting legal challenges. Importantly, the lack of effective mobilization 
displayed that the Shi’a community had not yet coalesced around a wholly unified 
sectarian identity.  
As a result, Jamiat al-Muntazar was forced to pass the waqf on to another more 
prominent local organization, albeit one oriented towards Sunni theology. In 1971, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
371 Public Letter of Authority from Maulana Sayyid Safdar Hussain, Chair, Jamiat al-Muntazir to 
Muhammad Bakhsh Sahib Qureshi, President, Anjuman-e-Jafariyya, Bibi Pak Daman, Lahore. 
April 30, 1970. Records of Bibi Pak Daman Trust via Asma Mamdot, Chairman, MPA National 
Assembly.  Sayyid Safdar Hussain was a renowned Shi’a Islamic jurist and philosopher in 
Pakistan. He first translated Imam Khomeini’s pre-revolutionary works into Urdu – as well as 
many important works by lead Shi’a jurists –and corresponded frequently with Khomeini through 
the end of his life. It was through his extensive work Sayyid Safdar Hussain’s work that a 
network of Shi’a madrasas was established throughout Pakistan through the 1980s.  
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managing trustee of Jamiat al-Muntazar, Seht Nawazish Ali, officially transferred all land 
rights to the Majlis Tanzīm ul-Islam. The Majlis Tanzīm ul-Islam was in fact an offshoot 
of the more orthodox Islamic Deobandi school and founded by a prominent Pakistani 
Islamic theologian named Israr Ahmed. At the time, however, they accepted the terms of 
the waqf-nama.  Seht Nawazish Ali counseled, “Sayyida Muhammad Fatima gave this 
land as waqf to Imam Husayn. We have appointed the mutawalli for the land and gave 
him the authority to construct a suitable building and make arrangements throughout the 
year for the religious education of students and during Muharram conduct majlis…We 
forsake all rights so that Majlis-e-Tanzīm ul-Islam can construct and fulfill her 
wishes.”372 Two months later, it was bought by a private citizen and turned into a Sunni 
mosque.  
Because of this complicated arrangement, the land that had been originally 
bequeathed for pilgrims to Bibi Pak Daman to use as a center of Shi’a commemoration 
fell out of their hands. In 1972, a local Shi’a scholar who lived close to Bibi Pak Daman 
wrote a letter to Maulana Sayyid Safdar Hussain, requesting that he “appeal to Auqaf to 
notify this plot and return to the zā’ireen (pilgrims) of Sayyida Ruqayyah.”373 The 
government’s takeover was viewed as a way for this land to return to its original purpose, 
though it fell outside the boundaries of the Auqaf Department’s notification schedule. 
Safdar Hussain responded to the concerned imam weeks later with brief explanation: “At 
this time, [they] believe it impossible. We must have faith that this is what Allah 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
372 Document of Transfer of Rights, Seht Nawazish Ali, Managing Director, Jamiat al- Muntazar, 
Witnessed by Professor Muhammad Sadiq Qureshi. Registry Amendment 549, file 3114, pg. 58-
62 [trans.] April 24, 1971. Records of Bibi Pak Daman Trust via Asma Mamdot, Chairman, MPA 
National Assembly.   
373 Letter from Sayyid Zeeshan Haider. September 21, 1972. Archive of the Personal Papers of 
Allama Sayyid Safdar Hussain. Jamiat ul-Muntazar, Model Town, Lahore.  
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willed.”374 The government, it seemed, was well aware of the fragility of the situation at 
Bibi Pak Daman and remained conscious of how they mediated and projected authority 
on the physical space of the shrine. 
 
Sectarianism Emerges  
 The government’s wariness of the charged nature of Bibi Pak Daman was not 
without reason. The physical space of the shrine was constrained, often overflowing with 
pilgrims, and the spiritual investments and political implications remained potent. There 
were real divides in historical and religious perspectives between various groups at the 
shrine, but they had been mediated on an individual and community level; the state’s 
entrance into the space added another actor to the complicated mix of mutawalli families, 
sajjada nashins, local residents, pilgrims, religious authorities, business interests, and 
political leaders. However, if the earlier debates at the shrine brought out questions about 
the state’s authority and the contours of its participation in religious life, the Auqaf 
takeover would lead to the escalation of conflict between Sunni and Shi’a pilgrims and 
leaders and, ultimately, the creation of sectarianism at the shrine.   
The government’s initial caution in the takeover of the shrine was not 
immediately and solely seen through a sectarian lens. Certainly, other factors and 
affiliations were of equal importance at Bibi Pak Daman. The initial response to the 
Auqaf takeover had been to come together under individual, familial, or business 
interests. Pilgrims and residents were engaging as individuals but had not consistently 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
374 Record of response: Allamah Sayyed Safdar Hussain to Imam Haider. November 3, 1972. 
Archive of the Personal Papers of Allama Sayyid Safdar Hussain. Jamiat ul-Muntazar, Model 
Town, Lahore. 
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mobilized as a collective and assertive Shi’a community. Yet from the beginning, the 
Auqaf administrators seemed preemptively alert to any potential discord among the Shi’a 
community, likely influenced by the changing political climate on a national scale. From 
the Chief Administrator of Auqaf of West Pakistan himself came the directive that Auqaf 
officials at Bibi Pak Daman were required to “adopt a suitable line of action to which all 
the parties might be agreeable. He further desired that Shi’a Leaders should be taken into 
confidence” in all matters.375 On a broader scale, while Field Marshall Ayub’s 
government had tried to clamp down on civil discord by suppressing right-wing religious 
parties, sectarian tensions had increased in recent years, making the state sensitive to 
signs of discord. In 1963, two separate attacks on Shi’a Muslims raised the specter of a 
growing spiral of sectarian retaliation. In response, the government had attempted to 
persuade Shi’as to restrict Muharram processions, creating new impediments to obtaining 
permits for these public displays. Prominent Shi’a ulema had protested these restrictions, 
demanding at the All-Pakistan Shi’a Ulema Convention that the government provide 
adequate security of public rituals and for the self-administration of Shi’a trusts, shrines, 
and waqf properties.376 Nevertheless, this language of restriction for the good of public 
safety and sectarian protection would thus be echoed in the guidelines put forth after the 
government’s takeover at Bibi Pak Daman, another space that had a clear potential for 
conflict over the public use of space.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
375 Affairs at the shrine of Hazrat Bibianpakdamanan Sahiba, attn.: Administrator of Auqaf, 
Central Zone. Memo No. ACZ-9-2(1)-104/68/3098. 25th March 1968. General Records of Darbar 
Hazrat Bibi Pak Daman, Lahore.  
376 Hassan Abbas, “Shi’ism and Sectarian Conflict in Pakistan: Identity Politics, Iranian Influence, 
and Tit-for-Tat Violence.” 
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 Much recent scholarship has focused on denaturalizing the concept of 
sectarianism and highlighting instead the social and political conditions under which the 
category ‘sectarian’ becomes a useful mode of analysis and a signifier of behavior.377 
How sectarianism is produced and activated is a result of changing facts on the ground, 
creating new frameworks for organizing behavior. In the case of Bibi Pak Daman, the 
entrance of the government into shrine affairs in fact constructed the conditions for an 
‘official’ sectarianism, reinforced by the government’s desire to retain order in a chaotic 
urban space. In turn, for devotees, sectarian claims provided an effective language for 
articulating a range of concerns – land rights, questions of gender, and religious rituals, in 
the tumultuous political context of the 1970s. The emergence of the Pakistan People’s 
Party (PPP) in 1967, led by the charismatic Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, created a new horizon of 
possibilities for Shi’as to understand themselves in the political arena. Bhutto was a 
secular Shi’a, as were many amongst its leadership ranks, and the PPP brought in Shi’a 
supporters who were previously inactive in the political sphere. As Hamid Dabashi 
argued in his recent work Shi’ism, “sectarian thinking in and out of Muslim communities 
is always a matter of external political manipulation of internally dormant doctrines.”378 
Shi’ism, he believed, was a religion of protest; its narratives and doctrines have 
historically been galvanized into a sectarian framework only in the face of challenges to 
its political and legal authority. The combination of select outbursts of religious violence, 
new Shi’a leadership in the political and clerical classes, and the state’s attempt to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
377 For more on the subcontinent, see Harjot Oberoi, The Construction of Religious Boundaries: 
Culture, Identity, and Diversity in the Sikh Tradition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1994); Christopher Bayly, Origins of Nationality in South Asia: Patriotism and Ethical 
Government in the making of Modern India (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).  
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regulate religious behavior would more broadly facilitate new ways of understanding 
what ‘being Shi’a’ meant.  
This changing power dynamics would become clear at Bibi Pak Daman. The most 
significant conflict that emerged was regarding the control of the masjid attached to Bibi 
Pak Daman and religious ornamentation of the shrine itself. The competing Sunni and 
Shi’a interpretations of Bibi Pak Daman would be marshaled to influence these disputes. 
The site, of course, was a place of worship for a broad swath of the population. While 
many Sunnis questioned Bibi Ruqayyah’s history, many prayed at the shrine with little 
engagement in the controversies over their identities. Those that accepted the story about 
Ruqayyah did so in a more localized context, rarely linking her presence to the larger 
Shi’i narrative trajectory. Shi’i hagiographies, however, revealed more at stake in their 
commitment to the story of Ruqayyah’s arrival in Pakistan, as Bibi Pak Daman became 
enmeshed in their validation and self-identity as a besieged community. Indeed, the 
denial of Ruqayyah’s presence became interpreted as yet another slight in their history, as 
those who claimed that it was not Bibi Ruqayyah were viewed as limiting the tragedies of 
the family of the Prophet.379 Thus, the claim that the graves may have belonged instead to 
the daughters of the saint Syed Ahmad Tokhta was internalized as a challenge to Shi’i 
doctrine itself, giving the two differing narratives extra weight.   
The takeover of the shrine, according to communication between Auqaf officials, 
gave rise to these sectarian cleavages, forcing the government to become a reluctant 
arbitrator in a volatile situation. As part of their initial information gathering, Muhammad 
Asghar and other local Auqaf officials had observed the average prayer times of different 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
379 Khaki, Bibian Pak Daman, 14.  
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devotees and formalized prayer timings to avoid any confusion. However with tensions 
over regulated prayer timings often leading to confrontation between members of both 
sects and local officials, in 1969 the Auqaf Department further separated the waqf 
properties of Bibi Pak Daman and gave up rights over the shrine’s surrounding and 
attached lands. The masjid attached to the shrine, which had been recently renovated by 
devotees, was given up and the payment of salary to the Imam was passed on to local 
leaders.380 This de-notification pointed at the government’s initial reluctance to become 
too deeply involved in the daily religious functions at the shrine. Its initial focus at Bibi 
Pak Daman was similar to the stated goals at Sufi shrines across Pakistan – to regularize 
ritual administration, ensure that donations were funding shrine maintenance and not the 
network of caretakers and attendants that profit off the shrine, and creating a capable 
government bureaucracy.  
Despite the Auqaf Department’s desire to remain outside of explicitly religious 
disputes by returning the masjid to private ownership, just months later they were 
compelled to reassume “the administration, control, management, and maintenance of 
Masjid Hanfia” to restore order to a chaotic situation that had emerged from regulating 
and then de-regulating this space in such short order.381 The existing staff – the Imam, or 
prayer leader, and the muezzin was again placed on the Auqaf payroll.382 The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
380 Memo from Assistant Manager for Waqf Properties, Sector V to Administrator Auqaf, Central 
Zone, Lahore. Memo No. AMLW-V-660/69. [trans.] Dec. 22, 1969. General Records of Darbar 
Hazrat Bibi Pak Daman.  
381 Order Notification from Raja Hamid Mukhtar, Chief Administrator of Auqaf, West Pakistan. 
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consequence of this decision, however, was that for bureaucratic purposes, the masjid 
was designated in the same manner as the shrine – officially a Sunni religious site, albeit 
one where the rights of the minority communities could not be prejudiced.  
This act marked the reengagement of the government in these divisive matters, 
but in a manner that would create a sectarian framework for regulating dispute. The 
brewing conflict remained at the forefront of Auqaf and Punjab Secretariat records. Close 
attention was paid to the activities of the devotees and detailed reports were exchanged 
over all matters as tensions at Ruqayyah’s shrine began to escalate. In July 1970, an 
Auqaf official at Bibi Pak Daman alerted the central office of a crisis that was emerging 
at the shrine. For the previous two years, Sheikh Abdul Majid, a member of Bibi Pak 
Daman’s Religious Purposes Committee, had been commissioning work and construction 
on the shrine from his own private finances.383 The construction had been on the 
government’s radar, but it had not been a matter that elicited enough reaction amongst 
devotees to interfere with. Once completed, however, the official noted with alarm, 
“Inside the dome, Sheikh Abdul Majid is having the names of the Ayima Karam (Ahl al-
Bayt) inscribed in glass-etch work. On this issue, the Ahl al-Sunnat and their followers 
are raising objections that along with the names of Ahl al-Bayt, the names of the 
Prophet’s Companions should be inscribed.”384  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
reference to Memo No. A.M.LHR-V/645/70, August 20, 1970. General Records of Darbar Hazrat 
Bibi Pak Daman, Lahore.  
383 This committee was compromised of influential community leaders, including members of the 
mutawalli families and sajjada nashins. The preeminence given to the Prophet’s family versus the 
Prophet’s companions (out of whom the first Caliphs emerged) is a point of ritual and doctrinal 
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384 Letter from Assistant Manager for Waqf Properties, Sector V to Chief Administrator Auqaf, 
Central Zone, Lahore. Memo No. AMLW-V-170, [trans.] July 1, 1970. General Records of 
Darbar Hazrat Bibi Pak Daman, Lahore.  
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This dispute was now firmly an Auqaf Department matter, both as a result of their 
position as the main form of authority onsite at Bibi Pak Daman and their appropriation 
of the masjid explicitly to mediate potential religious strife. The content of these 
inscriptions drew an immediate reaction from high-level Auqaf authorities. Officials 
discussed action that would neutralize the tension; because members of the shrine’s 
official Religious Purpose Committee were involved, the government ultimately stepped 
in to act as an arbitrator. In reference to the above memo, the Chief Administrator, Auqaf 
ordered local officials “to take immediate measures to avoid the sectarian clash, by 
stopping the construction immediately. Further construction should not be started until a 
gentleman [sic] agreement is reached between the two parties.”385 This message was then 
passed on in a handwritten note to Sheikh Abdul Majid, requesting him to “stop further 
construction immediately to avoid sectarian clash at the shrine.”386 The context had been 
set. While previously these had been viewed as community disputes, they were now to be 
handled as sectarian conflict.   
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(Figure 4.1: Inner grave coverings were also stitched with the Ahl al-Bayt) 
In this particular instance, however, there were financial considerations at play 
alongside purely devotional concerns. Sheikh Abdul Majid had undertaken a much-
needed renovation and aesthetic upgrade of the shrine, financed completely through 
private funds and donations. In response to the crackdown on his construction, he 
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claimed it was not intended as a religious or sectarian confrontation, but rather a tribute to 
the family of the women commemorated at the shrine. The government, too, was ever 
resistant to increasing their financial commitment to any one shrine, especially one as 
contentious as Bibi Pak Daman. As a result, they sought to mediate a solution that would 
not impede on the renovation entirely. The Chief Administrator of Auqaf sent new 
instructions to officials onsite, those who had had numerous dealings with the involved 
parties. He directed, “You were directed to stop the construction personally [sic] 
immediately …Now it is desired that you should try to settle the dispute between the two 
sects at your personal level, say by calling a meeting of the two sects and persuade them 
in a reasonable manner and tacts [sic].387 In this instance, the Auqaf’s financial interest 
clearly aligned with the Shi’a pilgrims and they claimed an inability to interfere with 
minority rights by preventing the renovation. But it had also moved a dispute amongst 
various local influences at the shrine into one that could only be viewed through the lens 
of sectarianism. Personal rivalries, business interests, and religious differences amongst 
pilgrims were subsumed into a pure Sunni-Shi’a dynamic. Following the government’s 
lead, pilgrims and religious authorities too would engage within this framework. 
In 1971, there was once again danger of “serious conflict” breaking out between 
Sunni and Shi’i devotees at the shrine.388 The struggle began on July 27th, 1971, when a 
group of Sunni pilgrims commissioned the engraving of the four Rāshidūn caliphs on one 
of the internal structures in the shrine. The belief in the Rāshidūn is objectionable to 
Shi’as, who believe that the three earlier caliphs had usurped ‘Ali’s legitimate claim as 
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Muhammad’s successor. Inscribing their names on the shrine for one of ‘Ali’s daughters 
was seen as a deliberate provocation in this context. The conflict over ornamentation 
reveals how deeply aesthetics and devotion were linked at this site and the importance of 
the choice of textual references for devotees. As a result of the brewing conflict, on 
October 25th, 1971, the RPC and the Chief Administrator, Auqaf again called Shi’a and 
Sunni representatives together and discussed a compromise on the use of Bibi Pak 
Daman, to neutralize the warring division of space that had evolved. A joint ruling sought 
to pacify both parties. Men were barred from the inner sanctum of the shrine, a 
concession to Shi’a beliefs that respect for the piety and veiling of Ruqayyah and her 
family must continue even in their physical absence, as one of the most important tropes 
in Shi’a history is related to the forcible de-veiling of its women. This rule had been 
shared with the female attendants at the shrine in 1967; now, it was brought into these 
discussions as a part of a formalized and routinized religious conduct. Rather than a 
debate about men simply following proper traditions of adab, or respect, as it had been 
addressed previously, it became inserted into this sectarian framework. 
 To pacify Sunni devotees, it was decided that no majālis would be held inside the 
space of the shrine. This was interpreted as a significant blow to Shi’a organizations 
around Bibi Pak Daman, as majālis gatherings were a critical component of Muharram 
rituals and had historically been an important tool in reinterpreting the Karbala narrative 
based on political contexts. Most importantly, the masjid located inside Bibi Pak Daman 
– the one the government had so recently reacquired – would no longer issue the azān, or 
call to prayer, of either sect, so as to neutralize it. Thus, all people could pray inside, but 
it would no longer function as a mosque where devotees could congregate for collective 
	   220	  
prayers.389 This was a dramatic step – the Friday afternoon prayers were obligatory for 
Muslims to read in congregation. The mosque was seen as a living institution. Now this 
site would be emptied of doctrinal rituals and the blessings attached to praying together, 
deactivated from collective public use in order to avoid conflict.  
That the government would take such an aggressive approach at Bibi Pak Daman 
is not surprising. In March 1971, the Awami League announced the declaration of 
independence of East Pakistan, beginning a nine month armed struggle against West 
Pakistan. All major elected leaders of the Awami League fled to India to set up a 
government in exile, with the full backing of the Indian government and armed forces. 
On December 16, 1971, East Pakistan was officially dissembled as a province of Pakistan 
and replaced by the new state of Bangladesh. The intense and pervasive sense of loss this 
event precipitated cannot be overstated. The impact of the war and the dismantling of 
Pakistan was “the most traumatic event in Pakistan’s short life as an independent 
nation.”390 The material losses were tremendous – Pakistan lost over half its population, a 
significant portion of its territory, and its second most economically productive province. 
Politicians and the media reminded the population that the Hindus of India had never 
accepted the existence of Pakistan and remained ready to weaken it at any turn.391 The 
new government of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, called to take over on December 20th, 1971, 
would play on the shame of the war. “Desperate men who were blinded by their lust for 
power and seemed to have been possessed by death had first destroyed and then 
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surrendered half the country to an aggressor. The other half was in imminent danger of 
destruction. The people of West Pakistan were lost and completely demoralized…An 
appalling defeat and disgrace had been inflicted on our unprepared people,” Bhutto 
lamented in 1972.392 More than the shame, however, was that the destruction of the 
territorial integrity of Pakistan dramatically undermined a central ideal of the Pakistan 
movement – that Islam was enough to create and hold the new nation-state together, even 
one with a discontiguous geographic reality.393 The lesson was that political dissent and 
minority discontent could create a powerful platform to articulate grievances that could 
turn into the roots of dissolution. With trouble brewing in Baluchistan and the North 
West Frontier Province, any sectarian conflict had to be mitigated.  
The struggle with East Pakistan provides an illuminating, albeit complicated, lens 
into the debates at Bibi Pak Daman. It is no surprise, then, that the government so swiftly 
acted to bring the parties together and neutralize the Sunni-Shi’a conflict at Bibi Pak 
Daman. Their perception of the threat of sectarian conflict undermining Islamic unity was 
real, and they acted to regulate behavior in a way they believed would temper these 
tensions. However, though officials agreed on the new terms, the prohibition on men 
entering the inner spaces shrine caused great unrest amongst the Sunni population, 
leading to a collective letter of protest to Governor of Punjab. On March 15th, 1972 a new 
notification was issued in response to these agitations. The new guidelines stated that 
there would be no limit on the recitation of the Qurān in the inner shrine by any pilgrim, 
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the names of the Rāshidūn were allowed to remain, and majālis would not to be allowed 
inside the inner courtyard of the shrine, “so that no person of one faith will commit an act 
that will wound the other side.”394 However, the notification reiterated that the shrine was 
acquired as a Sunni shrine and would continue as such, but the Sunni majority could not 
obstruct the Shi’a faithful from carrying out personal religious rituals.  
This amended compromise revealed the uneasiness with attempts to categorize the 
shrine and the difficult balance the government sought to keep as a perceived neutral 
party. It is striking that both Sunnis and Shi’as appealed to officials to negotiate their 
spiritual and ritual differences and segment the physical interior of the shrine, illustrating 
the ways that devotees appropriated the government’s takeover of the shrine as a new 
way for asserting their preferences, creating a new channel through which grievances 
could be aired. The state was now an active force on the ground at Bibi Pak Daman. The 
Auqaf Ordinances that federalized the shrine through the 1960s and ‘70s created a 
framework in which the use of space would be contested and divided, a development that 
affected the ways in which different communities related to Bibi Pak Daman.  
 The trust in government intervention, however, remained tenuous, as mistrust 
existed on all sides. For national purposes, the Auqaf Department had displayed an 
investment in affirming that the graves at Bibi Pak Daman belong to Bibi Ruqayyah and 
her companions, yet the majority of the members of the Religious Affairs Committee and 
the government authorities of the Auqaf Department were Sunnis. Once that became the 
lens through which these incidents were viewed, official interference, once tolerated and 
manipulated, was never greeted with total welcome. Indeed, the extent to which the 
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government was able to exert control on day-to-day practice certainly varied. The 
distance between official judgments and daily ritual was illustrated on March 24th, 1972, 
when another petition from local Shi’a leaders, led by retired Lahore Court Judge Syed 
Jamil Hussein Rizvi, to the Chief Administrator of Auqaf led to an amendment permitting 
majālis to be held a few times a year in Bibi Pak Daman, with advance notice.395 Despite 
the limited number of official gatherings allowed, however, Bibi Pak Daman remained a 
hub of activity throughout the year, with majālis held daily throughout the month of 
Muharram and on most important dates in the Shi’i calendar, making clear the distance 
between law and practices. Bibi Pak Daman provided a space in which these opposing 
frameworks were negotiated on the ground. Auqaf officials recognized the potential for 
conflict that free expression of rituals would ignite at a site such as Bibi Pak Daman. 
Their solution was to regulate and restrict activities so as to have minimum impact on the 
opposing sect. Rather than allow devotees to fill the space with meaning through 
narrative, prayer, and ritual, the government sought to empty the shrine of all contention.  
 Yet Bibi Pak Daman was not a settled site, and it continued to provide space for 
asserting identity. Maulvi Muhammad Bakhsh Shah Qureshi, the Shi’a representative on 
the Religious Affairs Committee, remained unsatisfied with the compromises on 
ceremonies at the shrine. He noted that the Chief Administrator of Auqaf, Punjab, had 
mandated a limit on Shi’a expressions of piety and that if any devotee “gets carried away 
by love and emotion and begins to recite a lamentation or weep, they are forcibly 
removed [from the site].” During Chehlum ceremonies in Lahore, commemorating forty 
days after the martyrdom of Husayn, a rider-less Zuljanah horse symbolizing Husayn’s 
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sacrifice had traditionally led a procession through the streets and ended at Bibi Pak 
Daman. Such evocative symbolism had now been prohibited by the compromises of the 
past months. For Qureshi, there was a disparity in regulation that had real implications on 
the lived experience of devotees. He charged unhappily,  
It was to my astonishment that I saw that in this holy and blessed shrine, 
when the Sunnis arranged the yearly urs under the auspices of the Auqaf 
within the boundaries of the shrine, not only did arrange a milad and naat 
khani, they organized a full musical evening with drums and chants. The 
chadors were spread by men on the holy grave….If a Shi’a devotee is 
moved by the presence of his Bibi and begins to cry or recite a lament, it is 
not permitted, but the Sunnis can play music and engage in revelry – why 
is there such a difference?396  
 
Qureshi’s anger at these Shi’a rituals being curtailed can be understood through Geertz’s 
model of what ceremonies entail and why they matter. According to Geertz, ceremonies 
contain two distinct aspects – they provide a “model of” and a “model for” reality.397 The 
Zuljanah horse was seen as a symbolic model of the reality of Husayn’s rider-less horse 
returning to the camps to inform the women of the Imam’s martyrdom. It was a way to 
access and invoke the emotional trauma of the moment in collective grief. Yet the 
imagery of Karbala also provided Shi’a Muslims an ideal paradigm for organizing the 
world, to make sense of their minority status and the injustices they associated with their 
history. Prohibiting the Chehlum procession from entering Bibi Pak Daman was a direct 
challenge to the reality of Shi’a experience and their attempts to impose meaning through 
ritual. For Qureshi, the latitude that was granted to Sunni visitors, whose milad was like a 
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“carnival” in which speakers were allowed to speak against Shi’as and their rituals, 
exacerbated the matter.  
These attempts to neutralize the space were, of course, continuously negotiated, 
managed, and often disregarded by the different involved parties. They also existed 
within a national political context in which young Shi’a were galvanizing to assert 
collective action. In May 1972, the Imamia Students Organization was founded in 
Lahore, with the aim of advocating for Shi’a needs through religious and social outreach. 
Membership in the ISO would spread rapidly through much of Pakistan, and its students 
became increasingly vocal in the need for Shi’a voices to be heard in textbooks, public 
religious ritual, and Islamic charities. The ISO’s emergence was a new voice in 
challenging the status quo and the state’s attempts to quell religious and ethnic 
discontent. Those attempts continued at Bibi Pak Daman. A letter written in late 1973 
from the Manager of Waqf Properties to the Head of Auqaf, Central Zone detailed 
multiple escalating events within the shrine that had challenged the neutrality of the site.  
He reiterated the Auqaf rules: “Other than fixed occasions of dates and hours, members 
of Shi’a and Sunni communities are not allowed to congregate for religious rituals.” 
Pilgrims to the site regularly disregarded these schedules, conducting rituals and reciting 
prayers at all times of day. Yet in periods where tensions are heightened, as they were in 
the early 1970s, these rules become the default and Auqaf officials recommitted to a strict 
division of space. Any actions, even on the individual level, that challenged that order 
were seen as real threat. In this case, concerns were raised over a female devotee, Asma 
Kaneez, who had been chanting nohas, or poetic lamentations about Karbala. This was a 
danger, it was reported, because “while listening to her the Shi’a ladies begin matam 
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[beating of chests in lamentation], which is a violation of the restrictions and cause of 
tension. While watching the Shi’a ladies do matam inside the shrine makes the Sunni 
ladies angry, it can also lead them to retaliate as they have threatened. This matter can be 
prolonged and become a cause of conflict.”398 
Asma Kaneez protested that she was merely exercising her right to practice her 
faith at a public space, a ritual that was directly related to the story of Karbala. The 
official insisted, “If this is agreeable then the following notification should be publicly 
posted inside: ‘Inside the shrine’s inner grounds, after offering basic salutations and 
prayers, kindly restrict yourself to reciting the Qurān; other than that, majlis, milād, and 
noha can only be practiced in the allotted space and time.’”399 Interestingly, the Auqaf 
manager does admit that these rituals were viewed as necessary religious expressions that 
“refresh” faith, yet when they carried such emotional resonance as to move listeners to 
collective action, they became a threat at a site like Bibi Pak Daman. The takeover of 
Bibi Pak Daman did not give the government legal license to dictate explicitly what 
religious expressions were practiced – a violation of constitutional rights – but they were 
able to enforce negotiated schedules under the threat of sectarian violence.  
Bibi Pak Daman’s Auqaf Manager goes on to relay another brewing conflict, one 
that again revolved around ornamentation: the inscription of a particular Qurānic verse 
that Shi’a Muslims believe refers to the Prophet’s family. In Surah Al-Shūra, verse 23, 
Allah instructs Muhammad – “Say: no reward do I ask of you for this except the love of 
those near of kin.” For Shi’as, this is a clear reference to ‘Ali, Fatima, and their children, 
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known as the Ahl al-Bayt, and a legitimization of the Shi’a line of succession; Sunnis 
contest this claim. At Bibi Pak Daman, this verse had a clear connotation, as Ruqayyah is 
the immediate link to the Ahl al-Bayt. The Manager of Waqf Properties related the 
following narrative about the conflict: 
Syed Ahmad Hussain Shah, a member of RPC [Religious Purpose 
Committee], has installed a black stone plaque inscribed with this ayat for 
which he received permission Oct. 25. Two other members [of 
RPC]…confirmed that no one had any objections to the installation of this 
stone. However, upon further inquiry, it was found that the installation 
was delayed for some time because the ayāt was engraved with the Urdu 
translation. Many Sunni devotees had objections to the translation. It was 
decided through negotiations that if this ayāt was installed without 
translation, there would be no objections. As a result, on this plaque, only 
the Qurānic ayāt is written, without any translation.400 
 
The calculation made here is striking – there was no justifiable reason to remove a verse 
of the Qurān from a sacred site, even one as polarizing as Bibi Pak Daman. In this case, 
negotiations between Sunni and Shi’a members of the RPC had reached a settlement, yet 
it was outcry from pilgrims that prompted a change in the agreement. A translation into 
the vernacular would allow pilgrims to understand the meaning of the verse. For a site 
like Bibi Pak Daman, translations, narratives, and understanding threatened the balance 
of what could be allowed and managed. Only Arabic – that few could understand – would 
be permitted.  
For multiple reasons, the Auqaf Department had displayed an investment in 
affirming that the graves at Bibi Pak Daman belong to Ruqayyah and her companions, 
supporting hagiographies and accounts that verified the authenticity of the graves. 
Nevertheless, because of the years of encroachment in a Sunni-populated area, the 
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network of sajjada nashins that claimed authority over the shrine, and the identification 
of the majority of devotees, the government acquired the site as a Sunni religious site. 
Auqaf officials and the government managed this duality by understanding and ordering 
behavior in a sectarian context. Pilgrims, religious leaders, and local residents 
internalized these constructs. The bureaucratization of religious representation and the 
segmentation of rules and rituals constructed a formal sectarianism at the shrine, one 
perpetuated by government attempts to neutralize the space from conflict. The Auqaf 
takeover in the 1960s was not without opposition, nor did these ordinances create 
uniform standards. Indeed, as seen in these instances, those rules continued to be 
negotiated, as devotees repeatedly appealed against and to the government in their 
attempts to assert autonomy over their religious practice. In these instances, devotees 
displayed a remarkable degree of sophistication, playing various branches of the 
government against each other to receive the desired ruling and utilizing the language of 
constitutional rights to continue their devotional routines. Yet these contestations over 
space, finance, and ritual also created a new way of ‘being Shi’a’ at the Bibi Pak Daman 
shrine. Being Shi’a meant an explicit acceptance of the narrative of Ruqayyah bint ‘Ali 
and the practices that corresponded to those beliefs; it was now equally defined by the 
government as a structure of behavior to be regulated, in opposition to Sunni attempts to 
control space.  
The emergence of sectarianism at the shrine also existed within a rapidly 
changing national framework. The loss of East Pakistan and the rise of Zulfikar Ali 
Bhutto in 1971 marked a new frame of reference for Shi’a Muslims. Bhutto was not an 
outwardly religious man, though he drew much support from Pakistan’s Shi’a multitudes, 
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around a fifth of the population. His years in office represented an era of Shi’a 
prominence in public life, challenged by rising rightwing and Sunni Islamic opposition. 
In 1973, Bhutto acquiesced to religious pressure and ratified a constitution that officially 
declared the minority Ahmadi community as non-Muslims. It was viewed in part as a 
Machiavellian move, deflecting attention from the Shi’a community and saving certain 
policy agendas by allowing the othering of the Ahmadiyya in its stead.401 While Bhutto 
sought to portray himself as a secular politician, his actions would keep Pakistan firmly 
on a sectarian footing. It would only be exacerbated by Zia ul-Haq’s coup in 1977 and the 
aggressive Islamization policies of his regime. Yet while the rise of Zia is frequently 
identified as a flashpoint for the creation of sectarian divides in Pakistan, the interactions 
at Bibi Pak Daman in the decade preceding reveal how ‘being Shi’a’ and acting sectarian 
began to take shape and what particular histories were appealed to.  
 
Old Authority Meets the New State 
 Despite the Auqaf Department’s presence at Bibi Pak Daman and its prominent 
role as arbitrator between Sunnis and Shi’as through the 1970s, there remained other 
influential presences at the site that endured, as the shrine was an internal frontier where 
rival ideologies and claims were mapped at a particularly fluid period of change in 
Pakistan. The dynamic between the mutawallis and the government in matters of 
religious conflict illustrate the other continuing tension that played out at Bibi Pak 
Daman – the older forms of familial authority and inheritance that had laid claim to the 
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lands around Bibi Pak Daman against the ‘new’ order of government bureaucracy 
established after Pakistan’s independence. According to most estimates, after the 
nationalization of waqf properties, the Auqaf Department had received most of its income 
from cash-box income in the Lahore region, and a large portion of those funds had been 
collected at Bibi Pak Daman.402 The question of who received this income was 
particularly fraught at Bibi Pak Daman, since the caretakers were not direct descendants 
of the saint buried at the shrine – as at most other shrines around Pakistan under the 
Auqaf Department’s control – and claims of authentication and ancestry were difficult to 
legitimate. Nevertheless, the struggle for control and mistrust of financial dealings 
pervaded the interactions between caretakers and government officers. The three locks 
that guard the donation boxes were opened simultaneously on Fridays in the presence of 
representatives from all groups - neither the Auqaf officials or the mujawwars (another 
local term for mutawalli) could complete the ritual without the presence of the other, nor 
did they trust other representatives with the proceeds. The tenuous nature of the alliance 
between older and newer forms of authority at Bibi Pak Daman was a microcosm of the 
similar interplay that existed across Pakistan since the Auqaf Ordinances were first 
issued, but it took on an added dimension at Bibi Pak Daman, where the government 
alternated between the objective broker in sectarian debates and the political force 
undermining traditional rituals and relationships with their new bureaucracy. Bibi Pak 
Daman was a critical space, both in religious imaginings and charitable donations, and 
the stakes were extremely high. 
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 The sajjada nashins at Bibi Pak Daman occupied a fluid middle ground, 
negotiating with the government to maintain some of their influence and mounting legal 
challenges when they felt their hereditary rights were being impeded. These sajjada 
nashins were previously the sole beneficiaries of donations and funding to the shrine, free 
to spend at their discretion. Many had some of their own personal lands taken into 
government possession in 1967, and it is over those lands that the legal challenges 
emerged in the subsequent decades. In these situations, however, the Auqaf Department 
painted themselves as protectors of the pilgrims and their interests. In a discussion with a 
legal advisor to the department, the Auqaf Manager at Bibi Pak Daman relates an 
ongoing conflict with Abdul Karim, one of the gaddi nashins present at the handover of 
the shrine in 1967. A judge in Lahore’s High Court had inquired why Auqaf officials had 
begun construction on land that was still under dispute between present and past gaddi 
nashins and the Auqaf department. The gaddi nashins had filed an injunction to halt all 
further development without their consent, but Auqaf officials had ignored it: “There are 
large numbers of pilgrims and devotees visiting the shrine who desire to stay overnight 
but at present there are only 2 rooms available for guests that are totally insufficient. The 
guests are extremely inconvenienced and have no shelter from heat or rain.” The 
constraint had become so serious that the local Auqaf offices “requested Punjab Governor 
Lieutenant Ghulam Jilani to request permission to build. Thereafter Chief Administrator 
Auqaf, Punjab, on great public demand and pressure, gave permission for 
construction…for convenience of devotees and pilgrims visiting the shrine and has no 
connection with the past mutawalli or matters concerning them.403 This letter was also 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
403 Memo from Manager Auqaf, Sector V (Bibi Pak Daman) to Legal Advisor, Office of Chief 
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published as a circular at the shrine, as part of the Auqaf’s strategy to position this land as 
a public good, appeal to the pilgrims at the shrine, and circumvent both the local 
influence of the gaddi nashins and the legal processes carried out by other branches of 
government. Their actions, of course, were not selfless: the funds to be earned by 
expanding rental properties onsite would add significantly to the shrine’s revenues, 
income that would be completely inaccessible to Abdul Karim.  
 Yet Auqaf officials were not always able to present themselves in an altruistic 
fashion in disputes with the gaddi nashins. These families had long been influential 
residents in the Bibi Pak Daman area, developing ties that existed even before the 
creation of the new Pakistani state and its apparatus. Over the decades, they expanded 
their support through marriage and kinship ties, by awarding patronage and access at the 
shrine, and forging alliances with merchants and bazaar shopkeepers. These older 
networks of authority commonly emerged in shrine regions, and Bibi Pak Daman was no 
exception. By virtue of their standing in their community or the individual acts of 
patronage they awarded, they were often able to gain backing from residents and pilgrims 
against government intervention. In 1985, Muhammad Abdul Jaleel, son of Nizam ul-Din 
Sabiq, gaddi nashin, entered into a series of disputes with local police and Auqaf officials 
over a graveyard he claimed was private property. He had been burying members of his 
family in this particular graveyard since 1972 and claimed he had written documents 
from the Chief Administrator Auqaf de-notifying that piece of land. Muhammad Abdul 
Jaleel also cited a circular dated August 26th, 1960 that proved the Department of Auqaf 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Administrator, Auqaf, Lahore. Memo No. MLW81-3-Auqaf/444 [trans.] Sept. 17, 1981. General 
Records of Darbar Hazrat Bibi Pak Daman, Lahore.  
	   233	  
had no control over private graveyards in the area.404 Because of the increase in pilgrims 
to the shrine and rapid encroachment, this gaddi nashin sought to build a fence around 
this plot of land to protect his family’s graves. The government resisted, claiming that the 
sajjada nashins at Bibi Pak Daman had simply usurped the land and claimed it as their 
own. Living on or using land did not invalidate the initial waqf arrangement for Bibi Pak 
Daman, nor did it invalidate the legal right the Auqaf Department now had to those lands.  
 Abdul Jaleel took another tactic, drawing on his history at the shrine. He 
emphasized his importance in the community, arguing that through the recent troubles at 
Bibi Pak Daman, he had been “daily settling fights and argument between Shi’a and 
Sunni ladies. To protect petitioner’s own legal rights as well as prevent Sunni-Shi’a 
conflict, I have locked the graves around Mai Tanveeri and…put a notice that entry 
cannot be gained without permission. Petitioner thinks all disputes should be settled with 
respect.”405 His purported role in mediating the growing sectarian conflicts emerging at 
the shrine was of particular import, at a time when “Islamization” policies were 
increasingly focused on a rigid adoption of conservative principles, many of which 
alienated minorities such as the Shi’a. Abdul Jaleel expressed his sadness that “despite 
my loyalty to you they have not reached an agreement, nor has petitioner been contracted 
by a senior official from Auqaf. If the Auqaf department can prove [my] claims to be 
false, [I] would forgo them…Does the Auqaf Department deny me the religious right to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
404 Memo from Chief Administrator Auqaf, Lahore to All Deputy Commissioners in West 
Pakistan. Wide Circular Letter, No. 1-(14) Aukaf 60.D. Aug. 26, 1960. Circulars Office, Records, 
Punjab Secretariat.  
405 Letter from Muhammad Abdul Jaleel, Gaddi Nashin, Darbar Bibi Pak Daman to Manager 
Waqf Properties, Central Zone, Lahore. Record No. 1 (M.A.J)(P.G.Y) [trans.]. March 25, 1985. 
General Records of Darbar Hazrat Bibi Pak Daman, Lahore. 
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my family’s graves?”406 The language of religious rights was a powerful one, especially 
at a time that the state faced growing challenges framed in religious discourse.  
This dispute continued for a period of years, becoming increasingly strident, but 
the lack of a respect for the social standing of a gaddi nashin continued to be one of the 
main points of contention. In a letter to the local police station to file complaint about 
trespassing on ‘his’ land, Abdul Jaleel challenged the Auqaf Department’s claims to the 
land at Bibi Pak Daman, 
The petitioner is a gaddi nashin from Bibi Pak Daman, Chairman of the 
Shi’a Sunni Peace Committee and every year has received recognition for 
Shi’a Sunni unity efforts, which judiciary and administration is witness 
to…The dargah of Bibi Pak Daman is in control of Department of Auqaf, 
even though it is not a waqf property. Petitioner had three private 
graveyards, to which the Auqaf Department has no connections or rights 
to…where many of his ancestors and close relatives are buried.407   
 
He continued on to point out that he was a vital member of the shrine community, 
opening a small private canteen near his property for pilgrims and providing negotiating 
services at the shrine to mediate sectarian disputes.  
 Despite their influence in the community, however, there remained great public 
mistrust of the self-serving interests of the sajjada nashins. Devotees of Bibi Ruqayyah, 
both Sunni and Shi’a, believed that for decades these men simultaneously supported the 
alternate view that the shrines hold the graves of the daughters of Syed Ahmad Tokhta; as 
sajjada nashins to this Sufi pīr, it would be their right to be involved in shrine affairs. In 
a book endorsed by the Auqaf Department as the preeminent hagiography and history of 
the shrine, this rival story is rejected as phony scheme: “All these lies were written to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
406 ibid, Record No. 1 (M.A.J)(P.G.Y) [trans.], March 25, 1985. 
407 Petition from Muhammad Abdul Jaleel, Gaddi Nashin, Darbar Bibi Pak Daman to Deputy 
Superintendent Police, Area Qila Gujjar Singh. Sections 452/506 [trans.] Nov. 11, 1988. Punjab 
Secretariat, Lahore. 
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support Sunni sectarian views and mujawwar claims, so that if the Auqaf Department 
ever releases the shrine, their descendants will get a share.”408  
***** 
 The process of imagining, activating, and contesting Bibi Pak Daman brought to 
the forefront larger questions about the role of the state, gender, and religious practice in 
the years following Pakistan’s independence. The shrine was a space in which Shi’a 
Muslims could articulate an identity that placed them in the center of Pakistan’s creation 
myths. The importance of the shrine and its implications remained at the center of these 
debates – indeed, it was the particular nuances of Bibi Pak Daman and Ruqayyah’s life 
that transformed the shrine into an internal frontier of contestation. “For us, the people of 
Pakistan, what a fortunate blessing that for our spiritual guidance, one the children of ‘Ali 
came as a guest to our land,” the Auqaf Department recognized, “but in our petty quarrels 
we have not recognized her as she deserved.”409 Yet it was in these quarrels that a picture 
of the intimate challenges of the nation-building project emerged.  
On July 5th, 1977, General Zia ul-Haq ascended to power in a military coup, 
arresting Bhutto and members of his cabinet. Almost immediately, Zia ul-Haq would 
institute his new Nizam-e-Mustafa. The contours of state and the nature of religion in 
public life and private ritual changed dramatically. “The basis of Pakistan was Islam,” 
Zia declared. But what Islam – and who could practice it – would ignite tensions on the 
ground at Bibi Pak Daman, in the shrine and its bazaar.  
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
408 Hashmi, Makhdooma Bibi Ruqayyah, 10.  
409 Hashmi, Makhdooma Bibi Ruqayyah, 159.  
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Chapter Five 
Transactional Spaces: Bibi Pak Daman, Sayyeda Zaynab, and a New Shi’a 
Transnationalism  
 
 
 Three times a week, Zehra Niaz arrives at the shrine of Bibi Pak Daman early in 
the morning in her most simple cotton shalwar kameez. Broom in hand, Zehra sets to 
work rinsing, sweeping, and ordering the inner mausoleum and courtyard, preparing 
Ruqayyah’s shrine for the day’s onslaught of visitors. With her is a small group of ladies 
who frequent the shrine on as many mornings as they can, gathering to perform this 
humble service in the hopes that Ruqayyah would intercede for their prayers. Yet while 
these women arrive in modest clothing to administer to the shrine, those who are granted 
the privilege to clean after the pilgrims and dust Ruqayyah’s mausoleum are from the 
most influential families in Lahore. Zehra Niaz herself belongs to prominent Shi’a 
political clan – her uncle had been a Senator from Punjab province, the family owned 
vast tracts of rural agricultural land, and her husband was a current Member of 
Parliament. Like many other women who grew up in Lahore, Zehra had witnessed her 
mother and female relatives frequent Bibi Pak Daman in times of need or distress, finding 
comfort in ziyārat to Ruqayyah’s shrine. Yet her status and political access allowed her a 
window into the “bureaucracy and corruption of Auqaf officials,” she lamented, and she 
had vowed to use her influence to expand and develop the shrine into a modern sacred 
space, a structure fitting for a revered figure of Ruqayyah’s status. She began working 
with the Bibi Pak Daman Trust, an extension of the Religious Affairs Committee 
established by Asma Mamdot, a Member of Parliament and ardent devotee of Ruqayyah 
bint ‘Ali. The members of the Bibi Pak Daman Trust were a mix of Shi’a and Sunni, all 
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from the wealthy landed political classes of the Punjab, all united in their suspicion of the 
male Auqaf officials and sajjada nashins onsite who handled the donations from 
pilgrims. “The money that flows through this shrine should be enough to make this the 
most beautiful shrine in our nation,” Zehra stated in English, “but where has that money 
all gone?”410  
As she stooped to collect the remnant flower petals that dropped off ornate 
garlands deposited by pilgrims – “I keep these at home where I read Qurān,” she 
explained – Zehra recalled travelling to the Sayyeda Zaynab shrine in 1985 with her 
father, aunt, and sister. Her father had a manufacturing contract with business contacts in 
Damascus, and her family had the wealth to manage to the trip in relative comfort. 
Despite maintaining that part of her devotion to Ruqayyah bint ‘Ali stemmed from her 
love of Zaynab, Husayn, and the Prophet’s family, the memories and intricate details of 
her short ziyārat now eluded Zehra. Instead, what stayed with her was the feeling of 
being distinctly Shi’a, in a period when heightened sectarian divides and political 
tensions meant that Shi’as were actively asserting their identity across transnational 
space. She had grown up amongst an older generation that downplayed sectarian identity 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
410 Field notes, interview with Zehra Niaz, July 10, 2012, Lahore. Zehra responded to all 
questions posed in Urdu in flawless English, as upper class Pakistanis educated in English 
medium schools frequently did. Zehra’s name has been altered here, as she was worried about the 
implications for the Bibi Pak Daman Trust in speaking too critically to an outsider, as they still 
relied to some extent on access provided by Auqaf officials. In a letter addressed to the Manager 
of Auqaf at Bibi Pak Daman and the Secretary of Auqaf for the Government of Punjab, the Bibi 
Pak Daman Trust lamented, “In our previous meeting we were assured that all administrative 
matters shall be taken care of and all the missing facilities shall be provided but…until today 
nothing has been done so far…It is sad to note that the income earned on daily basis from this 
holy shrine is enough to improve the dilapidated condition but we fail to understand why the 
shrine of the daughter of Hazrat Ali (AS) is not given its due importance and is in a total state of 
neglect?” Letter from Managing Committee to Gondol Saheb, Oct. 25, 2008. Records of Bibi Pak 
Daman Trust via Asma Mamdot, Chairman, MPA National Assembly.   
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in public life, as for decades Shi’a political leaders had followed the example of 
Muhammad Ali Jinnah and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and remained loyal to secular or regional 
parties. Yet when she traveled to the Sayyeda Zaynab shrine “it was like the Shi’as were 
everywhere in the world,” she recalled. “Around the shrine next to pictures of ‘Ali and 
Husayn there were pictures of [Ayatollah] Khomeini, but those same pictures we saw in 
Pakistan everywhere. He was the hero for the students, for Shi’as. All the bazaar-walas 
sold his posters.” For Zehra’s family the visibility and awareness of being Shi’a was 
enhanced by living through Zia ul-Haq’s Islamization programs, which attempted to 
create a normative state Islam that homogenized public religiosity.411 Yet from Damascus 
to Lahore, the pictures of Khomeini had spread, and the implications of Shi’ism and the 
visitation to shrines had changed.  
By 1979, seismic shifts were occurring in the geopolitical landscape, creating new 
realities on the ground at the Sayyeda Zaynab and Bibi Pak Daman shrines. For much of 
the early and mid-20th century, evolving narratives, entrenched interests, and new regimes 
coalesced to turn the shrines into established sites of meaning and contestation. Through 
the tumultuous 1970s, these sites had maintained a balance between national appeals and 
sectarian claims, caught in competing discourses of authenticity and new authority. With 
the changing demographics and international contexts of the 1980s, however, the shrines 
became more decidedly sectarian spaces. Despite continued attempts by states to 
universalize – or even neutralize – their meaning, ziyārat to the Sayyeda Zaynab and Bibi 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
411 In addition to presidential Ordinances, Zia ul-Haq changed the legal and constitutional 
framework of the state to reflect his Islamization programs. In 1978 he introduced Shari’at courts 
to determine whether existing laws confirmed with the Qurān and Sunnah, on which sat groups of 
ulama who did not need to be legally qualified. In 1986, the Ninth Amendment provided 
constitutional grounding to empower the President and the nation’s Shar’iat Court to be the 
highest law making authorities in Pakistan.  
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Pak Daman shrines increasingly became a critical way to express being Shi’a. Who was 
visiting these shrines, the languages in which they operated, and the aesthetics of the sites 
were transformed by merchants, pilgrims, and authorities alike at the Sayyeda Zaynab 
and Bibi Pak Daman. New images and a flourishing transnational Shi’a material culture 
shaped these sites into multifaceted visual spectacles, with bazaars that projected 
transnationally and shaped identity through consumption.  
The two sites became further linked through bazaar and gender dynamics, 
especially as the concepts of barakat (blessings) or karamāt (miracles) were conceived 
and used.412 Shi’a commemoration and mourning rituals were a means through which 
bonds between believers and saints were cemented, creating communal ties of 
remembered suffering through Ruqayyah and Zaynab and the scenes they witnessed at 
Karbala. Yet the shrines also allowed devotees to individualize their relationship to the 
saint, through their requests for barakat, the purchase of souvenirs and gifts in the bazaar, 
and their interaction with the space of the shrine. Pilgrims constructed interpretations for 
their behavior, as the Sayyeda Zaynab and Bibi Pak Daman were lived, layered sacred 
spaces. With shrine officials and religious authorities promoting bazaars and appropriate 
uses of the shrine spaces, the divide over ‘folk/popular’ versus ‘orthodox/ulama was 
blurred. While hagiographies and narratives were often produced and consumed by a 
self-selecting audience, at the shrine they could be shaped and contested, especially in 
states where Shi’as constituted a minority. Indeed, it was at these shrines that the fluidity 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
412 Anne Betteridge has categorized two kinds of miracles in contemporary Shi’a understandings: 
mu’jizāt, which are “rare and earthshaking” and karamāt, which are “more modest miracles.” 
This chapter will focus primarily on karamāt, the kind of every day interventions that devotees 
ask of their saints. See Anne Betteridge, “Specialists in Miraculous Action: Some Shrines in 
Shiraz,” in Alan Morinis, ed., Sacred Journeys: The Anthropology of Pilgrimage (Westport, 
Greenwood Press, 1992).  
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between textual representations and practiced spirituality emerged – both informed the 
other, and neither can be looked as the whole embodiments of religious experience. The 
Imams had prescribed Ziyārat, but how it was undertaken changed. Through increases in 
pilgrimage and visual culture, the growth of ritual and the bazaar, and the use of space, 
the Sayyeda Zaynab and Bibi Pak Daman became transnational Shi’a sites, reflective of 
the complex attitudes of what ‘being Shi’a’ now meant.  
 
The Sayyeda Zaynab and Bibi Pak Daman in a New World Order   
The ramifications of the political upheavals that played out across borders at the 
turn of the decade would have a direct impact on life at the Sayyeda Zaynab at Bibi Pak 
Daman shrines. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Hafez al-Assad were largely secular politicians 
with ties to a religious minority, and both drew legitimacy in part by emphasizing the 
marginalization of their particular ethnic groups. International events and domestic 
upheaval, however, compelled them to validate their leadership through Islamic 
appeals.413 The Iranian Revolution in 1979, ongoing turmoil in Iraq, and new dynamics of 
Shi’a mobilization and public religiosity changed the space of and around the Sayyeda 
Zaynab shrine, creating a transnational milieu enhanced by a growth in pilgrimage. Yet 
the regime of Hafez al-Assad sought to maintain a delicate balance, capitalizing on the 
benefits of the shrine and the explosion of sentiment around Zaynab, while maintaining 
some ‘official’ distance from sectarian affiliation. In Pakistan, Zia ul-Haq’s 1977 coup 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
413 Bhutto organized the Lahore Summit in 1974 for the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, part 
of his foreign policy shift to engage more actively with the Islamic countries of the Middle East. 
Newly declared by Musa al-Sadr as part of the mainstream of Muslims sects, al-Assad’s 
attendance gave him visual grounding amongst the political leaders of the Muslim world in a 
period of increasing tensions with the Muslim Brotherhood.  
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accelerated the emphasis on Islam as a guiding policy principle, an impulse that had been 
growing through the 1970s with Bhutto’s focus on alliances with the Gulf and the Middle 
East. Yet it was the dual impact of the Iranian Revolution and the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan in 1980 that led to increased pressure and calls for Islam to play a significant 
part of public life in Pakistan – but the question of which interpretation of Islam would be 
played out at Bibi Pak Daman.  
The concept of abrupt change certainly does not capture the complex and 
evolving nature of geopolitical alliances, and the Iranian Revolution alone did not 
completely transform the realities of the Sayyeda Zaynab overnight. Indeed, though 
sectarian ties were crystalizing and devotees had begun to embrace new understandings 
of “being Shi’a” throughout the 1970s, the Syrian involvement in the Lebanese Civil War 
also illustrated the complexity of understanding behavior purely through a sectarian 
lens.414 The sources of discontent in Iran, too, stemmed from a myriad of socioeconomic, 
political, and religious factors. Yet the dramatic overthrow of the Shah, the rise of 
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and his Velayat-e-Faqih (or Governance of the Islamic 
Jurist), and the transformation of the Iranian state in short order into one based on a 
revolutionary Shi’a ideology undoubtedly created a new framework for understanding 
religion in public life. Much scholarship has been done on the new narratives that 
emerged out of the Iranian Revolution, the way religion was adopted as a language of 
protest, and public ritual mourning became a galvanizing force for action.415 In practice, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
414 In 1976, Musa al-Sadr intervened to prevent a break between the Palestine Liberation 
Organization and the Syrian regime. See Henry Tanner, “P.L.O Urges Syria to Quit Lebanon,” 
The New York Times, May 15, 1976. 
415 Part One of this dissertation lays out the evolution of narratives and changes after the Iranian 
Revolution and cites additional sources. For further work on the subject, see Peter Chelkowski, 
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this new reality did have some immediate impact. In 1980 Nabih Berri, the new leader of 
Amal, clarified, “We have learned many lessons from the Iranian revolution, among them 
that reason is stronger than arms, and the word is stronger than the bomb, and religion has 
its own revolutionary impact…The Iranian revolution has helped us a great deal in that it 
has shown us that the weak and the deprived can fight and do have strength if they are 
united.”416 Ali Shari’ati’s new discourse on Shi’ism and the depiction of Zaynab as a 
defiant figure had linked her shrine to a new range of meanings in the build up to the 
Revolution. While pilgrims in various times had always individually interpreted ziyārat, 
the Sayyeda Zaynab was now charged with a new political and spiritual significance, an 
assertively Shi’a sacred space that was the subject of intensifying pressures.   
This was a new paradigm for the shrine. From Muhsin al-Amīn to Mahdi 
Murtadha and beyond, the authorities that promoted the shrine understood the value of 
engaging in the resonant discourses of their time – nationalism, pan-Arabism, pan-
Islamism – and increasingly Shi’a rhetoric was gaining popularity. Yet it was not just in 
narrative framing that the shrine evolved. Political contexts beyond the Iranian 
Revolution made Syria and the Sayyeda Zaynab a transnational focal point and changed 
the demographics of the shrine. In 1979, demonstrations swept Iraq in support of 
Ayatollah Khomeini and Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, the ideological founder of the al-
Da’wa party. In response, the Iraqi Ba’athist state cracked down on Shi’a political 
activity. Hafez al-Assad was forced to assure Saddam Hussein that Syria had not 
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participated in attempts to overthrow his government, with the tension between the two 
Ba’athist regimes, Syria’s growing alliance with Iran, and suspicion of Shi’a ties souring 
relations between the two countries.417 Baqir al-Sadr was detained and transported to 
Baghdad, “his representatives and hundreds of Da'wa members were rounded up and 
imprisoned or executed…His sister, Amina al-Sadr, known as Bint al-Huda, went to the 
holy shrine of Imam 'Ali and gave a fiery speech urging people to demonstrate against the 
government and to protect their leader.”418 Bint al-Huda was her brother’s staunchest 
companion, a vocal supporter of Shi’a advancement in Iraq, and an advocate for women’s 
issues. A prolific writer, Bint al-Huda was a well-known figure, had published fictional 
novels, wrote advice columns in Shi’a newsletters, and had established women’s schools 
in Najaf endorsed by the grand marja’ Muhsin al-Hakim. On April 5th, 1980, she was 
arrested with Ayatollah al-Sadr and executed without trial on April 8th; their bodies were 
never recovered. On learning of their deaths, Ayatollah Khomeini stated it was “with 
utmost grief I have come to know that the martyr Ayatollah Sayyid Muhammad Baqir al-
Sadr, and his illustrious, noble sister, who held a high station among the scholars and 
possessed a radiant position in the literary field, have attained martyrdom.”419 
The symbolism of a Shi’a woman from a respected family publically rallying 
supporters in favor of her mistreated brother was not lost in that charged atmosphere. In 
death, Bint al-Huda had been proclaimed an illustrious martyr, an attribute rarely invoked 
for women, and at the Sayyeda Zaynab the comparison was deliberately invoked. Her 
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writings were present in every bookstall, a newly paved side street was named in her 
honor in 1981, and in 1983 Iraqi properties fleeing from Saddam Hussein’s crackdown 
opened al-Aminah, a new women’s accommodation to house female pilgrims.420 Indeed, 
exiles from Iraq had already made a growing impact on the infrastructure of the Sayyeda 
Zaynab in the 1970s; the Shirazi brothers and the establishment of the hawza Zaynabiyya 
began a period of rapid growth and interest in the shrine as an alternate Shi’a learning 
center. The region around the Sayyeda Zaynab, known as Sitt Zaynab, became a haven 
for refugees from a range of conflicts, from the expanding Lebanese Civil War to the 
crackdowns in Iraq. The demographics became more international, with the Syrian 
government providing basic services for the new influx, but the area around the shrine 
also became more distinctly Shi’a as refugees, students, and ulama arrived in greater 
quantity. The number of Twelver Shi’as living in Syria as whole rose significantly after 
1980 with the arrival of forty thousand Iraqi Shi‘as suspected of having Iranian 
affiliations and purged by Saddam Hussein.421 These Iraqis and many Lebanese Shi’as 
settled around the Sayyeda Zaynab, along with students arriving from Pakistan, India, 
and the Gulf states who were drawn to the Sayyeda Zaynab by the new possibilities it 
offered.422  For many of these new residents and visitors, it was a new accommodating 
space for establishing a communal and public Shi’a identity. The transnational appeals 
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that began with the rhetorical reimagining of Zaynab by Ali Shari’ati and Musa al-Sadr 
were actualized on the ground. 
 While the fallout of geopolitical realities changed the appeal of the shrine, the 
new Iranian regime also became actively engaged at the Sayyeda Zaynab. Individuals and 
the Shah’s personal office had made donations for the upkeep of the site, but for the new 
Iranian regime the expansion of the Sayyeda Zaynab had consequences beyond a cultural 
or religious agenda. Funding the Sayyeda Zaynab certainly affirmed the Iranian state’s 
devoutly Shi’a credentials, but the alliance with Syria also gave it a credible Arab ally in 
the brewing showdown with Iraq. Indeed, the ratcheting up of tensions between Iran and 
Iraq would erupt into outright conflict in September 1980 and last a costly eight years, the 
longest war of the 20th century and the most destructive military conflict since World War 
II.423 Both Iran and Iraq engaged in full-scale rhetorical and propaganda wars through 
print and airwaves, with Iran careful to portray its revolutionary mission as a pan-Islamic, 
not Shi’a, cause. In turn, Saddam Hussein, a rival to Syria’s Ba’athist party, wrapped 
himself in evocative historical and cultural tropes that appealed to older strains of pan-
Arabism. In broadcasts he referred to himself as “the leader of their Arab nation, the 
knight of the Arabs, the conqueror of the racist Persians.”424 The Sayyeda Zaynab became 
a new territory onto which these disputes were mapped. Saddam Hussein versus 
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Ayatollah Khomeini, Iraqi refugees fleeing persecution, Iranian pilgrims and 
revolutionary leaders asserting their religious ideology, Shi’a students and ulama drawn 
to new hawzas, and Syrian Twelver shrine authorities and Alawi state officials were 
brought together around the shrine in the early 1980s, marking it as a space on which the 
battle for identities and allegiances could play out.  
 If the Iranian Revolution gave Syria a new ally in the changing geopolitical 
landscape, its repercussions were similarly deeply felt in Pakistan. With a long shared 
border and a significant Shi’a population, Pakistanis watched the unfolding events in Iran 
with a mix of admiration and apprehension. Bhutto had enjoyed good relations with the 
Shah of Iran, and the presence of a stable and friendly state on one border had provided 
Pakistan stability in its constant tensions with India. In the context of the growing 
popularity of Islamic parties at home, however, the sight of the mass protests sweeping 
Iran and invoking a revolutionary Shi’a ideology presented an uneasy reality for many in 
Pakistan. In August, 1978, an editorial in Dawn newspaper warned, “It is for the forces in 
opposition to recognize that their failure to settle their differences with the government 
with a compromise would destabilize the country further, and this can have serious 
implications for the security and stability of not only Iran, but the region as a whole.”425 
As the revolutionary forces picked up steam and the end of the Shah’s absolute monarchy 
became a reality, however, reports in Pakistan’s leading newspapers embraced the self-
affirming possibilities of an Islamic Iran. Under Zia ul-Haq’s martial law, an aggressive 
Islamization program was taking root and the connections were made between the mutual 
struggles to create true Islamic states. “The triumph of Islam in Iran has been an 
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endorsement of Pakistan’s own ideological basis and an inspiration to its current efforts 
to adopt the Islamic way of life,” declared a Pakistan Times editorial.426 Zia ul-Haq’s 
government was one of the first to initial official ties with the new regime.  
Yet the official enthusiasm for the revolutionary forces began to dim as it became 
clear that Iran’s leaders did not intend their ideology to end at their borders. Tehran 
Radio’s broadcasts began exhorting the people of Pakistan and Saudi Arabia to overthrow 
their systems, as neither were true iterations of a proper Islamic state. Media channels 
expressed anger that the Islamic credentials of the Pakistani state were being challenged. 
Indeed, the disillusionment with the revolution crystallized further with the triumph of 
conservative counterrevolutionary forces and Iran’s new constitution stating that the 
official religion of Iran would be of Ithna’ ‘Ashari Islam. “On the face of it, this gives a 
second grade status of citizenship to persons subscribing to non-Asna [sic] Ashari 
beliefs,” a worried letter to the editor mused.427 Pakistan had itself constitutionally 
declared Ahmadis non-Muslims only years earlier, yet the discomfort with an avowedly 
Shi’a state would be increasingly evident.   
Indeed, the mixed reactions to the Iranian Revolution made clear that what Islam 
and Islamization meant remained deeply unsettled, even for those who accepted the need 
for a greater role of religion in public life. The fear of Iran’s Shi’a influence was realized 
when Shi’as refused to submit to Zia ul-Haq’s new Zakat Ordinance, passed in June 
1980.428 The law called for the mandatory deduction of a zakat tax from all bank saving 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
426 Pakistan Times editorial, February 23, 1980, Lahore edition. 
427 “Letters to the editor,” Dawn newspaper, August 29, 1980, Karachi edition.  
428 Zakat was a tax on the income and wealth of a Muslim, considered one of the five pillars of 
Islam. Sunni and Shi’a fiqh differ in their implementation – Shi’a Muslims pay khums instead, 
and are permitted to donate to a representative of the Imams.  
	   248	  
accounts. Shi’as around Pakistan erupted into mass protests against the law, seen as a 
violation of their religious rights. On July 4th and 5th, 25,000 Shi’as marched on the 
capital and staged a sit-in to demand exemption from the ordinance, in defiance of 
martial law. It was through the support of Tehran that the exemption was granted, with 
Khomeini personally intervening to pressure Zia ul-Haq into a retreat.429 Supported by 
Tehran, the protests against the Zakat Ordinance was the first mass-scale Shi’a movement 
in Pakistan’s history and would spur the creation of new political parties dedicated solely 
to advancing Shi’a interests in Pakistan. The demonstrations were led by the highly-
organized movement, the Tahrīk-i Nifaz-i Fiqh-i Ja’fariyya (Movement for the 
Implementation of the Ja'fari Law, which would remain a considerable force. Shi’a 
mobilization and challenges to the government’s religious doctrine would have a direct 
effect on Bibi Pak Daman, where one Sunni resident complained to the Auqaf manager 
that Shi’as read out Khomeini’s weekly Friday sermon (khutba), despite the prohibition 
on inflaming sectarian tensions.430 
 The tenuous sectarian and ethnic balance that Pakistan had managed in the 
decades since its independence would explode with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan at 
the end of 1979 and the inpouring of military and foreign fighters.431 The porous border 
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and resulting waves of Afghan refugees had a damaging effect on economic inequality 
and the balance of ethnicities and power that make up the federating units of Pakistan. 
Most transformative to the realities on the ground, however, was the influx of money, 
primarily from the Gulf States, to fund religious schools (madrasas) and organizations 
devoted to promoting an Islamic public culture in Pakistan. These funds spawned a 
multiplying network of madrasas, many with the sole purpose of training its students for 
jihad (holy war). Their brand of conservative Salafi Sunni Islam would permeate public 
culture, aggressively promoting a strict interpretation of Islamization and coming into 
conflict with Sufi orders and Shi’a organizations. In Lahore alone, the increase in 
madrasas was fourfold in the 1980s.432 Through Saudi Arabian funds, four Deobandi 
madrasas had been established in the Qila Gujjar Singh area by 1984; their presence 
would “greatly increase sectarian tensions at darbar Bibi Pak Daman,” according an 
Auqaf manager. “Ahl al-Shi’a were upset at the volume of their azān, which was heard at 
Bibian Pak Daman. Many complained that [the madrasas] were deliberately inciting 
Shi’a-Sunni unrest.”433  
 The dueling forces of increased Shi’a mobilization in the wake of the Iranian 
Revolution and the pressure from Gulf-backed conservative Sunni groups to further 
regulate public religiosity created a new milieu at the shrine. Debates over the appropriate 
range of activity at the shrine were given an added valence by the international strains on 
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Pakistan. Auqaf officials, local residents, Shi’a and Sunni devotees and organizations, 
and shopkeepers in the bazaar imposed their understanding of what the shrine meant. 
With uneasy or hostile relationships with Iran, Afghanistan, and India on Pakistan’s 
borders causing internal instability, Reactions over how Islam was projected in rituals at 
Bibi Pak Daman and its bazaar were weighted with that context. 
 
“A Masterpiece of Islamic Architecture”  
In early 1979 the Sayyeda Zaynab shrine committee met with the Syrian Ministry 
of Awqaf to pass a bill to allow the shrine to expand and meet the increasing needs of 
pilgrims. Under recommendations from the Awqaf Ministry and the Ministry of Housing, 
the shrine committee allocated the necessary budgets and bought 150,000 square meters 
of real estate surrounding the existing shrine, to be used for pilgrims’ comfort and 
establish new parks and gardens to beautify the area. The expansion would increase the 
area of sacred space, expanding the haram (inner shrine), the courtyard, and allow new 
properties to be dedicated solely towards the creation of a self-sufficient shrine city.434 
Yet while the shrine committee had help from a cadre of individual supporters who had 
continued to raise funds and awareness on their behalf, including Mahdi Bahbahani and 
representatives from Iraq and Lebanon, it was the new government in Iran that paid 
outright for the land.435  
Shrine administrators had found a receptive audience in Iran’s desire to export its 
revolutionary ideology, as investing and remaking holy spaces – shrines, mosques, and 
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religious schools – was key in its cultural agenda.436 Hani Murtadha, a mutawalli of the 
Sayyeda Zaynab, had traveled to Iran with a government delegation in late 1978 and 
presented the issues facing the shrine to officials from Iran’s Ministry of Culture and 
Higher Education. He noted that despite the growing popularity of the site, “there was 
room for only 9 more graves [and] for Muslims being buried near Sayyeda Zaynab is of 
huge importance.” The committee needed financing for legal and engineering efforts for 
new graveyards in the north and east, he informed them, as droves of Shi’a from Syria, 
Lebanon, Afghanistan, Iraq and Pakistan were bequeathing in their wills to be buried at 
the shrine. The practice of Shi’a Muslims choosing to be buried in the sacred spaces of 
their faith was a common one, for those who could afford the high price of demand. Yet 
the holy graveyards of Najaf, Karbala, Samarra, and Kadhimiya in Iraq were off-limits in 
a deadly war, and Zaynab and Damascus were a powerful link to the events of Karbala. 
That the demand for graves at the shrine was surpassing the availability of ‘sacred’ land 
owned by the shrine was indicative of the devotion and popularity of Zaynab in Shi’a 
communities worldwide. As such, an information center and library was also needed “to 
give information and enlighten visitors on the lives and character of the Ahl ul-Bayt,” and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
436 The extent to which Iran was engaged with and successful in exporting its particular brand of 
revolutionary is a topic that continues to be debated, in light of its sustained tensions with Saudi 
Arabia over spheres of influence. For more see “Khomeini Urges Export of Iranian Revolution,” 
The New York Times, October 15, 1981; Roschanack Shaery Eisenlohr, “Iran, the Vatican of 
Shi’ism,” in Middle East Report, No. 233 (Winter 2004), 40-42 and “Post Revolutionary Iran and 
Shi’a Lebanon: Contested Histories of Shi’i Transnationalism,” in International Journal of 
Middle East Studies 39 (2007), 271-289; Hafizullah Emadi, “Exporting Iran’s Revolution: The 
Radicalization of the Shiite Movement in Afghanistan,” in Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 31, No. 
1, Jan. 1995; Ruhi Ramazani, “Iran’s Export of the Revolution: Its Politics, Ends, and Means,” in 
The Iranian Revolution: Its Global Impact, ed. John Esposito (Miami: Florida International 
University Press, 1990), 40-62 and Independence without Freedom: Iran’s Foreign Policy 
(Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press), 2013. 
	   252	  
a modern hospital and hiring of doctors was required to manage the loads of za’ireen in 
all states of health and age.437 
 
 
(Figure 5.1: The new graveyard in 1983) 
 
 The shrine committee welcomed the direct Iranian involvement and influence, 
without the financial means to truly capitalize on the popularity of Zaynab and create a 
shrine to rival the Iraqi and Iranian sites. Yet they were also able to earn the secular 
Ba’athist government’s acquiescence of expansion plans and the direct involvement of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
437 Hani Murtadha, “Syed Hani Murtadha, Mutawalli al-Maqām al-Sharīf,” al-Mawsim, 1, No. 4 
(1989), 78. 
	   253	  
Iranian money, surprising in a state that had a delicate relationship with public religiosity. 
On the face of it, it was remarkable that the regime, so sensitive to the mistrust of its 
majority Sunni citizens, would immediately allow the Iranian government to advance its 
agenda.438 Yet it was the Murtadha family’s deep ties that allowed them to maintain a 
national face to the shrine and create greater permissiveness for international 
involvement, even while constructing a swelling Shi’a enclave in the capital. Indeed, 
there remained a difference between the non-Syrian leaders (militants, refugees, and 
ulama) who used the Sayyeda Zaynab as political proxy and the local notables who had 
an investment in the stability of the political order and had ties to Syrian Shi’a 
community. For the state, the Murtadha family represented a bulwark of influence and 
constancy, allowing them to capitalize on the economic gains of a popular shrine city. In 
turn, the mutawalli of the shrine gained prestige and international influence not usually 
accorded to Syria’s small Twelver Shi’a community, one that had been overshadowed by 
the Alawi rise to power.  
 The financial and political support for the Sayyeda Zaynab shrine was distinct 
from other sites under the Ministry of Awqaf in the 1970s and 1980s, all under much 
stricter state control. Anthropologist Yasser Tabbaa has explored the conflict that 
emerged concurrently over the Sayyeda Ruqayya shrine, the purported gravesite of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
438 Syria’s deteriorating relations with the Muslim Brotherhood heightened the sectarian context. 
From 1976, Sunni Islamists had fought a campaign against the Ba’athist state and had been 
gaining in strength. As a result, the regime responded in brutal retaliation, including making 
membership in the Muslim Brotherhood punishable by death. In February 1982, the Syrian army 
besieged the city of Hama for 27 days. The resulting massacre essentially wiped out the Muslim 
Brotherhood as a viable national influence. See Yvette Talhamy, “The Syrian Muslim Brothers 
and the Syrian-Iranian Relationship,” Middle East Journal, Vol. 63, No. 4 (Autumn, 2009), 561-
580.  
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Husayn’s young daughter that died in captivity in Damascus. The Sayyeda Ruqayya 
shrine was located in Old Damascus, in the midst of the Souq Al-Hamidiya where 
Yazid’s prison had been located. In the early 1980s, a backlash began from local 
residents, merchants, and the Syrian Department of Antiquities and Museums against an 
aggressive expansion and rebuilding effort directed by the Iranian state.439 Building an 
ornate new Shi’a shrine came into conflict with the desire to preserve cultural heritage, as 
this area of Umayyad “Old Damascus” had immense cultural and historic significance 
and was protected by the Laws of Antiquities and the Law for the Protection of the 
Ancient City of Damascus. According to Tabbaa, letters from the Director General of 
Antiquities and Museums to the Prime Minister outlined the various problems that the 
expansion of Sayyeda Ruqayyah would create for the traditional life of walled Damascus, 
and tensions between Antiquities and Awqaf officials grew heated.440 
In contrast, the massive expansion of the Sayyeda Zaynab drew considerably less 
ire, despite the large-scale developments funded by Iran and the dislocation of residents 
and businesses. The distinction lay in how the Sayyeda Zaynab was likely viewed within 
Syria. Despite languishing in relative disrepair and obscurity, the Ruqayya shrine was 
part of an old, downtown, ‘authentic’ Damascus, and the valuing of ‘old’ cultural heritage 
was viewed as a sign of modernity. Its location near the Umayyad palace gave it a 
defined historical importance. In contrast, the Sayyeda Zaynab claimed a much longer 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
439 Tabbaa, “Invented Pieties,” 111. One such letter came in 1982 from Najah Attar, the Minister 
of Culture, asking for a stoppage of works. It was Attar who spent significant time with Benazir 
Bhutto in her 1996 visit to the Sayyeda Zaynab, guiding her on the new progress made at the 
shrine. Despite al-Attar’s involvement with the Ba’ath leadership, her brother, Issam al-Attar, was 
the Supreme Guide of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood from 1963-1980 and exiled from Syria 
since the Ba’athist takeover. 
440 Tabbaa, “Invented Pieties,” 29.  
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tradition, with references to the site dating back before the 12th century, yet it occupied an 
ambiguous space. It was not covered by preservation laws, removing it from the tensions 
of cultural heritage, a pressing concern for newly independent states constructing an 
unbroken historical narrative for themselves. Its previous underdevelopment, emphasized 
by the maraji’ in their appeals for better conditions, and location in the outskirts of 
Damascus had placed it in a state of ‘in-betweenness;’ the sense that the shrine formed a 
frontier between authentic Damascus and the foreign ‘other’ only grew as scores more 
pilgrims began to visit the shrine. A Damascene businessman who had moved from 
Homs in 1981 with his family and owned a travel agency not far from Marjeh Square 
embodied that sense. He noted that he had never been to the Sayyeda Zaynab area, nor 
did he know of anyone who frequented the area. “For what?” he noted dismissively. The 
area had been full of “foreigners” and those who felt no loyalty to the country, those 
displaced that had flooded in since the 1970s. He explained, “It is very different from 
Damascus.”441 The ‘othering’ of the Sayyeda Zaynab nevertheless allowed its expansion 
to proceed with little challenge.442 
Indeed, even as local Syrian Twelver Shi’as continue to frame the site as a 
national landmark, Iranian money and engineering would dramatically transform the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
441 Field notes, interview with Muhammad Khatem, March 15, 2012, Damascus. 
442 The civil war in Syria was raging during my fieldwork in 2012, yet as a result locals were 
more inclined to share their opinions and stories with me, impressed that a foreigner had ventured 
into their country and sought to understand more. Our young and stylish hotel receptionist, Rihab, 
had taken a liking to us, especially with entire floors sitting empty of visitors. On one occasion, 
she offered to drive us from the Sayyeda Zaynab into Old Damascus. When the car reached the 
main throughway, about mile away from the shrine, she discarded her hijab into the back seat. 
“Of course we dress like this in Sitt Zaynab, you know? It is for respect.” The area was a holy site 
for Muslims like her, she explained, so she followed its customs. “But no one dresses like this in 
proper Damascus.” Rihab believed that the Sayyeda Zaynab existed as a distinct milieu from the 
Damascus she understood, yet she acceptance of the norms of the Sayyeda Zaynab. 
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Sayyeda Zaynab into a recognizably Shi’a space. Iranian designs altered the aesthetics of 
the inside spaces, with high ceilings and gilded interiors meant to covey a sense of 
spiritual wonder and “the greatness of Allah.”443 Two minarets, built at 50 meters high 
and engraved with all the attributes of Allah, the names of the Shi’a infallibles, and 
decorated with exquisite stonework, were erected by 1981. By 1984, the outside  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
443 Sūwar al-haram al-sharif, Photographs, Folder 13, Majma’ al-Sayyeda Zaynab li al-Ma’lūmāt 
wa al-Abhāth, Murtadha Family Private Papers, Sitt Zaynab, Syria.  
           (Figure 5.2: New Iranian funded inner dome) 
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(Figure 5.3: New marble courtyards) 
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courtyard had been expanded and laid with imported white marble and the inner dome 
and arches engraved and inlaid in colorful Iranian tile work. The style of architecture had 
become a signature of Iranian investment in renovating Shi’a shrines and holy spaces, 
visually marking the Sayyeda Zaynab as a transnational Shi’a shrine in the mold of Qom 
and Mashhad. 
 
 
(Figure 5.4: New minarets) 
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Revolutionary Iran’s support was not just about finances or aesthetics, however. 
According to a senior Murtadha family member, “The support of our brothers [from Iran] 
was important to confirm for all Ithna’ Ashari Shi’i that this was the only accepted grave 
location of Sayyeda Zaynab.”444 As an avowedly Islamic state, Iran’s acceptance of the 
shrine authenticated and sacralized the site for Shi’a Muslims, delegitimizing other 
locations and sanctioning ziyārat to this site.  
Yet if urban Damascene citizens were more likely to view the expansion of the 
Sayyeda Zaynab with indifference, or as part of the ‘backwards’ outskirts of the city, its 
‘in-betweenness’ still provided a powerful tool in Islamic rhetoric. For Syrian Twelver 
Shi’as, the ornamentation of the shrine emphasized the grandness of space, the 
importance of ziyārat to the shrine, but also the sense of spectacle that transcended 
narrow sectarian definitions. According to Muhammad Bashir Zahdi, chair of the 
National Museum and professor at University of Damascus, “It is one of the most 
important shrines of the Islamic world and a masterpiece of Islamic architecture...To 
witness the beauty of the shrine is to capture your awe.”445 In an introduction to a volume 
published on the Sayyeda Zaynab by the Ministry of Culture, the site was described as a 
paragon of Islamic architecture and history, “in the heart of the Arabs. In Iraq we see the 
destruction of holy places…its historical manuscripts are being burned, and these 
magnificent structures that are deeply rooted in its culture are being damaged and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
444 Field notes, interview with a senior Murtadha family member and head engineer at the 
Sayyeda Zaynab, March 12, 2012, Damascus. The subject requested to remain unnamed. As 
custodians of the shrine, the relatives of Hani and Mohammad Radha Murtadha traveled under 
strict police protection, with regular threats to the Sayyeda Zaynab shrine forcing many to send 
their families out of Syria.   
445 Muhammad Bashir Zahdi, “Maqām al-Sayyeda Zaynab al-Kubrā fi madinah al-Sayyeda 
Zaynab: Tarīkh ‘inshiya’ al-maqām wa anhār al-saqf al-qadīm.” al-Mawsim, 1, No. 4 (1989), 173. 
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destroyed.”446 The Sayyeda Zaynab, a modest shrine just decades earlier, had been 
entirely remade by transnational influences and inhabited by a new mix of locals, 
students, and Shi’a refugees, yet was positioned by Syrian Shi’as as a national beacon. 
The efforts to improve the shrine represented a struggle “for our nation’s civilization and 
the protection of its culture, pride, and glorious history.”447 Unlike Syria’s Ba’athist rival 
Iraq, which was intent on destroying its cultural heritage, the new Sayyeda Zaynab was 
recast as an example of Syria’s great Arab and Islamic heritage.  
 
 
(Figure 5.5: The new shrine) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
446 Muhammad Sa’id al-Tahiri, “Introduction,” al-Mawsim, xi.  
447 ibid, “Introduction,” al-Mawsim, xii.  
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The Religious Tourist at the Sayyeda Zaynab 
 
By the early 1980s, the groundwork to create a major Shi’a shrine to rival Najaf 
and Karbala had been laid by the shrine committee in its appeals to the leading maraji’, 
bureaucrats, and allies. Undoubtedly, the shrine was carefully managed to rival the major 
Shi’a pilgrimage sites; it was a sacred space that emerged in the modern nation-state 
context, onto which various interests could enforce their ideological agendas. While the 
importance of the Sayyeda Zaynab in part grew from geopolitical impulses, with the 
shrine growing as a rival to Najaf, Karbala, and Qom in periods of great instability, the 
broader appeal of ziyārat to the Sayyeda Zaynab cannot be reduced simply to this. 
Indeed, the shrine committee’s recognition of the need for more graveyard space in 1979 
implies that Shi’as already viewed the shrine as a most sacred site and a desired final 
resting place for devotees of the Ahl al-Bayt. The complex appeals of the Sayyeda 
Zaynab were both personal and political; ziyārat became institutionalized with state 
patronage, but za’ireen, merchants, and locals adapted it individually and framed new 
ways of engaging with the site.  
With Syrian and Iranian relations growing closer in the early 1980s, both states 
invested in ziyārat to Damascus by making it easier and cheaper relative to other sacred 
sites.448 In March 1982, Syria and Iran signed trade and tourism agreements through 
which Syria received oil at low cost and Iran was granted the right to send religious 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
448 The anthropologist Sabrina Mervin labeled it the “pilgrimage of the poor” (hajj al-fuqara), 
accessible to those who could not travel to Mecca or the shrines in Iraq for a variety of reasons. 
Mervin, “Sayyida Zaynab: Bainlieu de Damas ou nouvelle ville sainte chiite?”, 151. 
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tourists to Damascus, up to one thousand visitors a week.449 The vast majority of these 
pilgrims were sponsored by the Iranian Martyr’s Foundation (Bonyad Shahid va Omur-e 
Janbazan), which paid for mothers and widows of the ‘martyred’ soldiers of the Iran-Iraq 
war to receive subsidized trips to the Sayyeda Zaynab shrine to compensate and mourn 
for their loss. The Iranian regime supplied these families with cash, and in turn the Syrian 
government provided pilgrims with housing, food, and transportation during their visit to 
the Sayyeda Zaynab. A whole new infrastructure was built to accommodate the mass 
increase in ziyārat to the shrine. Saeb Nahas, a wealthy Syrian businessman, established 
Transtour, the first state-approved group operator for the Sayyeda Zaynab. Transtour 
handled the Iranian pilgrims almost exclusively in the 1980s, securing accommodations 
and managing the itinerary of visits to Syria’s sacred sites; according to the Syrian 
Ministry of Culture, Nahas and the organization performed a critical “economic service” 
to the nation, allowing Syria to capitalize on the “deep devotion for Zaynab al-Kubra.”450 
This was the beginning of the religious tourist to the Sayyeda Zaynab – religious pilgrims 
who traveled in organized groups, were managed by itineraries, engaged in both 
commerce and Shi’a rituals, and returned home with souvenirs to remind them of the 
blessings of ziyārat. 
Zaynab’s shrine had an undeniably powerful resonance for the Iranian 
revolution’s leaders, including as the site of Shari’ati’s grave, and her life provided an 
ideal paradigm to justify and encourage the wide scale sacrifice of young Iranian men. If 
Khomeini valued Fatima as an exemplar of Shi’a femininity, during the war it was 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
449 David Ottoway, “Move Offsets Drop in Arab Support: Syria Turns to Iran as Political, 
Financial Ally,” The Washington Post, December 29, 1983. 
450 “Sharika al-Sayyida Zaynab li al-siyāha wa al-ziyāra mashrū’ al-majma ‘al funduqī”, al-
Mawsim, 25.   
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Zaynab who became a commanding trope. To monitor the public and the advances of 
conservative counterrevolutionary forces, the state formed a female unit known as the 
Khaharan-e Zaynab (or Sisters of Zaynab) to police women’s public modesty, organize 
mass demonstrations, and work in mosques to prepare medicine, repair soldiers’ clothing, 
and send food for men on the front lines.451 Zaynab’s birthday was declared “Nurses’ 
Day” during the Iraq War, with posters and postage stamps issued for the occasion.452 
There was an extraordinary pressure mounted on a public and social level to inspire a 
sense of the righteousness in the mass deaths of soldiers, especially for Iranian women to 
willingly sacrifice in the way that Zaynab knowingly sent her sons, nephews, brothers, 
and companions to die in the name of a true Islam.453 A pilgrimage to the Sayyeda 
Zaynab was to give these women a religious grounding to accept their loss, effectively 
tying them to one of the most revered figures in Shi’ism. Yet while the initial impetus 
behind these groups may have been political, their overwhelming popularity and the 
increase in individual visits suggests that za’ireen saw some potential spiritual or social 
gain from the experience. These ziyārat groups also gave these women some small 
degree of freedom from the constraints they experienced in their daily lives. Though 
traveling within a supervised structure, these women were often permitted to make the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
451 Maryam Poya, Women, Work, and Islamism: Ideology and Resistance in Iran (New York: St. 
Martin’s Press, 1999), 78-80. 
452 Peter Chelkowski, “Iconography of the Women of Karbala: Tile, Murals, Stamps, and 
Posters,” in The Women of Karbala: Ritual Performance and Symbolic Discourses in Moden 
Shi’i Iran, ed. Kamran Scot Aghaie (Austin: The University of Texas Press, 2005).    
453 See Faegeh Shirazi, “The Daughters of Karbala: Images of Women in Popular Shi’i Culture in 
Iran,” in The Women of Karbala, 2005. The rhetoric used to justify the Iranian losses would later 
inspire a new genre of film and literature in Iran. Marjane Satrapi, for example, would famously 
capture the sense of comic tragedy in the destruction of a generation by depicting the gold-plated 
‘key to heaven’ that poor young soldiers were given, her indictment of the false honor they were 
given by the religious guard. See Marjane Satrapi, Persepolis: The Story of a Childhood (New 
York: Pantheon, 2004).  
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trips independently, without individual male companions, and were able to socialize with 
each other in the shrine and bazaar.454 Visiting the Sayyeda Zaynab shrine gave them the 
opportunity to engage with multiple identities – as Shi’as in a sacred space, as Iranians 
participating in an act of national validation, as women collectively visiting the site of a 
female saint, and as individuals who would construct individual meaning.  
Indeed, by the early 1980s, the women arriving at the Sayyeda Zaynab in 
sponsored buses from Iran would encounter a different reality on the ground. The shrine 
committee had allowed the shrine to turn into a transnational space in a relatively short 
space of time, with the tacit acquiescence of the largely secular Syrian regime. From the 
sparse plains of Karbala, Zaynab’s shrine had grown into a bustling commercial space, 
with a new aesthetic, visual culture, and an enlarged bazaar. As part of the planned 
expansion, the shrine committee “created an initial allotment of a bazaar of 25000 meters 
to fulfill the needs of the pilgrims, with 50 shops and 100 vendors, so that seasonal 
objects can be sold.”455 A member of the shrine committee explained the reasoning 
behind the planning of the bazaar,  
We felt we must make Sitt Zaynab a place that za’ireen from all over the 
world will make a first choice as a spiritual destination. For the Shi’i, 
Praise Be to God, we can earn barakat from visiting many different 
places, all over the world, even those places where the descendants of the 
Imams have visited. Of course, the shrine of Zaynab bint ‘Ali is different, 
as [she is] the great victor of Karbala. It is a great honor to those who can 
come to sit inside the haram and pay respect through her to the Ahl al-
Bayt. But they must be able to find conditions that match their needs. We 
must supply them with places to purchase prayer books and rugs, chador, 
aqīq [garnet rings], and gifts for family to share their blessings, all central 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
454 Tabbaa, “Invented Pieties,” 111. 
455 Copy of Amendment of Decree No. 995, 11 July 1981, Folder 13, Majma’ al-Sayyeda Zaynab 
li al-Ma’lūmāt wa al-Abhāth, Murtadha Family Private Papers, Sitt Zaynab, Syria.    
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within the holy grounds of the shrine…The shops had to be part of the 
sacred land of Sitt Zaynab.456    
 
The argument mirrors the responsiveness of marja’ to concerns about comfort 
through the 1950s and 1960s and reveals a concerted desire to transform ziyārat to the 
Sayyeda Zaynab into a spiritually and physically appealing experience. The ability to buy 
and sell faith and pilgrimage created new ways for devotees to imagine and interact with 
Zaynab and her shrine. The link between the bazaar and pilgrimage was certainly not a 
new invention of the Sayyeda Zaynab, as commerce had been a central part of the growth 
of ziyārat to Shi’a shrines. However, at the Sayyeda Zaynab, the planned expansion of 
the bazaar had a different resonance and a unique link with Zaynab’s story. One of the 
central traumas and recurring motifs of the Karbala story is the parading of the female 
survivors through the bazaar outside the Umayyad palace. The bazaar was decorated for 
the arrival, with shopkeepers and residents of Damascus cramming in to the space to see 
the prisoners. Zaynab and the other women of Husayn’s household were de-veiled and 
made to endure hours of ridicule and public spectacle, for these were people that 
supported Yazid’s victory. The bazaar was the heart of Yazid’s cruelty and debauchery, 
the space where the contrast with female piety became clearest. This narrative was turned 
on its head at the Sayyeda Zaynab shrine, where throughout the 1980s the bazaar was 
established and sacralized as part of the shrine space, endorsed by its caretakers and 
selling religious goods to satisfy the demands of pilgrims. Because the bazaar served the 
needs of devotees, it became part of the sacred geography of the shrine, a natural 
extension of the blessings derived at the shrine. While the Hamidiyah bazaar around the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
456 Field notes, interview with a senior Murtadha family member, March 12, 2012, Damascus. 
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Umayyad mosque was a symbol of tyranny and sorrow for the family of the Ahl al-Bayt, 
the growing industry around the Sayyeda Zaynab would become a space where Shi’a 
pilgrims could buy and assert their identity.  
The bazaar grew under the de facto control of the shrine committee, which issued 
permits to prospective merchants and collected rent revenue from the stalls. Yet while the 
stated purpose of the bazaar was to provide necessities to pilgrims, the boundaries of 
what that entailed remained unclear. One such permit, issued in October 1984, noted that 
the particular stall would be selling “prayer rugs, ittar perfume, prayer books,” among 
other items. The stall, like much of the land in the bazaar, was rented to its shop owner, 
Ayyub, for a long-term lease, but all land would be returned to the shrine or renegotiated 
after a period of 25 years.457 Despite the descriptions on the permit of items that could be 
categorized as primarily related to ritual use, both at the shrine and in domestic spaces, 
the bazaar would soon take on a busy life of its own. Very soon after receiving his 
permit, Ayyub noted that the demand from the za’ireen meant that he could stock more 
than his prayer mats and perfume and encountered no opposition from shrine officials. 
Indeed, the increasing number of foreign visitors who brought disposable income with 
them gave him leeway to expand his offerings to match the demand for souvenirs and 
more conventional items. Iranian pilgrims brought trade with them as well, setting up 
makeshift stalls to sell pistachios and using their earnings to buy American and foreign 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
457 Field notes, interview with Ayyub, March 7, 2012, Damascus. All names of interview subjects 
have been changed in this chapter, as fieldwork was conducted during the war in Syria and 
tensions around the Sayyeda Zaynab were heightened with the growing sectarian nature of the 
conflict. Shrine documents presented lease guidelines as between 25-40 years, depending on size 
of plot.  
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manufactured products that were officially banned at home.458 The Sayyeda Zaynab 
formed a different frontier for these pilgrims, allowing them to access their Shi’a identity 
but expand their spiritual and consumption horizons beyond their national boundaries. 
Many would use the profit earned by reselling goods to finance the costs of ziyārat; the 
Iranian State agency Bonjade Mostafasan, funded with the shah’s confiscated wealth, 
charged the martyr’s family members “750 for a one-week pilgrimage to Damascus that 
covers the flight, hotel and $150 in Syrian-currency pocket money.”459 Yet the purchase 
of goods from the Sayyeda Zaynab bazaar would imbue these items with a sense of 
religious approval; this bazaar was morally superior, approved by the shrine committee 
on the sacred land of the shrine and a direct contrast to the Hamidiya souq that secular 
tourists would frequent. Within a year of obtaining a permit, imported watches quickly 
became Ayyub’s most popular items. Pilgrims wanted to give useful gifts that still 
retained the barakat of the Sayyeda Zaynab, he explained. An item used daily “would 
remind them of al-Sayyeda all the time” – a logic that could extend the boundaries of 
‘blessed’ items to anything bought and sold in the bazaar. Ayyub watched the rapid 
transformation firsthand. Merchants quickly realized that shrine officials would take a 
loose approach to monitoring the content of goods sold, he explained. As long as nothing 
sold was “forbidden” (mamnū’), those who received their permits for “religious goods 
very soon changed their stock” to accommodate the pilgrims who wanted to spend their 
savings in the shadow of the holy shrine. “Better here,” he affirmed, echoing a prevalent 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
458 Richard Bernstein, “Syria and Iran are Nurturing a Wary, Ambiguous Alliance,” The New York 
Times, July 5, 1985.  
459 Uli Schmetzer, “Survival outweighs even heavenly honor in pilgrims’ prayers,” The Chicago 
Tribune, April 20, 1987.  
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sentiment. The revenue would help merchants pay their rent, and that rent went to the 
Sayyeda Zaynab shrine committee to continue to improve the shrine.  
 
(Figure 5.6: A stall in the bazaar) 
 
The expansion and the diversification of the Sayyeda Zaynab bazaar was not a 
unique phenomenon amongst Shi’a shrines in the 1980s, especially in the wake of the 
Iranian Revolution and the new regime’s funding of a distinct assertive aesthetic at 
mosques and shrines abroad. The trade in souvenirs emerged at Karbala through the 
commodification of ‘sacred ground;’ Meir Litvak has noted that by the 19th century, the 
production and sale of religious trinkets was a main component of local industry in 
Karbala, even to the chagrin of some more conservative ulama that rejected 
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commoditizing sacred experience.460 At a larger scale, similar marketplaces operated in 
Mashhad, Iran, where the city’s economy was dependent on its relationship with the 
largest mosque in the world and in a country where the link between bazaar and ulama 
was historically strong, as it was at Shi’a shrine sites.461 Yet while the purchase of 
souvenirs was encouraged in Iran through a state system based on Shi’ism, or in Karbala 
through the influence of old merchant-ulama families, the example of the Sayyeda 
Zaynab in Syria was unique. ‘Religious consumption’ in the new bazaar was directly 
planned between the Shi’a shrine committee and the Syrian government, which had a 
substantial economic interest in adapting an accommodating attitude to ziyārat, and 
framed within Zaynab’s own Karbala narrative. It turned the Sayyeda Zaynab region into 
a self-sufficient outpost of Damascus. The pilgrims and scholars who would frequent the 
shrine would have no pressing needs to venture into the main city, further cementing the 
divide between the new shrine space and the older, ‘modern’ urban spaces. In 1986, 
Mohammad Ali Rizvi, a Shi’a Pakistani student arrived at the Jamiat al-Muntazar. “For 
many months I never traveled to Damascus – I never found a good reason,” he noted. 
Interestingly, Mohammad chose to distinguish Damascus as a separate urban entity; the 
distance between the Sayyeda Zaynab and Damascus was not just a physical one. While 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
460 Meir Litvak, “The Finances of the ‘Ulama’ Communities of Najaf and Karbala,” 60.  
461 Afshin Molavi, Persian Pilgrimages: Journeys Across Iran (New York: W.W. Norton & 
Company, 2002). According to Keddie, “The bazaar has long been the economic, social, and 
religious center of towns and cities.” See Nikki Keddie, “Iranian Revolutions in Comparative 
Perspective,” in The American Historical Review, Vol. 88, No. 3 (June, 1983), 579-598; See also 
Ahmad Ashraf, “Bazaar-Mosque Alliance: The Social Basis of Revolts and Revolutions,” in 
International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society, Vol. 1, No. 4 (Summer, 1988), 538-567; 
Meir Litvak, “Continuity and Change in the Ulama Population of Najaf and Karbala, 1791-1904: 
A Socio-Demographic Study,” in Iranian Studies, Vol. 23, No. ¼ (1990), 31-60; Mansoor 
Moaddel, “Shi’i Political Discourse and Class Mobilization in the Tobacco Movement of 1890-
1892,” in Sociological Forum, Vol. 7, No. 3 (Sep. 1992), 447-468.   
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the Sayyeda Zaynab has long officially been defined as within the confines of greater 
Damascus, even pointedly referred to as part of the great Arab capital by Mushin al-Amīn 
and the Murtadha family, Mohammad’s distinction between where he resided and 
Damascus created a mental demarcation between a secular city and the shrine life he 
knew. Mohammad’s view of the Sayyeda Zaynab provided an inverted mirror to the 
reasoning of the Damascene travel agent who felt no need to interact with the foreignness 
of the Sayyeda Zaynab. While Muhsin al-Amīn and the Murtadha family had taken great 
pains to emphasize the ties to an Arab or national character, the shrine was now part of a 
geography of its own. 
Thus, the scenes of a modern sectarian pilgrimage that emerged from the early 
1980s and expanded through political and financial support challenged the idea of a 
dichotomy between faith and materiality, a distinction that had been emphasized by the 
imams in their early tracts on ziyārat. According to sayings attributed to the sixth Imam, 
Ja’far al-Sādiq, any Shi’a undertaking ziyārat of Husayn’s shrine was advised to be “in a 
state of intense grief, with tearful eyes, appearance of being battered with calamities, in a 
state of thirst and starvation” and were warned to observe a very ‘”basic diet.”462 The 
almost wretched description of the ideal pilgrim, one who shunned all physical comfort, 
was a stark contrast with the explicit reasoning behind the creation of the souq. Yet the 
concern for ease or the importance of proper physical conditions was not new, with 
similar arguments driving the expansion and improvements made at the shrine throughout 
the 1950s. Often framed in the language of a religious and spiritual responsibility, these 
projects also made the Sayyeda Zaynab a more desirable destination for Shi’a pilgrims. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
462 Ibn Qulawayh, Kāmil al-Ziyarat, 265 
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The development of the bazaar and the establishment of first officially sanctioned ziyārat 
tour groups in the 1980s, however, projected the shrine outwards into a transnational 
space. Saeb Nahas’ investment grew substantially in the Sayyeda Zaynab area and was 
the face behind much of the commercial development around the shrine, including the 
establishment of the Safir al-Sayyeda Zaynab, the first higher end hotel built in the area. 
In 1988, Nahas founded a commission “for economic coordination between Syria and 
Iran,” with the purpose of building a large hotel and commercial complex close to the 
Sayyeda Zaynab, where foreign pilgrims could benefit from the kind of organized 
services that were still lacking. A note from the mutawalli, Hani Murtadha, to Nahas 
noted the commission “did significant work for the nation” and “the Arabs of his sect.”463 
The focus on the nation and of Nahas as an Arab is noteworthy. Nahas was one of Syria’s 
most wealthy businessman, from a prominent Twelver Shi’a family – a lineage that the 
shrine committee emphasized against charges that they were beholden to Alawi and 
Iranian influences. He was among the small percentage of notable Syrian Shi’a who were 
involved in the shrine affairs, in a period when resistance to Iranian influence and Alawi 
control of the regime had broken out into violent confrontations. “Nahas had what we say 
is ‘hasab and nasab,’” a member of the Murtadha family explained, invoking an Arabic 
phrase to note someone’s lofty status, both in the inherited noble qualities of ancestry and 
in direct lineage and genealogy. “It was important for Syed Hani and Syed Radha to have 
a face just like ours for the development of our lady’s shrine. All of Sayyeda Zaynab’s 
za’ireen come because she calls them. We are only here to serve them. But [Nahas] made 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
463 Memo from Hani Murtadha to Commission of economic coordination between Syria and Iran, 
attn: Saeb Nahas. Majma’ al-Sayyeda Zaynab li al-Ma’lūmāt wa al-Abhāth, Murtadha Family 
Private Papers, Sitt Zaynab, Syria.  Note: the word “shi’a” was used, which as a general noun also 
refers to a sect, in addition to the Shi’a as a proper noun.  
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it more simple to develop the shrine, because he is Arab, and from a well-known 
family.”464 The reliance on Saeb Nahas, both financially and as a figurehead, reveals the 
importance to the Murtadha family of maintaining Syrian Twelver Shi’a control on the 
space. While the land bought for expansion was financed by Iran and money from foreign 
pilgrims helped fund the growth of the bazaar, having an Arab Shi’a ally take on a key 
development role validated the space as important to national interests and allowed the 
Murtadha family to continue their work. In turn, Nahas’ investment in tour groups and 
hotel complexes was a business move, not limited simply by religious sentiment, and 
illustrated the appeal of ziyārat on an economic level.   
 
Buying Barkat   
Indeed, as authorities and merchants encouraged the tourist experience as part of 
ziyārat to the Sayyeda Zaynab, for visitors the purchase of souvenirs and keepsakes 
became a critical part of completing and memorializing the pilgrimage. While Ayyub and 
other merchants quickly found that pilgrims and shrine authorities alike had no qualms 
with expanding the range of offerings in the bazaar, it was still the posters depicting 
scenes from Karbala, wall hangings stitched with hadith and Qurānic verses, prayer 
beads, and other religious trinkets that remained the most popular items. In content and 
form, these items were not substantially different that those sold in other locations – 
indeed, many plastic prayers beads were manufactured in bulk, with identical designs 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
464 Field notes, interview with a senior Murtadha family member, March 12, 2012, Damascus. He 
stated further that the land that the Safir hotel stood on had become extremely valuable with the 
rise of ziyārat, valuable beyond the rate that Nahas was given to entice development. “Keeping in 
mind that the land is extremely valuable and the gains were not sufficient, we undertook 
renegotiations with partners in the 1990s to reach an agreement to give a reasonable share. After 
40 years, the hotel will return to the shrine in totality,” he noted. 
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sold in other locations in Damascus.465 Yet these objects gained meaning from their 
context, perpetuating the experience of pilgrimage and solidifying the purchaser’s active 
participation in a broader community of believers. As Colleen McDannnell has argued, 
many individuals used these mass-produced items in highly personalized, meaningful 
ways that lend the object a ‘traditional’ or ‘hand-crafted’ function.466 
The importance of the commodity in both the construction of identity and the 
delineation of group boundaries has been discussed extensively in an expanding literature 
on material culture, as well as an emerging emphasis on the role of consumer goods in 
promoting nationalist sentiment in the Middle East.467 At Sayyeda Zaynab, both shrine 
authorities and visitors alike echoed the significance of purchasing souvenirs and the 
value placed on the religious token, as the ethos of the religious consumer became an 
ingrained part of the ziyārat experience. Promotional material published by the shrine 
committee discussed the wide-ranging items that could be bought in the surrounding 
bazaars, from “tape recordings of world-famous Qurānic readers to quality silver rings 
made with the holy stones of durhe-Najaf.”468 A pamphlet published and distributed by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
465 Another merchant at the Sayyeda Zaynab bazaar, Ibrahim Haddad, mentioned his cousin 
owned a similar stall at Souq Hamidiyya and they shared stock. He noted that while many similar 
stores stocked cheaper quality beads imported from Turkey and China, they guaranteed their 
stock came directly from Iran and Iraq, “from Qom and Najaf only.” Field notes, March 13, 2012, 
Damascus. 
466 Colleen McDannell, Religion and Popular Culture in America (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1995). 
467 For relevant literature on theories of material culture, see Arjun Appadurai, ed. The Social Life 
of Things (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986) and Susan Strasser, ed. Commodifying 
Everything (New York: Routledge, 2003); also see Relli Schechter, ed. Transition in Domestic 
Consumption and Family Life in the Modern Middle East (New York: Palgrave McMillan, 2003) 
for further discussion of the centrality of consumption in nationalist discourses.  
468 “The Zainabiya Today.” Safar Al-Shaam. (Damascus: Maktab Tabra’at Al- Zaynabi, 2004), 2. 
The durhe-Najaf is the term used for moonstone, considered to be the favored stone of the Imam 
‘Ali. Rings, necklaces, and earrings with the moonstone are often bought by Shiite Muslims for 
protection.  
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the Zaynabiyya Trust mentioned the “barakat of keeping reminders of our Lady’s shrine 
in your home, so that your heart is filled with longing to return. A picture or a taziyeh 
(miniature replica) reminds us that we are the lovers of the Ahl al-Bayt, the chosen few 
amongst Muhammad’s progeny.”469 These discussions show an awareness of both the 
religious and commercial value of souvenirs, promoted as a form of garnering revenue 
for the upkeep of the shrine, but also the critically important ways in which the purchaser 
interprets images, jewelry, and trinkets. It is significant that the word ‘blessings’ is used 
in reference to buying souvenirs or taking pictures. From this standpoint, these items are 
not ancillary to the traditional rituals of ziyārat, such as reading the Qurān or saying one’s 
prayers at the shrine. Rather, these purchases are encouraged as actions that qualify the 
pilgrim for addition blessings because of their ability to perpetuate the experience of the 
pilgrimage. Thus ziyārat is no longer a bounded activity performed at the shrine itself. It 
extends into the realm of memory and representation, where wearing a ring of a specific 
stone or viewing a small replica of Zaynab’s shrine will extend the religious and 
emotional experience of the pilgrimage. 
The belief that these tokens could contract space and time underlies many of the 
purchases at the Sayyeda Zaynab bazaar. Mehjubeen Naqvi, a Shi’a from Pakistan, 
recalled her first ziyārat to the Sayyeda Zaynab in 1989.470 Though Mehjubeen came 
from a devoutly Shi’a upper middle class family from Karachi and had for years longed 
to pay a visit to Zaynab’s grave, something had always interfered with her desire to make 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
469 ibid, Safar Al-Shaam, 3. 
470 Field notes, conversation with Mehjubeen Naqvi, March 11, 2012, Damascus. Mehjubeen was 
on her third trip to the Sayyeda Zaynab, though she acknowledged in our conversation that this 
might be the last for a long time because of the declining political situation. Her group had 
stopped in Mashhad and was cutting the itinerary to Damascus short by three days to return to 
Dubai. 
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the trip. At the time, a ziyārat trip from Pakistan was still a significant undertaking, and 
groups typically set aside up to a month for the long journey, seeking to maximize the 
value of the trip. When she was finally able to make the trip with her husband, 
Mehjubeen’s group spent approximately three weeks in Damascus, staying in mediocre 
apartment lodgings on the outskirts of Sitt Zaynab. They had visited the shrine daily, men 
and women separating to say their prayers, recite majlis in Urdu, and beseech Zaynab for 
blessings. There were days the pilgrims spent hours at the shrine, with transportation 
back and forth to their lodgings somewhat limited. In that time women read Qurān and 
prayed, often overcome with the emotion of being so close to Zaynab, but much of the 
time they spent just being in the shrine, Mehjubeen admitted, chatting amongst 
themselves, sharing snacks, catching a short nap, and then returning to their prayer beads. 
What she was able to describe in most detail about the trip, however, were the two items 
she bought in the bazaar outside the shrine. The first was a silver replica of a cradle, 
known in Urdu as a jhoola, which was a symbol of the martyrdom of Husayn’s six month 
old son ‘Ali Asghar and the empty cradle left to his mother, Umm Rabab.471 Mehjubeen 
brought the jhoola home to install in her private imambargah, a small room full of shrine 
replicas, prayer hangings, and Kabala paraphernalia that she had devoted to majlis and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
471 The two most recognizable symbols in Karbala mourning rituals were the alam (Arabic for 
flag) and the cradle. The alam in devotional rituals could either be a green, black, or red flag, to 
symbolize the flag of the Prophet’s Bani Hashim family, given to ‘Ali and then to Abbas ibn ‘Ali. 
In the subcontinent, an alam was usually a long wooden pole mounted with a silver or metal 
‘panja,’ in the shape of a hand that symbolized the five original members of the Ahl al-Bayt – 
Muhammad, ‘Ali, Fatima, Hassan, and Husayn. If the alam was the symbol of battle, the 
masculine side of Karbala, the cradle represented the loss the women endured and the sacrifices 
they gave of their own body. Ali Asghar was kept thirsty along with the rest of Husayn’s 
companions, and in her thirst Rabab was unable to provide milk. Husayn beseeched his enemies 
to take mercy on the baby, but Ali Asghar was shot through the neck instead, becoming the 
youngest martyr of Karbala.  
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the remembrance of Shi’a martyrs. The jhoola became the centerpiece of her personal 
shrine, and during Muharram, all the ladies who attended majlis in her house sought to 
touch it and ask for their requests.  “The jhoola that comes from the shrine of Zaynab 
carries great barakat,” she explained. “We give our condolences to Umm Rabab and 
Umm al-Masā’ib [Zaynab] when we weep over it, and we feel pain as if we were present 
with them and could give our own children as sacrifice to our Imam.” In turn, that pain 
and narrowing of distance is what caused Zaynab and Rabab to intercede on their behalf. 
The cradle symbolized what Susan Stewart would call the longing of the souvenir. “We 
do not need or desire souvenirs of events that are repeatable. Rather we need and desire 
souvenirs of events that are reportable, events whose materiality has escaped us, events 
that thereby exist only through the invention of narrative,” Stewart has argued.472 The 
jhoola, like other items bought in the bazaar, constructed a narrative of both ziyārat and 
of Marziya’s elationship to Karbala.  
The second item she bought was a pair of earrings for her daughter. The earrings 
were meant to impart on her daughter Zaynab’s protection, carrying with them the 
potency of the shrine. “She wore the earrings every day,” Muhjebeen stated. Unable to 
bring her daughter to the Sayyeda Zaynab, she gifted her a token designed to bestow 
some blessing from the shrine. Interesting, Mehjubeen noted that the earrings still remind 
her of Sukayna, Husayn’s young daughter, whose earrings were ripped from her lobes 
during captivity. The meaning Mehjubeen placed on the jewelry as symbolizing some 
part of the Karbala narrative was a common behavior, echoed by pilgrims purchasing 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
472 Susan Stewart, On Longing: Narratives of the Miniature, the Gigantic, the Souvenir (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 1992), 135. 
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items in the bazaar. Indeed, gifting itself is a social act, one that imbued the object with a 
complex interplay of meanings and purposes.473 During this and her subsequent ziyārat 
trip she brought home an assortment of prayer beads and musallahs (mats) to give as gifts 
to family and friends, those who would appreciate tokens specifically from Zaynab’s 
blessed shrine. For Mehjubeen, like the pilgrims who prayed at the shrine and crowded 
the bazaar, the purchase of items in the bazaar was an assertion of meaning and identity. 
As Arjun Appadurai has theorized, “consumption is eminently social, relational, and 
active, rather than private, atomic, or passive.”474  Buying souvenirs and gifts at the shrine 
allowed Shi’as to create transnational links through objects; a poster or wall hanging 
purchased in Damascus and displayed in Karachi allowed for individual meanings but 
also marked the user as part of a shared experience that transcended local contexts. In a 
period where visual symbols and narrative tropes of Shi’ism were used as powerful 
galvanizing tools, the purchase and exchange of such items from the Sayyeda Zaynab 
shrine was in part an act of asserting one’s Shi’a identity. Surrounded by posters of 
Khomeini, ‘Ali, and Husayn, the stalls in the bazaar were flooded with items that allowed 
pilgrims to continue and share the experience of ziyārat to a sacred Shi’a space.  
Yet the emergence of the Sayyeda Zaynab as a sectarian space would also create 
new differentiations in status and competing ways of ‘being Shi’a.’ With the shrine 
established as a sacred Shi’a site, pilgrims and residents alike constructed their own 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
473 The French sociologist Marcel Mauss was the first to form a theory of exchange and meaning 
around the idea of the gift and its social structure. First published as an essy in 1925 (and in 
English in 1954), Mauss’ theory was a seminal moment for anthropological theory. See Marcel 
Mauss, The Gift: Forms and Functions of Exchange in Archaic Societies (London: Routledge, 
1990). 
474 Arjun Appadurai, “Introduction,” in The Social Life of Things: Commodities in Cultural 
Perspective, ed. Arjun Appadurai (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988). 31.  
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understanding of what that behavior entailed. Fariba Adelkhah has focused on how 
religious tourism has resulted in the diversification and individualization of religious 
activity inside and outside the shrine.475 Edith Szanto and Sabrina Mervin have taken a 
similar approach to the residents of the Sayyeda Zaynab region, examining the 
competition for influence between the various hawzas and demographic groups and the 
Syrian state’s acceptance of these public religious displays.476 Yet visiting za’ireen also 
distinguish themselves in their behavior, even in acts that affirm their participation in a 
community of believers. Marziya is a Syrian Twelver Shi’a who has lived in Sitt Zaynab 
for over 25 years. Her Iraqi husband had moved to the area in the 1980s and enrolled as a 
student at the hawza Zaynabiyya; her father, who had taught at the hawza, had arranged 
their marriage. Marziya organizes weekly majlis lectures at the hawza Zaynabiyya during 
the months of Muharram and Safar, teaches classes during ‘off-season,’ as she terms it, 
and has seen firsthand the evolution of pilgrimage to the shrine. The Pakistanis and 
Indians come in large groups and are the most demonstrative, she noted. The women 
gather to chant lamentations, weep loudly, and beat their chests, both inside the haram 
and in the courtyard. They usually wore traditional shalwar kameez in a range of colors, 
she described, marking them in visual contrast to the Iranians and Iraqi pilgrims dressed 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
475 Fariba Adelkhah, “Moral Economy of Pilgrimage and Civil Society in Iran: Religious, 
Commercial and Tourist Trips to Damascus,” in South African Historical Journal 61(1), 2009, 
31-53. Her focus is primarily in the way that individuals from recent ziyārat groups from Iran 
challenged and subverted the state’s ideology. 
476 Szanto analyzed debates between various hawzas and their chosen marja’ over the legitimacy 
of tatbir, a mourning ritual involving striking one’s head with a sword or knife to draw blood. See 
Edith Szanto, “Following Sayyeda Zaynab.” Sabrina Mervin focuses on the differences between 
public rituals at the Sayyeda Zaynab and among the Shi’a of Hayy al-Amīn, acknowledging, “The 
Syrian state allows these Shiite foreigners to demonstrate their religious particularities.” See 
Sabrina Mervin: “Ashura: Some Remarks on Ritual Practices in Different Shiite Communities 
(Lebanon and Syria),” in The Other Shiites: From the Mediterranean to Central Asia. eds. Silvia 
Naef, Ulrich Rudolph, Gregor Schoeler (Bern: Peter Lang, 2007).  
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primarily in black chador. Most noticeably, according to Marziya, “They buy everything. 
They bring home hundreds of tasbeehs (prayer beads), even the plastic ones. [They buy] 
jewelry, pictures, perfume, bags full.”477 Her sister Fatima adds in English, “the 
shopkeepers know they want to buy everything if you say [it] is from a mazār. ‘This ring 
is from Najaf al-Ashraf,’ they buy. You say, ‘this chador was put inside the dharih [of 
Zaynab],’ and the women will buy it.” 
 Marziya and Fatima passed no explicit judgment on the rush to purchase 
commodities from the bazaar, despite insinuating a certain degree of credulity. Yet as 
locals to the Sayyeda Zaynab, they observed and generalized group behavior. In contrast 
to the Pakistanis, the za’ireen from the Gulf States rarely engaged in the same public 
displays of religiosity. They were wealthier, Marziya explained, and usually stayed in 
their preferred hotels at higher rates. Most notably, however, “the Saudis only buy gold. 
For them, everything is ‘bi’dah,” she explained. Bi’dah, or innovation outside of the 
Qurān and proscribed Sunnah of Muhammad, is a source of much debate in Islamic 
jurisprudence. More conservative Sunni interpretations, including those espoused by 
Wahhabi doctrine in Saudi Arabia, stated that there were no true good forms of bi’dah; 
Shi’a theology has tended to be more permissive of bi’dah, provided it did not contradict 
the Qurān or hadith. Interestingly, Marziya implied that Gulf Shi’as, especially those 
from Saudi Arabia, were willing to undertake ziyārat and spend considerable amounts on 
accommodations but had adapted the Wahhabi view on the purchase of goods from the 
bazaar. They were less inclined to purchase key chains, jewelry, miniatures of the shrine, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
477 Field notes, conversation with Marziya at Sayyeda Zaynab, March 5, 2012, Damascus. 
Marziya and her younger sister Fatima would invite us to a majlis held at the Shirazi hawza 
where she was giving the main lecture. The majlis could normally have hundreds of participants, 
she noted, but with the war the numbers had dwindled.  
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and other paraphernalia, according to Marziya, because they lived in a milieu where such 
practice could be labeled as bi’dah. That ideology had seeped into their own 
understandings of acceptable practice. While they might purchase certain valuables from 
the shrine, their social environment curtailed the practice of sharing gifts or visual 
representations of ziyārat to the Sayyeda Zaynab.  
 
Bibi Pak Daman in the Nizām-e-Mustafa 
The distinctions over the appropriate range of behavior at shrines, including the 
permissibility of purchasing religious trinkets as barakat, were echoed at Bibi Pak 
Daman and in its bazaar, unsettled spaces in a country coming to terms with its own 
identity. Like at the Sayyeda Zaynab, a more assertive brand of Shi’ism shaped the 
debates over the space and the behavior of its pilgrims. Yet the scrutiny over practices 
remained strong, especially as performed by female devotees to the shrine. If Syrian 
Shi’as sought to frame the site as a national landmark or certain pilgrims to the Sayyeda 
Zaynab self-regulated for fears of accusations of bid’ah, the ambiguities of Ruqayyah’s 
shrine illustrate the growing intensity of sectarian pressures against Shi’a rituals.  
By the end of the 1970s, there were significant pressures in Pakistan calling for a 
greater emphasis on Islam and demonstrations of faith in public life. The loss of 
Bangladesh in 1971 and the declaration of the Ahmadis as non-Muslims in 1974 were 
two landmark events in Pakistan’s engagement with Islam as the defining feature of the 
state, setting the precedent for greater demands for a religious system of governance. 
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, an essentially secular politician at the head of a left-leaning party, 
introduced an increasing number of “Shariat” regulations designed to regulate public 
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behavior – a nod to the pressure that Islamic organizations were exerting on the political 
process. Bhutto faced intense competition from a coalition of conservative Islamic parties 
in the elections of March 1977; though the PPP won a strong reelection mandate, the 
party’s manifesto had been repositioned on Islamic grounds. In April 1977, Bhutto 
announced a set of laws banning gambling, horse racing, and the consumption of alcohol, 
and Friday replaced Sunday as an official holiday.478 Despite the widespread 
understanding that Bhutto himself did not abide by these restrictions in his private life, 
the purpose of these measures was ostensibly about “reiterating his determination to 
introduce complete Islamic order in Pakistan…designed to make Pakistan a true Islamic 
State.”479  
Though the rise of Zia ul-Haq in 1977 changed the political culture of the state, 
the trend towards a state-mandated religious culture had thus been on the rise before the 
imposition of martial law. Islamization, however, crystallized these efforts, with Zia ul-
Haq attempting to frame a sanctioned, normative Islam in Pakistan. In addition to legal 
ordinances and constitutional amendments, new laws in the areas of education and 
culture included the replacement of English with Urdu as the national medium of 
instruction, compulsory teaching of religious subjects (Islamiyya) in all levels of 
education, increased emphasis on Arabic in education, and mass distribution of new 
textbooks, many funded by Saudi Arabia.480 In a speech delivered on the death 
anniversary of Muhammad Ali Jinnah, Zia ul-Haq stated that these measures were meant 
“to establish an Islamic social order in Pakistan [and] are the true manifestation of Jinnah 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
478 “New Measures Introduced,” Pakistan Times, April 18, 1977.  
479 The Sun editorial, April 18, 1977, 1.  
480 Muhammad Qasim Zaman, “Sectarianism in Pakistan: The Radicalization of Shi’i and Sunni 
Identities,” in Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 32, No. 3 (Jul., 1998), 699-716. 
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dreams.”481 While martial law hindered legal and political challenges to the new laws, the 
mass mobilization of Shi’as in the wake of Zia ul-Haq’s zakat provisions created a new 
sectarian dynamic.  The concurrent rise of Iran as an Islamic state and the influx of 
funding from Gulf States for madrasas and Sunni ideological agendas framed an 
increasingly violent showdown over what an ‘authentic’ Islamic state could allow. At 
Bibi Pak Daman, geopolitical events, growing anger over Islamic orthodoxy, and 
discomfort over the expanding nature of Shi’a devotionalism made the shrine a 
microcosm for debates.  
The rise of sectarian violence in the early 1980s often emerged around sites of 
worship. Clashes in Karachi in 1982 began a cycle of retaliation, erupting in riots in 
October of 1984 that resulted in five dead and more than 200 wounded, and more died in 
Shi’a-Sunni violence in other major cities.482 Yet conflict over the administration and use 
of sacred space was not limited to inter-sect divides. In 1984, Prime Minister Indira 
Gandhi had ordered the Indian Army to take control of the Golden Temple, the holiest 
shrine in the Sikh religion, and root out Harchand Singh Longowal, the leader of a Sikh 
separatist movement who had barricaded himself within the shrine. The resulting standoff 
resulted in the mass deaths of hundreds of civilians, many who had chosen the temple as 
a space to assert their distinct identity.483  The violence over religious public spaces was 
mirrored in Pakistan. Anger over the Auqaf’s management of shrines and the allowance 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
481 Dawn newspaper, September 11, 1980.  
482 William Richter, “Pakistan in 1984: Digging In,” in Asian Survey, Vol. 25, No. 2, A Survey of 
Asia in 1984: Part II (Feb., 1985), 151. 
483 See “Indian Army Units Surround Holy Sikh Shrine in Punjab,” The Washington Post, Jun. 4, 
1984; Cynthia Mahmood, “Blue Star,” in Fighting for Faith and Nation: Dialogues with Sikh 
Militants (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011). Gandhi was assassinated by two 
of her Sikh bodyguards, four months after Operation Blue Star. 
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of Sufi music led to a major confrontation at Lahore’s Badshahi mosque between 
conservative, Wahhabi-influenced Deobandi followers and Barelvi disciplines, who 
incorporated Sufi veneration of saints and tombs in their practices.484 A tense 
environment reigned at major shrines, with the threat of violence hanging over disputes 
about religious doctrine and practice.  
 
A Shrine Under Attack 
The spreading conflicts between the state’s putative imposition of Islam and the 
traditions of Sufism and Shi’ism quickly reached Bibi Pak Daman, leading the 
government to limit access to the shrine and take over more land. The Auqaf Manager 
noted that for years, Sunni and Shi’a pilgrims had quarreled over a plot of graveyard 
land, but in 1985, a physical confrontation broke out when Deobandi students from a 
nearby madrasa had defaced an ornate Shi’a gravestone and removed the alam installed 
on it. According to the Deputy Commissioner, the students had threatened further 
attempts on the graveyard “as the ornamentation of graves was bid’ah. Both the parties 
desired to utilize this place to promote their religious interests, which is likely to give rise 
to sectarian differences. Keeping in view the tension prevailing in the area and the 
sectarian nature of the dispute, it is requested that this piece of land be acquired and 
closed by the Auqaf Department, in public interest.”485 In response to the aggression by 
madrasa students, the Auqaf Department fenced in the property with armed guards, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
484 Al-Munshir vol. 26, no. 3 (1984)  
485 Letter from Shahid Rafi, Deputy Commissioner to Commissioner, Lahore regarding taking 
over of Khasra No.4740, April 5, 1989. General Records of Darbar Hazrat Bibi Pak Daman, 
Lahore. 
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limiting access to certain hours of the week. Vociferous protests from Shi’a visitors that 
they should be allowed to access the graveyard and perform prayer and ritual were met 
with refusal, based on the need for public order. The protestors had ultimately achieved 
their aims – the state intervened to limit Shi’a public religiosity, deemed as threatening to 
the system in the current situation.   
How rituals change and adapt when access is restricted through the display of 
government policing, however, should also be noted. The heightened presence of security 
became a common sight for pilgrims, both at Bibi Pak Daman and around Pakistan, but 
the presence of metal detectors, fences, and checkpoints undoubtedly altered the flow of 
movement between the surrounding bazaar and the shrine. In turn, shopkeepers and 
residents of the area alike complained that while the government was sometimes 
employed as a mediator between Sunni and Shiite representatives, the vast majority of the 
population viewed the government’s intentions and policies with some suspicion. 
Shopkeepers claimed that government security had affected business by limiting free 
movement of pilgrims who would otherwise buy devotional offerings to leave at the 
shrine.486 The proprietor of a small shop on the northern end of the confiscated lot wrote 
the Auqaf Department in response, questioning by what right the government had 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
486 This would be a frequent and ongoing source of conflict between shrine authorities and 
merchants, as Bibi Pak Daman was a constant target. In 2010, a shopkeeper brought a case to the 
Lahore High Court to demand recompense from the Auqaf Department, which had shut down 
many stalls due to terrorist threats: “till today no unpleasant incident of terrorism ever took place 
in the history of this respected shrine...the petitioner in his old age is being deprived from his 
legal right of profession.” Haji Muhammad Yaqoob vs. Chief Administrator Auqaf, etc, Writ 
Petition 199/2011, Jan. 29, 2011, General Records of Darbar Hazrat Bibi Pak Daman, Lahore. 
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prevented access to this plot and demanding “full returns on rent dating from February to 
this unlawful seizure.”487 
Yet while there existed recriminations against the government’s role in religious 
life, equal criticism was leveled on the pilgrims to Bibi Pak Daman and their practices. 
For critics, the stories that described Bibi Ruqayyah’s life read more like myths than 
factual history; unlike the majority of shrines in Pakistan, its ambiguity was hugely 
problematic for detractors, as it was one of the few shrines for which historical record or 
proof of lineage and descent of the caretakers was sparse. This uncertainty, then, opened 
the shrine and its pilgrims to attack: if there could be no satisfactory proof given for the 
story of Bibi Pak Daman and Bibi Ruqayyah’s existence, then devotees were simply 
engaged in un-Islamic rituals and superstitions – a charge that carries extra weight in 
Pakistan, where sensitivity to long-standing Hindu influences in local religious practices 
abounds.488 The defacing of graves by religious students was one such articulation. Shi’a 
pilgrims also complained to shrine officials that Sunni “agitators” had passed out papers 
questioning the authenticity of Ruqayyah’s grave at the shrine and printing an 
inflammatory quote from the Qurān. “The Auqaf Department must intervene to stop this 
act of provocation and the unjust invocation of the noble Qurān, to which all Muslims lay 
faith,” urged the letter.489 The outright rejection of Ruqayyah’s grave and the shrine itself 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
487 Letter from Azhar Ali to Secretary Auqaf, Lahore, Memo No. ACW-ML-34/2, Oct. 21, 1985, 
General Records of Darbar Hazrat Bibi Pak Daman, Lahore. 
488 See Akbar S. Ahmed, Resistance and Control in Pakistan (London: Routledge, 1983) and 
Katherine Ewing, ed, Shari’at and Ambiguity in South Asian Islam (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1998).  
489 Letter from Chairman, Anjuman-e-Nisaran-e-Ruqayyah Kubra bint ‘Ali to Chief 
Administrator, Auqaf, Lahore, Memo No. ACW-3-14-LM, Oct. 15, 1985. General Records of 
Darbar Hazrat Bibi Pak Daman, Lahore. The quoted Qurān verse read: “Surely whoever 
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had a clear logical endpoint in the context of national discourse - those that flocked to the 
shrine to give offerings, pray at the graves, and seek miracles from these saintly women 
could be committing shirk, or the veneration of inanimate things as objects of worship.490 
Indeed, the charge that pilgrims to Sufi shrines were engaged in un-Islamic behavior was 
a common one in the 1980s, but that Ruqayyah’s narrative was distinctly Shi’a made Bibi 
Pak Daman a more prominent target for those critiques. Belief that saints had the ability 
of intercession and in the infallibility of the twelve Imams had long been a challenge to 
Shi’a theology, as more conservative Sunni doctrines believe the Qurān prohibited 
praying to anyone but Allah and the Prophet. But ziyārat to an entirely false shrine would 
thus be superstition at best, and at worse, falling wholly outside the bounds of Islam.  
 These very concerns about misleading superstition were echoes of those voiced 
decades earlier in Javid Iqbal’s tracts, concerns that first prompted the creation of the 
Auqaf Department. The Auqaf ordinances issued through the 1960s and 70s were in part 
an attempt to normalize these practices and bring rhetoric about shrines and mystics in 
line with ‘conventional’ Islamic beliefs, endorsed by the state. While Zia ul-Haq’s power 
was never enough to uproot the deep ties that devotees had to saints or shrines, the 
accepted context for understanding these sites changed. The correct justification for the 
visitation of shrines, according to official and orthodox positions, was because they were 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
associates [others] with Allah, then Allah has forbidden to him the garden, and his abode is the 
fire; and there shall be no helpers for the unjust.” (Surah al’Mā’ida). 
490 Shirk was considered a refutation of the first principle of Islam: tawhīd, or the oneness of God. 
Thus, a practice associated with shirk was fundamentally un-Islamic and was an accusation 
frequently leveled by Wahhabi and Deobandi Sunni followers at Shi’a and Sufi veneration of 
saints and shrines. The concept of shirk was often applied in general to reject figural 
representations and imagery in Islam, yet the lived realities were often much different. For more 
see, G.R. Hawting, The Idea of Idolatry and Finbarr Barry Flood, “Between Cult and Culture: 
Bamiyan, Islamic Iconoclasm and the Museum,” in Art Bulletin, 84.4, 2002. 
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primarily sanctified places of prayer. When the identity of the saints could be ‘verified,’ 
proponents could argue that they were praying to personalities that were known in their 
own time for their miracles and piety, as Auqaf Department materials explained during 
Zia ul-Haq’s time. At Bibi Pak Daman, however, even devotees believed that the graves 
were representative, not real, and its history was far more uncertain.  
 The concept of pilgrimage to Bibi Pak Daman represented only part of the 
critique, however, as the rituals that pilgrims engaged in at the shrine were equally open 
to censure; on the surface, many appeared to mirror those enacted at Hindu temples. 
Devotees brought offerings to Bibi Pak Daman in the hopes that these items would 
facilitate a return of blessings, spreading flower petals over the graves to show their 
respect. A commonly observed ritual at the shrine was the distribution of traditional 
sweets with rings embedded in them. Pilgrims who wanted to make a request of Bibi 
Ruqayyah would pick a sweet and wear the ring until the wish was granted. When the 
wish was fulfilled, the pilgrim gave a return to Bibi Ruqayyah and her shrine, leaving 
more sweets with rings as thanks and allowing future pilgrims to continue the wish cycle. 
This cyclical relationship embodies what Pnina Werbner has dubbed “sacred exchange,” 
and what anthropologists John Eade and Michael Sallnow have termed the “self-
interested exchange between human beings and the divine.”491 This exchange allowed 
pilgrims to commoditize blessings and gratitude, with rings and sweets symbolizing 
divine intervention. Another manner of requesting intercession was for devotees to tie red 
string on the marble lattice that shields the central grave or deposit a lock to symbolize a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
491 See Pnina Werbner and Helen Basu, eds, Embodying Charisma: Modernity, Locality, and the 
Performance of Emotion in Sufi Cults (London: Routledge, 1999) and John Eade and Michael 
Sallnow, Contesting the Sacred: The Anthropology of Pilgrimage  (London: Routledge, 1991), 
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mannat – a vow made to a saint for future offerings in exchange for the granting of a 
wish. When these wishes were granted, the pilgrim returned to the shrine to remove the 
threads and locks and deposit sweets, flowers, or donations to the shrines’ upkeep. 
Pilgrims burned incense and candles as they beseeched Ruqayyah for intercession, and 
the oil and ash residue were buried due to their sacred essence, rather than discarded.  
 
(5.7: Mannat locks at Bibi Pak Daman) 
 
Locks, thread, flowers, sweets, jewelry, incense and all the other items needed for 
these rituals and prayers were sold in the surrounding bazaar, blurring the line between 
religion and consumption and raising questions about causality – whether the presence of 
these commodities created ritual or the existence of these rituals created the demand for 
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commercial goods. Yet the ubiquity of these items and the associated rituals were not 
without censure. In an article published by a local magazine and obtained by the Auqaf 
Department for its files, the writer lambasted the Ahl al-Shi’a for “the practice of 
Hinduanna rituals [which] are condemned. Mithai (sweets) and garlands are poojah 
worship.”492 Equating rituals at Bibi Pak Daman with poojah, the practice of worshipping 
Hindu deities, was a powerful critique, again invoking the idea of shirk and un-Islamic 
behavior. For a nation born out of the notion that Muslims could not co-exist amongst a 
Hindu majority, the charge that pilgrims at Bibi Pak Daman were replicating Hindu 
customs was both a charge against Islamic orthodoxy and the idea of Pakistan. The 
presence of the article in the Auqaf records indicates that shrine authorities were 
constantly aware of the condemnation leveled against the shrine, including the effect that 
these critiques could have for the delicate balance on the ground. Nor was the criticism 
limited to tokens like sweets and flowers. The Auqaf Manager was strongly advised to 
limit the mehndi rituals at the shrine, as they were causing discord.493 The use of mehndi, 
or henna, was common in marriage rituals in the subcontinent and was a symbol to 
invoke the martyrdom of Qasim ibn Hassan, Husayn’s young nephew. Some Shi’a 
traditions note that Husayn had made a promise that his daughter would marry his brother 
Hassan’s son; knowing that death was coming in Karbala, Qasim was wed before Ashura. 
This particular narrative remains a source of some disagreement within Shi’a 
historiography, with many recent scholars questioning the presence of marriage rituals in 
such a somber night. The use of mehndi nevertheless became a highly ritualized, 
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Zone, Lahore. Nov. 25, 1987. General Records of Darbar Hazrat Bibi Pak Daman, Lahore. 
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syncretic means of marking the events at Karbala and requesting the intercession of Shi’a 
infallibles in marriage matters, a ritual that clearly earned censure at Bibi Pak Daman.   
 While many of these practices occurred at shrines around the country, certain 
rituals had added meaning at Bibi Pak Daman, such as mehndi. Others were more 
exclusively associated with Bibi Pak Daman. During the month of Muharram, a pure 
white horse was paraded through the narrow lanes of the bazaar, representing Zuljanah, 
the horse of Imam Husayn who carried him in Karbala and then disappeared in grief over 
the death of his master. At Bibi Pak Daman, people stood on both sides of the bazaar and 
paid respect to the Zuljanah, many showering the horse with flowers and other offerings 
as a sign of honor.494 The Auqaf Department often suspended the Zuljanah procession in 
periods of heightened tensions, incurring the anger of Muhammad Bakhsh Shah Qureshi 
and other Shi’a members of the community.495 Despite the defense that the Zuljanah was 
merely a representation of Husayn’s suffering at Karbala, the reverence shown to a mere 
animal was viewed as symbolic of the un-Islamic nature of Sufi and Shiite belief, while 
the practices of pilgrims at the shrine were condemned as deriving from neighboring 
Hindu rituals.  
 In addition to the scrutiny over devotional acts and rituals, Bibi Pak Daman in 
particular was associated with female religious practice and concerns, which have often 
been labeled by scholars and devotees alike as distinct and more ‘folk’ than the male-
dominated Islamic orthodoxy. Discussions of women’s religious practice have long 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
494 David Pinault has extensively studied Shi’a devotional rituals in the subcontinent and the way 
that transnational symbols and narratives are adapted and challenged within the community. See 
David Pinault, Horse of Karbala: Muslim Devotional Life in India (New York: Palgrave 
McMillan, 2001) and The Shiites: Ritual and Popular Piety in a Muslim Community (New York: 
St. Martin’s Press, 1992). 
495 See chapter 4  
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pointed to its fluidity and adaptability, but also the way women have often been forced to 
deviate from proscribed, text-based practices by the rejection of their presence in state-
sanctioned rituals;496 this view of women’s religious devotion was particularly 
pronounced at Bibi Pak Daman. In fact, it was often regarded as a shrine that catered 
toward female concerns, and for many years the presence of men within the shrine 
courtyard was a source of great controversy. So feminized had the shrine become that 
local hagiographies claimed that the trees present within the courtyard of the shrine had 
once possessed great barakat and shif’a (healing) in the leaves, but as men began visiting 
the shrine, the trees lost much of their miraculous abilities. According to local traditions, 
the most common practice at Bibi Pak Daman related to wishes about children and 
conception.497 In addition, while ‘folk’ religious practice was most commonly linked to 
class divisions, rooted in Iqbal’s view that poorer and more rural populations were more 
susceptible to religious syncretism and needed the education of the Auqaf Department, a 
large cross-section of classes was represented amongst women pilgrims at Bibi Pak 
Daman.498 The charge that women were more susceptible to superstition was a common 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
496 Mary Elaine Hegland in particular has done much work on Shi’a female devotional practice in 
Pakistan and women’s growing participation in rituals as a result of a new religious 
transnationalism. She argues, “Shi'a Muslim women in Peshawar, Pakistan have increasingly 
faced restrictive ritual constructions of femininity and fundamentalist ideology… Rather than 
denying or contradicting symbolic and verbal deprecations of femininity outright, they have 
devoted themselves to the commemorative rites for the Shi'a martyr, Imam Husein. They have 
used these rituals to develop their own self-confidence, performance abilities, entertainment, 
fame, and social support, disclosing through the performative aspects of their ritual activity, their 
agency, and transformative achievements.” See Mary Elaine Hegland, “Flagellation and 
Fundamentalism: (Trans)Forming Meaning, Identity, and Gender Through Pakistani Women's 
Rituals of Mourning,” in American Ethnologist, Vol. 25, No. 2 (May, 1998), 240. 
497 Khaki, Bibian Pak Daman, 32-33. 
498 Zehra Niaz and the Bibi Pak Daman Trust represent an upper class of women engaged with the 
shrine. According to a bazaar merchant recently quoted in a local news article, “Mostly women 
believe in the ladoo [traditional sweet] myth. Many educated women from posh areas like the 
Defence Housing Authority, Gulberg, and Cantt visit the shrine with a hope that their wishes will 
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one, but it certainly gained more traction in the context of Bibi Pak Daman, where 
women and their spirituality were the focal point of both the narrative associated with the 
shrine and the practices that occurred within it. Indeed, the gender dynamics at Bibi Pak 
Daman were unique amongst the most popular Sufi sites in Pakistan, where shrines to 
female saints are extremely rare and the division of space and gender conventions at 
many large shrines result in a substantially larger male presence.  
 Yet despite its perception as a feminine shrine – both in identity and the concerns 
it represented – it was nevertheless inserted into a male-dominated government 
bureaucracy, coming under attack from those whose vision of legitimate Islamic practice 
conformed to strict patriarchal control and limiting the influence of feminine and local 
traditions. Indeed, an increasing number of complaints were lodged with Auqaf officials 
against women pilgrims at the shrine, who were insistent on their mourning rituals but 
prone to become overemotional. A court injunction was taken out against Parveen and 
Nawab Bibi in 1985, ordering that they “shall not deliver any speech or raise any slogan 
for a period of TWO MONTHS,” the duration of the months of Muharram and Safar. The 
order noted that the two women “delivered objectionable speeches in the past…and 
uttered words which tended to create sectarian hatred. They have not been persuaded by 
reason.” In light of the tensions prevailing in Lahore and around the country, the law had 
to step forward to put a halt to the brewing conflict.499 Yet these women were not content 
to accept the state’s restrictions. In an affidavit responding to the court’s ruling, the two 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
come true.” Ali Usman,“Bibi Pak Daman – A place of solace for everyone.” The Daily Times, 
January 15, 2008.  
 
499 Memo from District Magistrate, Lahore, to Madam Parveen Dukhtar [daughter] Nawab Bibi, 
No. RDM/DPO, Sept. 23, 1985, General Records of Darbar Hazrat Bibi Pak Daman, Lahore. 
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women argued that they “must be allowed to gather at Darbar Bibian Sahiba and express 
their unity with Bibi Zaynab on the holy day of Safar. This [ruling] severely prejudices 
[their] religious freedom and harms the expression of faith.”500 The insistence that these 
women be allowed to hold majlis on the 24th of Safar, Zaynab’s death anniversary, was 
critical for understanding how Bibi Pak Daman functioned for these women. The majlis 
was medium for assertiveness, both of their identities as Shi’a and the particular bond 
they more generally felt for the women of Karbala. In the face of a male authority 
structure seeking to empty the shrine of emotional consequence, women like Parveen and 
Nawab Bibi challenged the boundaries of state controlled religiosity.  
 
 
A Shrine in Sacred Geography  
 
To a large degree, it was the unsettled nature of Bibi Pak Daman and the 
arguments over its function that allowed these conflicts to take on a more charged 
valence. Even as anthropologists and historians of religion have analyzed the complex 
meanings ascribed to pilgrimage, the notion of the shrine occupying a central space in the 
lived and imagined identities of devotees remained a salient one. For many faiths, 
however, and most certainly Shi’ism, multiple centers of this sort existed, places that 
possessed an emotional valence for believers and, linked together, construct a map of 
sacred geography. These linkages were prominently illustrated in the narratives, use of 
space, and bazaar surrounding Bibi Pak Daman. Both ritual practice and the commodities 
and souvenirs sold at the shrine emphasized a duality that existed as a result of this notion 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
500 Letter to Shahzad Hassan Pervez, District Magistrate, Lahore from Nawab Bibi bint 
Muhammad Qizilbash, Nov. 1st, 1985, General Records of Darbar Hazrat Bibi Pak Daman, 
Lahore. 
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of expansive and interconnected sacred space, where both the specific place and the 
places alluded to coexist. Ruqayyah’s story was incomplete without reference to the great 
names of Shi’ism, such as ‘Ali, Husayn, Zaynab, and her husband, Muslim bin Aqīl. 
Indeed, it is her very association with these figures that made her story relevant and her 
shrine a place of special stature. She was, of course, revered for her singular role in 
spreading Islam in the subcontinent, but it is the references to these other better-known 
narratives that frame the contours of her story. Beginning with ‘Ali’s will, her story 
wound through her husband and sons’ martyrdom in Kufa, Husayn’s sacrifice in Karbala, 
and Zaynab’s sorrows and trials in Damascus. Her shrine, then, functioned 
simultaneously as a place for devotees to gather to seek her intercession and as a local 
conduit to a wider religious space. Medina, Najaf, Karbala, Damascus – all the holiest 
sites and most emotive images were brought together in this small and unassuming 
complex in the crowded alleys of Lahore. For women like Parveen and Nawab Bibi, Bibi 
Pak Daman was a place for them to access narratives of mourning for Zaynab and the 
other martyrs of Karbala. 
These connections were made explicit in the surrounding bazaar to Bibi Pak 
Daman, a narrow street filled with numerous small stalls that overflowed with posters, 
books, prayer beads, cloth embroidered with prayers and invocations, jewelry, silver 
alams, and other paraphernalia. The items sold at the Bibi Pak Daman bazaar illustrate 
how ties to other Islamic figures and sacred sites was promoted, bringing them into closer 
proximity with Ruqayyah’s shrine. While a small number of books were sold about the 
history of Bibi Pak Daman, the vast majority of literature in the bazaar was about the 
lives of the Prophet Muhammad, his daughter Fatima, Zaynab, or the twelve Shiite 
	   295	  
Imams. Similarly, prayer compilations and almanacs were popular items, and the contents 
and instructions in these books are attributed to the Prophet and the Imams. Amongst 
stickers and posters with prayers, the most common are those imprinted with the prayer 
Naad-e-‘Ali, a short prayer that was said to have been revealed to Prophet at the Battle of 
Khaybar, instructing those in difficulties to call on the intercession of ‘Ali. While the 
Auqaf department owned some of the land of the bazaar, large portions had fallen out of 
public control through encroachment. As such, the Auqaf Department had limited ability 
to monitor all the goods sold. A resident of the Bibi Pak Daman region filed a complaint 
with the Auqaf Department that a shopkeeper had been loudly playing the lecture on 
sajda (acceptance of God’s will) and the events after the night of Ashura, recited by 
Rasheed Turabi, a Shi’a scholar whose fiery lectures had been deeply popular before his 
death in 1973. The Auqaf Manager recommended his assistant speak to the shop owner, 
yet little could be done to enforce any decisions because the land was outside Auqaf 
control.501 The bazaar land has largely been privately owned, according to the manager of 
the Auqaf Department at Bibi Pak Daman, despite attempts by the Auqaf and Bibi Pak 
Daman Trust to reclaim the original waqf allotment of land. Thus, the exchange of 
religious commodities conducted outside the shrine often existed outside the realm of 
explicit religious or government control.502 Yet these shopkeepers capitalized on the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
501 Letter to Assistant Manager for Waqf Properties, Sector V, from Administrator Auqaf Central 
Zone. [trans.] 6th June 1988. General Records Darbar Hazrat Bibi Pak Daman, Lahore. 
502 Field notes, interview with Mian Muhammad Syed, Head of Auqaf Division, Bibi Pak Daman, 
January 3rd, 2011, Lahore. Currently, a collective board forms the de-facto governing structure of 
the shopkeepers, and the faces of these members are displayed prominently in the main bazaar 
area. Interestingly, this billboard also includes a picture of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, 
chairman of the Pakistan Muslim League (N) and a politician whose deep ties to Punjab remain 
the basis of his support. The picture of Sharif is merely one element in the mix of sectarian, 
regional, and national interests that surround Bibi Pak Daman. 
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sacred connections of Bibi Pak Daman, understanding the demand and encouraging the 
purchase of a range of goods that invoked Shi’as most revered personalities.  
 What is notable, then, is that the protests did not always relate to Ruqayyah, but to 
the concept of the shrine itself. Only some of what was sold the bazaar directly 
referenced Ruqayyah herself, because the variances in her narratives allowed 
interpretations that stretched beyond the specific contours of her life. The bazaar 
reinforced that Bibi Pak Daman’s spiritual power drew in part from the sacred spaces that 
it could invoke. It was valued both for its specificity and its ambiguity, the latter of which 
was reflected in the few items sold in the bazaar that were specific to the shrine. In his 
book of Sufi devotional posters, scholar Jurgen Wasim Frembgen notes that the 
devotional posters gathered from Bibi Pak Daman were distinct. Unlike posters from a 
wide range of shrines for Sufi saints, the devotional images specific to Bibi Pak Daman 
merely depict the shrine itself,   
Following Islamic moral rules, there is of course no imagined figural 
representation of the female saints, but the depiction of the shrine is taken 
as a kind of synecdoche for them. Basically, the picture consists of a 
photograph showing the sanctuary, courtyard, and some devotees with 
additional sketched contours on the green flag and on the tomb in the 
foreground. The light blue sky is filled with inscriptions in Arabic, namely 
the formula ya hayy, ya qayyum (‘Oh the alive, of the self-sustaining’) and 
the invocation of the five members of the holy family (ahl al-bait). The 
view of the shrine is elaborately framed including a cartouche mentioning 
the name of the saint and of the artist.503 
 
 
Another poster, obtained in the bazaar of Bibi Pak Daman, depicts a very similar image 
of the inner mausoleum, surrounded by devotees performing their ziyārat rituals. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
503 Jurgen Wasim Frembgen. The Friends of God: Sufi Saints in Islam (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2006), 17.  
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Frembgen’s point about the lack of figural representation specifically of female saints 
seems to hold true, as the portraits of Shiite personalities in the bazaars of the Sayyeda 
Zaynab and Bibi Pak Daman were solely of the male Imams. Because the veiling and 
purity of the women of Shi’ism was central to its own narrative and self-fashioning, any  
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(5.8: Bibi Pak Daman Poster) 
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images of these women are of fully covered figures, their identities ambiguous and 
obscured. The only image associated with Ruqayyah in the bazaar is in replicas of “The 
Night of Ashura,” by famed Iranian miniature master Mahmud Farshchian, which depicts 
veiled women weeping over Husayn’s rider-less horse in Karbala. This same picture is 
most commonly associated with Zaynab and used to illustrate narratives of her suffering.  
 
(Figure 5.9: ‘Evening of Ashura’) 
 
Indeed, despite the narratives about their lives that were developed through the 20th 
century and the political and spiritual investment in their shrines, as women the recorded 
histories of Ruqayyah and Zaynab were limited. Yet the anonymity of these women 
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allows these images to take on multiple valences. Indeed, reproductions of the “The 
Night of Ashura” were amongst the most popular images sold at the Sayyeda Zaynab 
bazaar, covering books on Karbala, calendars, and magazines on Shi’a subjects. In the 
use of this image to represent Ruqayyah, her personality and her suffering are 
generalized, her story linked to events that she may or may not have witnessed and to all 
the women who sacrificed and mourned for Husayn. The common images found at Bibi 
Pak Daman and the Sayyeda Zaynab tie the two women together in collective suffering, 
in both their general presence as witnesses to Karbala and the specific ways their shrines 
allow believers to access these narratives.    
 The malleability of images of these women was similarly echoed at the Sayyeda 
Zaynab. One of the most prominent images in the bazaar was one made famous during 
the Iranian Revolution and the war with Iraq, published as a commemorative poster on 
Zaynab’s death anniversary by the Islamic Republic Party, or Hezb-e-Jumhuri-e Eslami. 
Chelkowski describes the poster: 
Two crowds of women appear in this poster. The first group is composed 
of women in white chadors (symbolically representing shrouds and 
readiness for martyrdom) who ride camels while holding in their arms the 
severed heads of their martyred male relatives. The camels are chained 
together to symbolize captivity. In the second group is a multitude of 
women wearing black chadors with clenched fists stretching away to the 
horizon. The women wearing white chadors represent the courageous 
captive women of Karbala….the black chadored [sic] women represent 
contemporary Iranian females supporting the war efforts against Iraqi 
aggression. A large silhouetted woman in a white chador looms out of the 
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crowd of contemporary women and smashes the Ommayyad/Pahlavi 
crown with her fist.504 
 
The image was clearly a product of its context, yet it shifts when brought into the 
Sayyeda Zaynab and Bibi Pak Daman bazaars. Its presence at the Sayyeda Zaynab and 
Bibi Pak Daman shrines ties these shrines – and these women – to an assertive 
interpretation of the role of women on Shi’a historiography. For the merchants that sell 
the poster and devotees that buy it, the image is given a context broader than the Iranian 
Revolution. Yet its ubiquity also underscores David Morgan’s emphasis on the ‘sacred 
gaze,’ that the act of seeing and social and cultural constructions of belief are what create 
the image’s meaning.505  
 
Women and the Female Shrine 
The general sacredness of Bibi Pak Daman was often used as a substitute for 
Ruqayyah’s identity; as a consequence, while devotees certainly thronged to the shrine 
for spiritual benefits, details about the specific identities of the women buried there were 
much less emphasized. Nevertheless, the shrine remained a popular destination for 
women, many recalling their visits there as a rite of passage. Asma Rizvi, a middle-aged 
visitor from the Gulberg section of Lahore, noted that her mother had routinely brought 
her and her sister to Bibi Pak Daman throughout her childhood. Every few months, or 
“whenever she was most in need of our Bibi’s intercession,” her mother would arrive at 
the shrine with sweets and a green strip of cloth to tie around the grill of the gravesite to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
504 Chelkowski, “Iconography of the Women of Karbala,” 127-129. 
505 David Morgan, The Sacred Gaze: Religious Visual Culture in Theory and Practice (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2005)  
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bond her wish to Ruqayyah. Yet Asma had only heard Ruqayyah referred to as “Bibi” for 
years of these visits; “I only learned in truth who she was many years later, and even now 
I am not sure of those women buried here with her,” she admitted.506 She still recalled, 
however, in vivid detail the certainty that her mother and her circle of frequent visitors 
felt at the power of the shrine and its Bibi to deliver blessings, even attributing positive 
news that they had not specifically prayed for to the intercession of Bibi Pak Daman. 
They always made sure to read the Hadith-e-Kisa while at the shrine, she remembered, 
noting that it was important for her now to always recite this prayer at Bibi Pak Daman to 
honor Ruqayyah’s esteemed family.507 Asma herself had begun to frequent the shrine 
later in life, years after she became fully aware that it was Ruqayyah bint ‘Ali buried at 
Bibi Pak Daman. It was only when she was preparing to send her eldest daughter away to 
Canada for college in 1998 that she came to the shrine to seek comfort. Her mother had 
suggested bringing her daughter to do girvee at the shrine, a ritual in which a devotee 
would tie a thread rubbed against the shrine to a loved one to give them over in protection 
to the saint.508 She returned to Ruqayyah’s shrine after years away and bought incense 
and flowers at one of the many stalls outside the shrine, the quantity of which had 
increased exponentially since she had last visited. At the shrine, she had used string from 
all the six graves to tie around her daughter’s wrist, to give her as much blessing and 
protection from Bibi Pak Daman as she could, echoing an act her mother had likely 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
506 Field notes, conversation with Asma Chaudhry, January 6, 2011, Lahore. 
507 The Hadith-e-Kisa is a narrative that Shi’a Muslims recite as foundational text for the 
legitimacy of the Imamate, passing through ‘Ali and Fatima. In this account, the Prophet 
Muhammad was said to have gathered Hassan, Husayn, ‘Ali, and Fatimah under his cloak and 
labeled them his Ahl al-Bayt.  
508 Girvee in Urdu was also used as a word to mean ‘pawn’ or ‘protect,’ to give over an object to 
someone to keep in protection for a certain time.  
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performed years earlier. Apart from Ruqayyah, “no one knows if it is her daughters or her 
husband’s sisters,” she admitted; nevertheless, she believed that to be buried alongside 
Ruqayyah they must all be blessed, and there could only be benefit to beseeching all the 
women that were buried at Bibi Pak Daman. Finding comfort in her visit, regardless of 
the personalities buried at the shrine, Asma would visit the shrine to pray for good exam 
grades, a sick relative, and in times of concern for her family.  
The commodities sold in the bazaar of Bibi Pak Daman reflect the very 
malleability of meanings associated with the shrine, allowing women to engage with the 
site in multiple ways. The proliferation of items associated with other figures of Shi’ism 
indicates the intrinsic duality of Bibi Pak Daman: Ruqayyah’s presence was important in 
the local context, even as the shrine itself functioned as a portal of sorts, linking devotees 
in Pakistan to a broader sacred geography. Posters of the dual shrines of Husayn and 
Abbas in Karbala were sold alongside silver and gold plated alams and replicas of baby 
cradles. The items bought in the bazaar were brought into the space of the shrine to 
sacralize, often rubbed against the grill marking Ruqayyah’s grave, with Bibi Pak Daman 
representing a place where women could access the blessings and sacred space of 
Karbala. Mehnaz Begum, a member of a prominent Shi’a family, noted that the alam for 
her family’s large Muharram commemorations came yearly from Iran or Iraq, but before 
the first of Muharram the alam was taken to Bibi Pak Daman to musk (rubbed against the 
grill protecting Ruqayyah’s mausoleum for blessing) and then installed for their large-
scale Muharram rituals. Her family’s roots were in the Mohalla Shi’a, in the old walled 
city of Lahore’s Mochi Darwaza neighborhood. The Muharram commemorations in 
Mohalla Shi’a were amongst the oldest and fiercest displays of ritual in Pakistan, with 
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hundreds pouring into the narrow streets to listen to majlis sermons, recite lamentations 
and perform matam (striking of one’s chest), including with knives, and take part in the 
Zuljanah processions. When Mehnaz Begum was a young girl in the 1970s, the young  
 
(Figure 5.10: Alams and cradles at Bibi Pak Daman) 
 
Shi’a men from Mochi Darwaza had enrolled in droves in the Pakistan army; “they used 
to come do matam in their uniforms and the walls would shake,” she remembered. “Just 
like they would always come back during Muharram, the women would always go to 
Bibian Sahiban with our main alam and give condolences to Ruqayyah for the 
martyrdom of her brother.” The alams at Mochi Darwaza still continued to stop at Bibi 
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Pak Daman, she noted, as did the Zuljanah process.509 The tradition that tied an alam in 
its journey from the major shrine cities of Iran and Iraq to the center of Shi’a ritual in 
Lahore went through Bibi Pak Daman, bringing the events of Karbala and the tragic 
aftermath the women suffered together into the focal symbol of devotional practice. It is 
in these ties that transcended time and space that the shrine drew its power and relevance, 
and the interplay between narrative, consumption, and ritual continuously affirmed Bibi 
Pak Daman’s importance in relation to the larger Islamic (and Shiite) shrines. Yet it also 
created separate spheres for men and women. The men, fully garbed in visual displays of 
masculinity, performed ritual self-flagellation and bloodletting, echoing the sacrifice of 
the men at Karbala. The women, in turn, travel to Bibi Pak Daman to sacralize the alam.  
Indeed, it is not only in the surroundings of the shrine does one encounter the way 
women narrow distance between themselves and Karbala, with the courtyard around the 
mausoleum often devoted to remembrance of other revered Shi’a figures. On important 
days in the Islamic calendar pilgrims thronged to the shrine from all parts of Pakistan, 
converging on this focal point as a space for celebrating and mourning the lives of 
martyrs. According to Mian Muhammad Syed, Head of the Auqaf Division at Bibi Pak 
Daman, while the yearly total of visitors to the shrine was difficult to ascertain, as 
pilgrims usually moved freely between the shrine and the bazaar outside, the largest 
single day congregation apart from Ashura appears on the 9th of Zilhajj, the date of the 
martyrdom of Ruqayyah’s husband, Muslim bin Aqīl.510 On that day, bus loads of 
mourners – primarily women – arrive from across the Punjab to pay tribute to Karbala’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
509 Field notes, conversation with Mehnaz Begum, July 12, 2012, Lahore. 
510 Field notes, interview with Mian Muhammad Syed, January 3, 2011, Lahore. 
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first martyrs and ostensibly offer condolences to Ruqayyah for the sacrifice of her 
husband and sons. Many of these women from rural Punjab rarely left their villages, yet 
the yearly pilgrimage to Bibi Pak Daman marked a social and spiritual journey for them, 
a chance to leave the confines of their daily life and interact with and in sacred space. In 
addition, according to an official pamphlet published by the Auqaf Department, from the 
8th to the 10th of Muharram, the climax of the events at Karbala, the Auqaf Department 
provides food and drink to the mourners who gather to commemorate the deaths of 
Husayn and his family, a ritual that they began in 1967 to prevent upsetting the delicate 
balance that existed at the shrine and that had grown exponentially in scope.511 Notably, 
none of these days are those associated primarily with Ruqayyah, unlike most shrines, 
where the birth or death anniversaries of the saints are the most prominent dates for the 
gathering congregations. The ambiguity of Ruqayyah’s life, however, means that 
numerous events could be commemorated, allowing for women to access the shrine in a 
range of rituals and sacred days. It is this ambiguity that conversely permits the 
narrowing of time and space, bringing Bibi Pak Daman and its female devotees in contact 
with places and events that Pakistani Islam was otherwise removed from. In a state 
regulating public religiosity and defining Islam by a range of punitive ordinances, Bibi 
Pak Daman provided a sacred space in which women could challenge these boundaries.  
 
The Path of Moderation  
By the end of the 20th century, ziyārat to the Sayyeda Zaynab and Bibi Pak 
Daman shrines gave Shi’as new spaces to socialize, create public bonds that transcended 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
511 Shehzad, Hazrat Bibi Pak Daman, 2nd ed, 24.  
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national boundaries, and claim part in assertive visual and ritual displays of religious 
identity. The work that had begun in the narrative reimaginings at the beginning of the 
century had created new interpretations for the lives of Zaynab and Ruqayyah, placing 
them both firmly in the center of discourses about Karbala and grounding them in 
nationalist ideologies. Their increasing importance in rhetoric and hagiographies aided 
those who argued that Ruqayyah and Zaynab deserved sites of worship befitting their 
lofty status in Shi’ism. A confluence of forces between new regimes, old influential 
interests, shrine authorities, Auqaf officials, and individual donors and pilgrims would 
debate the meanings of these spaces as they expanded and took on renewed importance 
through the 1970s. With the increase in visual culture and Shi’a transnationalism, the 
shrines became permissive spaces for Shi’as, merchants, pilgrims, and women to assert 
their identities. Straddling the divide between historical and new, between Shi’a and 
national, and between religious tradition and innovation, the Bibi Pak Daman and 
Sayyeda Zaynab shrines provided sacred space for a range of evolving ideologies.   
Yet if these shrines became important sites in understanding the range of 
behaviors that constituted “being Shi’a,” especially in states where Shi’as remained a 
prominent minority, they also provided a means of self-reflection and policing. Some 
za’ireen at the Sayyeda Zaynab framed commerce through the lens of religious blessings, 
but others were influenced by a dominant ideology that termed such activity as bid’ah. 
The overwrought emotions and rituals of devotees at Bibi Pak Daman earned the 
disapproval of conservative Sunnis and occasionally Auqaf officials, but it also earned 
critique internally. Devotion was important, reasoned Zehra Niaz, but women “who wail 
too loudly, slap at their faces, or collapse in tears betray the dignity of our bibis.” In the 
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current environment and attacks on Shi’a Muslims worldwide, “we cannot afford to be 
jāhil,” she argued, invoking a term used to describe both someone who was uneducated 
and the condition of the Arabs before Muhammad’s revelation. Rituals were important, 
but Shi’as could not provide enemies any further ammunition to attack them with. “The 
Qurān tells us everything in moderation. We cannot only do matam and ziyārat and 
ignore Qurān and salāt.” After the euphoria of the Iranian Revolution, wars, violence, 
and ideological attacks had taken their toll. If Shi’a shrines were to remain sites of 
difference, they could no longer afford to be characterized as un-Islamic. Despite the 
tremendous blessings associated with ziyārat to the Sayyeda Zaynab and Bibi Pak 
Daman, a new age of moderation would have to reign to protect these sacred sites.   
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	   309	  
Chapter Six: Conclusion 
Shrines and Meaning: Bibi Pak Daman and the Sayyeda Zaynab in 20th Century 
Perspective 
 
 
 
In October 1996, Pakistan’s embattled Prime Minister, Benazir Bhutto, arrived at 
the shrine of Bibi Pak Daman in Lahore to inaugurate the urs celebrations for Sayyeda 
Ruqayyah bint ‘Ali. Centuries after Ruqayyah was said to have fled from Karbala to 
Lahore, Bhutto’s ziyārat to Bibi Pak Daman, accompanied by her Shi’a “Iranian” mother, 
would resonate on multiple levels, harnessing a transnational sacred narrative in the 
service of a national appeal. The visit was covered in all the national media, with a full 
page image pullout in one of Pakistan’s largest newspapers of Bhutto praying at the 
shrine, surrounded by security and devotees, washing the shrine and giving offerings of 
sweets and flowers.512 For a leader standing on the precipice of crisis, with a shrinking 
base of political support, the optics and tropes at work were clear: this was Pakistan’s 
first female Prime Minister, whose government faced impending dismissal, visiting the 
shrine to a female saint who endured great persecution - a shrine in the heart of Punjab’s 
capital, the seat of opposition to her government.513 For years, Bhutto had highlighted the 
challenges faced by women in political participation. Now she stood covered in garlands 
and lighting fragrant oils and incense while celebrating an urs through devotional rituals 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
512 “Benazir, Nusrat Open Bibi Pak Daman Urs,” The News International. October 21, 1996. 
Nusrat Bhutto was born in Esfahan, Iran but migrated to Pakistan with her family before 
Partition. News coverage of her, especially by the opposition, consistently referred to as an 
Iranian or referenced her Iranian Shi’a origin, despite the deeply nationalistic rhetoric of her 
husband, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, and her prominence in Pakistani politics.  
513 Just one month after Benazir and Nusrat Bhutto’s visit to Bibi Pak Daman, Pakistan’s 
president dismissed Bhutto’s government in November 1996.   
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that had long been associated with female “folk” ritual practice, alongside her Shi’a 
mother.  
 
 
(Figure 6.1: Benazir Bhutto at Bibi Pak Daman, reciting Fateha for Sayyeda Zaynab) 
 
But the stories and events that were deliberately invoked by Bhutto’s visit were 
not meant to be contained solely within in the shrine; indeed, the visit to Bibi Pak Daman 
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provided a way for Bhutto to access a larger, historically emotive narrative and sacred 
geography. At the shrine, Benazir specifically recited a Sūrah al-Fātiha, the first verse of 
the Qurān, to send blessings on Zaynab bint ‘Ali. The reference to Zaynab was not a new 
one for Bhutto; Benazir had long drawn that comparison herself in the face of opposition 
and to evoke steadfastness in the face of wrong, especially after the execution of her 
father Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in 1979. In April 1996, just months prior to the visit to Bibi 
Pak Daman, she had traveled to Damascus for her second state visit at the invitation of 
Syrian president, Hafez al-Assad, and performed ziyārat to the Sayyeda Zaynab shrine.514 
At the shrine, Bhutto made a pledge to finance the expansion of the shrine’s southern 
courtyard as a token of her devotion to Sayyeda Zaynab and in return for Zaynab’s 
blessings in restoring Bhutto to power for a second term, allowing another visit to the 
shrine.515 Benazir was warmly received at the shrine; the friendly ties between the al-
Assad and Bhutto families – both nominally Shi’a ruling families in majority Sunni 
countries and Hafez al-Assad had offered the Bhutto children asylum after the execution 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
514 Steven Erlanger, “Christopher Gets Snub From Assad in Mideast Talks,” The New York Times, 
April 24, 1996. This was Bhutto’s second official state visit to Damascus; her first came in 1990 
during her first term as Prime Minister, when she was accompanied on her visit with the shrine’s 
caretaker Ridha Murtadha and Syria’s long-serving Minister of Culture (and current Syrian Vice-
President) Najah al-Attar. See Ziyarat al-Sayyeda Zaynab, ra’īsa, ma’a mutawalli al-maqām al-
Syed Ridha Murtadha wa ‘an yamīniha al-Sayyeda al-duktura Nahaj al-attar, wazīra al-
thaqafīya. Photograph. Majma’ al-Sayyeda Zaynab li al-Ma’lūmāt wa al-Abhāth, Murtadha 
Family Private Papers, Sitt Zaynab, Syria. Despite al-Attar’s involvement with the Ba’ath 
leadership, her brother, Issam al-Attar, was the Supreme Guide of the Syrian Muslim 
Brotherhood from 1963-1980 and exiled from Syria since the Ba’athist takeover.  
515 Interview with Zahid Ali, Charge d’Affaires, Embassy of Pakistan, Damascus, Syria, March 
26, 2012. According to Ali, this original bequest had remained an active pledge. When Bhutto’s 
husband, Asif Ali Zardari visited the shrine as the president of Pakistan in 2010, he renewed his 
commitment to the pledge and was presented with technical and financial requests by the 
custodian of the shrine, Jameel Al-Sheikh. See also “Syrian, Pakistani presidents discuss 
intensifying cooperation.” SANA News Agency, January 9, 2010.  
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of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto – and Benazir’s reverence and identification with Zaynab were 
well known.516 
 
 
(Figure 6.2: Benazir Bhutto with Najah al-Attar and representatives of the Murtadha family) 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
516 See Fatima Bhutto, Songs of Blood and Sword: A Daughter’s Memoir (New York: Nation 
Books, 2010), 176, 323-326. 
	   313	  
Benazir Bhutto’s visits to the shrines of Sayyeda Zaynab and Sayyeda Ruqayyah, 
and the connections and symbolisms invoked by her ziyārāt in 1996, were the 
culmination of decades of transnational narrative construction, international movements, 
national politics, personal rivalries, and new religious and gender paradigms that 
combined to make prominent these two shrines. Invoking Zaynab and Ruqayyah allowed 
Bhutto to access a complex web of transnational symbolism and meaning, and the spatial 
and emotional geography she traveled was a clear embodiment of the linkages, the 
emotive power, and the contestations over the two shrines. The Sayyeda Zaynab and Bibi 
Pak Daman shrines emerged and were expanded as popular pilgrimage sites primarily in 
the post-World War II era. Unlike older, more established Shi’a shrines in Iraq, Iran, and 
in Medina, around which Shi’a institutions of learning and complex political and 
religious patronage systems had emerged over centuries, the deliberate efforts to promote 
these two shrines were undertaken in a shorter span, primarily within the modern national 
contexts. They complicate a view that has privileged shrines to male Shi’a Imams as 
authentic centers of doctrinal Shi’a Islam, with devotional practice at other sites more 
distinctly feminized and syncretic.517 In fact, the sacralizing and growth of the Bibi Pak 
Daman and Sayyeda Zaynab shrines through narratives, politics, and practice consciously 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
517 Yitzhak Nakash has written in part on the appeal that the traditional male Shi’a shrines have 
had in attracted patronage and tribal support, primarily in Karbala, Iraq. Local religious leaders 
thrived on the economic and political support to be gained by settling and converting tribes; in 
turn, “the strong Arab tribal character of Iraqi Shi’i society found embodiment in the image of 
‘Abbas, son of the imam ‘Ali and Husayn’s half-brother.” See Yitzhak Nakash, The Shi’is of Iraq 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 144-145. Nakash notes that earlier Shi’i accounts 
of Karbala place little emphasis on ‘Abbas but by the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, in 
Arabic accounts of the battle ‘Abbas has become a central figure. This changing interpretation 
and emphasis on ‘Abbas’ strong physical attributes and loyalty versus Husayn’s piety 
demonstrates the clear evolution of religious narrative and collective memory in the service of 
physical manifestations – in this case, the expansion of the shrines at Karbala.  
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linked Ruqayyah and Zaynab to central events in Shiite history and co-opted a long 
jurisprudential tradition, religious exhortations, and interpretive frameworks that 
promoted the spiritual benefits of ziyārat to the shrines of the male Shi’a martyrs. Rather 
than peripheral spaces of worship, the shrines would be imagined, re-interpreted, and 
then developed into critical points on a transnational gendered sacred geography – even 
as politics and ideologies would raise their stature in Syria and Pakistan.  
By the 1990s, the decades-long efforts to promote and manage the Sayyeda 
Zaynab and Bibi Pak Daman shrines had come to fruition. Through the 19th century, the 
two shrines had warranted scant mentions in Shi’a hagiographies or in land and travel 
records. While pilgrimage to the shrines of the male Imams had become institutionalized 
by the turn of the 20th century, growing exponentially in spite of war, ideological clashes, 
and a changing geopolitical landscape, Bibi Pak Daman and the Sayyeda Zaynab had yet 
to emerge on the same scale. Yet the stories of these women and their shrines provided a 
kind of ideological blank slate, an ability to construct and historicize sacred space and 
project identity through engagement with the shrine. New narratives about their lives 
drew on concepts of ziyārat and Shi’a traditions of pre-determination and martyrdom to 
create transformed collective memories. As Talal Asad has noted, Islam is a discursive 
tradition, and practices and narratives draw their spiritual resonance from their basis in 
authenticity and history. Ruqayyah and Zaynab were positioned as a central part of 
Karbala mythology, an event that had centuries of emotive power behind it, yet the 
interpretations of their lives were decided grounded in the particular, as Roschanack 
Shaery Eisenlohr argues Shi’a transnationalism always is. Indeed, the renewed interest in 
Zaynab in the 20th century would gradually transform conceptions of the role of women 
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in Shi’a hagiographies, and narratives of Ruqayyah’s life would come to mirror some of 
these emerging tropes. Beginning with Muhsin al-Amīn, these discussions would become 
increasingly tied to particular sites of worship; by 1979 two seminal hagiographies on 
both Zaynab and Ruqayyah would frame them as critical national and transnational Shi’a 
figures, with their shrines as major sites of history and worship.  
In turn, marāji’, students, shrine authorities, merchants, women’s activists, 
politicians, local notables, donors, and pilgrims used the shrines to promote meaning and 
influence. An analysis of shrine records and correspondences reveals the ways that these 
shrines were used and understood by multiple forces, each approaching the shrine spaces 
as ways to assert particular interests. Borrowed from Juan Cole’s concept of the frontier 
shrine, this dissertation has argued that these shrines acted as internal frontiers, where 
competing ideologies could be articulated. The Bibi Pak Daman and Sayyeda Zaynab 
shrines illustrate how identities were produced on the ground, as Weiss and Makdisi have 
argued for, and in particular how practices of ‘being Shi’a’ and sectarianism evolved 
through finances, aesthetics, and ritual. In national contexts, the consequences of these 
debates were heightened at the Sayyeda Zaynab and Bibi Pak Daman shrines because of 
their unique position and the implications these sites had on multiple levels.  
The rapidly changing geopolitical landscape from 1979 onwards gave the shrines 
increasing importance. Larger numbers of pilgrims were visiting the shrines, spurred on 
by developing infrastructure and a greater emphasis on public religiosity. Prominent 
national figures invoked them to achieve considerable support, and by the 1990s new 
plans to significantly expand the shrines were underway. In 1991, Iranian President Ali 
Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani made his first foreign visit as president to Syria, visiting the 
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Sayyeda Zaynab to view progress and pledge another round of funding for further growth 
of the shrine and surrounding facilities.518 In 1994, local groups at Bibi Pak Daman 
requested government aid to repair facilities, build a large new hawza, and expand the 
shrine, directing pleas to Benazir Bhutto. In response, she allocated one million rupees 
for the project, following up on the progress during her visit in her second term as Prime 
Minister.519 These visits and pledges underscore that the processes of meaning-making 
around the two shrines had achieved broad acceptance.  
  
	  
(Figure 6.3: Ali Akbar Rafsanjani at the Sayyeda Zaynab shrine, accompanied by Hani Murtadha) 
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
518 Issam Hamza, “Syria Endorses Iranian Role in Gulf Security,” The Washington Post, April 29, 
1991.  
519 Letter to Shafiq Bukhari, Secretary and Chief Administrator, Auqaf, from Chaudhry Kafiyat 
Hussein Fidai, secretary of Anjuman-e-Nisaran-e-Ruqayyah Kubra bint ‘Ali, 11 Dec. 1999. 
General Records Darbar Hazrat Bibi Pak Daman, Lahore. 
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Shrines as War Frontiers  
	  
 As lived spaces, however, the meaning of these shrines was never settled, and 
these developments defined the Sayyeda Zaynab and Bibi Pak Daman as decidedly 
sectarian spaces. Those who rejected the practices associated with the shrines as un-
Islamic would nevertheless adopt the same frameworks for understanding these spaces – 
as Shi’a shrines to Ruqayyah and Zaynab, they represented a particular kind of public 
Islam in a narrowing range of acceptable religiosity. The rise of ultra-conservative Salafi 
Islamic movements, from the Middle East and North Africa to South Asia and beyond, 
has made shrines and religious sites prime targets. These individual movements are 
certainly products of their particular environments, but for Shi’a Muslims, attacks on holy 
shrines by groups ranging from ISIS to the Pakistani Taliban represent a transnational 
sense of being besieged. In Pakistan, spates of suicide bombings at major shrines, 
including the July 2nd, 2010 bombing of the Data Ganj Baksh complex in Lahore and the 
October 8th attack on the Abdullah Shah Ghazi complex in Karachi, have often limited 
access to Bibi Pak Daman.520 Notably, the majority of such attacks take place on Fridays 
– the day when traffic is at its peak at these shrines and the Auqaf Department often 
distributes food for langar, the practice of community eating. Limited access to Bibi Pak 
Daman prompted a reaction from Iran, which has pressured the government to provide 
allocations for more security and join their funding of a larger shrine.521 In turn, shrine 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
520 See Shahram Haq, “Hazrat Bibi Pak Daman urs begins today,” The Express Tribune, May 10, 
2011; “Suicide Bombers Kill Dozens at Pakistan Shrine,” The Guardian, July 2, 2010, accessed 
February 3, 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/jul/02/suicide-bombers-kill-dozens-
pakistan-shrine; Zahir Shah Sherazi, “21 killed as Taliban storm Peshawar imambargah,” Dawn 
newspaper, Feb. 14, 2015.  
521 Field notes, interview with Zehra Niaz, July 10, 2012, Lahore.  
	   318	  
officials reached out to Asif Ali Zardari, Benazir Bhutto’s widower, to remind him that 
“the Auqaf department of Iran has already requested to extend their architectural 
expertise for the construction of the shrine, and they are ready to send in a team of 
experts for [no] charge.” The goal of the project, according to officials, was to 
“accommodate Muslims from all sects, not only from the country but all over the Muslim 
world, who have expressed deep desire to pay respects to Syeda Ruqaiya [sic].”522 In the 
interim, however, armed guards and metal detectors surrounded the shrine. In Syria, the 
showdown between Salafi fighters and Shi’a devotees has turned the shrine into a 
battleground between warring forces. Volunteers from Iraqi Shi’a militias and the 
Lebanese Hezbollah have joined with Iranian Revolutionary Guard elements and vowed 
to protect the shrine from destruction at all costs.523 Car bomb explosions in 2012 and 
2013 caused major destruction to the Sayyeda Zaynab, setting off waves of protests in 
Shi’a communities around the world.524  
Those attacking the shrines largely accepted that they were critical to Shi’a 
believers and their conceptions of identity, but it was that veneration that they sought to 
destroy. For Shias, who often view themselves as a minority increasingly under attack 
from the growing portions of the public who adhere to Wahhabi and Salafi beliefs, 
visitation to the shrines now carries with it acts of defiance. In my fieldwork, pilgrims 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
522 Letter from Religious Affairs Committee, Bibi Pak Daman to Asif Ali Zardari, Co-Chairman, 
Pakistan People’s Party, November 10, 2008, Records of Bibi Pak Daman Trust via Asma 
Mamdot, Chairman, MPA National Assembly.   
523 See Salah Nasrawi, “Iraqi Shia Dilemma in Syria,” al-Ahram Weekly, June 26, 2013; Tim 
Arango, Anne Barnard, Duraid Adnan, “As Syrians Fight, Sectarian Strife Infects Mideast,” The 
New York Times, June 1, 2013; Mona Mahmood and Martin Chulov, “Syrian War Widens Sunni-
Shia Schism as Foreign Jihadis Join Fight for Shrines,” Guardian, June 4, 2013. 
524 See “Car bomb damages major Shiite shrine in Syria,” USA Today, June 15, 2012; “Protest 
rallies against attack on Hazrat Zainab (RA) shrine,” The Nation, July 21, 2013. 
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repeatedly told me that they would not be made to fear visiting these holy shrines, despite 
what the “terrorists” and “jihādi foreigners” wanted. Ruqayyah and Zaynab would protect 
them, I was told over and over, and if they were to die at a holy shrine completing ziyārat 
to a revered Shi’a saint, there was no end better than that. A conversation in 2012 with 
one of the many guards at the Sayyeda Zaynab shrine captured that sense of righteous 
commitment to these sacred spaces. As I walked through the armored gates with a 
representative of the shrine committee, we paused to get an update from a guard 
patrolling a security cordon at the Sayyeda Zaynab. The enemies would never win, he 
vowed, “God willing [Insh’Allah], they cannot erase the shrine, from the air or the 
ground.”525 From local sites of devotion just years earlier, through the interplay of 
narrative, politics, and ritual, these were now holy grounds that Shi’as were prepared to 
make a last stand on.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
525 Field notes, subject not named, March 13, 2012, Damascus.  
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